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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/31/2003 5:47 AM (GMT -6) |   | Okay, TGB and I, with the help of Alan and others, have been vigourously chewing on the "might" "would" counterfactual stuff for several months. It's kind of gone in different directions on different threads. I'd like to here summarize where I think we (Tom and I) are at. (TGB feel free to correct me if you differ from any of my conclusions). I personally believe we are making headway and that this is actually groundbreaking stuff. (But it may turn out we're both doddleheads, as we are both more than willing to acknowledge if proven wrong).
I'll give two background points; several arguments (reviewing a bit of history), and 6 "Reflections." (Also, I'm sorry, but I don't know how to draw in these posts, so you'll have to imagine lines at time. Maybe TGB can re-post it with the fancy drawings.)
On "Would’s," "Mights," And the Omniscience of God
Background 1: Aristotle’s Square of Opposition is a staple of western logic.
All (A) None (O)
Some Are (I) Some aren’t (E)
The truth values are these,
*IF (A) true, then( I) true, (O) false, (E) false.
* If (O) true, then (A) false, (I )false, (E)true, etc…
Background 2: The traditional view is that God knows all that WILL happen and all that WOULD happen if he had created a different world. (These are "would-counterfactuals" and constitute "God’s Middle Knowledge").
Philosophically, this is expressed as, "God knows the truth value of all propositions about what will and what would happen."
In the tradition view, God never knows anything as a "maybe." Suggesting such has constituted a denial of "omniscience" (the major objection to Open Theism).
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The Original Argument On Aristotle’s "Square of Opposition," the contradictory of "x would" is not "x would not" but "x might not."
X would X would not
X might X might not
This means (as argued in Four View of Divine Foreknowledge) that if God knows "X would", he must know its contradictory is false, and its contradictory is not "X would not" (this is its contrary, not its contradictory) but "X might not". Hence, I argued, God must know "mights," if only by virtue of knowing "woulds."
A Problem and a Question: The argument doesn’t quite work, however, for (it could be argued) God could know the "mights" ONLY by virtue of knowing the "woulds." All "mights" are entailed by "woulds". (Though never explicitly addressed, the western tradition of logic has assumed this). Hence, all of God’s knowledge is still about what will or would happen.
Yet, why ASSUME that God only knows "mights" by virtue of knowing "woulds?" Why assume all "mights" are logically entailed by "woulds"? Why can’t (I) be true and (A) and (0) false? We have received no response to this question thus far.
The Conjoined Might-Counterfactual Argument (Alan was most helpful here). Indeed, it seems we can PROVE that at least some propositions including "mights" are not logically entailed by "woulds," for we can meaningfully conjoin "mights" (x might and might not do y" ) but cannot meaningfully conjoin "woulds" ("x would and would not do y"). Hence, there is a class of propositions ("conjoined might counterfactuals") that an omniscient God must know that cannot be known merely by virtue of his knowing truth value of propositions about what will and would happen. In other words, if God is omniscient, he must know some of reality as MAYBE.
Problems with the Square of Opposition (TGB was most brilliant on probing this one)
How did the western tradition miss this? Part of the answer lies in the assumption that "mights" can be understood on the Square of Opposition. When placed in the Square, "might" is to "would" what "some" is to "all." But how is the relationship of "might" to "would" like the relationship of "some" to "all"? It is perfectly ambiguous.
On the one hand, "might" must mean something distinct from "would," for it represents a different truth claim. On the other hand, on the Square of Opposition "might" does not entail "might not." But how does "might" differ from "would" if it does not include "might not"? (This drove TGB nuts)
Insofar as there has been any reflection on this, "might" has been defined merely as logically possible. Hence, if "x would" then it follows that "x might" (viz. "it is logically possible that x would"). But this doesn’t work. For it is impossible to assert "x is logically possible" and deny that "not x is logically possible" unless one holds that "x is logically necessary: (for only logically necessary truths have no logically possible alternative). Yet it is absurd to suggest that "might" differs from "would" in that "might" is logically necessary while "would’ is not!
The tradition has no clear definition of "might," and cannot ever acquire a clear definition of "might" so long as it understands "might" on the Square of Opposition. For the Square of Opposition opposes "might" and "might not" while the true meaning of might is expressed in conjoined "might" and "might not."
The New Triangulation Approach: If we conjoin "might and might not," the (I) and (0) become one point and we have a Triangle of Opposition rather than a Square.
Would (A) Would Not (O)
Might and Might Not (IE)
If any one of the poles are true (and one must always be, for the categories are exhaustive) the other two are false. (Remaining paradox: it seems the relationship between the two "would" poles is contrary, not contradictory, but the relationship between the two "woulds" on the one hand and the "might/might not" on the other is contradictory. TGB is at the present inclined to interprete them all as contrary, I'm more inclined to think they are all contradictory. The fact that this violates their logical relationship in the Square of Opposition -- whichever course we take -- is perhaps expected given that we are proposing a new paradigm).
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Reflections: 1) Our arguments suggest that the standard logic of the west was set up to miss the reality of "mights." It inadvertently assumed that all reality is settled, hence that all meaningful propositions about reality are of what "will" and "would" happen. Only when "mights" are conjoined with "might nots" is the reality of "maybes" captured.
2) This perhaps confirms a prestigious tradition going back at least to the Pythagoreans that suggests that one indication that our logic about reality is more closely lining up with reality itself is that our logic is rooted in THREE foundational points. (Hail to the "Cult of Three" )
3) The western tradition has always referred to "woulds" and "mights" as counterfactuals. Our argument, however, shows that this way of speaking of "woulds" and "mights" is prejudiced in favor of the view that reality is exhaustively settled. All facts are settled, it was assumed, so propositions about what "would" and "might" happen are counterfactual. Against this, we have shown that "woulds" and "mights" are not necessarily counterfactuals, for they can be factual. It is a FACT that reality consists of "mights," for propositions containing conjoined "mights" are meaningful.
4 God could of course decide to create a world in which all propositions expressing "mights" are false. But even if he did so (listen up Mepheternal!) he would still know a) the truth value of propositions expressing "mights" (viz. he has rendered them all false) which itself shows that knowing "mights" is required by omniscience; and b) God would still by logical necessity know that there are other logically possible worlds in which "mights" are true, thereby showing again that knowing "mights" is required by omniscience.
