 |
| 
JET
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 10/15/2004 2:47 AM (GMT -6) |   | Another thing. Remember when I wanted to distinguish between "truth values" and "ontological values"? (And you were having fits about my terminology.) I like Hartshorne’s term, “predicate”:
“We need no third truth value, but we do need a third type of predicate for future moments of process besides ‘definitely P’ and ‘definitely not P’, namely ‘indefinite with respect to P’. (CSPM 135)”
I looked up the term “predicate”: “To affirm as a quality or attribute” or n. the word or words that make a statement about the subject of a sentence or clause. (Webster’s New World Dictionary)
Perfect. You have a state of affairs which doesn’t affirm anything. When you add a predicate, you then affirm some quality or attribute about said state of affair, resulting in a proposition. As to future states of affairs there are three basic "predicates" and as to propositions about future states of affairs, there are two "truth values". | | Back to Top | | |
 |
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 10/15/2004 3:24 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
JET: Another thing. Remember when I wanted to distinguish between "truth values" and "ontological values"? (And you were having fits about my terminology.)
Yeah I faintly remember this. Where did we discuss that? What thread? I prefer reserving “value” to express truth or falsity.
quote:
You have a state of affairs which doesn’t affirm anything. When you add a predicate, you then affirm some quality or attribute about said state of affair, resulting in a proposition. As to future states of affairs there are three basic "predicates" and as to propositions about future states of affairs, there are two "truth values".
Right. And this is why in our paper we decided to change Zp, Z~p, and Qp (where p was some ‘proposition’) to Z(S), Z(~S), and Q(S) (where S is some state of affairs). This was important, because we’re not claiming that the ‘proposition’ itself is what is determinate or indeterminate. It’s not the ‘proposition’ that “might and might not occur” for example. Even in the caes of the proposition Q(S), it's determinately the case that Q(S) is a proposition! So we're talking about 'states of affairs'. Keeping p would really miscommunicate. It’s the ‘state of affairs’ to which the operators attribute whatever it is they bring to the table; so it’s the state of affairs which is either to occur with a probability of 1 (in which case it ‘will’ occur), or a probability of 0 (in which case it ‘will not’ occur), or any probability greater than 0 but less than 1 (in which case it ‘might and might not’ occur).
I wanna engage Craig’s objections to Hartshorne in the article as well, but before we do that I thought these two footnotes of Viney’s article were interesting:
quote:
2Jules Lequier apparently advocated the Aristotelian view: "…between contingent past things and contingent things to come there is this difference: of two contradictory affirmations concerning contingent past things, one is true, the other false; but of two contradictory affirmations concerning contingent things to come, neither the one nor the other is true, both are false" (Oeuvres completes, ed. Jean Grenier. Neuchatel, Suisse: Editions de la Baconnière. 1952, p. 194).
Here we see the same mistaken identity of “will” and “will not” as contradictories. They are contraries. This seemingly insignificant point is hugely important. CH got this, and I think it's responsible for why he realized there’s no need for a third truth value. Craig misses this. Contradictory propositions must be one true and the other false, and contraries may one true and the other false OR both false.
quote:
3 …In addition to the charge of inconsistency, Craig finds fault with Hartshorne’s claim that the contradictory of "x will occur" is "either x will not occur or, at least, it may not occur" (MVG 101). According to Craig, "The contradictory of any statement ‘p.’ is ‘not-p,’ and not, as Hartshorne would have it, ‘not-p or possibly not-p’" (PS 16:201; PT 114).
Well, Craig has a point. CH apparently didn’t lay “may [or might]” and “may [or might] not” out in relation to “will” and “will not.” Once this is done on the square of opposition the clouds roll back and the sun shines. Craig is right to complain that CH’s “not-p or possibly not-p” is not the contradiction of “p.” But Craig is just as wrong to argue the contradiction of “will” is “will not.” To contradict a proposition p, all one does is prefix the ENTIRE proposition with “not,” and so “not p.” Craig just gets it wrong. The contradictory of “x will occur” is simply ~“x will occur” or “It is not the case that x will occur.” But this doesn’t mean “It IS the case that x will not occur.” It means only that “x might not occur.” If “will not” is, as Craig argues, the contradictory of “will,” what, pray tell, is the ‘contrary’ of “will”? In forming what he thinks is the contradictory of “x will occur” Craig mistakenly prefixes the negation “not” only to part of the proposition (to "occur" and so "x will 'not-occur'). It should be prefixed to the entire proposition (thus, not-“x will occur”).
