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In "God of the Possible", Dr. Boyd states that "... if God foreknows a future event, it must either be because he determined it or because it is an inevitable effect of past or present causes."

Do these two categories exhaust all possibilities? How would the
OV respond to a third possibility, namely that God knows everything
from one eternal now? Also, how would the OV view respond to the
charge that they are placing God IN time? (as opposed to outside
of time, "eternity")

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Do these two categories exhaust all possibilities?

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namely that God knows everything

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• Time involves change; and God does not change. How can anyone say that God is "in" time?



• Further, why would anyone say that God is "not un-enscribed" by time.

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Originally posted by PotOnWheel

Here's a colateral question (or two).

• ]Time involves change; and God does not change.

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Originally posted by aquinas
Can we know anything about God through His creation?

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Originally posted by honorman

Besides EVERYONE must deal with the fact that it isn't open theists who brought up the idea of God changing but the Old Testament.

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Originally posted by honorman

POW: as you probably know (given that you have been on this board so long), open theists believe that God does not change in his core being, nor in core will, but does change in relationship to his creatures.

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As I understand, the OV holds that the future is not "something" that
can be known, and therefore it is not a limitation on God's part if
He can't know the future.

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if God foreknows a future event, it must either be because he determined it or because it is an inevitable effect of past or present causes."

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and therefore it is not a limitation on God's part if
He can't know the future

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if God foreknows a future event, it must either be because he determined it or because it is an inevitable effect of past or present causes."

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So with this in mind, how would you respond to my previous question?
Are the above mentioned ways of knowing the future the only means
for God to know what is going to happen? If so, then can God have
some knowledge of the future? If He can have knowledge of
the future, (even some), then the future must be something that can
(at least to some degree) be known, wouldn't you agree?

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However, I think that getting into the details of the ontological
status of the future is a little premature.

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Could you answer a few questions for me? (could you give me as
pointed answers as possible)

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Is it possible for God to know (with certainty) future events?
(Obviously I am not saying "all future events" because I know your answer to that. I also believe that your answer to this question is yes, but I just want to make sure again.)

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If God can know some future events (regardless of how He knows
them), why can't God know all future events?

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Do you hold that man is the first cause of his own actions?

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Do you hold that given two options, man can actually choose either?

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JET: Ross, I’m not the one to summarize the divine timeless knowledge view. Heck, I haven’t even read the four views book. But I know someone who would do a great job summarizing this view and potential problems…hint: his middle initial is G, not J.

Tom: Ha! I just got it! Funny. You sly fox. Well, I don’t have much time actually. We’ve been round and round and round and…stop it!...this issue a hundred, no, a thousand, no, an infinite number of times! I’m now convinced that it’s past threads on the issue of God’s relationship to time that bunker-busted the search engine!

If you’re really interested (and you like pain) then read William Lane Craig’s Time and Eternity. Good book. Parts of it are really brilliant!

I think God is “now” temporal. He experiences the flow of time. Plain and simple. However, the mode of God’s existence in the absence of creation, whether temporal or atemporal, is, for me, a colossal waste of time to discuss at worst, and at best interesting Ph.D. thesis fodder for the super-intelligent (which I’m not). What God’s relationship to time is (or was) in the absence of (or prior to) the creation of the universe could not be more beside the point. Creation is here now. Who cares what God’s relationship to time was when it wasn’t here? And if you could prove it one way or the other, what would it matter now that creation is here?

Craig and others have convinced me as well that the idea that God is both timeless (atemporal, non-sequential; pick your term, doesn’t matter) AND temporal (in time, sequential, acts in time; pick your term, doesn’t matter) is an incoherent and so meaningless notion. Even if it could be construed as being coherent (I’m aware that Bill Hasker, whose views on this I really respect, actually defends the coherence of the view though he disagrees with it) it would explain nothing whatsoever. I find it an utterly useless construct. Some love the idea and revel in it. For some it’s the centerpiece of the view of God. I’m happy to see them happy.

For those needing a bit more pain in their lives, here’s a bit of something I submitted to my leadership last year in a paper (by the way, Laika, I liked your comment, “Declaring I’ll wear socks tomorrow doesn’t mean I see the future”!):

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[Note: There’s some of Doc and others in here. You’ll see it. I actually did footnote it where necessary in the printed version of this, but I took all that out for posting it here.]

What of the popular claim made by many Arminians that God simply “previews” (as it were) all of history? He doesn’t determine or cause all that happens, he simply “sees” it timelessly. On this view, our choices are free in the libertarian sense (viz., we could do other than we do), but God sees them timelessly and so eternally knows all that will ever come to pass. I’m personally unable to hold to such a view of God’s foreknowledge for several reasons:

First, it is incompatible with libertarian free will. Though there are those who argue that no contradiction exists in the claim that God eternally foreknows as definite our free choices, I’m inclined to side with those who argue otherwise.


Secondly, I believe it to be unscriptural. Scripture portrays God as sometimes “changing his mind” in response to human actions, expecting what does not come to pass (e.g., Isa. 5.1-4; Jer. 3.6-7, 19-20), speaking conditionally about the future (e.g., Ex. 13.17; Jer. 26), and testing people “to know” what is in their hearts. However, if the future is eternally settled in the mind of God, it becomes impossible, in my view, to understand such descriptions as truthful depictions of God’s relatedness to us and we are left with no option but to view God’s speaking in such ways as disingenuous.


