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Tom
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| Posted 3/12/2003 1:20 PM (GMT -6) |   | To add one last note to my correspondence with Hasker:
Tom: So, there exists no possible world in which Peter freely defends Christ in precisely the same circumstances as those in which he denies Christ. Perhaps Craig is the only one who argues this.
Hasker: No, that is not correct. There is indeed a *possible* world -- a world that does not contain an internal contradiction -- in which Peter freely defends Christ in precisely the same circumstances as those in which he denies Christ in the actual world. But this possible world is not a *feasible* world -- a world God is able to actualize -- because in fact, the counterfactual, "If Peter were in C, he would freely deny Christ," is true.
---- End of Correspondence ----
So, I was right on in thinking that in Molinism, God’s free knowledge, viz., his knowledge of all “logically possible worlds,” does not necessarily represent “possibly can be created by God” worlds. It represents only “logically coherent” worlds, worlds that are not logically contradictory in themselves. The slate of “possibly creatable” or “feasible” worlds from which God can choose to create are those which exist in his “middle knowledge.”
I have more on this, but it’s 2:30 AM!
Tom
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 3/13/2003 6:12 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: If there are “several possible ways” this world “can” go “depending on” creaturely (and divine) choices, then there is a set of distinct and determinate worlds.
Alan: I'm not denying that God can conceive of all the possible ways things could turn out and that this constitutes a set of distinct and determinate possible worlds. What I want to deny is that this set of logically possible worlds is REAL. The only world that exists outside the mind of God is the actual one. Possibility is logically prior to actuality, but actuality is metaphysically prior to possibility. I was cautioning Greg about the use of "possible worlds" talk in general because it encourages us to conflate logical and metaphysical possibility. They are not the same thing. For example, it is logically possible that I am never born, but it is not metaphysically possible since I have been born. 33 years ago it was metaphysically possible that I not be born, but it is no longer metaphysically possible. Thus, what is logically possible is, always has been, and always will be logically possible. What is metaphysically possible depends on what is actual.
quote:
Alan: A statement could be true in some worlds and not in others and not be timelessly true (or timelessly false) in any of those worlds.
Tom: Are you arguing FROM the truth of this statement or FOR its truth? Can you give us an example of such a statement?
Alan: This issue trades on the difference between logically and metaphysically possible worlds. I meant my claim to refer to metaphysically possible worlds. For example, prior to 2000, the statement "George W. Bush is elected president in 2000" is true in some metaphysically possible worlds and false in others. That statement is timelessly true (or false) in a world only if it is determinately true (or false) at all times prior to 2000 in that world. But if in each of these worlds that statement is contingent on the libertarian free choices of people in 1999, then it is not determinately true (or false) in those worlds at all times prior to 2000. Therefore, it is not timelessly true in those worlds.
Matters are quite different if we are talking about logically possible worlds. On the standard conception, a logically possible world is a fully determinate, maximal state-of-affairs. Different logically possible worlds are defined by the set of propositions that is true in them. Thus, any proposition true in W1 is timelessly true is W1 because it is true by definition of W1.
The point I want to add is that we can't settle questions of actual truth or falsity by appealing to logically possible worlds. The actual world is not a fully determinate, maximal state-of-affairs. Thinking about our world as ONE out of several logically possible worlds thus distorts our view of the actual world. Rather, the actual world is more like a branching set of logically possible worlds in which branches get pruned off as possibilities are foreclosed.
Clear as mud now, eh?
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 5/27/2004 12:02 PM (GMT -6) | | Thought I'd briefly resurrect an old thread with an new thought (which is really just a new way of phrasing the old thoughts that gave rise to this thread in the first place).
In the initiating post of this thread I argued that Molinism cannot consistently have it's cake and eat it too. My charge boils down to the claim that there are no counterfactuals of creaturely (libertarian) freedom that are strictly true. The reason is simple: a conditional (counterfactual or otherwise) is strictly true if and only if the truth of the antecedent is sufficient to guarantee the truth of the conclusion, but according to libertarianism, the antecedents of a free choice are not sufficient to guarantee which choice is made. It follows that libertarianly free choices cannot be captured by a strictly true conditional where the antecendent spells out the circumstantial and causal antecedents of the choice and the consequent spells out the choice itself. Thus there are no true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom of the sort that Molinism requires. So Molinism is false.
I still think this refutation is sound, but it recently occurred to me that there is another way of stating it.
All forms of non-open freewill theisms, such as Molinism and Ockhamism, affirm the following:
(a) libertarian freedom
(b) divine omniscience
(c) exhaustive definite foreknowledge (i.e., the future is and always has been exhaustively settled from God's epistemic perspective)
The problem here is this: Molinism and Ockhamism (attempt to) reconcile (a) with (c) by putting God's epistemic state out of sync with the metaphysical state of reality, but this undermines (b). On the one hand they claim that there is real future contingency. That is, there are aspects of the future that are not metaphysically certain. For example, they would say that it is not now metaphysically certain that an indeterministic coin about to be tossed will land heads. On the other hand they claim that it is and always has been epistemically certain to God whether the indeterministic coin would land heads or not. Thus there is a disconnect between God's epistemic state about the coin and the metaphysical state of the coin. Metaphysically, the probability that the coin will land head is 1/2, but God's epistemic probability that the coin will land heads is 1.
Now my question is why this shouldn't be seen as a serious compromise of God's omniscience. Given our epistemic limitations it is not uncommon for our epistemic probabilities to be out of sync with the metaphysical probabilities. Sometimes, as with the gambler's fallacy, this is due to faulty reasoning, and sometimes, as when a person has faulty background beliefs, it is due to our ignorance. But omniscience precludes this as a possibility for God. If the metaphysical probability of event E's occuring is 1/2, then God's epistemic probability regarding E's occurring should also be 1/2. In other words, if it is true that Prob(E)=1/2, then God's level of epistemic certainty regarding E's occurring should also be 1/2. If it is otherwise, then God's state of knowledge does not correspond to reality, which means that some of God's beliefs are false, which means that God is not, contrary to assumption, omniscient. Since we know God is omnscient, however, if (a) is true, then (c) must be false.