5) A standard argument against the open view of the future is that an omniscient God who knows the truth value of all propositions must know the truth value of all propositions pertaining to the future. Hence, it is argued, God must know whether its true or false that (say) "Hilary will be president in 2008." It is assumed that the only alternative available to the open position is to deny that "Hilary will be president in 2008" is either true or false (viz. deny the "law of excluded middle").
I think the "law of excluded middle" (bivalence) is up for discussion (hello "fuzzy logic"). But our argument demonstrates that the openness of the future can be held without rejecting the law of the exclude middle. The proposition "Hilary will be president in 2008) is false if in reality it now is the case that "Hilary may and may not be president in 2008." Note, this is true even if Hilary turns out to be elected president in 2008. When in reality it becomes resolved that Hilary will become president, it becomes false that "Hilary may and may not become president."
6) Many find comfort in believing that reality is exhaustively settled. They fear that a God who faced possibilities (maybes) is less in control than a God who faced only settled realities (certainties). The fear, however, is based on the anthropomorphic notion that God’s intelligence is limited like ours and thus that God has to spread his intelligence thin to the more possibilities he faces just as we do. If we believe God is infinitely intelligent, however, there is no basis for this fear. For a God of infinite intelligence, each and every possibility has the same status as a certainty, for all his intelligence has always been directed on each possibility. Whatever transpires, God was from all eternity been preparing for it as though it was the only thing that could transpire, even if he was not certain it was going to transpire.
I think this fairly represents the reflections on this topic the last several months. What think ye?
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 7/31/2003 9:59 AM (GMT -6) | | Just for the sake of having them near at hand, here’s the traditional square of opposites:
The A -- E
I -- O relationship would look like this:
All logicians are professors -- All logicians are not professors
Some logicians are professors -- Some logicians are not professors
Counterfactual Squares look like this:
x would do y in z -- x would not do y in z
x might do y in z -- x might not do y in z
And here is the proposed new Triangle of Opposites:
I do think the relationship must be contrary all the way around. Why I think so is on the other thread (“Alan help with Counterfactuals again”). But let me succinctly put it this way. If they are ALL contradictory then by definition no two can share the same truth-value. If “might and might not” is TRUE, then both “would” and “would not” are FALSE (being both contradictory to “might and might not”). But then how are “would” and “would not” contradictory if they are BOTH false? Can’t be. If any two propositions share the same truth-value, being either both true or both false, they cannot be contradictory, for contradictory propositions are, pardon the pun, contradictory! 
But if any one is TRUE and the other two FALSE what are they if not contradictory? Answer: Contrary. "Contradiction" is ruled out in favor of “contrary” when one begins by assuming any one—ANY one—to be FALSE, in which case no determination can be made about the truth-value of the other two. Try it on the triangle:
If A is false, what can THIS tell you about either E or I? Can you determine on the basis of A's being false alone that E or I are true and false (respectively), or false and true? No.
It's contrary dudes! All the way around.
Doc and I are still saying the same thing. He’s just wrong about their being contradictory! Arghghg. We are suggesting a new paradigm, but I don't think it's helpful to redefine "contradictory" to mean something different than what it means on the square.
More later! Loving it!
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 7/31/2003 10:10 AM (GMT -6) | | | * quiet as a mouse (where is she?), but appreciating this! * | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 7/31/2003 10:21 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc: Background 1: Aristotle’s Square of Opposition is a staple of western logic:
All (A) None (O)
Some Are (I) Some aren’t (E)
The truth values are these,
*IF (A) true, then( I) true, (O) false, (E) false.
* If (O) true, then (A) false, (I )false, (E)true, etc…
Tom: No biggie, but the order is:
A --- E
I --- O
Just so that we're all speaking the same lingo.
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Tom
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| Posted 7/31/2003 10:48 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc-
Excellent summary (now that I’ve read through it all!). Good stuff. There are a few minor points here and there, but it’ll come out in the wash.
Do you feel more comfortable about your chapter for Pinnock’s book? Remember that? Or has that already been sent off? That's where we got started on this stuff.
Tom  | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/1/2003 12:00 AM (GMT -6) | | albert: Can I summarise my position? God knows what is. He can know mights as logical deductions from what is. Mights only have truth value in relation to what is.
Tom: I absolutely agree. “x might do y in z” and “x might not do y in z” (or the conjoined “x might and might not do y in z”) are only true or false because they correspond to present realities that make them either true or false. And I cannot think of a single future-tense proposition which does not either correspond to or not correspond to the present state of reality; thus, I can't think of a single future-tense proposition which is not either true or false.
If, for example, it is now true that “x might do y in z one hundred years from today” it can only be true because there exists between the present state of reality and the possible state of reality proposed in this proposition an unbroken chain of possibilities that MAKES it true NOW that the future state of reality proposed in the proposition MIGHT be. “x might do y in z” THEN only because of what reality is NOW.
Consider:
Present reality at T (= the present time)
There exist only so many possible states to which the present state of reality at T may resolve itself at T+1. Agreed? However many those possible states are, and what they are, God only knows. But if at T (the present moment) there are no TRUE possible states of reality to one of which the present state of reality must resolve itself, then the universe, or reality as it now is at T, would be immutable. It could go nowhere. Future possibilities (even if its only ONE possible future) is what paves the road for a constantly changing world. If the state of reality at T changes to ANYTHING different at T+1, it follows that the resolved T+1 state of reality was possible at T. Now, unless you are a determinist (theological or otherwise), you believe that there are MORE than one possible states of reality facing the world at T. That is, the world “might” be x, y, or z at T+1. And this is true at T. That is, the proposition “The world might be x at T+1” spoken at T is true. Likewise, “The world might be y or z at T+1” spoken at T is true. Why? Because as you say, T+1’s x, y, and z correspond to T (our present state of reality) as possible next steps.
All of that is just to account for the change in the state of reality from T to T+1. Now, consider this—you’re standing at T. Contemplate all the T+1 possibilities. Let’s say there are 100 possible states of reality (though God knows the countless number of T+1 possibilities facing T), one of which WILL be the state of reality at T+1 though any one of which MIGHT be the state of reality at T+1.
But each one of these 100 T+1 possibilities also entails its own possibilities (some in common in with others, some not) for T+2. And each possible state of reality at T+2 entails its own set of possible states of reality for T+3, likewise unto eternity. God knows them all. For a “might” or a “might not” to be false NOW, it must be true that it does NOT correspond to, or fit into, any of the possible states of reality facing the present moment at T. God knows them all. For a “might” to be true NOW, it must be one of the infinite number of possible states of reality facing the present state of reality at T.
