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|  AlyoshaKaramazov Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 49 | Posted 3/17/2003 8:12 PM (GMT -6) |   | In Doc's "Satan and the problem of evil," he tries to show that, contra critics of self-determining freedom, the notion of self-determining freedom is not incoherent. One way Doc does this is by pointing out that God has been classically thought to possess self-determining freedom. quote: ...for no one has wanted to affirm that God's decision to create and interact with the world was necessary or capricious. (Satan and the prob of evil, p.70)
My question: Can't God only do the morally perfect thing? For instance, when deliberating whether to create the world or not, couldn't someone argue that God was compelled to create this world because it was better (in a moral sense) than not creating--or creating a different world? Isn't there only one course of action God could have taken, i.e., the morally perfect one?
Doesn't this also have implications for the type of free will God has, namely, wouldn't God then possess compatibilistic freedom? Since, at least for God, there wouldn't be alternate possibilities given his perfect goodness, it would seem to follow that he could only act in one particular way.
Anyway, I look forward to getting thrashed for this suggestion.
Tony
"Man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest."--Paul Simon | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Matthew Timothy Short Huh?

Date Joined Apr 2002 Total Posts : 635 | Posted 3/18/2003 12:58 AM (GMT -6) |   | I am freeing you from going against the grain of this site, by a good beating, or consider yourself having been severely thrashed .
God is Love,
Tim
2Ti 2:19…Let every one that nameth the name of Christ depart from iniquity... | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 3/18/2003 2:18 PM (GMT -6) |   | quote: My question: Can't God only do the morally perfect thing? For instance, when deliberating whether to create the world or not, couldn't someone argue that God was compelled to create this world because it was better (in a moral sense) than not creating--or creating a different world? Isn't there only one course of action God could have taken, i.e., the morally perfect one?
Good question, Tony.
I have one question in response. Why do you think there is only one morally perfect course of action God could have taken? It seems to me that moral constraints could still allow for a wide range of options in the type of world God chooses to create. In other words, I think that this world is one of several creatible worlds consistent with God's moral perfection. I don't know how to prove that, but I see no reason to deny it. And if there are several creatible worlds consistent with God's moral perfection then it is possible for God to exercise libertarian freedom in creating.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
 |  fyodor Registered Member
 Date Joined Dec 2002 Total Posts : 179 | Posted 3/18/2003 8:40 PM (GMT -6) |   | I wholly agree Alan. It seems like your attempt, Antoine, to classify God as having only one morally perfect is an attempt to answer your own question by limiting the possible answers to one. Not only is it limiting for your inquiry, but it also adds restrictions and qualifications to God's omnipotence and creativity. Why couldn't God create 10 morally perfect worlds? Why would creating a second morally perfect world make the first imperfect?
†††"To have a self, to be a self, is the greatest concession, an infinite concession, given to man, but it is also eternity's claim upon him." – S. Kierkegaard
Edited by - fyodor on 03/19/2003 01:41:33 AM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  rossfadeinout Registered Member

Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 428 | Posted 3/19/2003 3:54 AM (GMT -6) |   | I thought of a basic example....
I love my fiancee (this is hypothetical, my former fiancee called off our engagement two months ago). If I act according to my love for her, does that limit the action that I can take to act on that love? It doesn't seem that way to me. I could bring her flowers, or I could plan a date to go see the new Hugh Grant chick flick, or I could write her a poem, or I could... (I hope you see where I am going) It seems that acting in accordance with love opens more possibilites, not restricts the types of actions you can take.
Just thinking Ross
I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else. - C.S. Lewis | | Back to Top | | |
 |  anewbeginning Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2002 Total Posts : 88 | Posted 3/19/2003 7:50 AM (GMT -6) |   | Hi Tony:
I don't believe God "possess" freedom of the type we classify as "libertarian". In my opinion, libertarian freedom is a symptom of our finite minds. It is an expression of our limitedness, if that's a word. If God possessed it, He would not be "God".