Feedback appreciated.
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Tom
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| Posted 5/27/2004 2:46 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan-
Right on. Isn’t the disconnect between God’s epistemic state and the metaphysics of reality dismissed by Craig and other Molinists in their dismissal of the grounding objection? In fact, isn’t this precisely why they dismiss the grounding objection? The truth of counterfactuals really IS just a metaphysical surd that isn’t grounded in anything.
I suppose Molinists and Ockhamists who hold to EDF could be thought of as denying omniscience. But Craig defines Omniscience as “for all p, if p, then God knows that p and does not believe that not-p.” That pretty much confirms his belief in omniscience. But whereas Calvinists have a deterministic metaphysic in harmony with their belief that omniscience amounts to knowing the future exclusively in terms of what "will" and "will not" happen, Craig claims to have an indeterministic metaphysic, and THAT’S what makes his Molinism so strange, because he agrees with the determinsts that omniscience is expressed exclusively in terms of what "will" and "will not" happen with regard to the future and yet holds to a indeterministic metaphysic which by definition must be expressed ALSO in terms of what "might and might not" happen. Thus, he has an open or indeterministic metaphysic but denies there exist any true “might and might not” propositions (which are the only propositions capable of expressing an indeterministic metaphysic). Thus one is tempted to question whether Craig really believes in his own definition of omniscience or whether he really holds to an indeterminate metaphysic of the future. Seems that it's his denial of truth-makers (grounding objection) that allows him to claim to hold to a truly indeterministic metaphysic while denying there are any true "might and might not" propositions. God's knows the future is closed (because he only knows it in terms of "will and "will not") and yet holds to an open metaphysic.
No wonder there are so few Molinists.
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John Earp
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| Posted 5/27/2004 3:16 PM (GMT -6) | | You guys would certainly know better than I, but I was just wondering--Doesn't classical Arminianism logically entail Molinism? It would seem so, given that Arminians say:
1. Man has libertarian free will.
2. God exhaustively foreknows definitely which choices free agents will make in all instances.
3. And yet, there are some things that happen that are not God's will, according to Arminianism.
I realize the touchstone of Molinism is the concept of middle knowledge, but I guess my question would more directly be, "Doesn't classical Arminianism's view of foreknowledge entail middle knowledge?" It seems to me that any position that affirms libertarian free will requires some kind of "would, could, should, might, etc." It also seems to me that libertarian free will is logically inconsistent with any view other than the Open View.
Does Doc still call his view of foreknowledge "neo-Molinism?" Could that be a subconscious tribute to The Matrix? 
"The Discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world." Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology.
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 5/27/2004 3:30 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: Isn’t the disconnect between God’s epistemic state and the metaphysics of reality dismissed by Craig and other Molinists in their dismissal of the grounding objection? In fact, isn’t this precisely why they dismiss the grounding objection? The truth of counterfactuals really IS just a metaphysical surd that isn’t grounded in anything.
Alan: You're right, Tom, to see a connection between my anti-Molinist argument and the grounding objection. My argument is really just a version of that objection.
Tom: Whereas Calvinists have a deterministic metaphysic to match their belief that omniscience amounts to knowing the future exclusively in terms of "will" and "will not" happen, Craig claims to have an indeterminate metaphysic, and THAT’S what makes Molinism so strange, because he agrees with the determinsts that omniscience is expressed exclusively in terms of "will" and "will not" happen with regard to the future, but he he hold to a metaphysic that is expressed also in terms of what "might and might not" happen. Thus, he has an open or indeterministic metaphysic but denies there exist any true “might and might not” propositions (which are the only propositions capable of expressing an indeterministic metaphysic). Thus one is tempted to question whether Craig really believes in his own definition of omniscience or whether he really holds to an indeterminate metaphysic of the future.
Alan: Right on, Tom. There is definitely something odd about Craig's view. In my argument above I tried to spell out this oddness in terms of the inevitable disconnect that Molinism creates between God's epistemological state toward future contingents and the metaphysical status of future contingents. It seems to me that this is an extremely counterintuitive consequence of Molinism that undermines the very omniscience that they claim to uphold. Here's a somewhat more refined restatement of my argument:
If there exists a genuine future contingent event E the metaphysical probability of which is now, say, 1/2, then the following is true: Prob(E)=1/2. Since it is true, and omniscient God must know this. There are two ways in which we might characterize God's epistemic state:
(1) God is completely certain (i.e., epistemic probabily = 1) that Prob(E)=1/2.
(2) God is certain to degree 1/2 (i.e., epistemic probability = 1/2) that E.
If we characterize God's epistemic state by (1), then God is certain that E might and might not happen, which means that God does not have exhaustive definitive foreknowledge that E will happen. If we characterize God's epistemic state by (2), then God is not certain whether E will happen, which, again, means that God does not have exhaustive definitive foreknowledge that E will happen. What the Molinist wants to say, however, is:
(3) God is completely certain (i.e., epistemic probabily = 1) that E, even though Prob(E)=1/2.
Which is to say that there is a disconnect between God's epistemic state regarding E and the metaphysical status of E, which undermines omniscience.
So the Molinist has a choice: He can construe God's state of knowledge regarding E in accordance with either (1) or (2), in which case he cannot consistently hold onto EDF. Or he can construe God's state of knowledge regarding E in accordance with (3), in which case he cannot consistently hold onto omniscience.
Tom: No wonder there are so few Molinists.
Alan: There's more of them than you might think, and some pretty influential ones at that (e.g., Plantinga, Craig, Flint, Freddoso, etc.).
Thanks for the feedback, Tom.
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Lee Merrill
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| Posted 5/27/2004 6:21 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi everyone,
This is kind of fun...
Though I haven't read all the posts(!), it seems to me that Alan's argument is a lot like the argument that any real foreknowledge of a free choice makes it no longer a free choice.
But doesn't everyone (here) step up to saying that God knows at least some of what he will freely do in the future, and also that his choices are nevertheless still free?
Thus I think that the Molinists may possibly make off with their prize, in this regard.
