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| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > The raging debate continues here... > State of TGB's and Doc's Counterfactual Project | Forum Quick Jump
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Tom
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| Posted 8/7/2003 8:26 PM (GMT -6) |   | Albert: "Ontological openness" is completely meaningless woolly headed mumbo jumbo. The world is at it is. That is all there is to it.
Tom: Is “woolly” an Aboriginal word? Why OF COURSE there world “is” as it “is” and that’s all there “is” to it! Doc and are arguing what it “is.”
Albert: But on my view, the world is as it is, and what is logically possible is logically possible.
Tom: Now there’s a mouthful! 
Albert: …there is no real sense in which things could be "ontologically closed"… The answer is that "ontological openness" would only be a useful concept if there were some contrasting possible way things could be that could be described as "ontological closedness".
Tom: There is a contrasting way the world could be that is ontologically closed. Of course there is. You suggested one: “…if God determined that nothing was ever going to happen and he was never going to do anything - say he decided to freeze everything eternally as it is now.” This is pure ontological closedness, that is, immutability. Let me suggest one more sort of ontologically closed world, a world that changes in only one possible way, a world in which reality has only one possible next step. It’s not ontologically “immutable,” but it is “closed” in the sense that it only has one way to go, one thing to become. In this world everything that happens is the only thing that could have happened given the previous state of reality. The world would be ontologically closed to all possible states of affairs save ONE. And there are people who hold to such a view of reality, either by virtue of a scientific or divine determinism. In contrast to this ontologically closed system, the open view argues an ontologically open system of MORE than one possible next move for reality.
Albert: But such a world [one that is ontologically immutable] is so trivial and irrelevant that it doesn't warrant us rejoicing that our world is not like that and celebrating "ontological openness".
Tom: All the MORE reason to rejoice my friend! Thank God he chose to put us in an ontologically dynamic and open world! He could have placed us in one where everything that happened was the only thing that could happen given the initial state of reality at T+1. Unfortunately there are those who celebrate such ontological closedness. They also run a number of theological institutions (like the Evangelical Theological Society).
I’ll try to think of a way to reexplain what Doc’s and my beef with the traditional square is too ‘cause you’re misunderstanding us to be denying the standard relations between propositions, which of course we’re not denying.
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Tom
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| Posted 8/7/2003 9:37 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom wrote earlier:quote:
(A) “x will do y in z” - - - - - - - (E) “x will not do y in z”
(I) “x might do y in z” - - - - - - - (O) “x might not do y in z”
A – O are contradictory, as are E – I. They must falsify each other.
Albert: Tom, you seem to clearly claim here that O does not falsify A.
Tom: Looks like I clearly admit that A and O ARE contradictory and therefore falsify each other. If one is true there other must be false.
Albert: But I have shown that O DOES falsify A, and that is indeed what is required in the notion of contradictory (if X and Y are contradictories, then X falsifies Y and Y falsifies X). So I can't see how I misunderstood you.
Tom: Don’t you see my comment that immediately follows the four A, E, I and O propositions? “A – O are contradictory, as are E – I. They must falsify each other.”
Agreed: “will” and “might not” are contradictories are falsify each other. Likewise “will not” and “might” are contradictories are falsify each other. No problemo.
But again, their falsifying each other (which they DO) is only possible because “might” means more than merely “logically possible that.” Let A = “Tom will take a shower today” and let this be true. It is therefore FALSE (= O) that “Tom might not take a shower today.” Now, O’s being false does not mean my taking a shower today is not a “logical possibility.” My taking a shower remains “logically possible” (it is now today and I remain capable of taking a shower and there is nothing illogical about my doing so today). So in what sense then is O false (and it IS false) if “Tom will take a shower today” is true? It is false in a more than merely “logical” sense. It is false in a historically contingent sense. For O to falsify A, the “might” of O’s “might not” must mean more than merely “logically possible that.” I am using the givenness of the contradictory relationship between A and O (and E and I) to argue that “might” must mean more than “is logically possible that.” That’s all.