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 10/15/2004 4:28 AM (GMT -6) | | Another obsessive point to make:
I’m also arguing (haven’t gotten any responses on it yet) that we should differentiate between two states of affairs with regard to future tense propositions. In a proposition like Z(St), or “S will obtain at t” (t is some specific time) you have two different states of affairs to consider: (a) that state of affairs “about which” this proposition makes a truth claim (that state of affairs being S), and (b) that state of affairs which constitutes the truth attributed to S by Z. Remember, Z means “It is determinately the case that….” This says that now, at the time Z(S) is asserted, reality is such that S’s occurring is certain. Z reflects this presently obtaining state of reality that determines the probability that S will obtain to be 1.
So then, with regard to the future, presentism rests on the distinction between non-actual states of affairs "about which" propositions make some claim (on the one hand) and states of affairs which obtain at the time these proposition are made and which determine whether the states of affairs described by propositions ‘will,’ ‘will not’, or ‘might and might not’ obtain.
If Z(St) [‘State of affairs S will obtain at t”] is true, it can’t be true because S obtains. S obviously does not obtain at the time the proposition is asserted. So S cannot constitute the truth condition which renders Z(St) true. How could it? The moment t hasn’t arrived. S can’t have anything whatsoever to do with making "S will obtain at t" true. Some other state of affairs renders this proposition true. And what can that be but the totality of all presently obtaining state of affairs, or what is now real? This is why I argue we should make clear the distinction between present states of affairs (present reality) which constitute the truth CONDITION of "S will obtain at t" and the future state of affairs (S) ABOUT WHICH we're making some truth claim.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 10/15/2004 8:26 AM (GMT -6) | | Okay. To finish up this article. Viney notes three objections that Craig raises against Hartshorne. Never mind whether or not Craig really understands Hartshorne. That’s Viney’s issue. I’m just interested in the views reflected in Craig’s three objections. Really there are four objections. The first one is briefly mentioned by Viney and it has to do with what understanding of the correspondence theory of truth one brings to the this whole debate. That’s such a big issue. But I briefly want to just post Craig’s arguments as Viney relates them (and labels them A1, A2, and A2):
Begin Viney--
Introduction: Before looking at Craig’s arguments, let us briefly examine what he takes to be presupposed by Hartshorne’s views. Craig claims that Hartshorne’s views about truth and the future presuppose "a crude view of truth as correspondence." According to this crude view, "in order for a statement to be true, the reality described by the statement must actually exist at the time at which the statement is true." This view is crude because "only present tense statements require that the events they describe exist contemporaneously with the truth of the statement" (PS 16:199; PT 99).
A1 (Part One): According to Craig, the truth of a present tense statement entails the prior truth of the future tense version of the same statement. Consider the two statements:
(1) It is raining (uttered on April 13).
(2) It will rain on April 13 (uttered prior to April 13)
Craig says that these statements have the same truth value (at the time of their utterance) because they make the same claim about the facts, viz, rain on April 13. Craig notes the absurdity of supposing, with Hartshorne, that it is possible for (1) to be true and (2) to be false (PS 16:200)
A1 (Part two): Consider, for example, two sentences, uttered prior to April 13:
(2) It will rain on April 13
(3) It may not rain on April 13
If (2) is true, then (3) is false. Yet, Craig apparently believes that it is possible for both statements to be true -- for (3) expresses the contingency of rain on April 13 and (2), according to Craig, is neutral as between the contingency and necessity of rain on April 13.
A2: If future contingent statements cannot be true because the events to which they refer do not yet exist, then past contingent statements cannot be true because the events to which they refer no longer exist. But past contingent statements can be true, as even Hartshorne admits. Therefore, future contingent statements can be true.
This argument betrays Craig’s misunderstanding of Hartshorne’s view of truth and the future. For Hartshorne, past contingent statements are true because the reality to which they refer is determinate. The future, however, is partly indeterminate. Thus, the possibility of assigning truth to past contingent statements carries no necessary implication for assigning truth to future contingent statements.
A3: Craig claims that a tensed proposition can be put into a tenseless form. For instance:
(4) It rained on April 13
can be rewritten in tenseless form as:
(5) On April 13, it rains
Although Craig acknowledges that (4) and (5) are not synonymous, he says that they have the same truth value. But the "tenseless versions are always true or false if they are ever true or false" (PS 16:200). Therefore, future contingent statements can be true.
