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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 6/25/2003 11:30 AM (GMT -6) |   | Tom, in honor of your "$1.00 per minute" rate I will leave a "short" quote this time.
quote:
short
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Tom
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| Posted 6/25/2003 8:03 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom, in honor of your "$1.00 per minute" rate I will leave a "short" quote this time.
quote:
short
But it cost me another $1.00 just to get online to read it!
Tom
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 6/26/2003 6:29 AM (GMT -6) | | RD" I don't think there's anything logically contradictory (about "might and might not"). It's just that the sentence does not tell us anything meaningful. "I might go to the movies tonite, and I might not go to the movies tonite." Tell me, what does that mean to you?
Doc: Yes. To say "might and might not" means at least that its NOT the case that you certainly will or will not.
TGB: I don't know if Doc would agree, but it seems to me that even if "might" is compatible with "will" and "would", "might and might not" is NOT compatible with "will" and "would." Would you agree Doc?
Doc: That’s exactly the point I’ve been making.
TGB: Using "might and might not" is very good. But it's complicated by the fact that "might" is also used with a different meaning when entailed by "will" and "would." Now we have a "might" of "x might do y" which is entailed in "x will do y" (a non-contingent event) and "might" of "x might do y" which is REALLY "x might and might not do y" (a contingent event). Arhghgh!
Doc: You’re raising good points TGB. IN formal logic "might" means "is logically possible that" pure and simple. We’re arguing, however, that there’s a DIFFERENCE in mights that are entailed by woulds, and mights that are conjoined with their contrast and hence can’t be entailed by woulds, for woulds can’t meaningfully be conjoined with their contrasts. Yet, so far as I know, there’s no category in formal logic to express this difference. This could potentially lead in the direction of modifying modal logic, for, if our reasoning has been cogent thus far, it certainly suggests that modal logic as it stands is imcomplete. It may be exposing a deterministic presupposition in standard western logic – a presupposition that inadvertently ruled out the possibility of "might and might not" proposition. Since he’s the expert on modal logic, I suggest Alan take this up and offer the world a total revamping of the western system… but remember to give us a wee little footnote please!
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 6/26/2003 8:36 AM (GMT -6) | | Greg: I see that it seems you are talking about intent. B/c you say, my saying "I might go to the movies, I might not go to the movies" - it tells you that I have SOME intention of going. But let's say tomorrow, I tell you it is in fact the case that I went to the movies last night. That is certain. I certainly went to the movies. The fact is certain. So how can you say you knew that it was not certain if I would go to the movies, when in fact, it was certain that i did?
What you mean is at the time the statement is made, you are judging my intent. To me, when I make the above statement, it shows that I am weighing my options, I just haven't decided what I will do yet. I am not certain about anything at the time I make the statement. The only way that my statment could be completely false is if I am purposefully lying. If I make the statement knowing full well I have no intention of going to the movies, then I have lied, b/c I insinutated that there was at least a chance I would go
I just don't see how what you're talking about could be incorporated into modal logic, it is too reliant on a person's intent, which of course is not known to others, and really cannot be known. | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 6/26/2003 12:29 PM (GMT -6) | | RD: But let's say tomorrow, I tell you it is in fact the case that I went to the movies last night. That is certain. I certainly went to the movies. The fact is certain. So how can you say you knew that it was not certain if I would go to the movies, when in fact, it was certain that i did?
Greg: Because the future tense was uncertain whereas all past facts ARE certain. Herein lies the difference between the past and the future.
RD: What you mean is at the time the statement is made, you are judging my intent.
Greg: No. You're intent is irrelevant. You may BELIEVE you might or might not go to the movies when IN FACT it is settled that you will or won't. Conversely, you may BELIEVE you WILL go to the movies whereas in fact you might or might not. The real question is, is it IN FACT the case (viz. in reality, as God knows it) that you WILL or WON't, OR that you might or might not. The statement "RD might or might not go to the movies" has meaning, has truth value, and therefore must be known by an omniscient God. And there's no reason to assume that the truth value of this statement is, from God's perspective (viz. in reality) FALSE. It COULD be true. And this shows that God's omniscience doesn't exclude, but rather must logically INCLUDE, conjoined might-counterfactuals.
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10.
Edited by - GregBoyd on 06/26/2003 5:31:12 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 6/26/2003 5:58 PM (GMT -6) | | I think the current discussion about might-counterfactuals can be significantly improved by distinguishing between some different ways in which the term "might" can be used.
I. "might of possibility" (MOP). In this sense, "might" means simply "possibly", nothing more. There are two subcategories.
I.A. "might of unconditional possibility" (MOUP). In this sense, "it might be the case that P" means "P is non-self-contradictory". For example, "Purple people eaters might exist, but square circles cannot."
I.B. "might of conditional possibility" (MOCP). In this sense, "it might be the case that P" means "given conditions X,Y,Z, it is possible that P". In other words, {P,X,Y,Z} forms an internally consistent set. For example, "Given the laws of physics, there might exist life on other planets."
II. "might of deliberation" (MOD). In this sense, "might" means that multiple options are on the table and that these options are not yet resolved in the mind of the deliberator. Again, there are two subcategories.
II.A. "might of theoretical deliberation" (MOTD). Deliberation about what to believe. Here "might" qualifies a proposition. For example, "Goldbach's conjecture might be true and then again it might not, I wonder which it is."
II.B. "might of practical deliberation" (MOPD). Deliberation about what to do. Here "might" qualifies an action. For example, "I might go see a movie this weekend, or I might go see a play instead."
Some observations:
1. MOCP implies MOUP, but the converse is not true. If something is conditionally possible then it cannot be unconditionally impossible, but unconditional possibility does not imply possibility under all conditions. (For example, it is possible that George is a bachelor, but it is not possible that George is a bachelor under the condition that George is married.)
2. Very frequently, when a MOCP is in view, the conditions are left unstated or implied. For example, in ordinary contexts if I say "It might rain tomorrow" I mean something more than "The notion of its raining tomorrow is non-self-contradictory". Instead, I mean that GIVEN the current state of the world, physical laws, and constants, it might rain tomorrow. The conditions are implicit.
3. MOD's are "subjective" or "first-person" in the sense that they are always affirmed from the perspective of a deliberating subject. And because there are multiple unresolved options, both "might" and "might not" are true from the deliberator's perspective. This does not entail that both "might" and "might not" are true simpliciter, unless, like God, the deliberator is infallible. MOD's are therefore always subjectively "conjoined" (to use Doc's term) but not necessarily objectively conjoined.
4. MOP's are "objective" or "third-person" in the sense that they are not intrinsically relative to anyone's perspective. P is either non-self-contradictory or not. {P,X,Y,Z} is either an internally consistent set or not.
5. MOUP's may be objectively "conjoined" but need not be. For example, "It might rain tomorrow" and "It might not rain tomorrow" are both non-self-contradictory. Therefore, in the MOUP sense they are both true, thus "conjoined". But "2+2 might equal 4" and "2+2 might not equal 4" cannot both be true in the MOUP sense because the latter one describes a logical impossibility.
6. Similarly, MOCP's may be objectively "conjoined" by need not be. "Given that there is a tree, it might be an evergreen" and "Given that there is a tree, it might not be an evergreen" are both true and are therefore "conjoined". But "Given that George is a bachelor he might be unmarried" and "Given that George is a bachelor he might not be unmarried" cannot both be true because the latter is internally contradictory.