Albert: Regarding ontological openness: OK, I admit on this one what I said was wrong. Indeed, the Calvinist view does result in ontological closedness.
Tom: Ah grasshopper my son! You are not far from the Kingdom of God! Consider what you just admitted, that the Calvinist view "does result in ontological closedness." If you concede the possibility of the ontological closedness of reality, and if you deny that reality is so ontologically closed, what must you AFFIRM regarding the ontology of the real world? That is is "open"! If you admit the meaningfulness of "ontological closedness" how can you deny the meaningfulness of "ontological openness" (which you require if you intend on denying "ontological closedness")?
More smelling salts please! And where's that stretcher?
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Tom
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| Posted 8/7/2003 9:58 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: But again, their falsifying each other (which they DO) is only possible because “might” means more than merely “logically possible that.”
Albert: OK Tom, this is *wrong*. If "might" means merely "is logically possible that (given the way things are)", then O DOES FALSIFY A.
Tom: Sorry duuude. It can't be wrong. If "might" means merely "is logically possible that" then O cannot falsify A. You won't find anybody to agree with you on this one.
"Logically possible that..." entails "logically possible that not..." UNLESS you're talking about necessary truths (which my taking a shower is NOT). This is why its being logically possible that I not take a shower cannot falsiy the truth that "I will" take a shower.
Albert: I don't know how more plainly I can put it. But let me put it like this. The statement "it is logically possible that x will not do y in z" DOES FALSIFY the statement "x will do y in z". I'm sorry, but it does. The argument from modal logic is summarized in my previous post.
Tom: Here's where we'll disagree then.
Albert: I assert that I have *proved* this in both propositional and modal logic. So your whole argument fails. Might DOES NOT mean more than merely "logically possible that".
Tom: Until next time then. Appreciate the input Al!
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Tom
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| Posted 8/7/2003 10:06 PM (GMT -6) | | Albert: You, of course, do believe that O falsifies A. But when you say this, you mean that O falsifies A only if O is the proposition "x might not do y in z". However, if O is the proposition "it is logically possible that x will not do y in z", then you don't believe O will falsify A.
Tom: Correct.
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Tom
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| Posted 8/8/2003 2:38 AM (GMT -6) | | Albert: "Mights" refer to logical possibilities RELATIVE TO WHAT IS, not just to logical possibilities.
Tom: Now you’re talking! That’s heading in the right direction!
Albert: My suspicion is that the whole confusion has come about because you haven't consistently maintained that point.
Tom: I’ve been hammering on this distinction from the get-go! Arghghg.
Albert: If x is y as a matter of fact, that is, it is the case that x is y, then it is not logically possible relative to what is that x is not y.
Tom: A is not –A. Obviously. But here's something additional (not to downplay where we DO agree)--Doc and I maintain that "x MIGHT become y" or "x might do y" are equally assertions of fact just as "x is y" is an assertion of fact.
Albert: Similarly, if it is the case, relative to what is, that x is not y is logically possible, then that FALSIFIES x is y.
Tom: (You don’t need “relative to what is” here since you’ve already said “if it is the case.) Simply:
If it is the case that x is possibly not y, then it is false that x is y, OR better yet:
If "x might not be y" is true, "x is y" is false, or
If "x is y" is true, "x might not be Y" is false.
Albert: Does this make it clearer? I think I have contributed to the confusion by not taking on the phrase "relative to what is" all the time when I talked about possibilities.
Tom: Yeah. Remember this from early on?quote:
Al: Greg, I think you're now using a different meaning of the word ‘possibility’. You are now using it to mean something achievable by an agent given the circumstances, rather than just something that might happen.
Tom: Exactly! This is precisely the point…Doc and I are definitely working with an understanding of “might” that is more than merely “logically possible that” (as Doc pointed out in his summary that opened this thread).
