 |
| 
leth
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/1/2002 8:17 PM (GMT -6) |   | I recently came across the statement, "God can not create what he does not know", and it seemed to me to be very relevant to the OV (Open View) given the dogma of creation ex nihilo.
I would first like to introduce the following axioms (and correct me if they are not consistent with the OV):
A1. Given state of affairs S[0], the next state of affairs S is derivable from S[0] as perfectly and definitely known if and only if S[0] contains no elements capable of exercising libertarian free-will.
A2. Given state of affairs S[0], the next state of affairs S is not derivable from S[0] as perfectly and definitely known if and only if S[0] contains one or more elements capable of exercising libertarian free-will.
A3. God's knowledge of the future is consistent with A1 and A2.
Then, consider the following state of affairs of reality (where reality is all that is real):
* God exists and nothing else exists (to allow creation ex nihilo).
Let us say that this is state of affairs S[0]. Given the above description of S[0], S[0] does not contain an element capable of exercising libertarian free-will. Therefore, given A3, state of affairs S is derivable from S[0]. God knows the future at least through S both perfectly and definitely.
Now, it's time to create. Let's say that God creates a plane suitable for a bipedal being to walk about. In addition to this, let's say that God creates a bipedal being upon this plane.
So we have state of affairs S:
* God exists. A plane about which a bipedal being may move, exists. A bipedal being, B, of the sort that is structurally capable of moving about this plane exists and is on the plane.
Let us further describe being, B. B has 2 component parts: a pair of legs and a mechanism called a will. If B is physically capable of performing an action, and is not otherwise prevented from taking an action, B will take said action if B's will is in the state of desiring to take said action.
Since B is not yet a free agent, by A3 ,state of affairs S is derivable from S. God still knows the next state of affairs perfectly and definitely.
Now let us assume that God wishes to grant B free agent status; B will be a being capable of exercising libertarian free-will (note again A1-A3):
Although I have a general idea of how to procede with my case, I can not currently offer a sound argument in deductive form that it is not logically possible for God to create a free agent given creation ex nihilo and if God is granted perfect and definite knowledge of the present.
Until I can, what I would very much like to see is a discussion of how God may grant free agent status to being B. This could then eventually be formulated as a constructive proof that it is logically possible for God to create such a being.
Then to start things off, I return to my initial paragraph about the matter of God creating something that he does not know. What I see to be the problem here as you (hopefully) attempt to proceed is that B will not function unless subjected to stimuli. Yet further, B will not function unless it is defined how it should respond to certain stimuli. The problem can be stated simply as, "God can not create a being that will function in a way that he does not know."
We could say that he need not do so, but rather only that he not know how the stimuli itself will function and when it will manifest itself. Yet then we see the same difficulty. The stimuli can not function in a way that is not definied.
My reasoning for this is not what you may think, but rather that saying, "Let there be X," is a meaningless statement unless X is exhaustively defined. There is no authority that God may appeal to for a definition, and no contractor that can do something without his knowledge.
I would appreciate any discussion, specifically if you can build a free agent given God, the plane, and B possessing a pairs of legs and a mechanism called a "will" capable of having a state that will correspond to actions taken by B.
Thanks, I realize that this is quite lengthy, but I just do not yet know how to present this convincingly in deductive form. | | Back to Top | | |
 |
Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
Date Joined Apr 2002
Total Posts : 635
| Posted 7/2/2002 3:15 AM (GMT -6) | | Welcome leth,
leth: Thanks, I realize that this is quite lengthy, but I just do not yet know how to present this convincingly in deductive form.
TIM: Neither does me or rather Huh? I mean, I catch very little of what you are getting at, my fault  , which might be disappointing for me if I should comment, however, I will by the act of my own volition, do so, I think  . Are you asking if God, whom possesses a free will and volition, is capable of creating a creature after His own image, in His own likeness; just wondering  ?
God’s Love,
Tim
| | Back to Top | | |
|
leth
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/2/2002 1:07 PM (GMT -6) | | Yes, I would like to look into how God could have created a free agent.
Let me make an attempt at fulfilling my request:
Suppose that God defines being B further as follows:
* When subjected to stimuli S1, B will will to take action A1.
