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Alan, what does it mean to be “transitive” here? Explanatory priority is transitive? What's that mean?

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But more than that; the reductio also fails because (12) is false. Adams's intuition seems to be that if F* were explanatorily prior to my doing A in C, then I could not refrain from A, which is a necessary condition of my doing A freely. But such an assumption seems doubly wrong. First, it represents the fallacious reasoning of fatalism. Though F* is (ex concessionis) in fact explanatorily prior to my freely doing A in C, it is within my power to refrain from doing A in C; only if I were to do so, F* would not then be explanatorily prior to my action nor a part of God's middle knowledge. Until Adams can show that the content of God's middle knowledge is a "hard fact," his argument based on (12) is undercut. Second, my being able to refrain from doing A in C is not a necessary condition of my freely doing A in C. For perhaps I do A in C without any causal constraint, but it is also the case that God would not permit me to refrain from A in C. Flint's essay on papal infallibility, which appears in the same volume as Adams's, provides a good illustration: though God would not permit the Pope to promulgate false doctrine, nevertheless he freely promulgates correct doctrine.{7} If such a scenario is coherent--and Flint seems to have refuted all objections to it--, then (12) is false.

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JET: Molinism would deny that God could create an alternate world identical to ours except that Peter does not deny Christ. I think it is fundamental to Molinism that God's choice to create free creatures entails that God is limited by CCF's. Isn't this part of the Molinist's theodicy? God created C as the best possible world given CCF's. God is not responsible for Peter's denial, because God could not have created a world equivalent to C in which Peter does not deny Christ. Rather, Peter is responsible because Peter had it "within his power" (LF) to do otherwise.

Alan: I agree that Molinism would deny this, but that very denial is inconsistent with LF. Contrary to how Molinists talk, God cannot unilaterally create either the world in which Peter freely denies Christ--he cannot create it, that is, without Peter's coorperation. Molinists falsely think of all world-possibilities as fully and eternally determinate. God can survey these possibilities, select the one he likes, and create it. But this cannot be so given LF, for LF gives rise to a branching tree of world-possibilities. God can create the initial conditions and the choice parameters, but by doing so he only chooses to create a world-tree, not a particular world. As choices are made, branches of the tree containing possibilities that were not chosen fall off.

If Peter really has it "within his power" to do otherwise in those circumstances, then it must be a real possibility that the history of the world is at it is until that time and Peter does not deny Christ. If Molinists deny this, then in so doing they undermine the very libertarian freedom that they want to affirm.

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JET: But Craig does not deny that it is "really possible that the history of the world is at it is until that time and Peter does not deny Christ". Based on his premise that God's middle knowledge is a "soft fact", Craig holds that Peter has it "within his power" to "bring it about" that God's middle knowledge includes Peter defending Christ in an identical world. This is what allows Craig to affirm LF (but not SDF).

What Molinists deny is that God had it within his power to create a world that is identical to ours except that Peter defends Christ. Peter, on the other hand, really has it within his power to defend Christ in circumstances C. If Peter does, then this would have been part of God's middle knowledge. In otherwords, God cannot change counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, but Peter can bring it about that God's middle knowledge was "otherwise".

At this point, I don't have a clue as to whether God's middle knowledge can be said to be a "soft fact". I haven't gotten that far yet. (In the bivalence thread, Doc mentioned that he argued in the four views book - which I haven't read - that God's knowledge is a "hard fact".)

What I'm trying to suggest is that:

1. Given that Craig "hinges everything" (per Doc, Bivalence thread) on the distinction between hard and soft facts, then any attempt to refute Craig's Molinism must deal with this distinction, and

2. For someone whose view of God and creation assumes the reality of "self-determining freedom" as described in "Satan and the Problem of Evil", then the question of whether God's middle knowledge can be said to be a "soft fact" is purely acedemic. The only purpose of arguing that it is a "soft fact" is to allow for freedom in a liberatarian sense (as traditionally defined). It has no bearing on the OV, because the OV assumes self-determination. If SDF is true, then we know Molinism is not true. Why? Because SDF assumes that I "create" my choice; thus my choice does not exist until I "create" it; thus, my choice did not exist (had no truth content) from eternity or at the logical moment before the DCD.