Albert: I did assert from the beginning that "might" means "logically possible relative to what is". I still maintain that is the correct definition of "might" and that O falsifies A if that definition is adopted.
Tom: That's the only meaning of "might" that will account for O's being able to falsify A! Exactly what I’ve been saying. O’s “might not do x” falsifies A’s “will do x” by virtue of positing a possibility (relative to the reality of this world) that is incompatible with the claim that x “will” happen.
I’m so fried now I’m not sure if we’re closer together or farther apart!
Albert: First, although in general "it is logically possible that x is y" and "it is logically possible that x is not y" can both be true, they cannot both be true in relation to what is.
Tom: “x is y” and "x is not y” are contrary and cannot both be true. Quite so. Of course, we are not talking about the present but about what MIGHT be the case in the future. Though "x is y" and "x is not y" cannot both be true (they are contrary propositions), "x might happen" and "x might not happen" CAN both be true (for the are subcontrary propositions). There's more about this that is VERY interesting (and which I think points out some weaknesses of the Square), but never mind that for now.
Albert: If when you say "might" means more than "it is logically possible that", you mean that it has to have the "relative to what is" clause attached, then ...
I AGREE WITH YOU!!!
Tom: Hurray! But Doc and I still have not yet found a word or phrase to capsulate this “relative to what is” meaning (that is, this “more than merely logically possible” meaning) as distinct from sheer “logical possibility.” Should we call it “historical contingency,” “historical possibility,” “openness to become”? I don’t know.
Albert: So my question is ... Are you happy with the defintion of "might" as "logically possible relative to what is"? Can we find agreement?
Tom: I think so. But like I said, I’d like to find a way to describe this other than “relative to what is.” Something that captures the historical contingency that is.
Albert: But if so, I don't see what ontological basis "mights" have.
Tom: I think it’s staring you in the face. You’ve narrowed in on what is unique about “mights” when you say “relative to what is.” “What is” is ontology. If a “might” is a “what is” then it’s ontologically the case that “x might happen.” Reality, or what is, is now such that it might become x. I think we’re asserting the same thing in affirming the open view but disagree (maybe about what the best way of going about defending this logically is.
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Does this square (no pun intended) with anybody?
1. If A is the case, then it is necessary that A is possible. This follows whether A is necessarily or contingently the case. If A = God’s necessary existence, then it follows that God’s existence is necessarily possible. If A = Tom’s contingent existence, then it follows that Tom’s existence is necessarily possible. Logical possibility stands behind BOTH necessary and contingent truths.
2. Thus, if A is necessary, then it is also necessary that –A be not possible. This is the definition of “necessity.” Negations of necessities are not possible. If A = God’s necessary existence, then –A (viz., God’s non-existence) is not possible. So, if A is necessary, it is possible that A and not possible that –A.
3. However, If A is contingent, then it is necessary that –A be possible (otherwise A is necessary and not contingent). Thus, if A = Tom’s contingent existence, then –A (viz., Tom’s non-existence) is possible. So, if A is contingent, it is possible that A and possible that –A.
4. Thus, in the case of contingent truths, “logically possible that A” ENTAILS “logically possible that –A” (from #3), while in the case of necessary truths “logically possible that A” EXCLUDES “logically possible that –A” (from #2).
As I said, “logically possible that…” entails “logically possible that not…” except in the case of necessary truths.
Tom
PS Doc, last month you started a one-year in-depth study of formal logic. Are you finished with that yet? You do plan on getting into modal logic, no? Being that this logic deals directly with the modal expressions “necessarily” and “possibly” maybe YOU’RE the one to master it from an open theist perspective.
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Tom
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| Posted 8/8/2003 4:07 AM (GMT -6) | | Note on the last part of my previous post:
I don’t mean to say that if “Tom exists” it must also be true that “Tom does not exist” since my existence is contingent. This is nonsense. I either now exist or I do not now exist contingently. What contingency in the case of present existence means is that I might not have existed and I might not continue to exist. My existence is not necessary. In the case of future-tense proposition A describing a contingent event, A must entail the possibility of –A. This is what “contingency” means.