* When subjected to stimuli S2, either B will will to take action A1 or B will will to take action A2.
* B is physically capable of taking actions A1 and A2, and B will not be prevented from taking the action that it wills; B will take the action that it wills to take.
I believe that this is the process (albeit simplified) by which the Open Theist would suggest that God may create free agents.
Suppose that God has decided to subject B to stimuli S1. God knows the next state of affairs, because B is not in the current state of affairs, capable of exercising libertarian free will. This is as expected.
Suppose instead that God has subjected B to stimuli S2. Either B will will to take action A1 or B will will to take action A2. Here the Open Theist would say that God does not know the future perfectly and defninitely; the future is open they would say; God has (supposedly) created a free agent.
However, this does not escape the previously mentioned problem. We must introduce a mechanism to decided whether B will will A1 or whether B will will A2. Then we are again back to our original problem; God would have to create this mechanism to function in a way that he does not know.
| | Back to Top | | |
|
Iconoclast
Registered Member
Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1227
| Posted 7/2/2002 5:59 PM (GMT -6) | | How about something like - He took a portion of that part of himself that has LFW and put it in B. God knows exactly how the mechanism of LFW works because he knows how he works. He has a working model of it. Perhaps this is why the text says that God breathed his spirit into Adam.
Is this at all what you are trying to get at?
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson | | Back to Top | | |
|
leth
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/2/2002 7:15 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
How about something like - He took a portion of that part of himself that has LFW and put it in B. God knows exactly how the mechanism of LFW works because he knows how he works. He has a working model of it. Perhaps this is why the text says that God breathed his spirit into Adam.
Yes, this is what I am trying to get at, and I appreciate you taking the time to look through it. However, I do not believe that it is at all so simple.
Unless this supposed mechanism allowing a being to exercise LFW chooses one choice from a set of many in such a way that God does not know in advance which it will choose given a particular set of choices, then I believe it fails to allow the creation of a free agent for the same reasons as noted previously. Yet, let us supppose that it is such a thing and therefore does not fail for these reasons, and attempt to discover its implications.
First, is it acceptable to say that God knows that he works in a way such that when a set of mutually exclusive but equally possible (equally in accordance with God's will) actions are presented to himself upon considering the counsel of his will, that upon the influence of this supposed mechanism God's will with respect to the stimuli giving rise to the set of possible actions comes to be in the state of willing to take one and only one of these set of actions (where before this influence, his will was neutral with respect to taking any particular one of them), where God can not know definitely which of the set it will be?
I must think on this, but it seems intuitively correct to me to say here that then we sacrifice God's perfect and exhaustive knowledge of the present.
Second, if the first is coherent, there is also the question of transferability.
[edit: wording]
Edited by - leth on 07/03/2002 12:18:11 AM | | Back to Top | | |
|
Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
Date Joined Apr 2002
Total Posts : 635
| Posted 7/3/2002 1:42 AM (GMT -6) | | Dear leth,
I believe you are suggesting that choice may not be the free act of my volition, because God determines or influences its perimeters by His own knowledge; is this correct in my understanding, of what you are presenting.
"I also believe, God experiences what He knows and I know what I experience", rather than, "God learning the outcome of what He knows and I knowing the outcome of what I learn".
God’s Love,
Tim
| | Back to Top | | |
|
leth
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/3/2002 6:56 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
I believe you are suggesting that choice may not be the free act of my volition, because God determines or influences its perimeters by His own knowledge; is this correct in my understanding, of what you are presenting.
Either this, or that if you are capable of exercising LFW, it may come at the minimum cost of sacrificing creation ex nihilo and God's perfect and exhaustive knowledge of the present.
Supposing still that it is coherent, do you find the functioning of the mechanism suggested by Iconoclast as I described in my previous post to be an acceptable illustration of how God is capable of exercising LFW, with the purpose of possibly allowing that duplicating this mechanism in beings is a means whereby God may grant beings free-agent status?
Perhaps what I first should have asked was for input to creating a definition of "capable of exercising LFW", as I suspect that this would significantly narrow the task of constructing (with whatever sacrifices) a mechanism to allow it.