7. Every true MOD implies the truth of some MOP, but the converse is not true. A person deliberating over different options necessarily presupposes that the options are either conditional or unconditional possibilities. But it "might" (MOP) be the case that George is a bachelor even though George is married and his marital status is no longer up for deliberation.
8. The issue of open theism is the issue of whether there are any objectively true MOD's. In other words, is God ever faced with deliberative situations? If so, then open theism is true. If not, then open theism is false.
9. There seems to be nothing logically contradictory about the notion of an objectively true MOD. If so, then open theism is at least a theoretical possibility. Open theism "might" (MOP) be true.
Soli Deo gloria,
Alan
Edited by - Alan Rhoda on 06/26/2003 11:01:26 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 6/26/2003 8:46 PM (GMT -6) | | Doc and Alan-
If in formal logic "might" only means "is logically possible that" (in which case I assume "might not" means "is logically possible that x not happen") then how does it follow (ask you both have argued) that "x might not do y in z" falsifies "x would do y in z." To my mind (which might BE the problem!) the logical possibility of x's not doing y in z is perfectly compatible with its being true both that x "will" and x "would" do y in z. It may be certain that x would do y in z while remaining "logically possible" that x might not do y in z (since "might" in formal logical speaks only of logical possibilities, in which case "x might not do y in z" means only "It is logically possible that x not do y in z").
Seems to me that if you want "x might not do y in z" to falsify "x would do y in z" then "might" must speak of the sort of contingency that it does in "might and might not." But you can't incorporate this latter meaning into formal logic. So...how does "x might not do y in z" formally falsify "x would do y in z"?
Tom
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 6/27/2003 9:25 AM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 6/27/2003 5:10 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan said:
quote:
8. The issue of open theism is the issue of whether there are any objectively true MOD's. In other words, is God ever faced with deliberative situations? If so, then open theism is true. If not, then open theism is false.
Sup, Alan. I think I hear what you are saying…but perhaps we’d better slow up a bit. I think that Doc and others have stated many times that EDF consistently applied means that, post-Creation, God could not be free in the deliberative sense. We already got that part. What Doc attempts to get at with the “might-might not” thing is HOW creation is set up metaphysically that allows God to be faced with deliberative decisions. We have to discuss the MOPs (or the MOCPs, more specifically) before we can jump to the MODs. I figure that you already know this, but I think it may need to be explicitly stated. This is how I see it…
1) The set of conjoined MOCP pairs wherein each might counterfactual is both logically possible and internally consistent is not empty.
2) It is possible (pun intended) that one of the pairs in the set above may constitute a situation that provides the context for a MOD.
Let’s do the math. If God is omniscient (as we have defined it here) AND #1 is true, then God would know all the conjoined pairs within the set in the MOCP sense. (What Doc wants to say.) #1 sets up the metaphysical possibility for #2. And if #2 is conceivable, then we have reason to say that MODs may exist for God.
Illustration:
Reality is such that both statements “Dwayne might get a Krispy Kreme doughnut tonight.” and “Dwayne might not get a Krispy Kreme doughnut tonight.” are each 1) logically possible and 2) internally consistent. As a conjoined MOCP pair, they can form the proposition “Dwayne might AND might not get a Krispy Kreme doughnut tonight.” This is true and God would know it as such. Now, this proposition forms a situation and context where God can make a deliberation: Do I WANT to allow Dwayne to go to Krispy Kreme tonight or not? The statement: “I MIGHT let Dwayne go…or I might not.” coming from God has meaning. Notice that this deliberation would not be possible if it were CERTAIN to God what I WOULD do tonight.
Easy as pie, y’all. What’s next?
The Brazen One (hehehe…),
"Smile. It could be worse." --from a good friend.
Edited by - MephEternal on 06/27/2003 10:13:45 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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geebob
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| Posted 6/27/2003 9:26 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Omniscience means that God knows everything which is actually the case, end of sentence.
You have a lot of food for thought but I thought I'd just reply to this particular claim.
the "might and might not" counterfactuals would in fact be grounded in actuality in the same mannter that determined future events are grounded in actuality, thus exhaustive knowledge of actuality may still require knowledge of "might and might not" counterfactuals.
If we limit God's knowledge to actuality, surely he wouldn't know the "might and might not" counterfactuals of possible worlds that lost their chance to be actualized, or were never in the scope to begin with, but that still leaves those that are relevent to this world.
I will gladly pay you teusday for a hamburger today.
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Tom
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| Posted 6/28/2003 12:21 AM (GMT -6) | | Albert-
I like a lot of what you say. However…
The “might” in “might and might not” is not the “might” of logical possibility but rather the might of actual possibility, which as you pointed out is where we live. As was mentioned earlier also, “might and might not” (= actually possible) entails “might” (= logically possible). Two different “might’s” are at work and that’s what’s confusing. Given this, I don’t think then that “might and might not” is meaningless. It “might and might not rain tomorrow” is meaningful. Even “it might and might not be raining outside now” is meaningful.
My question is: How is Doc going to get Bill Craig to admit that “might” may EVER describe what is actually possible in contrast to what is only logically possible. Craig is likely to insist that “might” ALWAYS means what is means formally, viz., “is logically possible that” and insist that this meaning be brought into “might and might not.” Then your complaint would be right, for to assert merely that “It is logically possible that it rain and logically possible that it not rain” is a rather empty assertion. Maybe Doc’s answered this too and I haven’t noticed it.
On your analogy of the husband and wife, it appears to me that you assume that God handles actual possibilities facing the same sort of limitations we do, that is, the more the possibilities, the less we are able to accommodate them. Being infinitely intelligent, God wouldn’t be limited in his ability to appropriately assess possibilities in relating to us. So, the possibility that I may hurt him deeply in the distant future doesn’t “mess” with the relationship now. Similarly, I know it’s actually possible that my wife and I will one day fall out of love and divorce. But we both relate to this possibility accurately and relate it to all the other truths of our relationship without it defining the relationship or consuming our attention. If there’s only a .00001 probability of her being unfaithful to me, then that’s all I need relate to. No problem. If time goes by and circumstances raise that probability to 50% or 75%, then my facial expressions (and actions) will change! So, yes, “love hopes all things,” but this only has meaning if love knows the reality of all things.
So I totally concur with your definition of omniscience: “Omniscience means that God knows everything which is actually the case, end of sentence.” But aren’t “possibilities” actual? Isn’t what MAY actually happen tomorrow a slice of what God knows to “actually be the case” now? So, God must know what “might” happen (where “might” describes what is actually possible in addition to [and in contrast to] what is merely logically possible) tomorrow (or next year, or next century) since it is “actually the case” now that it might happen.
Tom
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 6/28/2003 4:11 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom
So I totally concur with your definition of omniscience: “Omniscience means that God knows everything which is actually the case, end of sentence.” But aren’t “possibilities” actual? Isn’t what MAY actually happen tomorrow a slice of what God knows to “actually be the case” now? So, God must know what “might” happen (where “might” describes what is actually possible in addition to [and in contrast to] what is merely logically possible) tomorrow (or next year, or next century) since it is “actually the case” now that it might happen.
Tom, you KNOW that I'm not "up to speed," but...
Why must "'possibilities' be actual?"
"Nature" is actual. A spore has a nature that means that it continually can become both a fern and that other wierd form that it alternates back and forth in a life-cycle that would make for a weird sci-fi movie were it applied to humans.
quote:
<><><>:<><><>:<><><>:<><><>:<><><>:<><><>
A fern's lifecycle consists of two distinct stages. Firstly, spores develop in cases on the underside or edges of a frond (leafy branch). Once ripe, they are scattered by the wind. Those spores landing in suitable damp conditions germinate and produce a tiny heart-shaped leaf-like body called a thallus. This contains male and female sexual organs, and when the latter's egg cells are fertilised a new fern is born. The thallus soon withers and dies.