Thus, contingent “might” entails “might not.” That's what "contingent" IS. Now that we have settled on “might’s” meaning more than merely logically possible that, and also on the nature of “contingency,” we can see the inability of the traditional Square to account for all meaningful propositions expressing future contingencies. The square is not complete, meaning there are truths which have no defense on the square. Let me try again to explain what this chink in the armor of the Square is.
(A) All logicians are professors - - - - (E) No logicians are professors
(I) Some logicians are professors - - - - (O) Some logicians are not professors
It is certainly true that some logicians are professors and some are not (in which case it is false both that “all are” and “none are.” But the subcontraries in this case are BOTH true only because they describe different “portions” or “parts” of the “whole.” They cannot both be true and describe the SAME “some” of logicians. One cannot say “Some logicians are professors and THESE logicians are not professors.”
So it appears that there are true propositions ("might and might not") whose truth is not clearly defended on the square.
First, “x might” and “x might not” are assertions of historical contingency and not mere logical consistency. Albert and we agree on this, right Albert? "Might" means more than "logically possible that" on the square.
Secondly, if might-counterfactuals describe historical contingency, then it can never be the case that “might” and “might not” are not both either true or false. This follows from the nature of “contingency.” It cannot be true that and event is both contingent (in this “more-than-merely-logically-contingent” way) and not contingent. “Might” and “might not” are in fact one conjoined truth-claim and together describe one and the same contingency.
Thirdly, “might” and “might not,” when they are both true, are not true in the way non-counterfactual subcontraries are true. When we conjoin the subcontraries “some logicians are professors and some logicians are not professors,” for example, we are making a compound sentence, one which compounds TWO claims about TWO different subjects (those logicians who are profs and those who are not). But when we conjoin “might and might not” we are making one claim about one and same event subject. This means “might” and “might not” subcontraries which are both true on the square of opposites are NOT logical subcontraries at all (for they do not attribute contrary truth-claims to different subjects; they in fact attribute one and the same truth-claim to one and the same subject—this is not the stuff of subcontrary propositions). They are in fact two sides of ONE indivisible truth, whereas “some logicians are profs” and “some logicians are not profs” are two independent truths. “Might and might not” is not the logical equivalent of “some are and some are not” (or any other propositions formed by conjoining subcontraries).
These three points account for the inability of the traditional square to account for separate “might” and “might not” propositions. The square is not suited to accommodate propositions expressing contingent events.
Albert, what I’m claiming then is that IF “might” means more than “logically possible that” as we seem to agree, then, given the nature of historical ‘contingency’ expressed in these “mights,” there can never be a true “might” and a corresponding false “might not."
“Might” entails “might not”.
Thus, 1) we have a TRIANGLE and not a SQUARE and 2) future-tensed "mights" are not "counterfactuals" at all. THey are assertions of fact.
Tom
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Tom
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| Posted 8/8/2003 7:19 AM (GMT -6) | | Anticipating Albert's objection to my understanding of conjoined "might and might not"...
I want to describe a certain something and I’d like you, Albert, to tell me whether or not you think such things possessing the characteristics I shall give them:- are at all meaningful,
- if they are meaningful, whether propositions describing them are ever TRUE, and,
- if in the event the propositions describing them are true, how you would go about accounting for their truth-value in propositional form on the square of opposition.
I’m tossing out thoughts of the square for the time being and just talking from my heart here. OK? I want to describe a certain something. An event. A future event. A contingent future event. Here are the defining attributes of contingent future event A:- ‘A’ is physically possible. It does not describe cows jumping over the moon or the like. Its occurrence is consistent with the physical laws governing the universe AND with the rules of engagement that define and influence all the possible ways God can get involved in the world.