T Present state of reality:
It’s 11:54 AM and Tom has a 1:00 appointment at the publishers, but he’s really enjoying writing albert and can’t get away from the computer. Tom can a) shut down his laptop now and finish this note later or b) finish it now and be late for his appointment. If Tom chooses (a) then he’ll make his appointment and the footnotes of his Study Bible will be completed on time and he’ll get his August deposit and be able to pay all the translators money he owes them. If he chooses (b) and is late, his footnotes will not be done on time and he will not be able to pay his translators.
T+1 state of reality:
Tom chooses (a).
What the open view claims is that at T “Tom might be late for his appointment,” “Tom might not be late for his appointment,” “Tom might get his deposit this month,” “Tom might not get his deposit this month,” “Tom’s translators might resign if they are not paid this month,” etc. (or you can conjoin these all into “might and might not” props) are a) all either true or false at T and b) may be true (Bill Craig agrees they are either true or false but he denies "maybe" is EVER true). But there’s no reason for denying that they possess truth value at all at T. They either do or do not correspond to the state of reality at T. T either "will," "will not," "may" or "may not" beecome x, y, or z at T+1. And this pushes into the distant future. That is, the state of reality at the future T+10,000,000 might include x’s doing y in z because x’s doing y in z is one of the possible states of reality to which the state of reality at T+9,999,999 might resolve itself, and because the state of reality at T+9,999,999 is one of the possible states of reality to which the state of reality at T+9,999,998 might resolve itself, which is one of the possible states of reality to which the state of reality at T+9,999,997 might resolve itself, which is one of the possible states of reality to which the state of reality at at T+9,999,996 might resolve itself, etc., extending through an unbroken change of possible states of reality all the way back to T, our present state of reality. It is possible to know from what is NOW the case what MIGHT be the case in 10, 50, 1,000, or 10,000 years, for these distant possibilities are symbionically linked to the present moment and thus are part of what is NOW real. God knows all possible states of reality that are thus linked to our present state of reality. Dizzy yet? I am!
But to say a proposition is neither true nor false is to deny that it either corresponds to or does not correspond to the present state of reality. I can’t think of a single future-tense proposition that would not either correspond to or not correspond to the present state of reality, nor can I think of any reason for supposing there are any such propositions.
The chain of possible states of reality extending from T for 1,000 or 10,000 years is unbroken. Each possible state of reality follows from previous possibilities. Some possible states of reality facing T pass out of existence at T+1 when at T+1 one possible state of reality is realized. When I choose at T+1 (a) to make my appointment, I eliminate (b) from the realm of possibility. But some T+1 possibilities remain T+2 (or T+3, +100, or +1,000) possibilities because they may yet be resolved (describing as they do events yet future and yet corresponding to the resolved T+1 state of reality).
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/1/2003 2:01 AM (GMT -6) | | albert-
Enjoy the movie! Hey, I just watched "Pirates of the Carribean" with my boys last night. Wow. Nice adventure!
I would be surprised if my related-to-me-in-a-previous-lifetime friend Doc would not agree with what I said. I'm pretty sure that's what he's arguing as well when he argues that God is "infinitely intelligent."
Now I'm out the door in a rush too! Going camping for the weekend. See you all on Monday!
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 8/1/2003 4:37 AM (GMT -6) | | | Hey Albert I liked reading your posts- I agree with your reasoning...(just thought i'd say something positive ) | | Back to Top | | |
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Ochuk
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| Posted 8/1/2003 1:29 PM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/3/2003 6:59 AM (GMT -6) | | Albert-
OK it’s this statement of Doc’s that you question:quote:
Doc: Yet, why ASSUME that God only knows "mights" by virtue of knowing "woulds?" Why assume all "mights" are logically entailed by "woulds"?
And in your first post your respond with:
Al: My fundamental disagreement with your position is that I am not convinced that your "mights" correspond directly to anything in the real world…[and]...What does the statement "X might happen" correspond to in reality? It seems to me that reality is composed only of things that are, not things that might. A thing that might is a way of speaking about *something that is not*, i.e. does not exist and is not a part of reality.
Tom: And after agreeing with my post to you, do you now agree that “mights” do either correspond to or not correspond to the real world (i.e., the present state of reality)? If they correspond to the present state they are true “mights” or “might nots” while if they do not correspond to the present state they are false “mights” or “might nots.”
And how is it that “x might do y in z” may correspond to the present state of reality? By virtue of belonging to that group of possible states of reality facing the present state. The present state of reality at T entails, for example, possible states of reality x, y, and z at T+1. And T+1’s x (to choose just one possible state of reality) entails possible states of reality r, s, and t for T+2, and so r entails possible states of reality for T+3 that entail possible states of reality at T+4 and so on. What this means is that “Possible world r might happen” is true at T by virtue of being in the bowels of possibilities immediately realizable at T+1. This is the bedrock of what I understand Doc’s “infinite intelligence” argument to be. If “x might do y in z ten million years from now” is true, it’s only because the state of reality proposed in this proposition is linked via an unbroken chain of possible states of reality extending from that proposed by the proposition to our present state of reality. You and I are cool with this then, right? That’s good.
So, you have no more reason to question whether “mights” correspond to anything in the real world. All “mights” either do or do not correspond to the real (present) world and are thus either true or false. As for your question “What does the statement ‘x might happen’ correspond to in reality [the present state of reality]?’” it seems that they correspond to the present state either by being a) immediately historical possible next steps or b) historical possible next steps entailed by some immediately historical possible next step. This is what it means to say present reality is composed in part of “mights.” All the possibilities we’ve described are present in reality here, now. They are part of what is, not what is not.
Granted, their future fulfillment or failure to fulfillment are not part of what is. Fulfillment, as you say, “is not.” And this is where perhaps you’re crossing wires, confusing “fulfillment” with “possibility.” The “possibility” now is part of the present state of reality, while the “fulfillment” is not now real. But if the possibility is real, it’s fulfillment MUST occur or not occur.
Al: But that isn't what I was saying you seem to disagree with Greg about. The issue is whether "mights" and "might nots" are themselves true or false purely based on what is, as a function of what is. You seem to be saying that (at least insofar as they concern the future) they are true or false only in relation to what is.
Tom: Right.