Thanks,

Earl



Edited by - JET on 02/28/2003 06:43:09 AM

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“Timeless statements are always true or false. Recall that it is possible to eliminate the tense of the verb in a statement and specify the time at which that statement is supposed to be true. For example, the statement ‘The Allies invaded Normandy’ can be made tenseless by specifying the time: ‘On June 6, 1944, the Allies invade Normandy’….If the tensed version is true, then so is the tenseless version. Thus, correlated with any true past- or present-tense statement is a true tenseless version of that statement. Furthermore, a tenseless statement, if it is true at all, is always true. This is precisely because the statement is tenseless. If ‘On June 6, 1944, the Allies invade Normandy’ is ever true, then it is always true. Therefore, the statement is true before June 6, 1944. But in that case, it is true prior to June 6, 1944, that the Allies on that date will invade Normandy, which is the same as saying that the future-tense version of the statement is true.”

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This explains why Craig believes that if “It is raining today” is now true, that it must have been true yesterday that “It will rain tomorrow.” You can make a timeless truth from the present tense truth and relocate it to any time prior to "now." Since “It’s raining today, February 28, 2003 in Beirut” is now true, this can be made into a tenseless statement, “On Feb. 28, 2003 it rains in Beirut.” Since tenseless statements are always true or false, it is always true that “It rains in Beirut on Feb. 28, 2003” and thus true before Feb. 28, 2003 that “It will rain in Beirut on Feb. 28, 2003.”

I’d like to explore what’s wrong with Craig’s argument here regarding the truth value of a past- or present-tense statements made tenseless. Comments?

Tom


Love never end

Edited by - TGB on 02/28/2003 11:37:04 PM

Edited by - TGB on 02/28/2003 11:44:35 PM

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For example, assume that both of the following past-tensed statements are true: 1) “The Allies invaded Normandy on June 6, 19944.”
2) “The Allies might have invaded Normandy on June 5, 1944”.

The tenseless version of (2) is “On June 5, 1944, the Allies invade Normandy”, which obviously is false.

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Earl-

I would think that a tenseless version of (2) would rather be “On June 5, 1944, the Allies might invade Normandy,” not that they “invade Normandy.”

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So if there are true “might counterfactuals”, it is not true that “correlated with any true past- or present-tense statement is a true tenseless version of that statement.”

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I wanna think Craig is wrong on this too. But it sure sounds correct.

Tom


Love never ends

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I’d like to explore what’s wrong with Craig’s argument here regarding the truth value of a past- or present-tense statements made tenseless. Comments?

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In this case, the tenseless statement (“At T2, X happens”) is true at T2 and true at T3, but it is false at T1.

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“For example, there is a possible world in which Peter affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he in fact denied him. But given the counterfactual truth that if Peter were in precisely those circumstances he would freely deny Christ, then the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in those circumstances in not feasible for God.”

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Interesting, eh? But note, Peter’s refraining from denying Christ in C is only a “logical possibility.” It is not counterfactually true. What is counterfactually true is that “If Peter were in circumstance C, he would freely deny Christ.” In conceding the logical possibility of Peter’s refraining from denying Christ in C, Craig appears to be saying only that there is nothing self-contradictory about Peter’s refraining from denying Christ. But one cannot argue from the existence of this possibility to the truth of “If Peter were in C, he would freely refraining from denying Christ.”

So I was right and wrong. Right in that Craig agrees that there is a (logically) possible world in which Peter affirms Christ in C. So, “Peter freely affirms Christ in C” and “Peter freely denies Christ in C” are both logically possible worlds. Wrong in that there is no true counterfactual that corresponds to the possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ.