- ‘A’ is logically possible. It is not the logical equivalent of married bachelors or square circles. It posits a state of affairs that is meaningful and not logically self-contradictory. Whether or not this is identical to point #1 I don’t know. Just covering all the bases.
- ‘A’ is historically contingent for THIS world at THIS time given the history of THIS world. It is neither necessary nor inevitable that it happen given the present state of reality. It might occur. It might not.
Albert, you give this animal a name for me OK?
OK, so, you can deny that there are such future contingent events possessing the attributes I here define, or you can concede that what the sort of contingent future events I describe here do indeed possess the attributes I describe.
Now,
A) Are such future contingent events as I have here defined them meaningful? If so, then…
B) Are propositions describing such future contingent events as I have described them ever TRUE? If so, then…
C) Please show me how YOU would account propositionally for such truth-value on the square of opposites. Give me the proposition describing future contingent event ‘A’ and tell me where you would place it on the square, then give me the other THREE propositions, then give me the valid deductions FROM the proposition describing our future contingent event ‘A’ TO each of the other three propositions on the square.
Show me.
Tom
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Tom
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| Posted 8/9/2003 3:23 AM (GMT -6) | | Albert:
(a) "X is logically possible" just means that X is not self-contradictory.
(b) "X is logically possible relative to what is" means that X is not self-contradictory AND that X is not contradictory to any Y, where Y is a true proposition about what is.
This seems clear enough to me. Do you find that OK?
Tom: For the time being that’s OK, though I would word it differently perhaps. I’d like to see the wording suit future-tense propositions which of course is what we are interested in. And I have another suspicion that I won’t mention now. So OK. "x might do y” means that x’s doing x is neither self-contradictory (i.e., it is logically possible) nor contradictory to any other true proposition about what is.
Albert: This also clears up the past, present, future confusion I think. A future "X will" is true if it follows from what is (e.g. "the fish will die" is true if it is presently the case that God has unconditionally determined that it will die, a present state of affairs about God's intentions). A future "X might" is true if it doesn't contradict any future "X wills".
Tom: Good enough, though I object to the idea that the only way “x will happen” can be true is if God “determines” it. “x will happen” can be true if God specifically determines that x happen OR it can be true if x’s happen follows necessarily and inevitably from what already is the case. I may be free to jump or not jump off the Empire State building. Once I jump, “Tom will splat on the pavement below the Empire State building” is true, though not because God specifically determined that I jump. So, not every true “x will happen” is a description of God’s intentions. If that’s the case, let’s just be determinists.
Albert:Tom, I think that "might" and "might not" are subcontraties in exactly the same way as "some are" and "some are not", or at least "some will" and "some will not". This is shown most easily from modal logic. "X might" means "there is at least one possible world relative to what is in which X will", or in other words, "in SOME possible worlds relative to what is X WILL" (the "some will" part). "X might not" means "there is at least one possible world relative to what is in which X will not", or in other words, "in SOME possible worlds relative to what is X WILL NOT". So "might" and "might not" clearly do reduce to "some will" and "some will not" subcontraries. Can I really encourage you to start thinking in terms of modal logic and quantification across possible worlds (that is how modal logic is done).
Tom: Where in the heck is Alan Rhodes! Stinker went and got married on us! Doc, wanna comment on this? I don’t know what else to say.
Albert:I know this seems rather strange, but I claim that the statement "my name might be Albert" is true and the statement "my name might not be Albert" is false. Why? Because my name is Albert. Therefore, the statement "my name is Albert" is logically consistent with all propositions Y about what is, so, by definition, the statement "my name might be Albert" is true. However, the statement "my name is not Albert" is not logically consistent with all propositions Y about what is. It contradicts the true proposition "my name is Albert" which belongs to the set of propositions about what is. Therefore, by definition, the proposition "my name might not be Albert" is false.