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 |  Alan Rhoda Registered Member

Date Joined May 2002 Total Posts : 680 | Posted 3/19/2003 4:09 PM (GMT -6) |   | quote: I don't believe God "possess" freedom of the type we classify as "libertarian". In my opinion, libertarian freedom is a symptom of our finite minds. It is an expression of our limitedness, if that's a word. If God possessed it, He would not be "God".
Hey anewbeginning, Could you elaborate a bit? What kind of freedom do you think God has? And why is libertarian freedom incompatible with God?
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
 |  anewbeginning Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2002 Total Posts : 88 | Posted 3/22/2003 4:54 PM (GMT -6) |   | Hi Alan:
Right off the top I want to say I always enjoy your posts. There's a well deserved laurel for you. 
I am sure you will give me a philisophical lambasting but that's o.k. Keeps one consistent... and humble. 
What kind of freedom do I think God has? Hmmm. Well, is the term "freedom" even applicable to a being as potent as the Christian God? What I mean is, doesn't the very term "freedom" imply limitation? What could an infinite being be free of?
The other concern I have with conferring libertarianism to God is simply this. I don't see how one can separate God from His actions. Does that make sense? It seems, to me at least, that His "motions" are inseparable from His very essence. It's hard for me to put this thought to words. I guess I just feel that we maybe are wrong to interpolate God's conditions from our own experiences. In my mind, "libertarian choices" flow from my very weak character, interacting with my finite senses, interacting with my very limited mind. Simply put, libertarians make mistakes! There you go, clear as mud!
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 |  AlyoshaKaramazov Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 49 | Posted 3/24/2003 5:49 AM (GMT -6) |   | I saw this type of response coming--you guys are SO predictable!
Okay, got it: God could have actualized a number of different possible worlds "consistent with God's moral perfection."
New question: So God could have created a variety of different ways, but was God nevertheless compelled to create?
It seems to me that creating the world vs NOT creating AT ALL is a rather significant decision on God's part. By virtue of the fact that God decided to create THIS world, isn't this a divine stamp on the moral superiority of creating vs not creating? Isn't it the case, then, that God's decision to create was compelled by his moral perfection?
"Man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest."--Paul Simon | | Back to Top | | |
 |  student739 Registered Member
 Date Joined Mar 2003 Total Posts : 2 | Posted 3/30/2003 9:47 PM (GMT -6) |   | "By virtue of the fact that God decided to create THIS world, isn't this a divine stamp on the moral superiority of creating vs not creating?"
Having acknowledged the response already offered to you, you do not appear to offer any support for your claim that the fact of God's having created indicates that the action entailed by "God having created" is morally superior to the action entailed by "not God having created"? On the face of things it seems equally plausible that "God having created" and "not God having created" are morally equivalent.
However, I would suggest instead that your basic question is flawed. Comparing as we appear to be actions of God, a moral agent, we can not compare morally the action entailed by "God having created" to the action entailed by "not God having created" for no action at all is entailed by "not God having created". Replacing the latter statement with the statement "God not having created" does not help, for neither is any action entailed by the statement "God not having created".
What action are you suggesting we compare to the action entailed by "God having created"?
"God ignoring his duty to manifest his greatness"? "God ignoring his duty to create beings to enter into loving relationships with"?
Christians have traditionally maintained that God is wholly sufficient unto himself. Are you suggesting that we should think otherwise?
Are you suggesting alternatively that we are not evaluating actions available to God, a moral agent, but are instead evaluating morally states of affairs? Do states of affairs themselves have moral values? Shall we explore this option?
Please clarify. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  AlyoshaKaramazov Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 49 | Posted 3/31/2003 5:51 AM (GMT -6) |   | student739 wrote: quote: Having acknowledged the response already offered to you, you do not appear to offer any support for your claim that the fact of God's having created indicates that the action entailed by "God having created" is morally superior to the action entailed by "not God having created"?