I wonder about their view, though, in insisting that God may control the future, through knowing how men will freely choose. What if there is no possible universe in which Peter denies Christ? The Molinists have to say that for every choice that God needs in his plan, there is a possible (and not just logically possible!) universe in which that choice is made. But I don't see how they can assert that, with any degree of confidence.
Also! To arrange the circumstance so that X will freely choose Y still does seem to remove that freedom, in some sense. If a mother knows that her child will invariably do Y if she does X, then she can put X in her toolbox, to pull out whenever she wants Y.
Can the child be said to freely choose, then? I'm not so sure you can claim Y as a truly free action, especially if the mother really does know that Y will really happen if she does X, if she's not partly guessing.
Blessings,
Lee
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 5/27/2004 6:45 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Doesn't classical Arminianism logically entail Molinism? It would seem so, given that Arminians say:
1. Man has libertarian free will.
2. God exhaustively foreknows definitely which choices free agents will make in all instances.
3. And yet, there are some things that happen that are not God's will, according to Arminianism.
I realize the touchstone of Molinism is the concept of middle knowledge, but I guess my question would more directly be, "Doesn't classical Arminianism's view of foreknowledge entail middle knowledge?" It seems to me that any position that affirms libertarian free will requires some kind of "would, could, should, might, etc."
Good question, John. William Lane Craig, a prominent Molinist, would agree with you that classical Arminianism leads to Molinism. I don't think there's a strict entailment from your (1), (2), and (3) to Molinism, though, since those claims seem to me to be compatible with the simple foreknowledge position that most classical Arminians embrace. To get to Molinism you also need to affirm meticulous divine providence, i.e.,
4. Everything that happens is specifically intended by God either as an end or as a means to some greater good.
Simple foreknowledge does not give God this kind of providential control, but Molinism does.
John: Does Doc still call his view of foreknowledge "neo-Molinism?"
Alan: This came out is some thread awhile back. Basically, Doc gave up on "neo-Molinism" as a characterization of the open view after it was pointed out to him by a critic that the God of open theism possesses only (a) natural knowledge (i.e., knowledge of all possibilities) and (b) free knowledge (i.e., knowledge of actualities consequent upon God's sovereign decisions). Accordingly, there is no need on the open view for genuine "middle" knowledge. Hence "neo-Molinism" isn't really a variant on Molinism.
God bless,
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 5/27/2004 7:08 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Lee Merrill
It seems to me that Alan's argument is a lot like the argument that any real foreknowledge of a free choice makes it no longer a free choice.
But doesn't everyone (here) step up to saying that God knows at least some of what he will freely do in the future, and also that his choices are nevertheless still free?
Hi Lee, couple comments for ya:
First, the argument is not that foreknowledge of a free choice "makes" it no longer free, but rather that foreknowledge (of the infallible sort that God is thought to possess) of a free choice is incompatible with its being free. I don't think foreknowledge per se causes anything to happen, but like Jonathan Edwards, I do think that infallible foreknowledge of a choice shows that it is deterministically caused to happen. Where I would part company w/ Edwards is over whether there are free choices in the libertarian sense, and thus over whether God has the exhaustively detailed foreknowledge that has traditionally been ascribed to him.
Second, it is true that God's knowing what he will do does not make his choices unfree simply because it is on account of his choices that he knows what he will do. The two go hand-in-hand: God resolves at time T0 that he will do X at time T1 and he thereby knows at T0 that he will do X at time T1. So God's foreknowledge of his actions is consequent upon his choices. With respect to human choices, however, matters are different, for God is supposed to foreknow prior to the existence of any humans what they will freely do. But since this knowledge obtains prior to the occurance of any creaturely choices, it cannot, so it would seem, be consequent on those choice, but must be antecedent to them. This is where I think the difficulty of reconciling infallible foreknowledge w/ creaturely freedom arises. How can it be infallibly certain that I will freely do X before I do X, before I have made my free choice, or before I ever existed?
God bless,
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Lee Merrill
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| Posted 5/28/2004 3:04 AM (GMT -6) | | Hi Alan,
quote:
I do think that infallible foreknowledge of a choice shows that it is deterministically caused to happen.
But then God's choices are deterministically caused! But you add another condition next, so I think you must qualify this statement a bit...
quote:
Second, it is true that God's knowing what he will do does not make his choices unfree simply because it is on account of his choices that he knows what he will do.
I'm not sure what you are saying here, though. Are you saying that God's choices are free? I agree, and I think free-will folks would say men's choices are free, too.
quote:
God is supposed to foreknow prior to the existence of any humans what they will freely do. But since this knowledge obtains prior to the occurance of any creaturely choices, it cannot, so it would seem, be consequent on those choice, but must be antecedent to them.
But I think God may be said to choose at a time in the future, and know, in the present, that he will choose that way.
The Lord will inherit Judah as his portion in the holy land and will again choose Jerusalem. (Zech. 2:12)
I guess you could say that God has already chosen, when he makes such a prophecy, but then it seems odd to call the moment of selection of Jerusalem nevertheless a choice.
I guess this argument works better if you believe (I do) that God is not in time...
Blessings,
Lee
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Lee Merrill
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| Posted 5/28/2004 7:04 AM (GMT -6) | | I had a further thought or two...
quote:
I wonder about their view, though, in insisting that God may control the future, through knowing how men will freely choose. What if there is no possible universe in which Peter denies Christ?
I think the Open Theists hit a bump here, too, in the invicible chess master analogy. If an outcome depends on free-will human choices, how can we know that there is always a path that God can select, which accomplishes his purpose? If there are a finite number of chances for a couple to name their baby Cyrus, then what if they all refuse? There is a time limit on this prophecy, too, so eventually God has to force the last possible couple to name their baby Cyrus (Isa. 44:28), so it is not possible to guarantee the outcome, regardless of how people choose, without also being willing to override human choices.
quote:
I'm not so sure you can claim Y as a truly free action, especially if the mother really does know that Y will really happen if she does X, if she's not partly guessing.
I think the Molinists have to admit that God does indeed cause Y, by arranging the circumstances for X, so that the free(?) choice will without fail be made in the way that fits God's plan.
God is not merely observing now, he is acting, and acting in such a way as to guarantee the desired choice being made...