Tom: This all regards the present state of reality and entirely misses the point of discussion, which is the future, that is, in the case of your name, what your name might “become.” Your name now is Albert. So it cannot be true that your name might possibly not now be Albert. Obviously. We however are talking about the future. And as you know, a person’s name is a contingent affair and one of the easiest things to change. You can legally change your name to Fred if you wanted. This is possible. Well, if it’s possible (logically and relative to what is) to change your name, then the fact that your name is now “Albert” cannot falsify “Albert’s name might change to Fred” (which of course is the same as “Albert’s name might not be ‘Albert’,” where “be” = “become”).
So, give us an example of a TRUE “x might do y” in the future (where x’s doing y is possible relative to what is, is contingent, and is neither necessary nor inevitable), which does NOT entail the correspondingly TRUE “x might not do y.”
And consider this:
TRUE: "Tom might have only coffee tomorrow morning for breakfast."
My having only coffee for breakfast is both logically possible and possible relative to what is. Fine?
But here is another proposition describing something that is also both logically possible and possible realtive to what is:
TRUE: "Tom might have only orange juice tomorrow morning for breakfast."
I can offer about 50 true propositions all describing different things that I MIGHT only have tomorrow morning for breakfast. And they would ALL be true. How so? How can "I might only have orange juice tomorrow for breakfast" not falsify "I might only have coffee tomorrow for breakfast"? Because "might" entails "might not" when describing future events whose occurence is possible relative to what is. It must be true that what only "might" happen "might not" happen. [Note: I'm talking only about cotingent truths, not necessary truths.]
I'll stick by my claim that "Tom might have only coffee tomorrow for breakfast" entails "Tom might not have only breakfast tomorrow morning for breakfast."
Doc!
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Tom
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| Posted 8/10/2003 2:23 AM (GMT -6) | | Come on Doc and Alan! Where are you guys?
Here is Doc: 
Here is Alan: 
Here I am: 
Albert, there is so much to say and so little strength left! Arghgh. I think we may in fact be defining "might" as "relative to what is" quite differently.
Can you do me a favor? Tell me what it means to say the occurence of a possible future event is "contingent."
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Tom
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| Posted 8/10/2003 3:00 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc-
As nice as it would be to come up with a unified theory for openness, I think for the time being all we need to show is that "might" and "might not," being subcontrary, may both be true and that "might and might not" is therefore meaningful, and that therefore open theism is logically possible. That much Craig will have to concede. Of course, he'll argue that though it is logically possible for "might" and "might not" to both be true, they are in fact never both true, since for every event that ever happens it was eternally true that it either "would" or "will" happen. Seems to me that in denying there are any future contingent events that are both "might" and "might not" events, Albert as well believes that for every event that ever happens in this world it was true before it happened that it either "would" or "will" happen. How he remains an open theist is beyond me. 
So, Doc, settle for the simpler "open theism can be shown to be logically possible" for now. Wait until your 90, have a long beard like David Lewis did, and are too old to be kicked out of anything to nail down the fuller "open theism makes BEST logical sense."
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Tom
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| Posted 8/10/2003 11:08 AM (GMT -6) | | Yes he did. But Alan believes "logically possible" is the end of the road for open theism. I believe it's the beginning of the road.
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Tom
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| Posted 8/10/2003 8:47 PM (GMT -6) | | Albert: FOR THE RECORD:
1. I believe that for SOME propostions X, "X might" and "X might not" are both true (conjoined mights).
2. I believe that for SOME other propositions Y, "Y might" is true and "Y might not" is false.
This means that the future is partially settled and partially opened. Therefore I am an open theist.
Tom: Thanks Albert! I admit that I was proding you on purpose. Sorry bro!
But it paid off for me! Unless I'm still misunderstanding you, you believe that the part of the future which is "open" is expressed by "might and might not" (both I and O being true)while the part of the future that is NOT open, or rather the part that is "settled," is expressed by either "might" and "not might not" (I=true and O=false, for things that "will" happen) or by "not not" and "might not" (I=false and O=true, for things that "will not" happen).
