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|  GregBoyd Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 1818 | Posted 6/22/2003 3:06 AM (GMT -6) |   | I've been off the board for a few weeks, so excuse me if this has been covered. But I'd like to offer it up for inspection.
I've had some conversation with Alan Rhoda (you know, our resident genius) on might-counterfactuals and have -- I think -- finally refined my own thoughts on might -counterfactuals to an acceptable level. Here's my thoughts.
* It is the case that "would" logically entails "might". It seems counter-intuitive, but on the square of oppositions this is in fact the case. * It is the case that "might" does NOT necessarily entail "might not." I always thought this, but again in formal logic it doesn't hold. * The problem with classical Molinism is that it assumed that ALL "might counterfactuals" are logically reducible to "would-counterfactuals." * This can't work, however, since "might AND might not" is meaningful whereas "would AND would not" is not. * Hence, the distinctive thing about the open view -- what I'd like to call neo-Molinism) is not that it asserts "might-counterfactuals" as such have truth value. The distinctive claim -- and this is HUGE -- is that it asserts that CONJOINED might counterfactuals have truth value.
We've been looking for a term to describe might-counterfactuals that are not covered by would-counterfactuals, and I would like to propose that THIS IS IT: "conjoined might-counterfactuals."
The conclusion: Unless one wants to argue that the assertion "x might AND might not do y in situation z" is logically incoherent (viz. logically self-contradictory) it constitutes a proposition the true value of which an omniscient God must know. And this proves that an omniscient God MUST know some of reality as a "maybe." He'd be NON-omnisicent if he DIDN'T know the truth value of a proposition that was logically possible, hence if he DIDN'T know the truth value of conjoined might-counterfactuals.
And NOTE: Even if God decides not to actualize a world in which some might-counterfactuals are true (as the classical view holds), God would have to know other possible worlds as "maybes."
And now we may lay to rest the standard argument that omniscience RULES OUT God knowing anything as a maybe.
What think ye?
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10.
Edited by - GregBoyd on 06/22/2003 08:10:23 AM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  geebob Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 94 | Posted 6/22/2003 11:06 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: I've been off the board for a few weeks, so excuse me if this has been covered. But I'd like to offer it up for inspection.
In light of this, have you seen my first post on page 3 of "Wanna help critique Pinnock?"
I prefer this view very much to the proposal's of other open theists (Hasker's and Wolterstorff's, speaking of which, did you know Wolterstorff is openness now?)
However, there is a problem that needs to be addressed and that is in terms of preserving the rules of logic. I think with your conjoined counterfactuals, we are going to have to make some innovations to understand how they fit with basic propositional logic.
I will gladly pay you teusday for a hamburger today.
-Wimpy | | Back to Top | | |
 |  JET Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2002 Total Posts : 397 | Posted 6/22/2003 11:26 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: The distinctive claim [made by the open view] is that it asserts that CONJOINED might counterfactuals have truth value.
* * *
And NOTE: Even if God decides not to actualize a world in which some might-counterfactuals are true (as the classical view holds), God would have to know other possible worlds as "maybes."
Are you saying that openness requires only that conjoined might counterfactuals (CMC’s) have truth value and does not necessarily require that God actualized a world in which there are true CMC’s?
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 |  GregBoyd Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 1818 | Posted 6/22/2003 4:10 PM (GMT -6) |   | Geebob, has Wolterstorff gone public with endorsing openness? If so, where?
JET: Are you saying that openness requires only that conjoined might counterfactuals (CMC’s) have truth value and does not necessarily require that God actualized a world in which there are true CMC’s?
Doc: I'm saying that the distinctive claim of openness theology is that a) conjoined might-counterfactuals HAVE truth value and b) God created a world in which some might-counterfactuals ARE true.
In his love Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  JET Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2002 Total Posts : 397 | Posted 6/23/2003 4:06 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: * It is the case that "would" logically entails "might". It seems counter-intuitive, but on the square of oppositions this is in fact the case.
Is this because formal logic is using the term "might" in the sense of "physically and logically possible"?
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 |  geebob Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 94 | Posted 6/23/2003 9:30 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: Geebob, has Wolterstorff gone public with endorsing openness? If so, where?
The following excerpts are from Wolterstorff from God and Time: four views
Behind the change in action, there is, in turn, a change in knowledge: God's successive responses to Moses were motivated by God's knowledge, each time, of Moses' new protest; the changes in God's knowledge tracked the changes in Moses' protest. These, I say, are implications of how scripture represents God: God has a history, and in this history there are changes in God's actions, responses, and knowledge. (p 188)
What about the future? Are future events likewise components of facts and can we refer to them? Tense theorists divide on this point. My own view, which I won't defend here since it won't make any difference in what follows, is that only when an event is occuring or has occured can it be a component of facts and can it be referred to. There are lots of general facts about the future, but no facts having particular events as constituents. (pp 196-197)
Sander's and I believe Hasker interpreted this to mean that Wolterstorrf had pretty much come all the way over to the openness camp.