Thirdly, the simple-foreknowledge model affords no providential value whatsoever. If God timelessly knows all of history in the sense argued by advocates of simple-foreknowledge, then he knows his own as well as our choices, and he knows them in one single, timeless sweep. He does not acquire this knowledge in stages; he timelessly possesses it as an attribute. In this case, simple-foreknowledge provides God no providential advantage in governing the universe for the simple reason that God cannot intervene into the story line of history on the basis of such knowledge or access such knowledge in an attempt to determine what his own actions are to be. This includes attempting to prevent undesired events or to bring about what he does desire, warning and guiding people, and prophesying future events. What is foreknown, according to this view, is what actually happens and by definition is already the result of whatever has or has not been done to influence it. Such knowledge cannot then also be the basis of such interaction for the simple reason that this knowledge comes to God too late (logically speaking) for God to use it to influence outcomes.

For example, let us say God timelessly knows that Susan will be in a fatal car accident on her 21st birthday. Granted, this knowledge does not cause her death or determine her choice to go driving with her friends. We’re only talking here about whether or not timelessly definite foreknowledge provides God a basis upon which he is able to act providentially. Can God use his knowledge of Susan’s death to warn Susan not to go driving? Can God act in a miraculous way to prevent this accident? In fact, can God do anything on the basis of his knowledge that Susan will die to prevent her from dying? The answer to these questions is, of course, that God cannot intervene on the basis of simple-foreknowledge in order to prevent this event from happening. Since God’s foreknowledge is infallible, what he foreknows will happen will indeed happen. Not even God can act in order to change what he infallibly knows will come to pass. Simple-foreknowledge, if it existed, would be useless to God in preventing foreknown evil and other undesired events.

The same thing applies to God’s acting to bring about some event he wishes should happen. Why? Because by the time God foreknows what will happen, it’s logically too late to make use of this knowledge in order to bring about this event. The foreknown event is already the result of whatever divine influence contributed to bringing it about. It cannot also be the basis of that influence. On the simple-foreknowledge view, everything that God knows he knows timelessly. He doesn’t gain his knowledge of the future in stages. Therefore, if God were to timelessly possess exhaustively definite knowledge of past, present, and future, such knowledge could not provide him a basis upon which to determine how to act in ways not also timelessly foreknown by him. Thus, there is nothing a God who possesses simple-foreknowledge can do that a God who does not possess such foreknowledge cannot also do. In truth, whatever might be the reciprocal nature of the relationship between God’s actions and ours within the foreknowledge of God, the simple-foreknowledge model offers us no help whatsoever in understanding it. In my exposure to advocates of simple-foreknowledge, it appears the chief reason they hold to this model is because of the perceived providential advantage they believe it gives God and the perceived basis for trust in God they believe it gives them. But once the providential uselessness of simple-foreknowledge is faced, and the providential advantage of infinite intelligence (to be discussed immediately) is understood, one can continue trusting God with the added benefit of not having to embrace beliefs which explain nothing.


Lastly, the integrity of divine-human relations and God’s knowledge of tensed facts require, in my view, the abandonment of the timeless view of God in favor of temporal eternity. God engages in real relations with a changing temporal world and has perfect knowledge of tensed facts. These entail his being temporal. I would also argue, though the open view does not require it, that the integrity of God’s triune personhood suggests there is in some sense of the words a “before” and an “after” that characterize God’s own inner triune life irrespective of his relating to creation—the eternal, loving fellowship that exists between Father, Son, and Spirit and that constitutes God’s own experience and enjoyment of himself. God is not an “eternal, unblinking, cosmic stare”; he is from eternity actively self-related and personal.


[Note: As I said, I no longer find it necessary to even have an opinion on the mode of God’s existence prior to (or in the absence of) creation. My “hunch” is that God was not absolutely timeless prior to creation, and I state here the reasons why. Craig has me doubting this a bit while Nick Wolterstorff freed me up to not give a rip!]

…Does God play chess? There are three reasons for believing this is a good analogy of the way God relates to us:

First, as we’ve already seen, if God possessed timeless knowledge of every move I make in life, it would do him no good. He could not use this knowledge to strategize, plan, or respond to any of my moves, for every move he ever makes is equally foreknown in the one timeless act of knowing. Timeless knowledge is providentially useless.


Secondly, in the open view, possibilities give God room to move and act, room which timeless knowledge cannot provide. It accounts for how we actually live our lives and relate to God as well as for how God is able to act providentially in the world.


Thirdly, God’s glory and greatness are increased if we understand him as infinitely intelligent and facing a partly open future. Who is more glorious? A God who timelessly faces a future he can do nothing about or a God who achieves his purposes by perfectly knowing and preparing for all possible futures? Who do we admire more? A chess player who plays you with a computer printout of all the moves you will make, or a chess player who, facing genuine novelty as the game proceeds, and perfectly attending to every possible move and the constantly changing probabilities, is nevertheless creative and resourceful enough to guarantee the final victory? I’m genuinely surprised that anyone would call into question the orthodoxy of somebody who chooses to believe the latter describes the greater God.
Lastly, as amazing as it may seem, the simple-foreknowledge model seems to me to be…

…nothing more than pre-recorded open theism!

Consider, the simple-foreknowledge model believes that we live in a world where God really responds to us, where we are really free to choose, where our prayers really make a difference to God, and where things might sometimes really be different than they are. Open theists also believe we live in this kind of world. The only difference is that advocates of simple-foreknowledge believe that everything about this world exists eternally in God’s mind, and their trust in God’s providential care rests in this being the case. But I ask, what difference would such knowledge make to God? What difference would it make to the world? What providential advantage would God gain by possessing this kind of knowledge as opposed to foreknowledge of all possible story lines? None whatsoever. And if such knowledge is of no practical value to God, believing that he possesses such knowledge is of no practical value to us.

Tom

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