Very interesting. I'm just observing, not agreeing or disagreeing, but as I said, this reveals that we are in fact operating with two different definitions of what "might relative to what is" really means.
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 8/10/2003 11:33 PM (GMT -6) | | You two are hard to keep up with!!!! Okay, my two cents on the last two pages:
Doc said: You give a very strong and counterintutive interpretation to "A." If I say "Tom will respond again soon," I am not saying "There is no possible world in which Tom will not respond again soon." I’m only saying, "In this world, Tom will respond again soon."
Albert replied: This is pedantic. Modal logic allows for the notion of worlds being possible or not possible relative to other worlds. When I said that "x will do y in z" entail "There is no possible world in which x will not do y in z", I of course meant "There is no possible world RELATIVE TO THE WORLD THAT IS in which x will not do y in z".
Doc replies:
a) In possible worlds semantics, "all possible worlds" means "all logically possible worlds." To define "all possible worlds" as "possible worlds RELATED TO THE WORLD THAT IS" is no longer talk about all possible worlds: it is in fact to only talk about ONE possible world – namely, THIS one.
b) To define "might" as "possible relative to the world that is" is no longer to define it as "logically possible." It is to define it as HISTORICALLY possible – which is what Tom and I have been arguing for. Whether something is true or false relative to the world that is is not a matter of logic. Which is why we have been arguing that "might" cannot simply mean "logically possible."
c) So, I yet hold on to TGB's and my suspicion that if we define "might" only as logically possible, (A) and (0) do not contradict each other. "John WILL do x in y "does not contradict "it is logically possible that John will NOT do x in y." It DOES contradict, "it is historically possible" (viz. possible relative to this world) that John will not do x in y."
Albert: …there is no real sense in which things could be "ontologically closed"… The answer is that "ontological openness" would only be a useful concept if there were some contrasting possible way things could be that could be described as "ontological closedness".
Doc: I find this very puzzling. Suppose for the sake of argument I wanted to contrast Calvinism with Open Theism in terms of their beliefs about what is (ontology). One holds that the future is exhaustively predetermined. The other holds that the future is not exhaustively predetermined, but is (hmmmm) "open" to possibilities. If I can’t meaningfully talk about a world view that is "ontologically closed" or "open" – how can I talk about the contrast between Calvinism and Open Theism on an ontological level?
Since it SEEMS we can and do debate the open and closed ontologies, I take the concept of "ontological openness" verses "ontological closedness" to be meaningful. One holds that reality is open to historic (as opposed to merely logical) possibilities -- historic possibilities are part of reality -- the other holds that reality is closed to historic possibilities -- historic possibilities are not part of reality. Is this really nonsense?
Albert:I assert that "might" and "might nots" assert absolutely nothing about the real world. ….Mights" refer to logical possibilites RELATIVE TO WHAT IS, not just to logical possibilities.
Doc: If "mights" are true or false RELATIVE TO the real world, how is it they assert "absolutely nothing about the real world"?
Albert: although in general "it is logically possible that x is y" and "it is logically possible that x is not y" can both be true, they cannot both be true in relation to what is.
Albert: I believe that for SOME propostions X, "X might" and "X might not" are both true (conjoined mights).
Doc: It's not clear to me how conjoined "mights" can be true but not relative to what is? What does "true" mean if not correspondence with reality? When I say "Tom might and might not come back soon," am I not asserting that IN THIS WORLD – viz. relative to what is – Tom might and might not come back soon? If I'm not asserting this, what am I asserting? "Its true Tom might and might not come back, but not relative to this world"???
Tom: Doc, last month you started a one-year in-depth study of formal logic. Are you finished with that yet? ….When you figure it out let me know!
Doc: yeh, right, for sure, chah, whatever.
Tom (to Doc): As nice as it would be to come up with a unified theory for openness, I think for the time being all we need to show is that "might" and "might not," being subcontrary, may both be true and that "might and might not" is therefore meaningful, and that therefore open theism is logically possible. That much Craig will have to concede.