Here was my support: quote: It seems to me that creating the world vs NOT creating AT ALL is a rather significant decision on God's part. By virtue of the fact that God decided to create THIS world, isn't this a divine stamp on the moral superiority of creating vs not creating? Isn't it the case, then, that God's decision to create was compelled by his moral perfection?
This is why I don't see how it's "equally plausible" that a morally perfect being could either create or not create. Student 739 asks:
quote: What action are you suggesting we compare to the action entailed by "God having created"?
Further: quote:
Are you suggesting alternatively that we are not evaluating actions available to God, a moral agent, but are instead evaluating morally states of affairs? Do states of affairs themselves have moral values? Shall we explore this option?
My response: Allow me to answer you with a question of my own, O mysterious interlocuter. Are you suggesting that only the explicit actions of a moral agent are morally significant? An example of non-action by a moral agent that is nevertheless morally significant: you are the parent of a 2-year-old child. that child is in the bathtub and starts to drown. you watch as your child drowns and do nothing about it. this failure to act is morally significant.
now, the only point i'm trying to make is that not acting can have moral significance. if this is true, then what i'm comparing are not two actions, but acting vs. not acting.
One more question: Why isn't it morally significant NOT to act?
Of course, it's probably all moot anyway as I had a hard time understanding the following quoted paragraph. My response is directed toward my best and most charitable interpretation of what this says. Could you further explain this. In any case, this paragraph should win some award for most times the word 'entailed' is used. i'll call guinness. quote: However, I would suggest instead that your basic question is flawed. Comparing as we appear to be actions of God, a moral agent, we can not compare morally the action entailed by "God having created" to the action entailed by "not God having created" for no action at all is entailed by "not God having created". Replacing the latter statement with the statement "God not having created" does not help, for neither is any action entailed by the statement "God not having created".
"Superstition, idolatry, and hypocrisy have ample wages, but truth goes begging."--Martin Luther | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 3/31/2003 7:45 AM (GMT -6) |   | Sup. Just some thoughts.
I think that Doc and some others would say that having the "disposition" of always acting according to one's morally perfect nature is NOT a limitation, but freedom in its truest sense. God is completely free to act according to his true nature with NO type of hinderance whatsoever...unlike humans who consistently sin (miss the mark). God ALWAYS hits the target of his nature. Because we humans are used to doing "good" AND "evil" (or optimal/less-than-optimal), we unnecessarily assume that genuine libertarian freedom CONSISTS of the ability to actualize both categories. But this is not the case. We are arguring from a FALLEN state of existence, and to argue that libertarian freedom itself must exist SOLELY as we human beings experience it would seem to be misplaced. We are working in a general state of self-contradiction. Now don't get me wrong. I'm not saying that libertarian freedom entails essential self-contradiction at any time. That's absurd. What I am saying is that, given the type of being we are considering, it CAN involve self-contradiction on a level of SELF-UNDERSTANDING. (Like how renewed human beings can still act by the "old man" even though they are new creations) And that existential self-contradiction is only possible for non-God beings...like us.
As I see it, the exercise of libertarian freedom is the particular EXPRESSION of a thing's essential existence (borrowing Doc's terminology) where volition and power to influence are the primary domains. The human ability to choose "good" and "evil" to act upon is an EXPRESSION of our fallen nature. God's ability to know all things, yet consistently act according to aesthetic maximization is an EXPRESSION of God's perfection.
Summing up, self-determining or libertarian freedom can be separated from the aspect of existential self-contradiction (which actually EXCLUDES God from consideration)...and placed squarely upon the expression of one's essential existence that deals with the power to influence (which INCLUDES God). When done this way, we can see that both God and human beings possess the SAME TYPE of libertarian freedom...that has different EXPRESSIONS...because of our different types of essential existence. Follow? 
*****************************************
Next,
As far as God being compelled to create. This is what I'm getting...