Unlike seed-bearing plants, ferns reproduce with spores. A spore depends on moisture in which to grow into a gametophyte—one half of a fern's lifecycle. If you've never seen the gametophyte of a fern, look closely in damp areas for tiny heart-shaped leafy objects. If a spore is successful in growing into a gametophyte, it then develops sex organs. The sperm then travels through a moist film to the egg or the egg of another. After fertilization occurs, a zygote develops into the sporophyte—the fern structure with which we are most familiar. Like seed-bearing plants and unlike mosses, the sporophyte of a fern contains vascular tubing necessary for transporting water and nutrients to the leaves for photosynthesis and growth.
<><><>:<><><>:<><><>:<><><>:<><><>:<><><>
Many things are actual that are NOT immediately manifiest! That's fine. That's neat! Its like God said "Let there be light." and the potentialitity for both light and darkness are both "actual," BOTH when it is light AND when it is dark.
But WHY do you think that "possibilities" are equally "actual?"
At the very least, the "possibilities" category strikes me as being very much derived. I mean this: The potentiality of a plant is that it grows towards the light. The space in the lightward direction is pregnant with "potential," naturally. But the space towards the dark is not. Tangental potentialities 'crop up' where unclaimed light-space becomes vacant; sometimes taking a lot of time and non-direct progress for it to be found.
But "potentials" are nature based. The "Possibilities" seem to not be natural. They seem so "derived." They sound so abstract.
Edited by - fred on 06/28/2003 09:15:20 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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rsirkel
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| Posted 6/28/2003 6:29 AM (GMT -6) | | Albert
quote:
If we agree that truth is correspondence with the facts, then statements about future possibilities must correspond to something in order to be able to be true or false. But presentism argues that the future does not exist. The future is not a part of reality. In other words, there are no facts about the future. So it seems that no statement about the future can be said to be true or false, except if it follows deductively from statements about the present. So the statement "it is certain that Jesus will return" is true, but not because of referencing the actual second coming in the future. It is true in a derivative manner, because God in the present has unconditionally determined that Jesus will return, and God cannot lie (being necessarily good) and is all-powerful. It follows from these three propositions deductively that Jesus will return. So the truth of the statement "Jesus will return in the future" is entirely a function of statements which reference the present. But no statement about the future can be true by referencing the future, because there is nothing to reference. There is nothing for the proposition to correspond to.
Ron
Your statements provide the language that help me internalize "the future does not exist" with "God's Word exists" in, at least for me, a coherent way, many thanks. Also your quote
quote:
Furthermore, planning for possibilities is not bona fide knowledge at all. It is not justified true belief. Future planning consists in counter-factual statements of intent (e.g. if you did X then I would do Y). But statements of intent are not knowledge. So saying that God has not thought through all the things he would do under certain circumstances, in my view, entails something about his intentions, rather than about his knowledge
Ron
This quote points to a needed change of mind in how we think daily in relationship to reality. (The future does not exist. Planning for imagined possibilities that do not exist is vain and not true belief. God's word exists and is settled (in heaven) and needs to be settled in the hearts of men.) I do not want to distract from the discussion anymore than I have, but the discussion is helpful to me in developing pragmatic knowledge of reality.
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Tom
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| Posted 6/28/2003 11:51 AM (GMT -6) | | Fred: Many things are actual that are NOT immediately manifiest! That's fine. That's neat! Its like God said "Let there be light." and the potentialitity for both light and darkness are both "actual," BOTH when it is light AND when it is dark. But WHY do you think that "possibilities" are equally "actual?"
Tom: We’re using “actual” differently. By “actual” I do not mean “resolved.” Assuming I will paint my office later this year, and assuming I can only paint it red or green—either color I wish—it follows that “I might paint my office green” is now true. This “possibility” is actual, i.e., it is REAL, though it is not now “resolved” whether I will paint the room red or green. If possibilities were not actual in this sense of being “real,” then God would not be able to say “Let there be light,” for before anything can happen it must be first be possible that it happen.
----------------
Sorry for the length!
Albert: Thanks, TGB for your comments. I've been thinking more about this, and I think the difference between my position and yours and Gregs is becoming clearer. I have an even more "restrictive" view of omniscience than you do.
Tom: After reading your comments I’m more convinced we’re defining “omniscience” exactly the same. I don’t think you’re restricting your definition of omniscience. I think rather you may be restricting your definition of reality/creation. For example, I didn’t read anything in your comments that would suggest you’d have any objection to defining omniscience like this: “God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods.” If you can agree that this is what omniscience means—even if we may disagree on what constitutes a “truth”—then we have no disagreement on our doctrine of God. Right?
Albert: If we agree that truth is correspondence with the facts, then statements about future possibilities must correspond to something in order to be able to be true or false.
Tom: Right.
Albert: But presentism argues that the future does not exist.
Tom: It hasn’t yet occurred. Right.
Albert: The future is not a part of reality.
Tom: Well, eh…
Albert: In other words, there are no facts about the future.
Tom: This doesn’t follow. The future has not yet occurred. OK. But this doesn’t require that there be no true facts “about” the future.
Albert: So it seems that no statement about the future can be said to be true or false, except if it follows deductively from statements about the present. So the statement "it is certain that Jesus will return" is true, but not because of referencing the actual second coming in the future…But no statement about the future can be true by referencing the future, because there is nothing to reference. There is nothing for the proposition to correspond to.
Tom: I totally agree with the facts you present (the correspondence theory of truth and a conceptualist understanding of foreknowledge [i.e., God doesn’t get his knowledge of the future by ‘referencing’ the future that is “out there” somewhere]), but I don’t think there’s any reason to conclude therefore that future tense statements don’t have a truth-value. More specifically, I don’t think there’s any reason to conclude that propositions about what “will” “would” or “might” happen in the future are neither true nor false.
The answer I think is in your exception clause: “…unless it follows deductively from statements about the present.” There ya go. In my view, all future possibilities (that is, all true “mights”) follow logically and necessarily from the present state of affairs. Given the present state of affairs at T1, there are, say, x number of possible states of affairs that may follow at T2. Then, depending on which of these possibilities gets resolved at T2, there then exist a certain number of possibilities that exist at T3, and so on.
Of course, ALL possible states of affairs from T1 through to eternity exist at T1. Given the flow of events, some possibilities pass away. If at T1 it’s true that at T2 only x, y, or z may happen, then x, y, and z are all possibilities at T1. But when, say, y happens at T2, then x and z are no longer possibilities.
So, statements about what “might” happen in the future (like any other statement about the future) cannot be true, as you point out, by referencing the future. You’re quite right. If something truly “will” or “might” happen in the future, it is because of the present state of reality. This presents no problem for presentism, because presentism doesn’t argue that God references the future in order to know what “will” or “might” happen. How does God know the future then? By referencing the present of course. It is the present state of reality which determines what “will” or “will not” and what “might” and “might not” happen in the future because it is NOW true that whatever “will” or “might” happen tomorrow “will” or “might” happen. This is presentism.
Albert: As for possibilities, well, things get tricky. A possibility is something that isn't. The actual is something that is.
Tom: This is why you think we define omniscience differently. But again, we’re not so far away on this. We’re just defining “actual” differently. I’d say that whatever “exists” is actual, and possibilities exist. They exist “as possibilities,” but they exist nonetheless. As with Fred, you’re assuming possibilities aren’t “actual” because they haven’t yet resolved themselves into historical realities. But why define “actual” so narrowly?