This argument begs the fundamental question against Hartshorne. Craig offers no reason to suppose that (5) does not become true. He simply asserts that the tenseless version of a statement is "always true or false." According to Hartshorne, "the notion that dates can be assigned from eternity is one of the fairy tales -- or controversial assumptions -- which haunt this subject" (MIGB 74:51).
---End Viney
This is SO MUCH FUN!
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
JET
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 10/15/2004 9:11 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
A3: Craig claims that a tensed proposition can be put into a tenseless form. For instance:
(4) It rained on April 13
can be rewritten in tenseless form as:
(5) On April 13, it rains
Although Craig acknowledges that (4) and (5) are not synonymous, he says that they have the same truth value. But the "tenseless versions are always true or false if they are ever true or false" (PS 16:200). Therefore, future contingent statements can be true.
This argument begs the fundamental question against Hartshorne. Craig offers no reason to suppose that (5) does not become true. He simply asserts that the tenseless version of a statement is "always true or false." According to Hartshorne, "the notion that dates can be assigned from eternity is one of the fairy tales -- or controversial assumptions -- which haunt this subject" (MIGB 74:51).
Craig’s use of “tenseless” propositions begs the question? Where have I heard that before?
A couple of posts above, you refer to a particular sense of “state of affairs” meaning present reality. Assuming the world involves openness/process/becoming (etc.), then the “state of affairs” (i.e., the state of reality) which makes a proposition true or false is changing from moment to moment (at least with respect to propositions about the future). If what makes propositions true or false can change, then “tenseless propositions” are not “always true or false if they are ever true or false”. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 10/15/2004 5:13 PM (GMT -6) | | JET: If what makes propositions true or false can change, then “tenseless propositions” are not “always true or false if they are ever true or false”.
Tom: Hey JET-
I’m on the road so can’t say much. There are several things to say about Craig’s ‘tenseless truths’ argument. But with regard to what you say here, JET, I think you’re right in pointing out that a changing world means changing truth conditions and so changing truth values. If I remember from my talks with Alan, he wonders whether a consistent presentist must give up altogether on tenseless statements. Perhaps. But it seems to me that there are some genuinely tenseless truths. There would have to be if there are any necessary and so unchanging states of affairs. Wouldn’t propositions describing these states of affairs be timelessly true (i.e., not depend for their truth value upon any contingent state of affairs actualized in a temporal world)? Seems so. I understand a tenseless truth to be a proposition whose truth value depends not upon contingent states of affairs actualized in history but upon logically necessary states of affairs. Mathematical truths, for example, would qualify, as would truths describing other necessary and unchanging facts about God (that he exists, for example). These are tenseless truths. But just toying with language so you get a “grammatically” tenseless proposition, transporting it back to all points in time prior to the event described in the proposition, and there changing it back into a future tense proposition which has to be true just doesn’t cut it for me. But we have to find the best way to show why this won't work, why "JFK is assassinated in November of 1963" is false before November of 1963 and true afterwards.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 10/16/2004 4:20 AM (GMT -6) | | Yeah yeah yeah! OK, let’s look at Craig’s three (four if you include his criticism of what he feels in CH’s view of truth as correspondence):
quote:
Introduction: Craig claims that Hartshorne’s views about truth and the future presuppose "a crude view of truth as correspondence." According to this crude view, "in order for a statement to be true, the reality described by the statement must actually exist at the time at which the statement is true." This view is crude because "only present tense statements require that the events they describe exist contemporaneously with the truth of the statement."
I would agree with Craig that this is an inadequate view of truth as correspondence. I would not agree that in order for a proposition to be true, the reality described by the proposition must actually exist. Take the state of affairs “S” and the time “t.” What makes the proposition “S will obtain at t” true is not that S “actually obtains.” This obviously can’t be what makes the proposition true. The time t has not arrived and S is not actual. So at least in the case of future tense statements (whether they describe contingencies or not), what accounts for their being true cannot be the events they describe. But this doesn’t mean that NOTHING accounts for their being true. Something else accounts for their being true. I’d like to suggest that:
A proposition is true if and only if at the time it is asserted there exists SOME actual state of affairs which renders true the claim being made by the proposition.