Doc: Nah I say.  To be sure, the main goal has always been to simply show open thiesm is logically possible – which is why I am willing to work with the standard square of opposition in making the case. This is enough to show that omniscience does not RULE OUT divine knowledge of "maybes." But I am INCREASINGLY CONVINCED that in showing this we also can demonstrate....
a) that denying God’s knowledge of conjoined mights actually constitutes a DENIAL of omniscience (for even if God wanted to falsify all conjoined mights in this world, he would still know them (as false) and still know that in other possible worlds they are true. )
And I suspect we can also show (though this may take till I’m 90 with a long beard) that…
b) the working out of the square of opposition in western logic as it concerns mights was prejudiced toward the settled – it was NOT just a matter of logic. (With all due respect – and I mean that – I think Albert’s inability to see "mights" as part of "what is" reflects this, even though he is an open theist). A "closed" (sorry Albert) worldview has been snuck in. I’m more convinced than ever that our triangular way of assessing the situation WORKS, and alone captures the meaning of "might." For it alone allows for "mights" to characterize THE REAL WORLD.
Probably should try to sleep now.
Thanks for your tireless interaction Albert and TGB. I think this is very helpful.
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Bilbo
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 3
| Posted 8/11/2003 7:03 AM (GMT -6) | |
For the benefit of those attempting to follow this lenthy discussion (a discussion that I must confess, appears more than a little convoluted); would any of the participants be willing to divulge their sources for understanding counterfactuals and the logic of subjunctives?
I've seen David Lewis' name dropped a few times, but I for one recognize little of his thinking present in this exchange.
Thanks in advance.
Regards,
Bilbo. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/11/2003 8:30 AM (GMT -6) | | Bilbo-
I mentioned Lewis I think because I was encouraging Doc to grow a beard like Lewis did (long and scraggily). 
Living where I do I don't have good university or public libraries to visit, so I do what I can on the internet which, I'm pleased to say, is packed with stuff to read. I have a couple of introductory books on the way via amazon, but that's about it. The rest is just interacting over stuff.
I'm sorry it seems so convoluted. That's Albert's fault! Everything was fine until he came along!
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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ReasonableDoubt
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 655
| Posted 8/12/2003 12:56 PM (GMT -6) | | | I have to say, "Go Al!" I can't add anything, i completely agree- but would like to say to take Al's words to heart about studying logic or at least reading a book about it. He's completely on. :) | | Back to Top | | |
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Bilbo
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 3
| Posted 8/12/2003 6:16 PM (GMT -6) | |
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Tom wrote: I'm sorry it seems so convoluted. That's Albert's fault!
Albert replies: As agent 86 would say, "and loving it".
To Bilbo: David Lewis was an important pioneer of modal logic. But no-one in this discussion would agree with his ontology
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My intent in citing his name was not to impute his ontological views to any of the forum participants, but rather, to clarify the relation (if any) between claims made in the recent counterfactual threads, and work that has been done in this area by philosophers like him.
I asked about the source material used to develop the stated views, because I found the confident exposition of these complex matters somewhat puzzling, given that the use of terms and concepts is, for the most part, unconventional.
Its always good to see christians attempting to argue their views in a rigorous way, but its useful to provide some perspective and interpretive backdrop for the claims being made, to better facilitate evaluation of their worth.
Regards,
Bilbo | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/12/2003 7:03 PM (GMT -6) | | We'll take all the help we can get Bilbo. Please correct or comment on any part of the discussion. It's appreciated.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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ReasonableDoubt
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 655
| Posted 8/12/2003 7:24 PM (GMT -6) | | | TGB- I have to say, I'm impressed with your attitude in this thread - for that matter, for everyone's humility and civilized debate in this thread- even though I don't necessarily agree with you, I do think your attitude is so refreshing here that I have to give you some props. :) | | Back to Top | | |
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