Albert: Some possibilities we know intrinsically can never go from being an isn't to being an is, because they are incompatible with what is.
Tom: Then they’re not “possibilities.”
Albert: Other possibilities we know (or ordinarily think we know) could go from being an isn't to an is. These are the possibilities which you would say are actual.
Tom: I would say these are only possibilities, period. But I’d qualify by pointing out that your “isn’t” means “isn’t yet resolved” and not “doesn’t exist as a possibility.”
Albert: The real crux of the matter is, why are such statements true? What actual thing that is do they reference? I think they are true only in that they are compatible with what is.
Tom: Exactly. They ARE what is. “Possibilities” constitute part of the present reality that IS. Presentism affirms that all possible future states of affairs (and the future-tense propositions describing these possibilities) exist now “as possibilities” by referencing the present moment. If x may possibly happen tomorrow, it may happen because the present state of reality permits x’s occurring tomorrow.
Albert: For reasons I will leave aside, I would argue that possibilities can only be conceived abstractly and therefore incompletely, even by God. The only way anything can be conceived completely by God is for him to make it be actual and come to exist.
Tom: This may not be controversial depending on what you mean by “conceive abstractly (incompletelyt)” and “conceive completely.” If you mean that God knows future possibility x “as a possibility” and then comes to know x differently when x happens, I’d agree. But there’s no reason to call God’s knowledge of x as a possibility (that is, before it happens) “incomplete.” If x is only a possible occurrence, and this is how God knows it, there’s nothing incomplete about such knowledge. For sure, God experiences events as they happen even though he foreknew them as possibilities, and this experiential knowledge is different. Is that all you’re saying?
Albert: Let me give an example. I think we can all agree that God knows Pythagorus' theorem. Does this mean that God has in his mind mental images of every single one of the infinite possible right-angled triangles? I think not. And I don't think that the fact that he doesn't, detracts from his knowledge of the theorem, or triangles in general. Abstract knowledge that covers a whole class of cases still counts as knowledge.
Tom: OK, I follow. Well, I don’t know whether or not God contemplates an image of every possible right-angled triangle. I don’t see any reason why he COULD NOT if he wished to, but there’s probably no reason to assume he does. But what is “incomplete” about such knowledge. Nothing that I can see.
Albert: I think their will always be limits on God's knowledge of the possibles and logical deductions. If you wish to deny that, then I think you are actually involving yourself in a logical contradiction.
Tom: I don’t see the contradiction. You’ve suggested that God is unable to relate lovingly and intimately with us if he is conscious of the possibility that we may desert him and suffer for it (although it’s less than certain this is true since WE relate intimately while facing unpleasant possibilities), but you haven’t demonstrated anything logically contradictory about God’s having perfectly accurate knowledge of all possibilities and logical deductions.
Albert: Furthermore, planning for possibilities is not bona fide knowledge at all. It is not justified true belief. Future planning consists in counter-factual statements of intent (e.g. if you did X then I would do Y). But statements of intent are not knowledge.
Tom: The “intent” is not knowledge per se, but the “factors” (i.e., the “facts”) that inform our intentions certainly constitute knowledge. “If you do x then I would do y,” assuming the proposition is true, involves knowing x as a possibility and y as a necessary consequent of x.
Albert: So saying that God has not thought through all the things he would do under certain circumstances, in my view, entails something about his intentions, rather than about his knowledge.
Tom: I’d guess there are open theists who’d agree, and I don’t know that I’d necessarily disagree yet. Assuming that when God created he possessed perfect knowledge of all the possibilities, there may be no reason to assume that he had to make up his mind at the moment of creation what he would do in each of those possible story lines. He may just as well have decided to postpone determining what his response to a particular possible event would be. I’m not decided. I think an omnibenevolent God would know what the most loving thing to do in each possible story line would be and that he’d be committed to THAT course of action. But it might be true in some cases that there would conceivably be more than one perfectly loving thing to do. In such a case there’s no reason to think all God’s future actions fall entirely in the category of what he “would” do. God may face some “might and might not” courses of action regarding his own future actions. But none of this suggests anything like a less than complete, perfect, or infallible knowledge of all reality, if reality is believed to be partly determined and partly open.
Albert: I don't think my example "morbid planner" is a problem only because of our limited nature. I think that God always thinks the best of people, and does not plan for bad outcomes until it becomes evident that they are going to occur.
Tom: I totally agree.
Albert: Furthermore, I think this says something important about how we should act. I do think that it would affect God's perception of us if he simultaneously held intentions about what he would do if we turn away from him, while he had fellowship with us.
Tom: Then God can never “warn” us, since a “warning” is a declared intention to respond in a particular way on the condition that a person acts in a certain manner. Problem is the Bible is full of this. God announces to Israel what will happen, that is, what he intends to do to them, if they reject and abandon him. This doesn’t seem to cloud relational intimacy for God. It actually facilitates it in the case of finite sinful beings like us. Nor does it appear to necessarily complicate human relations. I know I may be required to administer sever discipline to my teenage son IF he does x, y, or z. And I’ve warned him about these. I don’t forget, and neither does he. But we still enjoy intimacy. The warnings don’t consume us, but we know those possibilities are out there.
Albert: As one final comment, on my view God has his total cognitive attention focussed on the real world. It seems to me that on your view, God's consciousness is absolutely cluttered full of infinitely many possible worlds, with the real world occupying only an infinitesmal place in his thinking. Obviously, God being God, that doesn't mean that he can't give this world full attention. It does raise the issue, though, of whether this world is just a tiny, peripheral concern of God, or whether it is his main, primary, focus of concern. I find it hard to believe that the real world (which I think is finite) holds a minor place in God's consciousness compared to, say, mental images of an infinite array of right-angled triangles. That's another reason I'm uncomfortable with your position.
Tom: Maybe you’re I too think God has his total attention focused on the real world. I just think “possibilities” make up part of that real world and that God knows these. That’s all. I don’t think his consciousness is “cluttered” since I think God’s intelligence is infinite. Think about that: infinite intelligence. It doesn’t get divided up between all the pieces of information God has to account for. His intelligence doesn’t get “spread thin” keeping tract of all the triangles and choices we make. If God wanted to draw, erase, and redraw every possible triangle in his mind over and over, that wouldn’t crowd or “clutter” his consciousness because God is “infinitely intelligent.” He can contemplate all the digits of Pi while giving YOU his “undivided” attention precisely because he doesn’t have to “divide” his intelligence and attention. His intelligence is infinite. God runs the universe AND gives each of us his undivided attention and focus! I can’t do that as a parent of four children. I can only give ONE person at a time my undivided attention. God can bring ALL God is to bear on an infinite number of facts and personal relationships, just as if there was only one fact to know—your fact—and one person to relate to—you.
That’s pretty awesome.
Tom
PS Sorry to butt in Doc! Albert addressed himself to you! Squeeze me!
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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 6/28/2003 4:14 PM (GMT -6) | | Folks, I can’t remember a discussion on this board that has intrigued and excited me as much as this one over the last two pages. GREAT STUFF. YAHOO. WE’ZE DIGGIN. As Fred expresses it (GREAT PICTURE of the dogs!), we’re ON THE TRACK. So much here to interact with! Where to start? I’ll just respond as I go along.
Alan: The issue of open theism is the issue of whether there are any objectively true MOD's. In other words, is God ever faced with deliberative situations? If so, then open theism is true. If not, then open theism is false.