Then, my understanding of the open view definition of "free agent" is: "an agent capable of exercising libertarian free will". I understand the open view to define "capable of exercising libertarian free will" fully as meaning that in the current state of affairs, the agent has before it several courses of action, and God does not know which course of action it will take. Also, I understand it to make the qualifications noted in A1-A3 of my first post.
[edit: poor wording]
Edited by - leth on 07/03/2002 1:24:30 PM | | Back to Top | | |
|
Iconoclast
Registered Member
Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1227
| Posted 7/3/2002 7:22 PM (GMT -6) | | leth
Then, my understanding of the open view definition of "free agent" is: "an agent capable of exercising libertarian free will". I understand the open view to define "capable of exercising libertarian free will" fully as meaning that in the current state of affairs, the agent has before it several courses of action, and God does not know which course of action it will take.
Iconoclast
This is how I understand it. I may choose to have 2 children or I may choose to have 3 children - or more or less. I may suddenly choose to act on an impulse to scratch my knee or I may put it off for another second or two. It seems to me that God would have a pretty good understanding of the probabilities but for God to know 100% all the time exactly what choice we will make would logically require that we are 100% determined by our environment and genetic make up and therefore free-will does not exist.
In fact, isn't part of what it means to be Human is that we are capable of choosing to suffer pain for another person? We are capable of NOT following our environmental and genetic influences that are screaming at us to save our own life in order to save someone else's life? This reminds of the benegesserit witch ("Dune" trilogy - first book) that tests the Quissatch Hadderach's "humanity" by torturing his hand in a box under the threat of death that if he withdraws his hand he will immediately die. In this view to be human means to be able to choose to ignore our bodily programming for a greater purpose.
leth
First, is it acceptable to say that God knows that he works in a way such that when a set of mutually exclusive but equally possible (equally in accordance with God's will) actions are presented to himself upon considering the counsel of his will, that upon the influence of this supposed mechanism God's will with respect to the stimuli giving rise to the set of possible actions comes to be in the state of willing to take one and only one of these set of actions (where before this influence, his will was neutral with respect to taking any particular one of them), where God can not know definitely which of the set it will be?
I must think on this, but it seems intuitively correct to me to say here that then we sacrifice God's perfect and exhaustive knowledge of the present.
Iconoclast
Again, this is exactly how I understand that it logically MUST be in order for free will to exist. Although I don't quite see how this means that we sacrifice God's perfect and exhaustive knowledge of the present. It seems to me that this is still intact. What is not intact is any thought that God has exhaustive knowledge of the future. God only knows the future as a set of possibilities with probabilities. Now, of course, this doesn't mean that God can't decide which probabilities he would like to assign 100% to by "over-determining" the outcome - which to me means compatibilistically making certain events come to pass - thus prophecy is simply God deciding what he is going to make happen - and sometimes only with conditions attached - IF you do this THEN I will do the following. I also do not think that this in any way limits God's omniscience. God knows everything that there IS to know. The future IS NOT yet. So we are not saying something about God's omniscience here, we are just saying something about the nature of the future.
I haven't actually read it but I think Greg Boyd lays all this out in his book, "God of the Possible".
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson | | Back to Top | | |
|
Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
Date Joined Apr 2002
Total Posts : 635
| Posted 7/6/2002 7:36 AM (GMT -6) | | Dear leth and Iconoclast,
Iconoclast on free will:
[The possible]…God only knows the future [concerning my free choices] as a set of possibilities with probabilities
[The certain]…God can decide which probabilities [of my free choices] he would like to assign
[The foreordained]…Prophecy is simply God deciding what he is going to make happen
[The contingent]…And sometimes only with conditions attached [to my free choices] - IF you do this THEN I will do the following
I also do not think that this in any way limits God's omniscience. God knows everything that there IS to know. The future IS NOT yet. So we are not saying something about God's omniscience here, we are just saying something about the nature of the future.
TIM: Iconoclast, I agree with the above position, which I believe you are presenting. That is, you have presented yourself clear enough, for my comprehension on these few points; concerning God’s attributes.
God is infinitely wise, with universal knowledge; knows absolutely all those things, which are possible as what is possible, certain as what is certain, contingent as what is contingent, and all those things, which are foreordained as what is predestined conclusion.