If we are to say that everything that God does is morally perfect, then it stands to reason that all of God's actions (and INACTIONS) have a morally perfect basis. Basically, God evaluates ALL things, and does the "best" God can do at all times. If we can ever find a BINARY set of mutually exclusive options open to God, then it would seem that whichever of the two choices God makes must be the better of the two choices. (Note: This assumes that the two options do NOT have the exact same value to God, in which case the choice between the two truly would be whimsical). When speaking of creating ANY non-God reality back "when" reality was ALL God, the choice is binary. Either God would create said reality...or God wouldn't. God couldn't do both.
Now, if it is the case that God always makes that best choice possible according to his moral perfection...AND...we suppose that the options to create or not to create were NOT value equivalent...then it would seem that God's actualized choice to create tacitly says that, out of the two choices, creating a non-God reality was the "better" thing to do.
But wait, wouldn't this mean that God, given his perfect nature, would be BOUND by his own perfect disposition (and integrity to the same) to create rather than NOT to create? Sure seems like it. If God had chosen NOT to create, then he would have been making a choice NOT IN ACCORDING with divine moral evaluation of the options. God's INACTION on this matter would have the moral significance of being LESS than what a morally perfect being would choose to do, given the two choices.
With this line of thinking, one would disagree with student's statement:
quote: On the face of things it seems equally plausible that "God having created" and "not God having created" are morally equivalent.
How about we put the question like so:
Is God's choice to express his love to OTHER EXISTENTS morally equivalent to God's opposing choice to NOT make other existents, while enjoying God's triune love by Godself?
THIS question is thorny as heck. Why? Because if the person says "No", then it would seem that the person would HAVE to say that God's moral perfection AND complete integrity DEMANDS some type of Creation event. And if the person say "yes", then the person has to admit that Creation was merely a product of WHIMSY, and not valuation of any type...which is tantamount to saying that Creation was arbitrary. Eenie meenie miney moe type stuff.
One can say this: Given God's nature, the creation of a non-God reality was a NECESSARY CONSEQUENT of the God's existence. This is not the same thing as saying that God was compelled to create...as if by some external or hypnotic force. Or saying that God NEEDED Creation. It is saying that Creation is an expression of God's genuine libertarian freedom as it has been described above. Far from being a COMPULSION, Creation becomes tacit EVIDENCE of God's love, moral perfection, self-determining freedom, and unflinching integrity.
Sooo....all this being said, I've said jack. Just a bunch of blah, blah, blah. But what do you think anyway? Holla back. 
Later,

"Smile. It could be worse." --from a good friend.
Edited by - MephEternal on 03/31/2003 12:48:59 PM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  a_theist "Thy will be done."

Date Joined Dec 2002 Total Posts : 286 | Posted 3/31/2003 4:13 PM (GMT -6) |   | Holla
"The 'sovereignty' of God is not, I suggest, a very biblical idea, especially if one has a low opinion of the respect of sovereigns for the freedom of their subjects." ~Charles Hartshorne
Edited by - A_Theist on 03/31/2003 9:14:26 PM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  AlyoshaKaramazov Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 49 | Posted 3/31/2003 6:36 PM (GMT -6) |   | Meph, thanks for posting.
Meph sez:
quote: What I am saying is that, given the type of being we are considering, it CAN involve self-contradiction on a level of SELF-UNDERSTANDING. (Like how renewed human beings can still act by the "old man" even though they are new creations) And that existential self-contradiction is only possible for non-God beings...like us.
Exsqueeze me??? baking powder???
I think I'm following your general point. Are you saying that God, because of his perfection, does not experience choices like we do, since he cannot choose a morally inferior option? quote: then it would seem that God's actualized choice to create tacitly says that, out of the two choices, creating a non-God reality was the "better" thing to do.
It seems to me you're falling into the initial problem I raised on this thread. God has "two choices" and because of his moral perfection is compelled to choose one over the other. I also don't understand how God's being compelled to create is any different from being the "necessary consequent of his existence," as you put it. I think I'm tracking with you, but you need to provide a fuller and more clear explanation of how God's libertarian freedom differs from human libertarian freedom. I think you're on to something here.
Later on down the road.