Blessings,
Lee
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 5/28/2004 4:40 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan: I do think that infallible foreknowledge of a choice shows that it is deterministically caused to happen.
Lee: But then God's choices are deterministically caused!
Alan: That would follow only if God's choices are fore-known by him. This I deny. We need to distinguish between God's choices and God's actions consequent on those choices. Some choices may be unilateral, i.e., God simply wills to do X. Other choices may be conditional, i.e., God wills to do X IF a certain set of conditions C obtains, where C is a future contingent. For simplicity's sake, let's just focus on unilateral choices for now. If God makes a unilateral choice at time T0 to do action X at time T1, then he thereby foreknows that he will X at T1. God foreknows his actions because he NOW knows his choices. God's choices can't be foreknown if they are free simply because God hasn't made his choices yet.
In sum, God choices are free but are not foreknown, which is perfectly consistent w/ the fact that infallible foreknowledge of a choice would show it to be unfree.
Lee: But I think God may be said to choose at a time in the future, and know, in the present, that he will choose that way.
The Lord will inherit Judah as his portion in the holy land and will again choose Jerusalem. (Zech. 2:12)
I guess you could say that God has already chosen, when he makes such a prophecy, but then it seems odd to call the moment of selection of Jerusalem nevertheless a choice.
Alan: I don't think it's odd at all if we bear in mind the distinction between choosing and acting in accordance with one's choice. I would say that God has already chosen to bless Jerusalem, and that his "choosing" here refers to his ACTING to bestow his favor on her after a time of chastening judgment.
Lee: I guess this argument works better if you believe (I do) that God is not in time...
Alan: I don't see how this helps your argument. Quite the contrary. If God is not in time, then what you just said, i.e., that "God may be said to choose AT A TIME in the future, and know, IN THE PRESENT, that he will choose that way" makes no sense, fo that can be true only if God is in time. If God is timeless, then he cannot literally FORE-know anything because there would be no before-after sequencing to his knowledge.
Lee: I think the Open Theists hit a bump here, too, in the invicible chess master analogy. If an outcome depends on free-will human choices, how can we know that there is always a path that God can select, which accomplishes his purpose? If there are a finite number of chances for a couple to name their baby Cyrus, then what if they all refuse? There is a time limit on this prophecy, too, so eventually God has to force the last possible couple to name their baby Cyrus (Isa. 44:28), so it is not possible to guarantee the outcome, regardless of how people choose, without also being willing to override human choices.
Alan: I agree with you that God cannot guarantee outcomes without being willing to override human freedom if necessary to achieve his goals. But that possibility only comes into play IF no one freely cooperates with God, which I suspect is not often the case since God has many persuasive reasources at his disposal that he can use to influence human choices without determining those choices. At any rate, I don't see that open theists hit a "bump" here, for open theism is not committed to the idea that human free will is so sacrosanct that God is never justified in overriding it when the need arises.
I appreciate the gracious tone of your interaction, Lee. God bless.
Alan
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Lee Merrill
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| Posted 5/28/2004 5:45 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi Alan,
quote:
God's choices can't be foreknown if they are free simply because God hasn't made his choices yet.
But did God not plan (on your view) to create Adam, before the moment when he actually created him? And this decision was free from human free-will contingencies. But I think everyone holds that God acts freely, without constraint, thus even knowing his plan, and his future choice, he must still be said to freely choose to create Adam when he actually did pick up the dust and make him.
quote:
The Lord will inherit Judah as his portion in the holy land and will again choose Jerusalem. (Zech. 2:12)
Lee: I guess you could say that God has already chosen, when he makes such a prophecy, but then it seems odd to call the moment of selection of Jerusalem nevertheless a choice.
Alan: I don't think it's odd at all if we bear in mind the distinction between choosing and acting in accordance with one's choice. I would say that God has already chosen to bless Jerusalem, and that his "choosing" here refers to his ACTING to bestow his favor on her after a time of chastening judgment.
That may be true, but then I would have expected a word other than "choosing" here, to refer to the future action, it seems to imply a decision at that moment, and not a carrying out of a prior decision.
quote:
Lee: I guess this argument works better if you believe (I do) that God is not in time...
Alan: I don't see how this helps your argument. Quite the contrary. If God is not in time, then what you just said, i.e., that "God may be said to choose AT A TIME in the future, and know, IN THE PRESENT, that he will choose that way" makes no sense, for that can be true only if God is in time. If God is timeless, then he cannot literally FORE-know anything because there would be no before-after sequencing to his knowledge.
Well, I don't mean that God is totally apart from time, just like he can appear to people as if he was just present in one place, though he is really everywhere. So fore-knowledge, I would say, refers to God's always knowing all his choices, that he will carry out at various moments in time. So I think that puts all of God's choices as foreknown (I think most Calvinists would step up to that), and yet free (which I think everyone agrees to). I'm not saying I understand this! But I think that it's kind of implied in the Calvinist view. Maybe I hit a bump here...
quote:
Lee: If an outcome depends on free-will human choices, how can we know that there is always a path that God can select, which accomplishes his purpose?
Alan: I agree with you that God cannot guarantee outcomes without being willing to override human freedom if necessary to achieve his goals. ... open theism is not committed to the idea that human free will is so sacrosanct that God is never justified in overriding it when the need arises.
OK, I thought the invincible chess master analogy meant God can always win, regardless of how people choose, that he doesn't need to make moves for people, to accomplish his plan. I guess I'm confused. More confused than usual...
I need to tell a story on myself! I did try and read the Divine Foreknowledge book, and didn't understand most of it. I felt like I had wandered into a room full of mathematicians discussing their theories, and using words like "groups" and "rings" and "orders," but they weren't talking about a wedding banquet! Or whether Aunt Tillie was going to have soup or salad. "Necessarily, God knows the future." I'm sure there must be some clear meaning of this to these folks, but it looks foggy from where I sit...
quote:
God bless.
Blessings to you, too!