The Jesuits argued that there are two logical moments prior to God’s decree to create. The first is God’s (natural) knowledge of all logical possibilities. The second is God’s (middle) knowledge of all true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Peter’s freely refraining from denying Christ in C exists as a possibility in God’s natural knowledge, not as a counterfactual truth in God’s middle knowledge. Peter’s freely denying Christ in C is what God knows in his middle knowledge. And because God’s middle knowledge is logically prior to God’s decree to create, God is able to use counterfactuals of creaturely freedom to decide exactly which world best suites his purposes and free will is not undermined.

Now, whatever was true in God’s natural knowledge logicall prior to the decree to create is still true. It’s still the case that “If Peter were in C, he would freely refrain from denying Christ” is logically true.

Alan, am I reading Craig’s chapter correctly? In reading it again I noticed that Craig never explains HOW the desired world described in the counterfactuals is actualized. In his response to Craig in the Four Views book, Paul Helm brings up the objection I already voiced. Actually, I got it from him but couldn’t remember where I read it. Helm comments:

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It is not clear to me how middle knowledge of the Jesuit variety…helps resolve the question of freedom and foreknowledge. Craig supposes that there is a possible world in which Peter affirmed Christ in precisely the same circumstances in which he denied him. But God wants the possible world in which Peter denies Christ to be actual. So what does he do? Can he decree that possible world? How can God be assured that when he decrees that possible world in which, in circumstances C, Peter freely denies Christ, it is that world that is actualized? ...it appears (to me at least) that God cannot decree the world in which Peter denies Christ without ensuring that Peter denies Christ, thus compromising Peter’s indeterministic freedom….”

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I think Craig would respond with something like this: Though the world in which Peter affirms Christ in C is a logically possible world, God could not have decreed it. This is not owing to any defect in God, but rather to the absence of any true counterfactual stating that “If Peter were in C, he would freely affirm Christ.” And God is limited to creating “counterfactually true” worlds. Not all logically possible worlds are counterfactually true.

What makes counterfactuals true? Craig thinks the question is “inept” (Four Views) and wrongheaded (but that’s another post!). One thing is for sure. Craig would agree that GOD doesn’t make them true. That’s determinism. But where Doc seems to think that Craig would also agree that WE don’t make them true (“…for created agents are not eternal, and Craig rightly denies retroactive causation” p. 145), I think Craig might argue that we DO make them true. Craig’s arguing that tenseless truths are eternally true and that tenseless statements describing our free actions can be gotten from past- and present-tense statements (that is, gotten from US) describing those actions shows one way perhaps that Craig would argue how it is that God eternally knows what shall come to pass.

Blessings,
Tom

PS Haven't gotten to your last two posts Earl. Later!


Love never ends

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Craig needs to do more than simply play with grammar to establish that a statement represents a metaphysically timeless truth.

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“Timeless statements are always true or false. Recall that it is possible to eliminate the tense of the verb in a statement and specify the time at which that statement is supposed to be true. For example, the statement ‘The Allies invaded Normandy’ can be made tenseless by specifying the time: ‘On June 6, 1944, the Allies invade Normandy’….If the tensed version is true, then so is the tenseless version. Thus, correlated with any true past- or present-tense statement is a true tenseless version of that statement. Furthermore, a tenseless statement, if it is true at all, is always true. This is precisely because the statement is tenseless. If ‘On June 6, 1944, the Allies invade Normandy’ is ever true, then it is always true. Therefore, the statement is true before June 6, 1944. But in that case, it is true prior to June 6, 1944, that the Allies on that date will invade Normandy, which is the same as saying that the future-tense version of the statement is true.”

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Is this another way of saying what Alan and TGB are saying:
The truth of some tenseless statements are trans-possible world (e.g. mathematical truths).
The truth of other tenseless statements are indexed to possible worlds (e.g. future contingents).
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Hence, the statement "George Bush is elected president in 2000" IS timelessly true relative to possible worlds x,y and z, is timelessly false relative to possible worlds x1, y1, z1, and IS NEITHER TRUE OR FALSE relative to which possible world will end up being actualized.

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