God, with an infinite foreknowledge or intelligence, without fatalistic determinism, remains free to make decisions and alter purposes according to His own will and wisdom; He is not a prisoner of His own foreknowledge. That is, God is relational…
God’s Love,
Tim
Edited by - Tim on 07/06/2002 12:37:46 PM | | Back to Top | | |
|
leth
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/6/2002 9:11 AM (GMT -6) | | Let me put it simply: it is my opinion that Open Theism must suppose God to be incapable of knowing how he himself will function. I believe that this leads to certain situations that Open Theists will likely find unacceptable.
I will attempt to illustrate this through a thorough example.
Further, and I will address this in a future post, I believe that because of this God can not create self-determining free agents (transfer his LFW mechanism as has been suggested).
First, I will concede that the description of free will that you have accepted is coherent. Below I will set up a situation in which God will exercise libertarian free will according to this description.
Let us suppose that God's nature compels him to will as follows prior to the influence of the LFW mechanism:
* Given the presence of stimuli S1, God will take only action A1.
* Given the presence of stimuli S2, either God will take action A2 or God will take action A3, where taking A2 and taking A3 are mutually exclusive.
Now let us suppose that stimuli S1 is present. God wills to take action A1, and will take action A1. God is not free with respect to stimuli S1.
Now let us suppose that stimuli S2 is present. Here we will suppose that God is free due to the influence of the LFW mechanism.
First, suppose again that upon considering the counsel of his will, God finds mutually exclusive actions A2 and A3 to be equally acceptable. If it is the case that given the presence of S2 that God can definitely know which course of action he will take, then God is not capable of exercising libertarian free will with respect to stimuli S2. We must then suppose that he can not definitely which course of action he will take. Then at this logical moment, the LFW mechanism influences God's will such that God now wills to take either A2 or action A3. God's course of action in this situation is contingent upon the unknowable choice-making functioning on the LFW mechanism.
I will first say that it seems absurd to suggest that in one logical moment God finds two courses of action equally acceptable, but that in the next, God suddenly finds one action more acceptable and now wills to take it. Yet, if not this, the other option is that God does not come to will to take only one of the actions and does not come to find it more acceptable, but rather that God is irresistably compelled by this LFW mechanism to take only one of the courses of action.
Further, according to my understanding of the insistence of Open Theists, God is not morally responsible for his free actions if this is an accurate portrayal of God exercising libertarian free will (and neither is he morally responsible for his non-free actions, those done necessarily due to his nature). Although God can place himself in a situation where he may by logical necessity freely take one of several mutually exclusive actions, he can not know which of the actions he will take. For God, taking a particular free action is a matter of chance. He can set himself up to freely take a particular action, but he can not guaruntee that he will take it. Given this definition of moral responsibility, shall we praise God, or shall we praise the unknowable functioning of the LFW mechanism he possesses by no act of his own?
As I will post next, I believe that if God is infact capable of exercising libertarian free will in this manner, that he can create free agents, but only if it is acceptable to say that agents can be free without being "self-determining". That is, he may not know the future actions of certain elements of the current state of affairs, but only insofar as they are contingent upon God's own limited knowledge of his own future actions.
| | Back to Top | | |
|
GregBoyd
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 7/6/2002 1:06 PM (GMT -6) | | Thanks for the interesting questions Leth. Let me make a general comment and then offer a few brief point by point comments.
General Comment: As I understand it, the gist of your argument is that if God is free in a libertarian sense and yet God knows how he would respond given any future set of alternatives, then God cannot create beings about whom he DOESN’T know how they will respond given any future set of alternatives. Any LFW "mechanism" God might place in them could not be such that it would prohibit God from knowing S (2) as a consequence of knowing perfectly S (1). Is this right?