Al: But Greg said: "Yet, why ASSUME that God only knows "mights" by virtue of knowing "woulds?" Why assume all "mights" are logically entailed by "woulds"?" That is the statement of Greg's which it seems you and I both disagree with. If the question is "does God know 'mights' and 'might nots' only by virtue of knowing what is (and logical entailments)?", you (and I) would seem to answer YES, but Greg would seem to answer NO.
Tom: We can wait for Greg to respond. But I’ll pay for his breakfast this October at Perkins if he answers “NO." I’m sure he’d agree that “x might do y,” if it is true, is true only because it is, as I’ve described, linked to the present state of reality by either being a) an immediately historical possible next move (from the present T to T+1) or by being b) a historical possible next step entailed by some immediately historical possible next step (somewhere along the line, T+10 or T+ a million).
Something can only “possibly” happen in the future if the present state of reality permits it directly (immediately) or indirectly (in the distant future).
What Doc is questioning is not how “mights” must be true (as you and I have agreed) if they are true (I think he’d agree with what we’ve said so far), but rather that “mights” (that is, contingencies, or historical possibilities) are only true if they are true by virtue of being entailed by “would’s.” This is what Doc wants to disprove. If we assume that “mights” are true only in the sense that they are the legs to “woulds” then there are no contingencies (for “woulds” are not independently contingent). If the totality of possible states of reality facing the present state of reality is composed entirely of what “will” or “would” happen and never of what “might” happen (“might” independent of “would”) then in what sense are we to argue that the present state of reality “might” be x, y, or z at T+1? Without independently true “mights” there can be no “multiple possible next steps” for the present state of reality to move into. There can be only ONE historically possible next state of reality facing the present state, and only ONE historically possible next step for that state of reality, etc.
Al: Also, Greg seems to want to give some kind of ontological status to "mights" and "might nots". Or at least, he sometimes seems to speak in a way that suggests that they occupy a place in his ontology (i.e., he seems to think that reality is composed of "what is" AND "what might or might not", whereas I would say that reality is just composed of "what is"). But it just isn't clear to me exactly what he is saying. If he is giving "mights" and "might nots" an ontological status, then I disagree with him.
Tom: I think what I’ve been trying to describe (that future possibilities are part of what is now the case by virtue of being linked via an unbreakable line of possible states of reality, etc.) IS what I (as least, not sure about Doc) would describe as the “ontology” of the future. Again, distinguish between “fulfillment” (which has no ontology) and “possibility” (which I think must have an “ontology”). You already seem to agree that “x might do y in z five hundred years from now” is either TRUE or FALSE based on what is NOW the case, that is, “the case” ontologically speaking. This “possibility” NOW exists, though its fulfillment does not exist. And “x might do y in z” cannot be TRUE or FALSE without being ontologically true or false. If we distinguish clearly between “possibility” (or “historical contingency”) and “fulfillment,” the former being either true or false on the basis of what is now ontologically the case, and the latter being the name we WILL give to what WILL be ontologically the case when the possibility in question resolves itself into one or the other (which is MUST do), then I think we’re OK.
Al and John, if it is not ontology which grounds the truth-value of “x might do y in z,” then what does ground its truth-value? What "makes" it true that "x might do y in z"? Or in other words, if a proposition describing a "possible" state of affairs is TRUE by virture of corresponding to what is ontologically the case, then the "possibility"--NOT the state of affairs itself--is ontologically the case as well.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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John Earp
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| Posted 8/3/2003 8:07 AM (GMT -6) | | TGB,
I think I agree with you (if I get your meaning) that for something to be possible it must be possible based on the present state of reality. For instance, it is not possible, based on the present state of reality, for me to jump unassisted to the moon.
What I think I disagree with you about is that I honestly don't see how, all things considered, mights and woulds are anything BUT possibilities, and therefore they cannot be equated with being. They don't exist right now except as possibilities. I of course could be wrong (been that plenty of times), but it seems to me that it is not reasonable at all to try to attach ontological reality to that which is only possible but not actual.
I agree that for something to be possible, that particular possibility must be grounded in reality as it exists now (i.e., it must be possible given the present state of reality), however, I don't see the advantage or necessity or wisdom in assiging ontological status to things which only may come to exist based on the present and given certain conditions necessary to their eventuality.
I am probably in way over my head on this subject, and I apologize if my comments are not helpful to the discussion. I have never taken a philosophy course or a logic course, which would explain my lack of comprehension of this topic, if I do in fact lack comprehension of it. It just seems logical to me to say that possibilities are not actualities YET, and that they may or may not become actualities, depending on the conditions necessary for their fulfillment.
It seems to me that possibilities do in a sense "exist," but this is only as potentialities (that which might or would be, given the right conditions). But to say they are realities seems to me a bit like saying I am now the father of three children, which presently is only a possibility. That would be confusing potentiality with actuality.
Am I making any sense?
"The Discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world." Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology.
revivaltheology.net
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Tom
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| Posted 8/3/2003 10:00 AM (GMT -6) | | John: What I think I disagree with you about is that I honestly don't see how, all things considered, mights and woulds are anything BUT possibilities, and therefore they cannot be equated with being.
Tom: The "states of affirs" which they describe cannot be equated with being. But the "possibility" that state of affairs x may occur I think can be equated with being. I totally agree “mights” are never anything BUT possibilities. How could they be otherwise? “Possibilities” never exist as anything but as possibilities. Right. I’m not saying they are ever anything else. I don’t see why this means we cannot speak of “possibilities” as being what they are (not the actualities they describe of course).
John: …it seems to me that it is not reasonable at all to try to attach ontological reality to that which is only possible but not actual.
Tom: What makes possibilities “real” if not ontology? This is not to say possibilities are “actualities.” Possibilities are “possible actualities” (obviously). But what grounds the possibility if not what is “actually” the case. Here is where I think people keep confusing “possibilities” with the states of affairs they describe. But these are not the same.
John: I agree that for something to be possible, that particular possibility must be grounded in reality as it exists now…however, I don't see the advantage…in assiging ontological status to things which only may come to exist.
Tom: We’re not assigning ontological status “to things” that may come to exist. We’re (at least I) am attempting to assign ontological status to something that DOES exist, and THAT is NOT the state of affairs referred to in any proposition describing a possible future state of affairs, but rather the “possibility” of that state of affairs. For example, take “x might do y in z.” The state of affairs, or let’s say rather, the state of reality itself referred to in this proposition is NOT one and the same with the possibility of this state of reality. “Possibility” is one thing. “Fulfillment” (the actual state of affairs described in such propositions) is an entirely different animal. And they must be different if the possibilities are to exist NOW as possibilities when the actualities (or fulfillments) do not yet exist.