"Superstition, idolatry, and hypocrisy have ample wages, but truth goes begging."--Martin Luther | | Back to Top | | |
 |  CalvinnHobbes Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 88 | Posted 4/2/2003 12:29 AM (GMT -6) |   | Bear with me. . .I'm thinking out loud. I'm following a train of thought for the first time here. I don't pretend to have this all figured out.
Might someone say that God IS by necessity compelled to express His glory, but that He is free to choose the MEANS by which He does that? (This would be somewhat analogous to our being by necessity compelled to seek beatitude while at the time possessing the freedom to choose the means by which we seek it.)
Let me see if I get anywhere with the necessity factor:
(1) If something is existing, then it is substantially existing IN SOME WAY/manner/mode (it has a "nature"). (2) If something is an existING nature, then that subsistent nature is necessarily expressING itself. ***To say that the subsistent nature exists but does not express itself in any real way is to imply that the nature doesn't ACTUALLY exist, unless of course you can think of a REAL actual/acting existent nature which possesses absolutely no ontological expression.*** (3) God is a subsistent existing nature. (4) Therefore, God is substantially existing in some way/manner/mode (i.e. "God has a nature which necessarily expresses itself" or "God has a nature/way/manner according to which He necessarily expresses Himself"). (5) God's nature is glorious-ness (for lack of a better word). (6) Therefore, God must necessarily express that glorious nature in SOME way. He cannot choose not to. (Absolutely no ontological expression = no nature = no existence)
Now the freedom component:
ANY free choice is both determined and rationally free. It is determined to choose from the only options available (as well as not to choose two or more incompatible things in the same time and sense), AND it is free to choose between the available viable alternatives (however many there may be).
In the former respect, God is "determined" to glorify Himself (for he cannot choose otherwise according to the conclusion of the argument above). It doesn't follow from this, however, that He must choose to glorify Himself in any PARTICULAR way. God can radiate His nature/glorify Himself within the Godhead alone. . .He can also radiate His nature/glorify Himself by diffusing His goodness throughout a created order. But in choosing a particular manner of glorification, He MUST also will the necessary means to that particular end. (i.e. If He chooses to glorify Himself through thoughts and actions of rationally free creatures, then He MUST create them.)
Are either or both of the above two choices concerning ends and means arbitrary? What do we mean by arbitrary--made for no reason whatsoever? If so, then no. The first choice reaches up, so to speak, to the necessarily expressive nature of God; the second choice follows from the first choice. The first choice (of the end) is neither completely free in the loosest sense of "free" nor is the second choice (of the correspondent means) necessary in the strictest sense of "necessary." Now if by "arbitrary" we simply mean "rather than another," then God's first choice (the end) IS arbitrary, but I don't see the problem. In this sense, ALL choices are arbitrary, free or otherwise.
So what is the "morally perfect thing" which God has no choice but to do (assuming He must do the morally perfect thing)? If the above argument (1-6) is sound, He must glorify Himself; we know at least that much. Now, is the chosen expression of a supremely Good nature (i.e. God's glorifyING) more or less morally perfect according to any different modes of its expression (in the Godhead vs. in creatures. . .or in this world vs. in another possible world)? I don't see any reason to think so. (I think I'm with with Alan on this point.) I think it's just a different chosen expression of the same morally perfect activity. God is necessarily actively engaging in the morally perfect activity of glorifying Himself--whether He's creating or not, and whether He's creating one thing or world rather than another.
Now an attempt at a negative case--
Tony, this is the only real demonstration I'm able to find in your contentions (and I think it's implicit rather than explicit). [And I know you're just playing devil's advocate in all of this]:
(1) All of God's actions are morally perfect actions. (2) Creating this world is one of God's actions. (3) Therefore, creating this world is a morally perfect action.
This looks sound to me. But I think this conclusion is all your reasoning guarantees us. It doesn't tell us that God's not creating would have been immoral or less moral. I wonder if you simply assume this.