Lee
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Tom
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| Posted 5/28/2004 10:06 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan: I agree with you (Lee) that God cannot guarantee outcomes without being willing to override human freedom if necessary to achieve his goals. But that possibility only comes into play IF no one freely cooperates with God, which I suspect is not often the case since God has many persuasive resources at his disposal that he can use to influence human choices without determining those choices. At any rate, I don't see that open theists hit a "bump" here, for open theism is not committed to the idea that human free will is so sacrosanct that God is never justified in overriding it when the need arises.
Tom: One could pursue this subject for a while. Just a comment or two from me though. If a freely chosen outcome is God’s goal in a particular instance, then there is no “guarantee” that God gets what he wants regardless of his resources and influence, as I’m sure Alan agrees. Open theists have argued that God can “guarantee” that he’ll get SOME people to freely choose to love him throughout history by arguing this is guaranteed ‘statistically’ across the board, like an insurance agency can be guaranteed that this year 12,000 teenagers will certainly choose to speed and wreck their cars. But they can’t know WHICH teenagers will wreck their cars.
Naming Cyrus (Lee’s example), however, doesn’t have to be a free parental choice. God could simply determine their wills to name him Cyrus. I know open theists often argue that God has lots of “resources” at his disposal he can use to “influence human choices,” and this sounds right to me, but I’ve always wandered just what those resources are and how they answer the question of ‘guaranteeing’ outcomes when they only ‘influence.’ Then there’s Cyrus’ career, his becoming king, and his releasing the Jews. That a “Cyrus” would do this was also prophesied. I don’t really understand how these can be unconditional, guaranteed, and also libertarianly free choices regardless of God’s resources. So I either have to admit that the prophecy is implicitly conditional (such things exist) and so not certain, or (more likely) that the it’s certain and not free. But in Cyrus’ case these choices don’t have to be free do they? Technically, the only choices that have to be libertarianly free are moral ones (the choice to love, to choice to accept the gospel, to worship, etc.).
Lee:But did God not plan (on your view) to create Adam, before the moment when he actually created him?
Tom: Sorry to butt in Alan. Gerry doesn’t like me answering other peoples’ questions.  But I thought since this is a discussion site it’s OK to jump in. Lee, I’d say ‘Yes’, God did plan (or choose, or intend) to create Adam before the very moment he actually created him and I’d say this was a free choice and that it was foreknown as certain. I can say all this because I think God’s choice to create was an unconditional choice God made. That doesn’t make it less than free FOR GOD, since he’s the one making the choice to create. Thus, there’s no incompatibility between God foreknowing as certain his own choices and those choices being both free and unconditional. The incompatibility exists between God’s foreknowing as certain his own choices (and ours) where those choices are conditioned upon factors which themselves lie outside of an unconditional decree of God.
Lee: That may be true, but then I would have expected a word other than "choosing" here, to refer to the future action, it seems to imply a decision at that moment, and not a carrying out of a prior decision.
Tom: Open up on the definition of “choice” a bit. Did I plan to get married on June 9 BEFORE June 9, BEFORE I actually said “I do” on June 9? Sure I did. I chose to get married on June 9 during the Christmas break prior to that June. And I also chose to get married on June 9 when I actually said the words “I do.” There’s no problem here, so long as the first choice is a choice to say the words “I do” on June 9, a choice to execute a choice, to actualize a state of affairs, ahead of time. Makes perfect sense. God can choose to create the world logically and/or temporally prior to creating the world. And in the case of creating the world, God can know for certain that he’ll actually create the world because his choice to create is unconditional.
Lee: Well, I don't mean that God is totally apart from time, just like he can appear to people as if he was just present in one place, though he is really everywhere. So fore-knowledge, I would say, refers to God's always knowing all his choices, that he will carry out at various moments in time. So I think that puts all of God's choices as foreknown (I think most Calvinists would step up to that), and yet free (which I think everyone agrees to). I'm not saying I understand this! But I think that it's kind of implied in the Calvinist view. Maybe I hit a bump here...
Tom: Or a wall!
Lee: OK, I thought the invincible chess master analogy meant God can always win, regardless of how people choose, that he doesn't need to make moves for people, to accomplish his plan. I guess I'm confused. More confused than usual...
Tom: The chess analogy was never intended to mean God ‘never’ unconditionally determines the choices of others in ANY circumstance. It was only offered as an analogy of how God is able to win (the game) without ALWAYS having to determine the moves of others throughout the game. It’s argued by theological determinists that God can’t guarantee ANYTHING, specifically that his overall purpose for creation will be achieved, if even one tiny event occurs outside of his unconditional determination. THAT’S all the chess analogy contradicts. It’s not an exhaustive model of everything God can or may do in every conceivable situation.
Sorry to have butted in again.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Lee Merrill
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| Posted 5/29/2004 7:03 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
If a freely chosen outcome is God’s goal in a particular instance, then there is no “guarantee” that God gets what he wants regardless of his resources and influence, as I’m sure Alan agrees. Open theists have argued that God can “guarantee” that he’ll get SOME people to freely choose to love him throughout history by arguing this is guaranteed ‘statistically’ across the board, like an insurance agency can be guaranteed that this year 12,000 teenagers will certainly choose to speed and wreck their cars. But they can’t know WHICH teenagers will wreck their cars.
But that's not the invincible chess master! The "law of large numbers" is what gets the statisticians their paycheck, but this is not that analogy: "Though she cannot be certain of how her opponent will move, for her opponent is a free agent, she is certain she can wisely out-maneuver him. ... God neither predestines nor foreknows everything as settled but is nevertheless certain of victory because of his divine wisdom. It is the only model in which God wins by virtue of his wisdom, creativity, and problem-solving intelligence. ... To simply control or possess information about the future requires no virtuous attributes." (Divine Foreknowledge).
This is not viewing the behavior of groups of people as the statisticians do. The analogy is speaking of a plan, and a guaranteed outcome, the statisticians do not plan how many incidents-of-a-given-type shall occur, rather they deduce that.
Also if we have God making moves for his opponent, you can certainly always win if you do that! But that undoes just what Dr. Boyd seems to be claiming for the Open View here.
quote:
I know open theists often argue that God has lots of “resources” at his disposal he can use to “influence human choices,” and this sounds right to me, but I’ve always wandered just what those resources are and how they answer the question of ‘guaranteeing’ outcomes when they only ‘influence.’