John: I am probably in way over my head on this subject, and I apologize if my comments are not helpful to the discussion. I have never taken a philosophy course or a logic course…
Tom: Neither have I, which is why I feel like I’m drowning every time I try to post on this crazy subject! It’s Doc’s fault!
John: It just seems logical to me to say that possibilities are not actualities YET, and that they may or may not become actualities, depending on the conditions necessary for their fulfillment.
Tom: Exactly. I know what you mean. I might be pushing for too fine a symantic here, but I prefer to say possibilities never “become” actualities. Possibilities live and die as possibilities. They never become anything else. They die in giving way to the states of affairs they describe or in failing to give way to those states of affairs. I might be alone in this one, but it makes perfect sense to me. If “x might do y in z” is true, this “possibility” has a life of its own apart from x’s actually doing (or not doing) y in z, for the possibility NOW exists even though x has neither done nor failed to do y in z. What accounts for this if not the ontological independence of possibilities (independent of their future actualization that is)?
John: It seems to me that possibilities do in a sense "exist," but this is only as potentialities (that which might or would be, given the right conditions).
Tom: Only that which “might” be. Possibilities are that which “might” be not what “would” be. If it’s a “would” it’s not independently “possible.”
John: But to say they are realities seems to me a bit like saying I am now the father of three children, which presently is only a possibility. That would be confusing potentiality with actuality. Am I making any sense?
Tom: Perfect sense. Which is why we need to distinguish between a “possibility” itself and the possible “state of affairs.”
“John might become the father of three children” is a proposition describing a possibility. The possibility (your being a possible father of three) NOW exists though the actuality (your being a father of three) does not. Part of who and what you are includes your now being “a possible father of three.” And believe me, possibilities are as real as anything else we deal with in life. We have to plan for them, account for them, protect ourselves from them, insure ourselves against them, invest REAL money and time into pursuing their fulfillment, etc. For something that possesses no ontological status whatsoever possibilities exert an amazing power over our lives.
Ontology might not be a good word to capture the “life” or “existence” of possibilities (not the actualities they describe—just the possibilities as possibilities). I’m not a philosopher and don’t use these words every day. But it’s the best word I can think of for the time being.
What I want to avoid is having to conclude that possibilities are not real because they possess no ontological status, which would follow if only that which possesses ontological status is rightly called REAL. If possibilities are REAL, they are so either a) by virtue of ontology or b) by virtue of the existence of that which is real which has no ontology (as opposed to that which is real which has ontology). For now I’m more inclined to think (a) is the case. Anyone wanna argue (b)? I’m all ears!
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| Posted 8/3/2003 10:23 AM (GMT -6) | | Al: Also, Greg seems to want to give some kind of ontological status to "mights" and "might nots". Or at least, he sometimes seems to speak in a way that suggests that they occupy a place in his ontology (i.e., he seems to think that reality is composed of "what is" AND "what might or might not", whereas I would say that reality is just composed of "what is").
Tom: Let's try it this way. Let's think of "what is" (viz., "reality") as the room you're standing in. This room has three doors. You have to choose one. You're free to choose any one. Each door leads you into another room with more doors, one of which you must choose. That choice leads you into another room with more doors, etc. until you die.
This example is a poor one because it suggests that the other rooms you enter and leave all NOW exist in the same sense. This is not the case. But don't think in terms of wood and block. This is a metphor for life. To open a door and pass into the room it offers takes TIME. And YET the rooms and doors you pass into ARE there as "possible" rooms and doors, otherwise you'd never be able to open a door and enter a room; never able to leave the room (world) you're in and pass into the world of your choices. Hang on.
OK. So the door you're in with its three doors is your present reality. But it is entirely correct (my short-circuited brain thinks) to say that all the rooms and doors connected to each of the three you NOW face are NOW present (though we seldom think this far ahead) in the three doors you face. What each door "IS" (ontologically speaking) is a passage way to another choice (or room of choices). If you choose door #2, the rooms and doors open to you through doors #1 and #3 are lost. They are no longer possible. They no longer "exist" because the room you just left is "history."
See the link? Your room with its doors is the ontological reality that now "is." But what each door "IS" is defined by what it leads to (or might lead to). This is what I mean be ascribing "ontological significance" to possibilities. But I DO distingish between "actualy being" in the room you are in NOW and being in other rooms (which is actually not the case). "Actualities" are the realities that define the room I am now in and the DOORS that room possesses. But those doors are part of the room, part of the reality that "IS."
OK, so kick me off the board. I am getting weirder and weirder.
Icon! Can I count on your for sympathy here bro?
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 8/3/2003 3:07 PM (GMT -6) | | My pre-existent twin (TGB) has held the fort on my behalf beautifully. In almost every instance he said what I would have said, and often better with more insight. Yet, for echoing purposes, let me respond to a few points first hand and perhaps add a few of my own.
TGB: But if any one is TRUE and the other two FALSE what are they if not contradictory? Answer: Contrary. "Contradiction" is ruled out in favor of "contrary" when one begins by assuming any one—ANY one—to be FALSE, in which case no determination can be made about the truth-value of the other two.
Doc: Got ya. But see, on the triangle, we DO know the determination of the other two points when we know the truth value of one. So, if its "contrary," it nonetheless acts "contradictory" in this respect. Yet, you’re right, if they're contradictory, then we have a scenario where two contradictorys (would/ would not) hold the same truth value, which is absurd.
UNLESS (hee hee) fuzzy logic leaps in at this point. But THAT would take us too far afield right now.
So, for the time being, I think I have to agree with you that it causes less friction with traditional categories to say this tri-relationship is contrary rather than contradictory. (But note how odd this is: a logic schema where THERE ARE NO contradictories!!!!)
Albert: What does the statement "X might happen" correspond to in reality? It seems to me that reality is composed only of things that are, not things that might. A thing that might is a way of speaking about *something that is not*, i.e. does not exist and is not a part of reality. So statements about mights can only be true or false insofar as they derive from statements about what is.
Doc: Albert, if this were true, there would be no logical difference between saying "x might happen" and "x does not exist." Clearly, the "might" is not just something that is NOT. The problem, as I see it, is that you define "reality" exclusively as ACTUAL. Why do THAT? We speak about possibilities and potentialities all the time.