. . .or perhaps have deduced it somehow from a disjunctive inference resembling something like this:
(1) Either God's creating is the morally perfect thing, or God's not creating is the morally perfect thing. (2) God's creating is the morally perfect thing. (3) Therefore, God's not creating is not the morally perfect thing.
A disjunctive argument can only be logically valid if one of the disjuncts is denied. You haven't denied one of the disjuncts. Therefore, (if you HAVE reasoned in this way,) your particular inference here is invalid. You haven't demonstrated that both disjuncts cannot be the case.
On another note, can we predicate some kind of quantitative or qualitative degrees of God's activity of glorifying Himself and say that one of His causal actions (the activity itself) can be more glorious than another or than its contrary? Here, someone might argue:
(1) Creating is more glorious than not creating. (2) God MUST engage in the more glorious alternative. (3) Therefore, God must create.
But why should we assume that the divine activity ITSELF (commission or omission) comes in more and/or less glorious manners? I think we can say that the divine activity (itself) is always perfectly glorious in any of its actions but that the outcomes of these different actions reflect that same glory from "different angles."
To sum up:
--Yes, I agree God can only do the morally perfect kind of action. --The expression of God's glorious nature is the only morally perfect kind of action. --This He does necessarily. He cannot not do it. --We've been given no reason to believe that God's particular method of glorifying Himself in creation is the only method by which He could have chosen to glorify Himself. --God's freedom to either create or not create seems assertable. --This freedom was not exercised "arbitrarily" in any threatening sense of the word.
Tell me if I've misrepresented, misreasoned, or missed the whole point anywhere. I wouldn't put it past myself.
Shane
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams
Edited by - CalvinnHobbes on 04/02/2003 4:24:29 PM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  student739 Registered Member
 Date Joined Mar 2003 Total Posts : 2 | Posted 4/2/2003 8:11 PM (GMT -6) |   | This is in response to AlyoshaKaramazov's reply to my original post.
"Are you suggesting that only the explicit actions of a moral agent are morally significant?"
I am not sure what you mean by "explicit" actions. "Explicit" or "implicit" are terms that might apply to our use of language in talking about actions, but it is not clear what would be meant by applying these terms to actions themselves.
"Now, the only point I'm trying to make is that not acting can have moral significance."
Not acting, it seems, can involve something of moral significance only in so far as refraining from taking a particular action may entail a failure to take some other action which one has a duty or obligation to take.
If there is no such action, then it seems nothing of moral significance concerning the status of God as a perfect moral being is involved in God not acting.
As I had said, so far as I am aware, tradition has always maintained that God had no obligation or duty to create. Hence I said what I did.
Again, are you suggesting that God did have an obligation or duty to create?
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 |  AlyoshaKaramazov Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 49 | Posted 4/2/2003 9:19 PM (GMT -6) |   | Hi Irving Copi, er, Shane,
Never did I think my spontaneous questions would elicit a thesis in response, but stranger things have happened, and Shane, you are the thorough sort.
Had a long day and night. Will give y'all a shout out tommorrow. Peace, love, and mad props, t-bag
"Superstition, idolatry, and hypocrisy have ample wages, but truth goes begging."--Martin Luther | | Back to Top | | |
 |  a_theist "Thy will be done."

Date Joined Dec 2002 Total Posts : 286 | Posted 4/3/2003 1:36 AM (GMT -6) |   | This is off the topic, but I wish I lived in Iowa (I can't believe I just sad that!) so I could chill wity y'all. But alas, I am in Wichita, KS.
Blessings, Paul
"The 'sovereignty' of God is not, I suggest, a very biblical idea, especially if one has a low opinion of the respect of sovereigns for the freedom of their subjects." ~Charles Hartshorne | | Back to Top | | |
 |  AlyoshaKaramazov Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 49 | Posted 4/3/2003 5:03 PM (GMT -6) |   | Okay, I just wrote the longest response to shane and student739, but apparently i wasnt logged in when i did it. so, when i logged in it deleted my post. screw it, i'm definitely not going through the thesis again. funny thing: shane just called, so i guess i'll just have to relay my response to him in person. and i thought i had finally accomplished my intended goal of transferring my life online.