I agree, I don't see how all possible human choices can always be out-maneuvered, if God has a plan that involves such choices.
quote:
So I either have to admit that the prophecy is implicitly conditional (such things exist) and so not certain, or (more likely) that the it’s certain and not free. But in Cyrus’ case these choices don’t have to be free do they? Technically, the only choices that have to be libertarianly free are moral ones (the choice to love, to choice to accept the gospel, to worship, etc.).
I agree that some prophecies are conditional, and sometimes the conditions are not stated. So we have to discern. I think the Cyrus prophecy was unconditional, as you seem to say as well. But I believe that accepting the gospel is not a free choice:
AC 11:14 He will bring you a message through which you and all your household will be saved.
Not "may be saved," but "will be."
JAS 1:18 He chose to give us birth through the word of truth...
AC 16:14 The Lord opened her heart to respond to Paul's message.
quote:
Lee:But did God not plan (on your view) to create Adam, before the moment when he actually created him?
Tom: I’d say ‘Yes’, God did plan (or choose, or intend) to create Adam before the very moment he actually created him and I’d say this was a free choice and that it was foreknown as certain. ... The incompatibility exists between God’s foreknowing as certain his own choices (and ours) where those choices are conditioned upon factors which themselves lie outside of an unconditional decree of God.
OK, that wasn't quite what I was after, though (if I'm understanding your point). I just was trying to point out that merely knowing about a free choice, even knowing exactly how it will be made, doesn't therefore make it not free. If that's true of God's choices, then I think we can say that is possible for choices in general, insofar as they are real, free choices. I know you all hold that God doesn't know future free human choices, but the Molinists do! So I was kind of assuming their viewpoint.
quote:
Lee: ... then I would have expected a word other than "choosing" here [in Zech. 2:12], to refer to the future action, it seems to imply a decision at that moment, and not a carrying out of a prior decision.
Tom: Open up on the definition of “choice” a bit. Did I plan to get married on June 9 BEFORE June 9, BEFORE I actually said “I do” on June 9? Sure I did. I chose to get married on June 9 during the Christmas break prior to that June. And I also chose to get married on June 9 when I actually said the words “I do.”
I agree, I think there may be two choices here, both free, and both must be the same (since it's a prophecy!), a bit of a paradox.
quote:
Lee: So I think that puts all of God's choices as foreknown (I think most Calvinists would step up to that), and yet free (which I think everyone agrees to). I'm not saying I understand this! But I think that it's kind of implied in the Calvinist view. Maybe I hit a bump here...
Tom: Or a wall!
It is difficult to fathom. I find that encouraging, though, since God appeals to nature when he is questioning Job, and I don't understand basic biology, much less quantum physics, much less how God chooses, or his relation to time, or his knowledge of the future. Just taking two standard points of doctrine, and making a deduction!
quote:
Lee: I thought the invincible chess master analogy meant God can always win, regardless of how people choose, that he doesn't need to make moves for people, to accomplish his plan. I guess I'm confused. More confused than usual...
Tom: The chess analogy was never intended to mean God ‘never’ unconditionally determines the choices of others in ANY circumstance. It was only offered as an analogy of how God is able to win (the game) without ALWAYS having to determine the moves of others throughout the game. It’s argued by theological determinists that God can’t guarantee ANYTHING, specifically that his overall purpose for creation will be achieved, if even one tiny event occurs outside of his unconditional determination. THAT’S all the chess analogy contradicts.
But I think the chess analogy says specifically that God doesn't need to make some of his opponent's moves in order to win. That's not being a chess master! Nor does it require any skill whatsoever, if you give me that ticket, I can beat Garry Kasparov...
And hi Jo-anne! I came in late on this thread myself, and haven't read nearly all the posts either, reading and posting takes a whole bunch of time, even when I skip-to-my-Lou.
quote:
could someone please just post a clear definition of molinism for me?
I'm no expert on Molinism! All I know is what I read in the newspapers. And I can't find a good link on this! Google has failed me...
From what I understand, Molinists start with the fact that God knows how people would choose in a given situation (1 Sam. 23:11-12; Mt. 11:21), even if those situations never actually happen. Then they conclude that God could therefore control the future, by arranging the circumstances, so that the choices are made that fit God's plan. But I might be misrepresenting their view here! I might be misrepresenting my view here, for that matter, for all I can tell. 
Blessings,
Lee
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Tom
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| Posted 5/29/2004 12:07 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: If a freely chosen outcome is God’s goal in a particular instance, then there is no “guarantee” that God gets what he wants regardless of his resources and influence, as I’m sure Alan agrees. Open theists have argued that God can “guarantee” that he’ll get SOME people to freely choose to love him throughout history by arguing this is guaranteed ‘statistically’ across the board, like an insurance agency can be guaranteed that this year 12,000 teenagers will certainly choose to speed and wreck their cars. But they can’t know WHICH teenagers will wreck their cars.
Lee: But that's not the invincible chess master! The "law of large numbers" is what gets the statisticians their paycheck, but this is not that analogy…
I wasn’t suggesting statistical guarantees ARE the chess analogy. They’re entirely different.
quote:
"Though she cannot be certain of how her opponent will move, for her opponent is a free agent, she is certain she can wisely out-maneuver him. ... God neither predestines nor foreknows everything as settled but is nevertheless certain of victory because of his divine wisdom. It is the only model in which God wins by virtue of his wisdom, creativity, and problem-solving intelligence. ... To simply control or possess information about the future requires no virtuous attributes." (Divine Foreknowledge). This is not viewing the behavior of groups of people as the statisticians do. The analogy is speaking of a plan, and a guaranteed outcome, the statisticians do not plan how many incidents-of-a-given-type shall occur, rather they deduce that. Also if we have God making moves for his opponent, you can certainly always win if you do that! But that undoes just what Dr. Boyd seems to be claiming for the Open View here.
Are we talking about the same thing? I was speaking of particular cases in which God’s “goal” is itself a freely chosen human outcome, like our choosing to love God. I don’t see how such a choice on our part can be guaranteed by God either by determining it unconditionally or by chess-mastery. The chess analogy was never intended to be THE all-inclusive analogy that explained everything about how God moves. In chess you can never remove the free will of your opponent, but open theists admit that God may sometimes determine the exercise of our wills. That doesn’t fall within the chess analogy. So what.