This is NOT like the "crude understanding of truth" Craig criticizes. I’m happy to kick this around a bit. But the distinction between two states of affairs, one constituting the truth condition that renders a proposition true and one constituting that ‘about which’ the proposition makes some claim, seems certainly to hold for future tense claims. “S will obtain at t” is true because at the time I assert it reality is such that “S at t” follows necessarily with a probability of 1. It’s that simple. Similarly for “S will not occur at t” in which case “S at t” follows necessarily from present reality with a probability of 0. And similarly “S might and might not occur at t” in which case “S at t” follows necessarily from present reality with a probability greater than 0 and less than 1. Point is there are always two states of affairs to reckon with, the first about which the proposition makes some claim (in this case “S”) and the second which accounts for or renders the proposition true (in this case that presently obtaining state of affairs which entails “S at t”). In the case of present tense propositions both states of affairs are one and the same, which is entailed in what it means to assert that something is NOW happening.
So Craig is right to criticize this crude understanding of truth as correspondence. But why should an open theist be limited to such a crude definition?
quote:
A1 (Part One): According to Craig, the truth of a present tense statement entails the prior truth of the future tense version of the same statement. Consider the two statements: (1) It is raining (uttered on April 13) and (2) It will rain on April 13 (uttered prior to April 13). Craig says that these statements have the same truth value (at the time of their utterance) because they make the same claim about the facts, viz, rain on April 13. Craig notes the absurdity of supposing, with Hartshorne, that it is possible for (1) to be true and (2) to be false.
They both make the same claim about the “fact” of rain on April 13th? How is April 13th’s rain a “fact” before the 13th? Assuming that its raining on the 13th is historically contingent, it’s not a fact.
Craig fails to distinguish between two sorts of tenseless propositions. On the one hand, 2 + 2 = 4 is timelessly true without any temporal indicator. On the other hand, “S happens at t” is grammatically tenseless but temporally indexed. This difference, it seems to me, is significant. Craig can try to dismiss the grounding objection, but he cannot construct timelessly true propositions describing events that are actualized historically in our world without including a temporal indicator.
Mathematical truths do not require temporal indicators, and Criag might inquire as to why, for the answer to why this is so shows why Craig's grammatical game can't produce timelessly true propositions describing historically contingent events. Propositions describing contingent states of affairs that obtain in a temporal world at some time and not at others by definition BECOME true, while propositions describing necessary states of affairs don't become true, they're timelessly true. So unless a state of affairs can be posited by a proposition without temporal indicators and still be true, it's not a timeless truth.
I submit that “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” (formed on the basis of the true past-tense “John Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” spoken after the fact) is fundamentally unlike the mathematical truth of 2 + 2 = 4 (spoken at any time without a temporal indicator). Why? Because mathematical truths are not historical events that are actualized or which happen at a specific time and whose truth may then be rendered timeless by grammatical word play. The truth of mathematical truths is not temporally indexed. Such truths are only discovered by us to be true on some date in history. But they’re not actualized historically. Thus, “John Kennedy is assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963” is grammatically tenseless, while “2 + 2 = 4” is metaphysically tenseless.
So while it is certainly the case that some tenseless statements are always true (e.g., mathematical truths and other necessary truths like “God exists”), this does not follow, as Craig alleges, simply from the fact that the statement is grammatically tenseless. Rather (as Alan pointed out in a former thread) it follows because the content of the statement contains no temporal references. As with all statements, tenseless statements referring to temporal events are true only to the extent that what they affirm is determinately the case). If self-determining free will entails what is ontologically indeterminate, then there must exist true propositions describing such events. And this “might and might not” alone is able to do.
quote:
A1 (Part two): Consider, for example, two sentences, uttered prior to April 13: (2) It will rain on April 13 and (3) It may not rain on April 13. If (2) is true, then (3) is false. Yet, Craig apparently believes that it is possible for both statements to be true -- for (3) expresses the contingency of rain on April 13 and (2), according to Craig, is neutral as between the contingency and necessity of rain on April 13.
How is (2) neutral as to contingency? Unless Craig is confusing “logical” and "historical" contingency. Something can be logically contingent but historically necessary. But how would Craig word a proposition express rain on the 13th where such rain really is determined to be? Would he not use “will” for this? How would he then express himself were rain on the 13th to be contingent? He uses the same "will." CH is right; “will” and “might not” are contradictories. They can’t both be true as Craig thinks. Craig’s categories are confused. He thinks “will” and “will not” are contradictories. And here now he argues that “will” and “might not” are subcontraries (because he claims they can both be true!). What, pray tell, does he think are the contraries of “will” and “will not”? What if “will” and “might not” are subcontraries, what is “might”?
quote:
A2: If future contingent statements cannot be true because the events to which they refer do not yet exist, then past contingent statements cannot be true because the events to which they refer no longer exist. But past contingent statements can be true, as even Hartshorne admits. Therefore, future contingent statements can be true.