I have two general comments:
a) There’s no compelling reason I know of to conclude that God has made up his mind about how he will respond in every possible future scenario. Once he DECIDES (viz. Resolves possibilitiesl into a definite course of action) he knows he’s decided it. But why think it impossible, or even undesirable, for God to consider some future possibilities and remain open to what he will do? Of course, if the alternatives are between a) good and b) evil or even between a) good and b) less good, then God knows he will choose "a" – all other things being equal. But if the options are between "a" and "b" where "a" and "b" have the same value (in every sense in which a value could be significant), then I could see God waiting till the last minute to decide. If you grant this, then there would be no problem with God giving us a piece of this sort of freedom and, consequently, no knowing exactly how we’re going to use it.
b) You’re assuming an inferential model of knowledge in your questions. Its as though God INFERS what HE’s going to do in the future on the basis of OTHER THINGS, and thus that God can perfectly INFER what WE’RE going to do on the basis of other things. But I don’t think the inferential model captures the gist of our self-knowledge perfectly. We know ourselves DIRECTLY, not INFERENTIALLY. Indeed, if we are free in a libertarian sense, then, I would argue, our subjectivity CAN’T be exhaustively inferrerd. We have a domain of "I’ness" that is strictly our known, and known directly only by us. Hence, even if one wanted to insist that God knows HIS OWN future free actionsas definite, this still wouldn’t warrant the assumption that he knows OUR future free actions as definite.
Now some quick specifics.
Leth: Let us say that this is state of affairs S[0]. Given the above description of S[0], S[0] does not contain an element capable of exercising libertarian free-will. Therefore, given A3, state of affairs S is derivable from S[0]. God knows the future at least through S both perfectly and definitely.
Doc: Just note that there’s a huge difference between God creating the sort of state of affairs where S is known as INDEFINITE at S[0], and God not knowing S perfectly. If God creates beings with free will, then WHAT IT MEANS to know the future perfectly IS to know it INDEFINITELY, for that is precisely WHAT IT IS.
Leth: Although I have a general idea of how to procede with my case, I can not currently offer a sound argument in deductive form that it is not logically possible for God to create a free agent given creation ex nihilo and if God is granted perfect and definite knowledge of the present.
Doc: I don’t see what the creation ex nihilo thing has to do with it. You’re wondering whether God can create a self-determining being or not. This is, in terms of the OV, equivalent to wondering whether God could create a being whose future action relative to significant alternatives is not exhaustively predictable on the basis of previous states of affairs. Can God create a world where it makes sense for God to say "maybe"? THAT is the question.
Now, note this Leth. If God CAN’T do something, it can only be because it is a logical contradiction to suppose it being done. So the question is, Is it a logical contradiction for God to ever say "maybe"? On the one hand, this seems to be an odd assertion. What is so contradictory about a world where possibilities are real to God. On the other hand, this seems especially odd in light of the fact that the Bible has God talking like this all over the place.
Leth: My reasoning for this is not what you may think, but rather that saying, "Let there be X," is a meaningless statement unless X is exhaustively defined
Doc: Only if you presuppose that it is meaningless for "X" to be "a decision making being." Or, to put it differently, why can’t "X" be "exhaustively defined" as "a being who defines her own future"? What it means to be free in a libertarian sense is that being exhaustively defined in the present DOESN"T entail being exhaustively defined in the future. Your problem, so far as I can see, is that you presuppose that this is not so, hence build in a compatibilistic conclusion into your premise.
Leth: We must introduce a mechanism to decided whether B will will A1 or whether B will will A2. Then we are again back to our original problem; God would have to create this mechanism to function in a way that he does not know.
Doc: if agents are free, their decision making isn’t reducible to a mechanism. If they are free, in a libertarian sense, then even after one has exhaustively delineated all the causes and stimuli etc… that preceded their decision, their decision was still NOT NECESSARY. So long as you keep looking for a mechanism, you will be denying free will at the start of your investigation.
Fun. Thanks. Come back.
Doc
"In Christ...the ONLY THING that matters is faith energized by love." Galatians 5:6
Edited by - GregBoyd on 07/06/2002 6:07:21 PM | | Back to Top | | |
|
Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
Date Joined Apr 2002
Total Posts : 635
| Posted 7/7/2002 1:36 AM (GMT -6) | | Hey leth,
I believe the connection of God’s experience and mine, to His universal knowledge, joined by any tie, as if it had happened or begun before now, leaves God out of the present to react, to me. That is, the present becomes a prescribed requirement, without purpose or determination, in my mind.
Answering the following question solves the dilemma for me and hopefully you; am I simply re-enacting before or reacting to God and others? Please answer this question for me, leth, I would appreciate it!