Lee: I agree, I don't see how all possible human choices can always be out-maneuvered, if God has a plan that involves such choices.
Tom: Open theists don’t claim the chess analogy proves that all possible scenarios can always be outmaneuvered by God. The chess analogy is offered to prove one thing: that guaranteeing ultimate victory of the overall plan without having to determine EVERY move we make makes perfect sense to us (even though one may sometimes loses a piece on the board or sometimes have to sacrifice a particular piece to secure the overall win—you win through losing). The chess analogy was offered against the accusation that if God EVER fails to get what he wants, God can't possibly guarantee that he’ll get the final victory. It wasn’t intended to explain how God can guarantee that a particular king named Cyrus will choose to free Jews.
Lee: I agree that some prophecies are conditional, and sometimes the conditions are not stated. So we have to discern. I think the Cyrus prophecy was unconditional, as you seem to say as well.
Tom: Yes. But since naming a child and choosing a vocation are not moral decisions, I don’t have a problem with God determining Cyrus in these respects.
Lee: But I believe that accepting the gospel is not a free choice…
Tom: We certainly disagree on this. If there’s any choice that is free, it’s this one.
Lee: OK, that wasn't quite what I was after, though (if I'm understanding your point). I just was trying to point out that merely knowing about a free choice, even knowing exactly how it will be made, doesn't therefore make it not free. If that's true of God's choices, then I think we can say that is possible for choices in general…
Tom: It’s true that for God to foreknow his own unconditional choices these choices remain free for God. They’re HIS choices. One could argue that it’s possible in general that we may foreknow OUR own unconditional choices as well since WE are the one’s freely making them. This works in principle, though only an omnipotent being could foreknow such choices as certain.
What doesn’t follow from it’s being true that God may foreknow as determinate his own freely determined unconditional choices is that God may therefore foreknow as determinate from all eternity OUR freely determined choices.
Also, you’re right in pointing out that foreknowledge of a free choice doesn’t “make it not free.” Nobody is claiming that God’s foreknowledge itself is what “makes” free human choices less than free. We we’re claiming is that just admitting that God isn’t the one “making us not free” doesn’t go very far in proving that eternally foreknown choices are in fact free choices that WE’RE making. What such foreknowledge does show is that WE are not the ones determining our choices, since they were rendered determinate in the mind of God before we made them. If we’re not determining our choices, who or what is? Just saying “God’s not determining them” doesn’t mean we ARE. In fact, we certainly aren’t determining our own choices if they were rendered determinate in God’s mind before we ever existed.
Lee: I agree, I think there may be two choices here, both free, and both must be the same (since it's a prophecy!), a bit of a paradox.
Tom: I thought we were talking about God’s choice to create Adam. No prophecy there. God chooses to create logically and perhaps temporally prior to actually creating. God planned to create and he did so freely. No paradox.
Lee: But I think the chess analogy says specifically that God doesn't need to make some of his opponent's moves in order to win. That's not being a chess master! Nor does it require any skill whatsoever, if you give me that ticket, I can beat Garry Kasparov...
Tom: Get the analogy straight though. The chess analogy is designed to contradict the claim that unless God determines ALL of our moves (and all of the moves in creation), God can’t possibly guarantee that he’ll win in the end, that he’ll have a Bride, a People who love him. The chess analogy says, “On what basis can you claim that guaranteed outcomes can ONLY follow from unilaterally determined moves? Chess is a perfect example of guaranteed outcomes following from LESS THAN EXHAUSTIVELY DETERMINED moves and involvement.”
Blessings,
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Lee Merrill
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| Posted 5/29/2004 1:35 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi Tom,
quote:
Lee: ... if we have God making moves for his opponent, you can certainly always win if you do that! But that undoes just what Dr. Boyd seems to be claiming for the Open View here.
Tom: Are we talking about the same thing? I was speaking of particular cases in which God’s “goal” is itself a freely chosen human outcome, like our choosing to love God. I don’t see how such a choice on our part can be guaranteed by God either by determining it unconditionally or by chess-mastery.
I agree! I don't see how it can be done either. But on the same page as the chess master analogy, I read, "God demonstrates his sovereign power by empowering others to enter into a loving relationship with him." The next paragraph starts, "It takes a truly sovereign God to make himself vulnerable like this." And the next paragraph says, "At this juncture an analogy might help demonstrate this point." And then we have the chess master analogy (Divine Foreknowledge, pp. 44-45). It seems clear to me that Dr. Boyd includes salvation, choosing to love God, as one of the main applications of this analogy.
quote:
Tom: The chess analogy was offered against the accusation that if God EVER fails to get what he wants, God can't possibly guarantee that he’ll get the final victory.
Then what, in your view, is the goal? What is the victory that God will certainly achieve? As far as it concerns human choices...
quote:
It wasn’t intended to explain how God can guarantee that a particular king named Cyrus will choose to free Jews.
But I think this problem affects every prophecy that depends on human decisions, and every plan that God makes that requires one decision, and not another. That's pretty comprehensive.
quote:
Lee: I just was trying to point out that merely knowing about a free choice, even knowing exactly how it will be made, doesn't therefore make it not free. If that's true of God's choices, then I think we can say that is possible for choices in general…
Tom: It’s true that for God to foreknow his own unconditional choices these choices remain free for God. They’re HIS choices. One could argue that it’s possible in general that we may foreknow OUR own unconditional choices as well since WE are the one’s freely making them. This works in principle, though only an omnipotent being could foreknow such choices as certain.
Roger Wilco. Glad to agree...
quote:
What doesn’t follow from it’s being true that God may foreknow as determinate his own freely determined unconditional choices is that God may therefore foreknow as determinate from all eternity OUR freely determined choices.
That's another issue, I agree again. The Molinists say that, and they're not here to defend themselves!
quote:
In fact, we certainly aren’t determining our own choices if they were rendered determinate in God’s mind before we ever existed.