Craig has convinced himself that open theists deny that future tense props positing contingent events are bivalent. They CAN be true. But the statements positing contingent events a) should be worded as such (using “might and might not” and not “will” as Craig does), and b) they’re only true if God believes they’re true, if God believes the event is contingent (not logically contingent! Historically contingent!). How does Craig think God would express his belief in the contingency of some event? With a “S will occur” or with “S might and might not occur”? And if God believes S is contingent, what does Craig think are God’s beliefs about propositions claiming S is determinate or ~S is determinate? In the end, I think Craig either has to admit that all this contingency he says he believes in is really just epistemological limitations on US or he has to be clear on how God would express himself in English were he to express his belief that some event’s occurrence was determinate or contingent.
quote:
A3: Craig claims that a tensed proposition can be put into a tenseless form. For instance: (4) It rained on April 13 can be rewritten in tenseless form as: (5) On April 13, it rains. Although Craig acknowledges that (4) and (5) are not synonymous, he says that they have the same truth value. But the "tenseless versions are always true or false if they are ever true or false" (PS 16:200). Therefore, future contingent statements can be true.
Ditto above.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 10/16/2004 6:25 AM (GMT -6) | | In my last post I said:
quote:
Propositions describing contingent states of affairs that obtain in a temporal world at some time and not at others by definition BECOME true, while propositions describing necessary states of affairs don't become true, they're timelessly true. So unless a state of affairs can be posited by a proposition without temporal indicators and still be true, it's not a timeless truth.
I wanna qualify something. The first sentence above seems certainly to be true. But I need to play with the concluding “So unless….” I can think of a proposition that posits a contingent state of affairs without any temporal indicator AND which IS true: “Snow is white.” It’s logically contingent but historically necessary (now that God’s created a world in which snow is white and not green or orange). Perhaps I should say “…So unless the state of affairs about which a proposition makes some claim is a necessary state of affairs, it can’t be tenselessly true.” Point is, the time-relation of a proposition follows the time-relation of the state of affairs that account for the proposition’s being true.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 10/16/2004 6:44 AM (GMT -6) | | One of Craig’s errors is his handling of the law of the excluded middle. He keeps saying CH has abandoned the ‘traditional’ understanding of this law. But Craig’s not right on this. The law of the excluded middle states that for any proposition p, it is true that (p or not-p). For example, if p is “Tom has blue eyes” then the inclusive disjunction “Tom has blue eyes, or Tom does not have blue eyes” is true. This is not quite the same thing as the principle of bivalence which states that for any proposition p, p is either true or false.
Notice that Craig argues that the only options we have to choose between in discussing whether or not x occurs are: “x will occur” and “x will not occur.” CH inserts a third option (as do we): “x might and might not occur.” Craig then assuses CH of abandoning the law of excluded middle (EM). But EM only holds for ‘contradictories’. That is, you posit any old thing you want, A. EM says it is true that (A or ~A). There’s not middle ground between a thing and its negation which is the same as saying between contradictories. EM says (p or ~p), either Tom’s eyes are blue or they are not blue.
It’s because Craig believes “x will occur” and “x will not occur” are contradictory propositions that he insists one of these must be true and the other false. It’s why he says it’s patently “absurd” to suggest of any event p that prior to p “p will occur” could have not been true. He’s right to insist on EM. But he just misunderstands what the contradictories are in this case. “x will occur” and “x will not occur” are contraries (as CH rightly understood). Craig’s just wrong on this. But we should be ready to respond to the objection that open theists have to deny bivalence and EM. Not true.
Earlier I talked about the difference between “THAT” and “WHETHER” (“that x will or will not occur” and “whether x occurs or not”). "That" defines WHAT it is about which we're wondering WHETHER it will happen or not. Now I see that it’s EM at work here. WHAT it is that happens or not is embraced by EM. With respect to “x at t” EM says it's necessarily the case that “At t, x or ~x.” Open theists agree that this is the case. But recognizing that “Come t, either x or ~x” doesn’t translation into the truth of “Either ‘x will occur’ or ‘x will not occur’.” See the slight of hand? Craig moves from contradictories (x or ~x), whith is true on EM, to (x or x~) which is not true on EM. Following EM, what's true is “Either ‘x will occur’ or ‘not-x will occur’.”