Albert: Now for your conjoining of mights. The reason mights can be conjoined in the form "x might and might not do y" is because mights speak about what is not, not about what is.
Doc: Why assume THAT? When I say "x might and might now" I’m intending describing something that IS – a real state of affairs.
Albert: Might #1: Greg might have been born in Australia.
Might #2: Greg might have been President of the USA.
The point is that "might #1" and "might #2" are mutually exclusive (given the premise), and therefore could not both be actual. But mights are not actual, so the fact that they are logically inconsistent doesn't matter.
Doc: Here you’re using might in the past tense as a counterfactual. When we refer to FUTURE mights we are in a different logical domain. (Which is why, as I argued, they should not be described as COUNTERfactual, simply factual.)
Albert: Modal realism states that all possibilities are actual in exactly the same way that the world that we live in is actual.
Doc: This view seems to realize that possibilities are REAL and combine it with your view that only the ACTUAL is real – and it arrives at a rather strange conclusion. The fundamental question is, why assume that only actuality is real? Why level ontology in this fashion?
Albert: But surely, whatever is, is indeed settled?
Doc: Why assume THIS? I’m playing you in chess. The possible moves I have to make are REAL, though not actual. The moves I’m likely to make are REAL, and with a slightly different status than merely the moves I could possibily make. The REAL chess game includes actual pieces, actual players, actualized past moves – but also future possible moves and viable moves the players "might and might not" make.
Albert: "Yet, why ASSUME that God only knows "mights" by virtue of knowing "woulds?" Why assume all "mights" are logically entailed by "woulds"?"
That is the statement of Greg's which it seems you and I both disagree with. If the question is "does God know 'mights' and 'might nots' only by virtue of knowing what is (and logical entailments)?", you (and I) would seem to answer YES, but Greg would seem to answer NO.
TGB: We can wait for Greg to respond. But I’ll pay for his breakfast this October at Perkins if he answers "NO."
Doc: As much as I hate missing a free breakfast, TGB is right. This is the very point of our project.
Albert: If he is giving "mights" and "might nots" an ontological status, then I disagree with him.
Doc: You’ve pinpoint the place of our disagreement. Consider this Albert: if the only thing that is REAL is actuality, then I submit we have no intelligible way to talk about actuality. If there is only "non-existence" and then "actuality," there is no way to render intelligible the transition from "non-existence" to "actuality." The WAY we render the this transition intelligible is by talking about possibilities and potentialities. If these don’t exist, actuality becomes a string of absurd "poppings."
J. Earp. I think I agree that mights should not be considered as reality. Would it be helpful to define counterfactuals as potentialities as opposed to actualities?
Doc: Now you’re groov’n Johnny boy.
J. Earp. What I think I disagree with you about is that I honestly don't see how, all things considered, mights and woulds are anything BUT possibilities, and therefore they cannot be equated with being. They don't exist right now except as possibilities. I of course could be wrong (been that plenty of times), but it seems to me that it is not reasonable at all to try to attach ontological reality to that which is only possible but not actual.
Doc: You and Albert, I tell you. If mights have no ontological status, then WHAT ARE THEY? Suppose a person is thinking about buying a car. They see the sticker and say "impossible." They then check out the interior and say, "well, it would be nice." the car dealer shows new and interesting features that are important to the buyer, she turns to her husband and says, "You know, this would be worth it. It’s a real possibility." They then get a call from their stock broker who tells them their stock just went sky high and they say " We’ll take the car." What happened? THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION BETWEEN THE POTENTIAL BUYERS AND THE CAR CHANGED. How are we to discuss THE REALITY of this changing situation?
Tom: We’re not assigning ontological status "to things" that may come to exist. We’re (at least I) am attempting to assign ontological status to something that DOES exist, and THAT is NOT the state of affairs referred to in any proposition describing a possible future state of affairs, but rather the "possibility" of that state of affairs.
Doc: I love my twin. Amen.
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Tom
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| Posted 8/4/2003 12:31 AM (GMT -6) | | Al-
I appreciate your responses! Even if we end up agreeing to disagree, I don’t think this is that significant a point since you grant that all propositions describing what “might” or “might not” be are either true or false based on the present state of reality and that some of these "mights" are true, even if we disagree over precisely how it is they relate to the present state of reality (you prefer “is consistent with” reality and deny “corresponds to” reality). OK.
Al: I assert that "might" and "might nots" assert absolutely nothing about the real world. They do not correspond to the real world. However, they are true or false based on whether the POSSIBLE scenario that they do describe is LOGICALLY CONSISTENT with the real world.
Tom: I got your distinction. But let me ask, What constitutes, or accounts for, this consistency with the real world? Logic? Is it just a metaphysical surd? What is it about the real world that makes a proposition describing what THIS real world “might” be in the future either true or false? I don’t think there is an answer for this outside of the ontology of the real world. “Logical consistency”? That only begs the question, What makes “x might do y in z” consistent with or not consistent with the real world? It seems self-evident to me (which isn’t saying much!) that “x might do y in z” (if true) does in fact assert something about the real world. It asserts that the ontological state of the real world is such that it could become the state of the world described in “x might do y in z.” If false, it asserts that the ontological state of the real world is such that it could not become the state of the world described in “x might do y in z.” Something is asserted about the real world when one asserts that this real world either might or might not become x.
Confusing “possibility” with the states of affairs described in “might” propositions makes it impossible to see that “mights” assert something about the real world. Granted, there certainly is an “is not” to every true “might.” But what “is not”? What is not is the actuality, that is, x’s actually doing y in z as described in the proposition. This obviously does not exist. But there is also an “is” to true “mights.” And this “is” is that which the real world now is which MAKES it true that “x might do y in z.” So long as one fails to distinguish between “possibilities” and the states of affairs they describe and to account for what reality grounds the “consistency” that exists between possible states of affairs and the real world, one would understandably want to deny that “mights” assert anything about the real world.
Al: Something that is possible is something that belongs to the set of things which do not exist.
Tom: This is the distinction I’m talking about. I don’t claim that the “something” that is possible now exists. It clearly doesn’t. But the “possibility” that x may exist is not one and the same as x’s existing.
Al: I don't know what you mean by saying that things which do not exist "face" what does exist, unless you just mean that they are logically consistent with them.