I agree that a known choice is therefore determined. But that doesn't necessarily make it not free! As in God's foreknown decisions. Nor does it mean that people aren't the source of their decisions (speaking free-will-istically, my view on this is somewhat different!). I don't see that that is a necessary implication.
quote:
Lee: But I think the chess analogy says specifically that God doesn't need to make some of his opponent's moves in order to win. That's not being a chess master! Nor does it require any skill whatsoever, if you give me that ticket, I can beat Garry Kasparov...
Tom: Get the analogy straight though. The chess analogy is designed to contradict the claim that unless God determines ALL of our moves (and all of the moves in creation), God can’t possibly guarantee that he’ll win in the end, that he’ll have a Bride, a People who love him. The chess analogy says, “On what basis can you claim that guaranteed outcomes can ONLY follow from unilaterally determined moves? Chess is a perfect example of guaranteed outcomes following from LESS THAN EXHAUSTIVELY DETERMINED moves and involvement.”
No, but what I was saying is that if God determines any moves, then he is no longer the chess master. Holding a ticket to make just one critical move for your opponent, spoils the whole point of this analogy.
Blessings,
Lee
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Tom
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| Posted 5/30/2004 9:52 AM (GMT -6) | | Lee: I agree! I don't see how it can be done either. But on the same page as the chess master analogy, I read, "God demonstrates his sovereign power by empowering others to enter into a loving relationship with him."
Tom: “Empowering” here isn’t irresistible.
Lee: The next paragraph starts, "It takes a truly sovereign God to make himself vulnerable like this." And the next paragraph says, "At this juncture an analogy might help demonstrate this point." And then we have the chess master analogy (Divine Foreknowledge, pp. 44-45). It seems clear to me that Dr. Boyd includes salvation, choosing to love God, as one of the main applications of this analogy.
Tom: I’ll have to have a look at the book. But I’m not suggesting that God doesn’t move wisely, utilizing knowledge of possible moves and responses, in pursuing our salvation. That is like a chess master. But what God can’t do I don’t think is provide absolute guarantees at the beginning of the game that a particular piece, say his King’s pawn, will or will not make it through the game. So God cannot guarantee that a particular individual will certainly be saved even if he can guarantee that overall SOME will be saved. When it comes to guaranteeing future outcomes, the only guarantee Kasparov can rightly make at the outset of the game is that he’ll win the game. Of course once the game develops there may be times when Kasparov can guarantee a particular move ahead of time, say, that you’ll cough up your bishop and do so willingly to save your queen which Kasparov now knows he will be able to jeopardize in seven moves.
A good chess master CAN limit his opponent’s moves by leaving him with no other option than to move his king forward one space. But I don’t think God can so arrange the options for human beings as to leave them no possible move other than to choose to love God. And I’m certain Doc would agree that the chess analogy doesn’t describe how God can squeeze out of us the free choice to love him. We can always choose not to love him. Those are the rules of the game of life.
Lee: Then what, in your view, is the goal? What is the victory that God will certainly achieve? As far as it concerns human choices...
Tom: That he will succeed in persuading SOME to love him forever.
Lee: But I think this problem affects every prophecy that depends on human decisions, and every plan that God makes that requires one decision, and not another. That's pretty comprehensive.
Tom: If the prophecy is a single libertarian choice, then it’s a conditional prophecy and thus its occurrence is not inevitable.
Lee: I agree that a known choice is therefore determined. But that doesn't necessarily make it not free! As in God's foreknown decisions.
Tom: You keep saying this, but there’s no parallel between God foreknowing his own freely made unconditional choices and God foreknowing our freely made choices. You’re assuming that since God can foreknow HIS choices and those choices can still be free, God can thus foreknow OUR choices and those choices still be free. But God would only foreknow as certain his own choices if those choices were unconditional; he wouldn’t foreknow his choices where they were conditioned on contingent human choices and events.
Lee: Nor does it mean that people aren't the source of their decisions (speaking free-will-istically, my view on this is somewhat different!). I don't see that that is a necessary implication.
Tom: People would remain “a” source of sorts of their decisions if God unconditionally determines those choices. But this isn’t libertarian free will. They remain a source of their choices in the sense that they are an instrument of God. I swing a bat and hit a home run. The bat is in a sense a source of the home run, but this is insufficient to secure moral responsibility.
Lee: No, but what I was saying is that if God determines any moves, then he is no longer the chess master. Holding a ticket to make just one critical move for your opponent, spoils the whole point of this analogy.
Tom: Depends. If the determination of my opponent’s move was made by me before the game began (i.e., not as a response to the circumstances of the game within the rules of the game) then yes, such a determination lies outside the analogy. But if the determination were made by me ‘in response to’ the flow of the game ‘as it happens’ and ‘within the rules of the game’, then that’s cool. Sometimes a chess master will be able to corner his opponent and leave him only a single option. That’s a sort of determination, but it’s not unconditional.
I’m saying a) choosing the love God can never be the latter sort of choice, viz., a choice God corners us into making, the “only” option we have. We always have to option within the rules of the game to refuse God’s love. On the other hand, b) God may sometimes determine the non-moral choices of human beings far ahead of time (like Cyrus). This (b) lies outside the chess analogy (since the chess master can't determine before the game begins any of his opponent's moves). Even if it does take us outside the analogy of chess, that doesn’t bother me. I never suggested the chess analogy accounts for everything God does nor that it should do so in order to be a good analogy. All it does is contradict the claim that if God didn’t unconditionally determine ALL things he wouldn’t be able to guarantee ANYTHING about the future. That's it. It doesn’t have to be true that God works at all times ONLY within the rules of the analogy. All that’s required is that the analogy provide an example of some guaranteed ultimate outcome while at the same time allowing for some outcomes to be indeterminate in order to dispel the claim of theological determinists.
Lee: I believe that accepting the gospel is not a free choice…I agree that a known choice is therefore determined, but that doesn't necessarily make it not free!
Tom: See any problem in these two statements of yours?
Tom
We’re way off of Molinism now (sorry Alan), so if you want to pursue this more, maybe we should start a new thread. I don’t wanna take Alan’s discussion of Molinism off course. | | Back to Top | | |
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