Doc: LOVED your clarifying remarks about "might" propositions. Has anyone done any thorough work in this area? I’ve never read anything other than Lewis’ stuff on counterfactuals… but he doesn’t get into any of the stuff we’re talking about. (Lets have a board vote on whether or not we think Alan’s first post-dissertation book should be on MIGHT –COUNTERFACTUALS. I vote YES!)
Anyway I’m not sure I agree that the question of Open Theism can be distilled into the question of God’s deliberation and "mights." As Meph pointed out, the question is whether THERE ARE objective MOCP’s, for in this case God must KNOW them as MOCP’s. How God responds to them – viz. whether it can be described as deliberation or not – seems to me to be a different question.
Relatedly, I’m not sure how MODs could be "objective," since deliberating is always a subjective process.
Albert: But I can't make any sense out of "X will certainly happen" other than that it means "God has determined that X will happen". Greg, if you have any other suggestion as to what "X will certainly happen" means, I would be glad to hear it.
Doc: Things can be certain to occur because of God’s will or because of present circumstances (including other wills) that render them certain.
Albert: The world, however, is concrete and not abstract. Abstractions are a product of thought, but the problem is that some abstractions can be actual and concretely realized, whilst others are intrinsically abstract and cannot be actual.
Doc: Ahhh, I see what your getting at now. You’re a nominalist, it seems. You don’t think "the world" (reality?) includes abstractions (hence possibilities). It seems you DEFINE "the world" (or reality) as ACTUAL. By contrast, I think that ACTUALITY is one MODE of reality, but not the only mode. I think possibilities and other things we may come to know through "abstraction" are also real – though not actual.
Albert: I am arguing for an intuitionist account of formal logic, that starts with the world rather than with the language. And in particular, by the world, I mean phenomenal consciousness. We need to understand how the concepts of formal logic arise from our abstracting from phenomenal consciousness.
Doc: I’d like to hear more about the intuitionist account of formal logic. In any event, I think you’d like this book called "Philosophy in the Flesh" which tries to show how all of our thinking arises out of and is conditioned by our embodied consciousness.
I tend to agree with you that logic and language can never capture the concreteness of reality. NO thought and expression about (say) this next sip of wine I’m going to take can capture the CONCRETENESS, the uniqueness, the absolute "thisness" of THE ACTUAL SIP. Concrete reality always outruns thought and talk about it. (Hence, even if God has eternal propositional knowledge of all that shall come to pass, he must LEARN in order to distinquish his propositional knowledge from the ACTUAL OCCURRENCE of what his knowledge anticipated. I used this argument in a paper last year at ETS to argue that Open Theist aren’t alone in arguing that God’s knowledge GROWS. EVERY temporal theists must acknowledge the same, if they are at all consistent).
Albert: Can I draw your attention to one scripture that you rightly use in regard to open theism. It is this:"nor did it enter my mind, that they should do such a detestable thing" (Jer. 32:35). You interpret this to mean, that God thought it was improbable that they would sin in this way. But is that taking the verse at its straightforward, face value meaning? No. The verse says that God didn't even conceive of such a thing.
Doc: You’ve got me here Albert – which is why, after God of the Possible, I’ve never leaned on this verse for support. This verse certainly supports your view. Still, for other reasons, I don’t it does so decisively. (viz. I have other reasons for believing God knows ALL possibilities from eternity).
Albert: I don't think that "might and might not" "knowledge", if you can call it that, actually is relevant to omniscience. Omniscience means that God knows everything which is actually the case, end of sentence. This includes what he has determined to do, amongst other things.
Doc: My argument, however, is that part of "what is actually the case" is that "might and might not" propositions have truth value. I don’t presently see how you can get around this. And so, if you’re right about the definition of God’s omniscience (and you are), God must know these "maybes."
TGB: Being infinitely intelligent, God wouldn’t be limited in his ability to appropriately assess possibilities in relating to us. So, the possibility that I may hurt him deeply in the distant future doesn’t "mess" with the relationship now.
Doc: Bingo. The "morbid planner" analogy is very clever, Albert. But I don’t think it works. God could only be described as "morbid" if he weighted negative possibilities heavier than positive possibilities for no other reason than that they are negative. I rather think that omniscience requires that God simply KNOW the OBJECTIVE (and always changing) probability of each and every possible future outcome.
TGB: So I totally concur with your definition of omniscience: "Omniscience means that God knows everything which is actually the case, end of sentence." But aren’t "possibilities" actual?
Doc: Look at that sentence carefully: "Aren’t possibilities actual"? Isn’t this a contradiction? I would argue that possibilities are possibilities because they AREN’T actual.
Albert: If we can really know that some possibilities go from being an isn't to an is, that means of course that it is true that some possibilities can go from an isn't to an is, since you can't know something that isn't true. The real crux of the matter is, why are such statements true? What actual thing that is do they reference?
Doc: As many thinkers since Plato have realized, any comprehensive metaphysic needs a category to mediate and render intelligible the transition from non-being to being. Otherwise being becomes an unintelligible random moment by moment creation-ex-nihilo. I submit that possibilities mediate between being and non-being. (These aren’t adequate by themselves for the job, for what renders intelligible the selection of possibilities that get actualized? I have elsewhere argued (Trinity and Process) that we need a category of "dispositions"… but we’re getting way off track now).
Albert: I would argue that possibilities can only be conceived abstractly and therefore incompletely, even by God. The only way anything can be conceived completely by God is for him to make it be actual and come to exist.
Doc: If you suppose that God can’t conceive possibilities "completely," you have to suppose that there is some reality that God doesn’t conceive (namely, the possibilities left over have God "incompletely" conceives of them). But this means there’s a reality not known by God – which constitutes the denial of omniscience.
Of course God doesn’t know possibilities and abstractions with the DEFINITENESS with which he knows ACTUALITIES. But that isn’t a limitation on his knowledge, but simply a specification of what it means to be a possibility as opposed to an actuality. With Hartshorne, I would argue that the primary distinction between actualities and possibilities is in DEFINITENESS. Actuality is unimprovably definite. Possibilities are indefinite to the degree they are abstract.
Albert: Perhaps I can sum this up as follows: God knows what is (the actual) comprehensively and concretely, and he also knows logical deductions which follow from the is (which includes the class of the possibles) abstractly and non-comprehensively. I think their will always be limits on God's knowledge of the possibles and logical deductions. If you wish to deny that, then I think you are actually involving yourself in a logical contradiction.
Doc: Are you saying that there’s something about possibilities and abstractions that a) are real but that b) can’t be known by God? If so, I don’t see how you can affirm omniscience.
Albert: Furthermore, planning for possibilities is not bona fide knowledge at all. It is not justified true belief. Future planning consists in counter-factual statements of intent (e.g. if you did X then I would do Y). But statements of intent are not knowledge. So saying that God has not thought through all the things he would do under certain circumstances, in my view, entails something about his intentions, rather than about his knowledge.
Doc: But to have intents relative to all possibilities, God must have KNOWLEDGE of all possibilities.
Albert: I don't think my example "morbid planner" is a problem only because of our limited nature. I think that God always thinks the best of people, and does not plan for bad outcomes until it becomes evident that they are going to occur.
Doc: God is love, and love HOPES, so God HOPES the best for all people. But I don’t see that we can suppose that God "thinks the best." Rather, his thoughts are always PERFECTLY ACCURATE. And why would God WAIT to plan for possible poor outcomes until they are inevitable? Think of all the opportunities to put a response in place he would have passed up simply because he didn’t want to dwell on negative possibilities? I think that God, like a perfectly wise chess player, covers his bases, including very low probabilities and worst case scenarios.