Tom: Well, I certainly mean this. But to say that possibilities are “consistent” with what exists and stop there is to miss the point. We must probe deeper, asking, What is it about what does exist that accounts for or grounds this “consistency” with the real world? We cannot uphold the consistency of “mights” to the real world and deny that the real world is responsible for this consistency. So we’re knee-deep in the ontology of the real world. Is the real world open to becoming x, y, or z? Or is the real world such that it can become only one sort of world in the next moment?
Al: One more point. The word "might" is problematic. At its most basic, it simply means "possible" in a strict logical sense, i.e. logically possible. But it can also mean logically possible *given a particular set of circumstances*.
Tom: Quite so. And this is why the traditional square of opposites doesn’t work. For example, consider these propositions arranged on the traditional square.
(A) “x will do y in z” - - - - - - - (E) “x will not do y in z”
(I) “x might do y in z” - - - - - - - (O) “x might not do y in z”
A – O are contradictory, as are E – I. They must falsify each other. O falsifies A. But if “might” means merely “is logically possible that” then O cannot falsify A, for its being merely logically possible that x not do y in z cannot itself falsify “x will do y in z.” A and O can both be true if “might” does not describe something more than a mere logical possibility. There are other problems with the traditional square that we’ve been over in the past, but they all lead inevitably to the conclusion that “might” means more than “logically possible that.” It means something more like “historically possible given the present state of reality.”
Al: Greg, I think you're now using a different meaning of the word ‘possibility’. You are now using it to mean something achievable by an agent given the circumstances, rather than just something that might happen.”
Tom: Exactly! This is precisely the point. We don’t deny the “might” of logical possibility, but the square demands more of “might” by requiring that it falsify “will do x.” So Doc and I are definitely working with an understanding of “might” that is more than merely “logically possible that” (as Doc pointed out in his summary that opened this thread). I suggest we find a word other than “might” to describe mere logical possibility and reserve “might” for historical possibility (or whatever we end up calling that possibility which is more than merely logically possible).
I wonder if your now seeing what it is Doc and I mean by “might” affects the discussion at all.
Al: I want to ask this of Tom and Greg: if you agree with me that "mights" and "might nots" are true only if they are consistent with what is, why do you try and add something more to the idea of "mights" and "might nots" beyond this?
Tom: I don't see myself as "adding" something beyond the fact that "mights" are "consistent" with what is. What you view as something more is in my mind simply what constitutes or grounds this "consistency" you speak of. So, two reasons then. First, because “might” obviously means more than “is logically possible that.” Saying “x might do y in z” is ‘logically consistent’ with the real word is itself perfectly consistent with theological determinism and Molinism. The open view asserts something far more significant about reality’s openness to possibilities. Secondly, only ontology can ground the truth-value of propositions about what the real world might become. In fact, every proposition of the form “x might do y in z” can be rephrased as an assertion about the real world: "x might do y in z" = “The present state of reality is such that it might become r” where r = x’s doing y in z. Claiming that the present state of reality might become anything different than it is is to assert something about the real world, about its ontology, about the nature of creation and the ontological openness of the universe.
Al: I argue that their [“mights”] meaning derives from how they are known to be true or false. You seem to want to make them something a bit more substantial. Why?
Tom: I think it’s because “true” and “false” are attributes of what “is” the case, about what is “real.” Something can only be true or false based on what is real (ontologically speaking). If we are going to assert “x might do y” is true, then this truth-value must derive from the real world. That x has neither done nor failed to do y is entirely beside the point. The “possibility” (that is, reality's openness to becoming this particular world [one in which x does y in z]) exists now. The real world is now ontologically open to becoming this. This state of being open to becoming something different that what it is is what I mean by the ontological significance of a "possibility."
Keep firing away Albert. We’re a loooong way from finding the right way to describe this.
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Tom
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| Posted 8/5/2003 1:00 AM (GMT -6) | | Sorry to bore you all with more. But I just wanna get this outta my head.
Al: I say, not only is there no such thing as possibility in your sense, but I have not the foggiest notion what it would be like if it did exist. Please describe it for me. I want to be able to recognize a possibility if I come across one. I suspect I am about as likely to stumble across one, as I am to stumble across the ideal right angled triangle, or the number pi.
Tom: I was just thinking (I hope!)—what I’ve said thus far about “possibilities” ought to fit into a nominalist or a realist metaphysic. I’m not talking about the ideal “possibility” (as compared to the ideal right triangle), but about concrete possibilities. As I understand nominalism, it is not denied that there is a concrete chair I am now sitting on as I write. What is denied is that there exists a category of “chair” apart from the concrete one I’m sitting on (and apart from all the concrete chairs in the world).
My speaking of “possibility” in the singular is just a convention due to a way of speaking that’s more comfortable for me. Sorry if I’ve been confusing. Let’s stick to real, concrete “possibilities.”
I find it difficult to believe you do not recognize possibilities in your every day life, that you don’t every day deliberate between what YOU believe are possible courses of action. You may not believe these possible courses of action “correspond to” the real world or that they possess an ontology of their own. That’s fine. But what you DO recognize and deal with as “possibilities” (as you understand them) are what I’m attributing ontological significance to. When describing “possibilities” I’m not offering anything different than the real courses of action you and I deliberate between every day we live. I’m offering rather a different understanding of those courses of action. So to answer your question (“Describe a possibility for me; I want to be able to recognize a possibility if I come across one), if I am correct in ascribing ontological significance to the concrete courses of action, options, and alternatives we choose between, the truth of my position would not be noticeable in options themselves nor in our manner of choosing between these options. It is rather assumed—or rather, “consistent with”—our manner of choosing between possible courses of action. The truth of my position (if I’m right), provides a better explanation for our shared manner of deliberating between possible courses of action. I’m not suggesting your understanding makes no sense to you as you choose from among alternatives. We’re just cross-polinatin’ here! If in the exchange of beliefs we each happen upon something that works or makes sense of life for us, embrace it. If not, flush it.
All that to say (again) that I think we’re talking about the same thing (or experience), the same situations of life in which we choose between courses of action or options. I claim these courses of action, these “possibilities,” are “real,” they are ontologically the case. They are part of what the real world IS. Consequently, their propositions assert something about the real world. What do they attribute to the real world? They attribute an ontological openness to the real world, a window or door existing in the real world. Each individual “might” asserts a unique openness to become that state of affairs described by each individual “might.” In my view, the specific courses of action we choose between are presented to us for our consideration not by logic, nor by anything unreal, but by the real world itself. It is what the real world now is that we choose between when we choose between possible courses of action. This is the ontology of possibilities. It would only be meaningless to say "we now choose between what IS the case" if the real world was not ontologically open to being different than what it is in more than one way. But if what the world “IS” in part is an openness to become x, y, or z, then it is meaningful to say "we choose betwen what IS the case" (possibilities) in order to bring about what is NOT the case (the actualities they describe).