Whether you believe life is a re-enactment or a reaction of relationships, matters little; each is playing their part, regardless. This is the consequence, which follows God, on whom all depends, that produced by His cause, the ultimate result.
Did God create without being able to relate to His creation, in real time?
God’s Love,
Tim
Edited by - Tim on 07/07/2002 06:39:20 AM | | Back to Top | | |
|
leth
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/8/2002 9:45 AM (GMT -6) | | Thank you both for responding.
First, I have to admit that my previous post does not represent the OV to the best of my understanding. The crucial change that I would make would be to suppose that the influence of the mechanism is always prior to God's considering the counsel of his will; it is never the case that God wills equally to take two or more mutually exclusive actions. God is therefore free, but at the cost of not knowing which action he will take, and not participating in the decision. However, there would still be the oddity of God knowing what he would have willed were it not for this influence.
TIM: Did God create without being able to relate to His creation, in real time?
Leth: No, I do not believe that God exists outside of time and somehow "experiences everything at once, and performs all of his interactions in a single thrust". I do not see any reason to suppose this to be the case other than as an artifact of trying to defend a completely immutable God.
In this post I will respond to your statements about God's own freedom.
The following is my assumption: God's future courses of actions are derivable as completely and definitely known from an unchanging nature as rules from which it may be inferred how he will act given a possible and complete state of affairs (including a state of God's knowledge of temporal "uniqueness", and God's emotional state).
GregBoyd: "We know ourselves DIRECTLY, not INFERENTIALLY."
Leth: I am not sure what you mean by "directly not inferentially". Note that I would not suggest that God takes the actions that he does does because he has inferred that he must, but rather because at a particular time, he actively wills (in an emotional sense) to take an action. He never wills (foremost so as to act upon it) to act contrary to his nature. Further note that unlike ourselves, I assume that God is capable of knowing himself completely and without flaw.
I will first address just your responses relating to the matter of God's own ability to exercise libertarian free will.
GregBoyd: There’s no compelling reason I know of to conclude that God has made up his mind about how he will respond in every possible future scenario.
Leth: Your statement is the very heart of my disagreement. To say that God has not made up his mind I believe we must propose either:
1. God can not infer his future actions completely and definitely from his nature and the current state of affairs (as expanded upon above).
2. God is capable of choosing to not infer his future actions completely and definitely from his nature and the current state of affairs (as expanded upon above).
3. God is influenced to make certain decisions by an unknowable and irresistable force or process.
It is my understanding from your respones that you would propose at least #1. However, I believe that your answers betray an implicit assumption that #1 is not the case.
If you are not infact proposing #1, then the remainder of my post will likely be off-target; in which case I would rather deal just with options #2 and #3.
GregBoyd: Of course, if the alternatives are between a) good and b) evil or even between a) good and b) less good, then God knows he will choose "a" – all other things being equal.
Leth: I agree. Yet, do we not affirm that this will always be the case precisely because we also affirm that it is contrary to God's unchanging nature to do otherwise? If not for this reason, then upon what basis can you affirm this?
GregBoyd: But if the options are between "a" and "b" where "a" and "b" have the same value (in every sense in which a value could be significant), then I could see God waiting till the last minute to decide.
Leth: Suppose as you have said, that given two mutually exclusive courses of actions, God finds them both equally acceptable (if they were not mutually exclusive, I presume he would take both). Though it is not immediately apparent because you have not been specific, I suspect you assert that the following is inferrable from God's nature: "Given the presence of two equally acceptable and mutually exclusive courses of action, God will take neither." That is, not "'till the last minute." In other words, God will wait until matters have changed such that one course of action alone is most acceptable. Is this an accurate assessment? I would see no reason to disagree with your statement if this is infact what you intend.
[edited to match your reply format]
Edited by - leth on 07/08/2002 2:53:12 PM | | Back to Top | | |
| Forum Information | Currently it is Monday, November 09, 2026 3:36 PM (GMT -6)
There are a total of 97,718 posts in 6,040 threads.
In the last 3 days there were 0 new threads and 0 reply posts. View Active Threads
|
Forum powered by dotNetBB v2.42EC SP3
dotNetBB © 2000-2026 |
|
|