Albert: As one final comment, on my view God has his total cognitive attention focussed on the real world. It seems to me that on your view, God's consciousness is absolutely cluttered full of infinitely many possible worlds, with the real world occupying only an infinitesmal place in his thinking.
Doc: I agree God’s attention is on the real world. But why think the ‘real world" excludes, rather than includes, possibilities? Also (as I see TGB later said), if God’s intelligence is INFINITE, it CAN’T be "cluttered" at all. Nor can we distinguish between an "infinitesmally small place and an very large place in his thinking. His thinking doesn’t get spread thin by considering many verses few, large verses small, or very probable verses very improbable thinks. Nor can we say that God’s "total cognitive attention" is focused in one direction or another. Rather. ALL God’s attention is, as it were, on each and every possibility.
TGB: This "possibility" is actual, i.e., it is REAL, though it is not now "resolved" whether I will paint the room red or green. If possibilities were not actual in this sense of being "real," then God would not be able to say "Let there be light," for before anything can happen it must be first be possible that it happen.
Doc: Okay, you’ve resolved the paradox I mentioned above. But if you mean by "actual" the "real," then you have no way left of clearly distinguishing possibilities and actualities. I suggest you let "real" cover both "actual" (as distinct from possible) and "possible" (as distinct from actual).
TGB (responding to Albert): …statements about what "might" happen in the future (like any other statement about the future) cannot be true, as you point out, by referencing the future. You’re quite right. If something truly "will" or "might" happen in the future, it is because of the present state of reality. This presents no problem for presentism, because presentism doesn’t argue that God references the future in order to know what "will" or "might" happen. How does God know the future then? By referencing the present of course.
Doc: The reason Albert doesn’t think future tensed statements have truth value is because they have nothing to correspond to them. But the reason he thinks THIS is because he doesn’t seem to acknowledge that possibilities are real (though he’s inconsistent on this, I think). He seems to conflate "real" with "actual" (so TGB tends to do). But the PRESENT both consists of actualities, eventualities (what WILL occur) and possibilities (what MIGHT occur). And an omniscient God must know ALL OF IT.
TGB: As with Fred, you’re assuming possibilities aren’t "actual" because they haven’t yet resolved themselves into historical realities. But why define "actual" so narrowly?
Doc: EXACTLY. But do you see the awkwardness and confusion of speaking of ‘actual possibilities’? You MEAN "real possibilities" – as OPPOSED to "real actualities."
TOTALLY LOVIN THIS.
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 6/28/2003 4:53 PM (GMT -6) | |
quote:
Fred: Many things are actual that are NOT immediately manifiest! That's fine. That's neat! Its like God said "Let there be light." and the potentialitity for both light and darkness are both "actual," BOTH when it is light AND when it is dark. But WHY do you think that "possibilities" are equally "actual?"
Tom: We’re using “actual” differently. By “actual” I do not mean “resolved.” Assuming I will paint my office later this year, and assuming I can only paint it red or green—either color I wish—it follows that “I might paint my office green” is now true. This “possibility” is actual, i.e., it is REAL, though it is not now “resolved” whether I will paint the room red or green. If possibilities were not actual in this sense of being “real,” then God would not be able to say “Let there be light,” for before anything can happen it must be first be possible that it happen.
By “actual” I do not mean “resolved.”
I'm not sure that's what I mean either. Nor am I sure that Light was "possible first" before God spoke it FROM NOTHING. Were it possible before hand then, seems to me, it would not be "from nothing."
At the core, I think, is something that both John Calvin and St. Maximus the Confessor have offered much to ponder -- the Creation and the Creator. Maybe different from how either expressed it, but I'd like to try. Hans Hofmann (a German abstract painter) spoke of a "kernel" that exists within the core of an expanding form -- a formal idea/expression that empowers the direction and degree of swollen and shrunken forms of a "plastic" (German for sculpture) model. (Rodin defines sculpture as "the art of the 'lump' and the 'void.'") I'll call that kernel a "germ." Created things possess the "word" that God spoke them. (No preposition will stay glued onto the end of that sentence.) God spoke everything.
A way in which creation reflects God is that while the germ within the nature of things is "good" (as God is at rest, unchangable) they are dynamic in their being developing (as God choses to interact with creation, not just re-act as a result of sin).
I don't like "resolved" for something that is in a dymamic state of developement. An airplane is "resolved" when it is landed and tied down. Flight is dynamic and developing -- full of potentialities.
Seems that "possibilities" is an external abstraction, and "potentialities" is an internal "reality" of the nature of the kernal/germ/logoi of the thing's nature's "speaking."
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PotOnWheel
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Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 6/28/2003 5:44 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
TGB: As with Fred, you’re assuming possibilities aren’t "actual" because they haven’t yet resolved themselves into historical realities. But why define "actual" so narrowly?
Doc: EXACTLY. But do you see the awkwardness and confusion of speaking of ‘actual possibilities’? You MEAN "real possibilities" – as OPPOSED to "real actualities."
TOTALLY LOVIN THIS.
Greg
TGB: As with Fred, you’re assuming possibilities aren’t “actual” because they haven’t yet resolved themselves into historical realities.
Fred: BUT THEN.... That's not what "Phred" is assuming! (cf. my post above)
TGB: How does God know the future then? By referencing the present of course.
Phred: Something's missing here. Anything said here has to do justice the reality of the cosmos. And as "cosmos" it has order given it spoken by God. The "present" is reality, but that reality is not solely a nominalized thing. The spoken "kernals" that the Creator (And I become more convinced of the danger of OV in minimizing the "Creator" aspect of God -- just a growing hunch. I must like to worry.  ) It seems to me (as if I'd know God's "mind") that the present is knowable, in part (creation can be known in part; but God does not partially know), in the same way that the future is. Some of the present's reality does not change. The spoken nature part. The part that includes both the nature/diversity/complexity of things and groups of things, AND the potentialities they can realize into actuality. Some of that is the same for the past, for the present, and for the future. And if I'm reading Maximus correctly (too new) some of that might be in-process too. But either way there is substantial continuity between present and future.
And (I'm speaking intuitively, of course!) ALL of that continuity is "known" substantially by means other than knowing the future by referencing the past. Likewise, the present is not just known by examining the present, nor by referencing the past and working forward (think driving with snow on the windsheild.) So-far-as (intuiting...) the spoken/created nature exists and continues the "referencing" business is not the only show in town.
What typically troubles me in a discussion like this is that THINGS and REALITY seem to get divorces from their Creator; and God takes a job that lays Him off from his Creator role.
Greg (to TBG): Of course God doesn’t know possibilities and abstractions with the DEFINITENESS with which he knows ACTUALITIES. But that isn’t a limitation on his knowledge, but simply a specification of what it means to be a possibility as opposed to an actuality. With Hartshorne, I would argue that the primary distinction between actualities and possibilities is in DEFINITENESS. Actuality is unimprovably definite. Possibilities are indefinite to the degree they are abstract.
Fred: Interesting.
Doc: Are you (Albert) saying that there’s something about possibilities and abstractions that a) are real but that b) can’t be known by God? If so, I don’t see how you can affirm omniscience.
Fred: I'm guessing that Albert will say that to make God bound to a certain kind of omniscience is to make God un-free. It goes to his proposal of an "existentialist" verses an "essentialist" basis for the person-hood of God.