It’s like the analogy I suggested of standing in a room with doors (= the real world with its possibilities) and choosing to open one door and live in the room (= the world and choices) it leads to. To say possibilities are not ontologically a part of the real world is to say the room in which you stand has no doors. But it does have doors, and the doors lead somewhere. The “somewhere” doesn’t exist and isn’t “actual.” But the “door” (the “possibility” itself) does exist. It’s part of the real world we now stand in. I’m not ascribing ontological significance to the “somewhere” to which various doors may lead us; I am rather ascribing ontological significance to the “doors” of the real world in which I stand.
Does this make sense to anybody out there?
I’m ready for the hangman’s noose!
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Tom
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| Posted 8/5/2003 6:43 AM (GMT -6) | | Albert-
Take your time. I have to reread them myself to figure out what is was I said!
Peace Down-Under,
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Tom
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| Posted 8/6/2003 3:29 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: A – O are contradictory, as are E – I. They must falsify each other. O falsifies A. But if “might” means merely “is logically possible that” then O cannot falsify A, for its being merely logically possible that x not do y in z cannot itself falsify “x will do y in z.”"
Albert: I disagree. O does falsify A.
I'm totally swamped for a bit here, Albert. Sorry. Catching up on stuff. I'm tag teaming with Doc, so it's (hopefully) his turn to body slam ya! But let me quickly say that my point was not to deny that A contradicts O (or that E contradicts I). They certaintly do! I in fact affirmed this clearly. What I denied was that these can contradict each other (as they SHOULD) if "might" means only "is logically possible that." Becasue they DO contradict each other, there must be more to "mights" than mere logical possibility.
I'm tagging Doc right now! Break a chair over his head Doc!
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 8/6/2003 8:26 PM (GMT -6) | | AL: A) "x will do y in z" entails (A') "there is no possible world in which x will not do y in z"
(O) "x might not do y in z" entails (O') "there is at least one possible world in which x will not do y in z"
Now A' and O' are clearly contradictory and mutually exclusive. Therefore, so are A and O.
Doc: You give a very strong and counterintutive interpretation to "A." If I say "Tom will respond again soon," I am not saying "There is no possible world in which Tom will not respond again soon." I’m only saying, "In this world, Tom will respond again soon." Of course, it is logically possible Tom will not respond again soon, even if its absolutely true that Tom WILL respond again soon. Hence, it doesn’t seem that A contradicts O.
Al, the only truths that hold across all possible worlds are necessary truths. On your treatment of the square of opposition, all "A" statements would be statements of necessary truths. What if I wanted to make a statement of a contingent truth (all professors are boring; all crows are black; all horses have four legs,etc…)? Where would I put them? And note, NONE of these statements contradict the logical possibility of their alternative.
Albert: I assert that "might" and "might nots" assert absolutely nothing about the real world. They do not correspond to the real world. However, they are true or false based on whether the POSSIBLE scenario that they do describe is LOGICALLY CONSISTENT with the real world.
Doc: When I say I might and might not work out tomorrow, I am saying something much more than "working out tomorrow is logically consistent with my present."
Albert: In other words, whether they are true or false can only be assessed in relation to the real world. But that doesn't mean they assert anything about the real world as it is.
Doc: Albert, I have to confess I find this VERY strange. How can something that doesn’t assert anything about the real world be deemed true or false – let alone true or false as assessed by the real world?
Back to ordinary language: I say to my wife, "I might work out tomorrow." She says, "Really?" I respond, "No, the ‘might’ didn’t say anything about the real world.’ Isn’t this odd? I WANT to give a fact about the REAL WORLD: namely, I might and might not work out tomorrow. I want to say that in the REAL WORLD, its not yet decided that I WILL or WON’T.
Albert: "Might" and "might not" statements are the subset of "do not exist" statements that are logically consistent with what does exist.
TGB: Granted, there certainly is an "is not" to every true "might." But what "is not"? What is not is the actuality, that is, x’s actually doing y in z as described in the proposition. This obviously does not exist. But there is also an "is" to true "mights." And this "is" is that which the real world now is which MAKES it true that "x might do y in z."
Doc: I love my preexistent twin. This was exactly what I was thinking when I read Al’s post.
A speaking of my twin, a final quote that is just to beautiful to let slip into the nether world of forgotten posts to quickly. Tom writes:
What do [mights] attribute to the real world? They attribute an ontological openness to the real world, a window or door existing in the real world. Each individual "might" asserts a unique openness to become that state of affairs described by each individual "might." In my view, the specific courses of action we choose between are presented to us for our consideration not by logic, nor by anything unreal, but by the real world itself. It is what the real world now is that we choose between when we choose between possible courses of action. This is the ontology of possibilities. It would only be meaningless to say "we now choose between what IS the case" if the real world was not ontologically open to being different than what it is in more than one way. But if what the world "IS" in part is an openness to become x, y, or z, then it is meaningful to say "we choose betwen what IS the case" (possibilities) in order to bring about what is NOT the case (the actualities they describe).
BRAVO.
Doc
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/7/2003 12:03 AM (GMT -6) | | 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6...
Adiaphora, call in the paramedics. Bring a stretcher! Albert was just body-slammed on the canvas by Doc and is out cold. Somebody bring some ice and smelling salts over too (and two cigars for Doc and me!).
...7, 8, 9...
Al? Al? Come to Al! Come to.
...10! The match is over!
Tom
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/7/2003 7:51 PM (GMT -6) | | Albert: The simple fact is, that you and Tom are *wrong* in claiming that A and O are not contradictories. THEY ARE.
Tom: OF COURSE they are! Doc and I do not deny this.
Albert: The whole square works perfectly as it is supposed to, and therefore your whole argument is built on an error.
Tom: Are you reading OUR posts?
Albert: The square of opposition for "will", "will not", "might", "might not" accords perfectly with classical logic and works out as follows:
A is the contrary of E
A is the contradictory of O
E is the contradictory of I
I is the subaltern of A
O is the subaltern of E
I is the subcontrary of O
Game, set and match to ALBERT!
Tom: You haven't said anything that we disagree with! This isn't what we talk about when we complain about the square!
Now go do your homework you naughty boy! 
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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