"Superstition, idolatry, and hypocrisy have ample wages, but truth goes begging."--Martin Luther | | Back to Top | | |
 |  One Love Registered Member

Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 13888 | Posted 4/9/2003 5:37 AM (GMT -6) |   | Sorry so long for a response, A. You said:
quote: Are you saying that God, because of his perfection, does not experience choices like we do, since he cannot choose a morally inferior option?
Pretty much. If we are going to take God's nature of ALWAYS doing the "best" that God can do very seriously, I don't see how we can come to any other conclusion.
************************************
Next, you said:
quote: It seems to me you're falling into the initial problem I raised on this thread. God has "two choices" and because of his moral perfection is compelled to choose one over the other. I also don't understand how God's being compelled to create is any different from being the "necessary consequent of his existence," as you put it.
Ok. If by saying "God's being compelled to create", you are referring to God's total integrity with God's own natural desire, freedom, and ability to maximize felt aesthetic value of Reality, then I guess agree with you. What I just want to be sure to highlight by my statement is that:
-Creation doesn't COMPLETE God, as if God were imcomplete previous to Creation -there was no EXTERNAL force upon God for this choice.
************************************
Next,
quote: I think I'm tracking with you, but you need to provide a fuller and more clear explanation of how God's libertarian freedom differs from human libertarian freedom. I think you're on to something here.
Cool. Basically what I'm saying is that the freedom that God has is the SAME freedom that we have. The only difference is in the modes of operation...and this is because of the difference that humans have from God in essential existence.
As I see it, the main thing that libertarian freedom wants to assert is that the volition and influential power of agents lie FUNDAMENTALLY within said agents on ALL levels. In such a manner that certain decisions and actions (not all, of course) can only be known as DEFINITE or CERTAIN, temporally AFTER they have taken place in the real world. This reality of one OF possibilities, as Tom has stated. In this way, both God and humans are self-determining loci of influential power in a world of options.
But what I believe doesn't get much thought is that this freedom is NECESSARILY constrained by the essential existence of the being that exhibits it. And what this means is that differences in that essential existence will DEFINITELY mean differences in how this freedom is expressed.
For example, let's say this about God...
1) God is omniscient. 2) God is infinitely intelligent. 3) God is perfectly integrous with Godself. 4) God is morally perfect. 5) Biggie: God always seeks the maximization of aesthetic appreciation in Creation at all times. (This is basically saying that, at all times)
Because of who God is, God actually BEING Godself entails some important things. God knows, from the jump, the actual value of all things actual and possible. And, with his infinite intelligence, can easily determine optimal ways of aesthetic maximation in reality, given all the revelant factors present. And God has the power to work towards those ways. And God does this all the time.
[Digression: All this assumes that it is God's nature to ALWAYS "do the best that God can do" in all situations. I know that some people want to argue that this is limiting God's choices, that God should be able to choose LESS-THAN-optimal ways of behaving, if God so chooses. That the ability to choose less-than-optimal options is what defines genuine freedom. I suppose that one could argue that. However, I just hope that these people understand that arguing this eventually causes a very REAL problem when it comes to theodicy. And we've dealt with that extensively here before...ain't that right, Doc? ]
Humans doen't have any of the 5 things that I've said about God. And this has the effects of us possibly being inaccurate and fragmented on many levels. And this will surely affect HOW we use our freedom. And that way will be different from God's use of the same type of freedom.
Basically, God's libertarian freedom would be limited by GOD'S nature, just like our freedom is limited by OUR nature. We cannot choose to turn into cherry vanilla ice cream and turn right back in 10 seconds. And the reason why is obvious. But this doesn't NOT say that we don't have libertarian free will. In like manner, God cannot choose options that will NOT further the maximization of aesthetic appreciation in Creation...and still be God. And this doesn't mean that God doesn't have libertarian free will. SeewhutI'msayin'? 
Hope this helps. If not, I'll try again.
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