Doc: But to have intents relative to all possibilities, God must have KNOWLEDGE of all possibilities.
Pfred: I very much KNOW that you and I use two *different* definitions of "nominalist." (Yours is modern, and mine is medieval.) But you might be fitting either definition here, Greg. It appears to me that the Greg Boyd definition of that "knowledge" is concrete; whereas Albert's might include more "abstractions" (despite his use of the word a moment ago as a criticism) akin to "concepts" (Remember his encapsulation that God can know something analogous to the concept of Pathagorean's theory and not need to know it over and over again -- like concretized arithmetically accumulating units).
Edited by - PotOnWheel on 06/28/2003 10:54:59 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 6/28/2003 5:57 PM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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PotOnWheel
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 6/28/2003 6:19 PM (GMT -6) | | When Hans Hofmann wrote about the form of a scultpure or the "push and pull" of the advancing and receeding colors on the picture plane of an abstract painting he refered to the inner forces at work giving them character and energy. It is a spatial metaphor.
There is also something "spatial" to the way Calvinists talk about reality. "Creation, Fall, and Redemption" seem to have a spatial layering of one lain across and somewhat modifying the other. Some modifications might be like a body on a matress, merely impressing. Other modivications might seem like a fusing and mixing in the boundary regions (degrees of depravity, etc.); but spatial metaphors work to help thinking about "Creation, Fall, and Redemption."
"Created" cosmos is always created. No mater what else happens to it it is created, is developing; and perhaps has other "issues" too. But created it is; and it has a Creator. The fall, and contra-creational or contra-developmental "issues" are also obviously at work. And Redemption is at work too. Its a lasagna!!! Layers.
Thinking about "possibilities" need to take into consideration the layers.
Its a lasagna!!! Layers.
Edited by - PotOnWheel on 06/29/2003 1:08:28 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 6/28/2003 7:39 PM (GMT -6) | | POW: Nor am I sure that Light was "possible first" before God spoke it FROM NOTHING. Were it possible before hand then, seems to me, it would not be "from nothing."
Tom: So you’d prefer to say that all of creation was “impossible” before God created it? That in creating, God did the impossible?
Pow, bro, possibilities don’t take the art OUT of creation. They put the art INTO creation. So be happy that possibilities exist! They provide you with a job.
----------------
Doc-
I seem to be doomed to wander the earth defining things differently than the rest of the world (first “might” and now “actual”). I’ll follow ya on reserving “actual” for present realities. Eventualities and possibilities are real but not actual. Because they’re “real” then they must be “realities” (though not “actualities”). Hmmm. Realities that are not actualities. Oh well. You write the books! I’m just a hacker!
Another thing I think we define differently is what we mean by “definiteness.” You say “God doesn’t know possibilities and abstractions with the DEFINITENESS with which he knows ACTUALITIES.” I’m assuming that in “God knows x definitely” “definitely” is an attribute of God’s knowledge and not of x. Thus, God’s knowledge “as knowledge” because it is infallible is equally “definite.” In other words, God’s knowing x is a possibility does not mean x is less than real or possible or that God's knowledge is less than definite. If we're talking about God's knowledge, it's all definitely this and definitely not that, that is, God knows "x might do y in z" definitely as "x might do y in z." If we're talking about the object of God's knowledge, the states of affairs themselves, then definiteness is ascribed to ontology (whether the ontology of actualities, eventualities, or possibilities). But you seem to attribute it to the outcome, to how the possibilities get resolved. I’d agree that how possibilities will be resolved is less than definite. But the resolved state is not itself the possibility. The possibility is the possibility. Since possibilities exist before they’re resolved, and since they are “definitely” what they are, and since God definitely knows them for what they are, why not say possibilities are as definite as actualities? Just because they haven't resolved themselves doesn't mean they aren't "definite." And they can't get any more "definitely" possible than they are.
Doesn't the fact that possibilities are REAL require that they be definite? Outcomes, that is, how possibilities resovle themselves, is an entirely different animal. It's a mistake to attribute the indefiniteness of the outcome to the truth-value of the possibility itself. Possibilities are just as definite, just as much what they are, as actualities are definite.
But I’m gonna end up losing this one too. But hey, what’s the site for? I'm definitely () never writing a book!
Doc: The reason Albert doesn’t think future tensed statements have truth value is because they have nothing to correspond to them.
Tom: I got that. But he doesn’t think they’re real because he assumes possibilities can only be real by referencing, or corresponding to, the future, whereas it’s clear that possibilities are real because they correspond to the present. He was asking what makes possibilities real. What "grounds" them? It's present reality that grounds the truth-value of statements about what "might" happen in the future.
Edited by - TGB on 06/29/2003 01:13:08 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 6/28/2003 7:44 PM (GMT -6) | | Oh, I wanna ask Alan…
If “might” has only one meaning in formal logic, only one meaning on the square of opposites, how do you KNOW that “might” may mean all of things you claim a page or two ago that it means? Can you demonstrate all those meanings on the square?
And again, I wanna ask to Alan and Doc, how does “x might not do y in z” falsify “x would do y in z” if in formal logic “might” only means “is logically possible that”? In this case “x might not do y in z” only means “It’s logically possible that x not do y in z” and this seems perfectly compatible with “x would do y in z.” So how’s it falsify it? Seems to me it only falsifies it IF we assume “might” means more than merely “logically possible that.”
Tom
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 6/29/2003 3:13 AM (GMT -6) | | TGB: Doesn't the fact that possibilities are REAL require that they be definite? Outcomes, that is, how possibilities resovle themselves, is an entirely different animal. It's a mistake to attribute the indefiniteness of the outcome to the truth-value of the possibility itself. Possibilities are just as definite, just as much what they are, as actualities are definite.
Doc: Consider my taking a sip of coffee within the next minute. It is in some respects definite – but the actual sipping will ADD to the definiteness. It may be definite as a "maybe I will, maybe I won’t," or definite as "I certainly shall…", but however definite it is, the ACTUAL ACT defines the "thisness" of the event. The actual sip is a once in eternity event. There never has been and never will be an instance of taking THIS sip right here and now. It’s unsurpassably unique and concrete – as opposed to the possibility of taking this sip.
It seems to me that this is the core difference between possibilities and actualities… increased definiteness. True, God knows possibilities as they are, with all the definiteness they have. But these possibilities, I submit, are always LESS definite than actuality.
TGB: …to Alan and Doc, how does "x might not do y in z" falsify "x would do y in z" if in formal logic "might" only means "is logically possible that"? In this case "x might not do y in z" only means "It’s logically possible that x not do y in z" and this seems perfectly compatible with "x would do y in z." So how’s it falsify it? Seems to me it only falsifies it IF we assume "might" means more than merely "logically possible that."
Doc: I like your brain TGB. You’re of course right. The "might" can’t mean simply "is logically possible that." Whatever the "would do x in situation z" asserts, it is an assertion of fact. So the "might not" that logically contradicts it must be a denial OF THIS FACT – hence must be itself an ASSERTION of FACT, not just logical possibility. Yet, I was taught that logic deals with formal definitions, not questions of fact. Hmmmm.
But maybe we need our resident logician Alan to help us out here.
Albert: Greg, you make a really crucial concession, from my point of view. You concede that nothing in thought, including the mind of God, can capture the concreteness, the uniqueness, the absolute "thisness" of the actual. I would respond by saying that, if God has in his mind a complete picture of the possible thing in question, but it lacks what you call the concreteness, the uniqueness, etc., then I would claim that God's knowledge of that possible thing in question is incomplete.