Maybe I ought to change this to a distinction between WHAT and WHETHER. "WHAT" is (following EM) 'either an event occurs or it does not occur', and "WHETHER" embraces the probabilities of its occuring or not (which are 0, 1, or some probability greater than zero and less than 1).
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 10/17/2004 11:42 AM (GMT -6) | | Just thinking…
I was looking at the standard operators in tense logic…
P = It was the case that...
F = It will be the case that...
H = It has always been the case that...
G = It will always be the case that...
…and I noticed that our determinacy (Z) and indeterminacy (Q) operators both begin with “It is….” I like this. I think it’s important.
Z = “It is determinately the case that…”
Q = “It is indeterminately the case that…”
And I thought how much more accurate it would be in tense logic for operators to all begin with “It is….,” that is, to stake their claim in the present and from the present describe the past or future.
To confuse it some more. Just think through this OK? This is not a syllogism. There’s no order to these thoughts. Just thinking out loud.
A) The only time at which a state of affairs may obtain is in the present. That is, the only time at which a state of affairs may be said to be ‘actual’ is the present.
B) All propositions are asserted at some point in time which, at the time of assertion, is the present and are true from that point of view. That is, when I make a truth claim, I assert that something is true at the time I make the claim, and that time is the present (when I make the claim). This is true even for past and future tense propositions. The only time at which a proposition is true is in the present. That’s the only time anything can happen or be actual. If truth-values are “actual,” they can only be so NOW.
C) If the truth values of propositions are grounded in anything, they can only be grounded in states of affairs that obtain at time they are true, which is at the moment they’re asserted, including propositions about the past and future. Plantinga, Craig, Freddoso, and other Molinists deny that the truth of propositions is “grounded” in anything. That is, they deny that there is anything that accounts for a proposition’s being true; they deny there ever exists anything by virtue of which a proposition is true. I disagree with this but don’t wanna argue the point here. All I’m saying here is that IF the truth of propositions is grounded in anything, in my view it HAS to be in states of affairs/realities that exist/obtain/are actual at the time the proposition is asserted.
For these reasons, when we say F, or “It will be the case that…,” what we’re really asserting is that “It is NOW true that it WILL BE the case that.” We don’t go around prefacing all our truth claims with “It is now the case that…” because language works on the assumption that what you claim is true is true when you claim it. It’s logicians who came along and screwed language up! They’re the confused ones!
I guess what I’m saying is that tense logicians (like Prior) who make use of G, F, P and other tense operators are unaware of, or if they’re aware of they don’t reflect enough upon, the fact that it is always the PRESENT moment from which we speak about the past, present, and future and from which our claims are true or not, and in which exists whatever states of affairs that ground the truth value of the propositions we make.
Remember I suggested that for future tense propositions there are always TWO states of affairs to consider? One is the non-actual state of affairs ‘about which’ a future tense sentence makes some claim (“Rain in the afternoon [at the time specified]” in “It will rain tomorrow afternoon”). That’s the state of affairs we’re saying something about. The other state of affairs in view is the actual state of affairs (not in view in the proposition’s wording at all!), some particular arrangement within reality at the time the proposition is asserted, which determines the probability of rain in 24 hours to be 1. This is what grounds the truth of the proposition and it’s what tense logicians overlook. Look at F, for example: “It will be the case that….” See it? There’s no explicit appreciation for the present. It’s not bad or false as it is. It’s just inadequate if you’re trying to develop a logic that accounts for the truth of future tense propositions. What is better is: “It is now the case that it will rain tomorrow.” This is a clearer picture, more inclusive, and more reflective of everything going on that makes “It will rain tomorrow” true. "It is (now) the case that..." says "There is some actual state of affairs such that...," and THAT is what's missing from all tense logic.
I suggest that tense logic, to me more accurate, recalibrate their operators by having them all express what they do from within the context of the present. Tense logic needs to be the logic of the PRESENT, pure and simple. Whatever you want to say that’s true or false about anything (past or future) can only be said from the vantage point of the present.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
| 86 posts in this thread.
Viewing Page : 1 2 3 4 |
| Forum Information | Currently it is Monday, November 09, 2026 6:54 PM (GMT -6)
There are a total of 97,718 posts in 6,040 threads.
In the last 3 days there were 0 new threads and 0 reply posts. View Active Threads
|
Forum powered by dotNetBB v2.42EC SP3
dotNetBB © 2000-2026 |
|
|