Doc: Maybe we’re in a terminological quagmire here Alan. To say "x is incomplete" has meaning if there is a greater conceivable "x" that IS complete. I don’t think God’s knowledge is incomplete in any fashion, for I don’t think there is a greater conceivable (viz. logically possible) form of knowledge. God knows possibilities perfectly/ completely/ exhaustively. What is "incomplete," then, is not God’s knowledge but the nature of possibilities in relation to the nature of actualities.
Albert: If the representation, in whatever form, was absolutely identical in all respects to the actual thing, then it would be the actual thing. That is why God would have to create something and make it actual, to know it comprehensively.
Doc: I agree. If possibilities, abstractions etc… (you’re "representation" and "proposition" knowledge) were identical in all respects to actuality, there would be no difference. But there IS clearly a difference. In what does it lay? I submit, IN the degree of definiteness. The only thing I THINK I’m disagreeing with you over is in expressing God’s knowledge of the indefinite as incomplete.
Albert: I assert that it is logically impossible for God to have complete and comprehensive knowledge of the possible. I would define "omniscience" as meaning "knowing everything which it is logically possible to know", just as we define "omnipotence" to mean "able to do anything which it is logically possible to do". This is my fundamental defence against the charge that I deny omniscience.
Doc: The qualification "that is logically possible to know" presupposes the reality of things that exist but are logically impossible to know. But this means that GOD DOESN’T KNOW EVERTHING.
Albert: In other words, God might be acting wrongly if he chose to know and think about some possible things. For example, if there is a person who is walking rightly before him and has given no sign whatsoever of infidelity, it might be wrong for God to think over the possibilities if this person turns away from him.
Doc: It would be wrong for God not to trust someone that he knows should be trusted. But I don’t see how it would be wrong to know that (say) there’s a 2% chance that Joe Smo will reject him in five years – if IN FACT there’s a 2% chance Joe Smo WILL reject him in five years. Indeed, suppose that one possible outcome of Joe rejecting God is that his wife will be thrown into a suicidal depression. Suppose there are things God could now begin to put in place (e.g. steering a person into her path who has a counseling background) that would help her through this depression in case Joe DOES reject God. If God DIDN’T put this in place when he could have, now I think you’d have grounds for morally objecting to God’s behavior.
Gotta go preach!
Blessings
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 6/29/2003 6:35 AM (GMT -6) | | Albert-
I’ll let you and Doc duke it out over nominalism/realism. Good stuff!
Doc-
There is one last “three” you require to make your “threeness” search complete: a THIRD breakfast with me in St. Paul…this October. Plan on it.
Doc: Consider my taking a sip of coffee within the next minute. It is in some respects definite – but the actual sipping will ADD to the definiteness. It may be definite as a "maybe I will, maybe I won’t," or definite as "I certainly shall…", but however definite it is, the ACTUAL ACT defines the "thisness" of the event.
Tom: I see your point. And I certainly agree that there is something unique to the act itself which God experiences when it happens that isn’t present in possibilities. Is it “definiteness” that the actual sipping adds? Or does the actual sipping simply introduce a deferent, though equally definite (given its nature as a possibility), aspect (viz., material experience) to our experience? I mean, possibilities affect us in uniquely profound ways as well, often directly influence changes in the course of world history. And yet they are less definite than a sip of coffee? I guess I’m wondering whether “definiteness” is the word that captures the unique “thisness” of acts over against possibilities. (I’m with ya, bro; just thinking out loud.) “Definite” over against “indefinite” suggests “real” vs. “less than real,” or suggests that material reality and historical acts are more real than immaterial realities, as if a “belief” is not as real as, say, hitting a home-run or tasting a fine Bordeaux.
(Oh wait a minute! I’ve tasted fine Bordeauxs. Hold on…
…yep. You’re right. Actualities are more definite than possibilities! )
Doc: I like your brain TGB. You’re of course right...
Tom: Remember, we were linked in our former lives.
Doc: …The "might" can’t mean simply "is logically possible that." Whatever the "would do x in situation z" asserts, it is an assertion of fact. So the "might not" that logically contradicts it must be a denial OF THIS FACT – hence must be itself an ASSERTION of FACT, not just logical possibility. Yet, I was taught that logic deals with formal definitions, not questions of fact. Hmmmm.
Tom: Yes, that’s what I thought. I slammed on the breaks and thought: “Hmmmm. Where do we go from here?”
Alan?
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 06/29/2003 11:36:29 AM
Edited by - TGB on 06/29/2003 2:26:15 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 13888
| Posted 6/29/2003 7:36 AM (GMT -6) | | Ok. I think this will help.
I believe that when Doc talks about “definiteness” with respect to reality, Doc is referring to the temporal concretization of eternal possibilities. The possible becoming actual. (In process, this is called "concrescence"...I think.) Thus, “indefiniteness” would be the extent to which an eternal possibility was NOT in the process of being concretized. Doc is not talking about the complete reality of something…which is the way Tom seems to be taking it. According to Doc’s metaphysics, reality is separated into two arenas, possibility and actuality. (Hartshorne, Whitehead, hmmm…). It doesn’t make sense to say that something is more or less “real” in this system, but it makes perfect sense to say that something is more or less “concretized.”
Got an analogy. Think of a superposition. Something that can only be known as range of probability, but not a distinct, single possibility, right? What happens when a superposition is measured? It suddenly becomes a single possibility. Before measurement, the placement is INDEFINITE. Afterwards, it becomes DEFINITE. Analogically, God’s infinite intelligence that is composed of the entire set of eternal possibilities would be like the superposition. When considering a particular event, all God can know is a range of possibilities. And the temporal concretization of any of those possibilities would be like the post-measurement state of the object. And the measurement itself would be like unto either divine or non-divine resolution (I’ll just call it that) of possibilities that make up the concretization process.
This is probably why Doc says that WE can make things “definite.”
Hope this helps,
"Smile. It could be worse." --from a good friend.
Edited by - MephEternal on 06/29/2003 12:41:12 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 6/29/2003 8:16 AM (GMT -6) | | 
Its about Lasagna. Its all about "layers."
TGB: Actualities are more definite than possibilities!
Doc: Consider my taking a sip of coffee within the next minute. It is in some respects definite – but the actual sipping will ADD to the definiteness.
PoW: There is also something "spatial" (metaphorically) about reality. . .a spatial layering of one layer lain across and somewhat modifying the other. Some modifications might be like a body on a matress, merely impressing. Other modivications might seem like a fusing and mixing in the boundary regions (degrees of depravity, etc.); but spatial metaphors work to help ... "Created" cosmos is always created. No mater what else happens to it it is (BOTH) created (AND) is developing ... too.
+
Doc: ...the ACTUAL ACT defines the "thisness" of the event.
pOw: Not always; not entirely, and not in every way. Some things about reality are MUSSEL LOADED. For some things it is what comes LAST that defines the meaning of everything else before it, from "catastophy" to "preparation." (Thief on the cross.)
.
quote:
POW: Nor am I sure that Light was "possible first" before God spoke it FROM NOTHING. Were it possible before hand then, seems to me, it would not be "from nothing."
Tom: So you’d prefer to say that all of creation was “impossible” before God created it? That in creating, God did the impossible?
Pow, bro, possibilities don’t take the art OUT of creation. They put the art INTO creation. So be happy that possibilities exist! They provide you with a job.
I'M NOT BACKING DOWN *THAT* EASILY, TOM!
Edited by - PotOnWheel on 06/29/2003 1:18:46 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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