I will gladly pay you teusday for a hamburger today.
-Wimpy | | Back to Top | | |
 |  GregBoyd Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 1818 | Posted 6/23/2003 7:35 PM (GMT -6) |   | Geebob, thanks for the reference. It certainly is difficult to interprete Wolterstorf as non-openness. Wow.
JET: Formally logic doesn't interpret "might" as physically and logically possible, just logically possible. So "might do x" is implied in "would do x." On this basis, it seems, classical Molinist concluded all "mights" are subsumed by "woulds," hence God's knowledge of would-counterfactuals covered his knowledge of might-counterfactuals. My point is that this is mistaken, for it is meaningful to say "x might AND might not do y" but NOT meaningful to say "x would AND would not do y." Conjoined might-counterfactuals thus constitute a distinct class of propositions the truth value of which an omniscient God MUST know. Hence, far from omniscience RULING OUT "maybes," it REQUIRES it.
Blessings Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  John Earp Registered Member
 Date Joined Oct 2002 Total Posts : 1715 | Posted 6/23/2003 7:39 PM (GMT -6) |   | I apologize if this is a really, really stupid question, but...
Isn't it true that "might" by definition implies "might not", but that "would" by definition excludes "would not?"
"The Discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world." Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology.
revivaltheology.net
Edited by - John Earp on 06/24/2003 12:41:04 AM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 6/23/2003 10:36 PM (GMT -6) |   | Hi Doc-
How would you go about proving the meaningfulness of "might and might not" propositions? There AREN'T any in the Bible and nobody speaks this way. So one could easily argue that every "might" God speaks is entailed in a settled "will" (not only is "might" entailed by "would" but it's also entailed by "will") or "would." There are no "might and might not" props in the Bible, so why couldn't every "might" or "perhaps" God speaks regarding some future event be understood as a "will" or "will not"? So the future is exhaustivey settled. How would you argue ANY of the "mights" of Scripture are really "might and might not"? How do you establish that any one particular "might" is a really "might and might not" prop if every "will" and "would" entails "might"?
Even if one argues that "might and might not" is logically possible, that doesn't prove that there are any TRUE such props.
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 06/24/2003 09:25:22 AM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Laika Registered Member

Date Joined Mar 2003 Total Posts : 2433 | Posted 6/24/2003 1:58 AM (GMT -6) |   | John Earp
quote:
I apologize if this is a really, really stupid question, but...
Isn't it true that "might" by definition implies "might not", but that "would" by definition excludes "would not?"
John, I had a similar question back when I understood this better  Look at the "contraries" and "sub-contraries" definition on this square of Alan's: http://www.pcigrp.com/Alan/square.pdf
"would" and "would not" both can't be true (XOR, exclusive or) "might" and "might not" both can't be false but both can be true
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 |  JET Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2002 Total Posts : 397 | Posted 6/24/2003 3:08 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: Even if God decides not to actualize a world in which some [conjoined] might-counterfactuals are true (as the classical view holds), God would have to know other possible worlds as "maybes."
But wouldn't a Molinist argue that all conjoined might counterfactuals in all possible worlds are false?
(I.e., under the Molinist concept of libertarian freedom, God knows with respect to every possible free agent in every possible world what that agent "would" do in any possible circumstances, right? If so, all CMC's would be false, right?)
quote: Conjoined might-counterfactuals thus constitute a distinct class of propositions the truth value of which an omniscient God MUST know. Hence, far from omniscience RULING OUT "maybes," it REQUIRES it.
I can see how CMC's as a distinct class of propositions helps demonstrate that Molinism is based on a huge asssumption (that ALL CMC's in ALL possible worlds are false). But I'm not sure I see how CMC's as a distinct class of propositions proves that omniscience requires "maybes".
Thanks,
JET
Edited by - JET on 06/24/2003 10:46:18 AM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  PotOnWheel Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 9890 | Posted 6/24/2003 5:23 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote:
The following excerpts are from Wolterstorff from God and Time: four views
Behind the change in action, there is, in turn, a change in knowledge: God's successive responses to Moses were motivated by God's knowledge, each time, of Moses' new protest; the changes in God's knowledge tracked the changes in Moses' protest. These, I say, are implications of how scripture represents God: God has a history, and in this history there are changes in God's actions, responses, and knowledge. (p 188)
What about the future? Are future events likewise components of facts and can we refer to them? Tense theorists divide on this point. My own view, which I won't defend here since it won't make any difference in what follows, is that only when an event is occuring or has occured can it be a component of facts and can it be referred to. There are lots of general facts about the future, but no facts having particular events as constituents. (pp 196-197)
My hunch is that Nick has a "bigger picture" in mind when he says "God has a history, and in this history there are changes in God's actions, responses, and knowledge," and that all that fits INSIDE that bigger picture. Another way of repeating myself would be to say that I don't think that the man who is trying to develop-back-into Protestantism the notion that "God Speaks" would say this so much along the line of the Medieval definition of "nominalism" (not the contemporary dictionary's definition.) I'd hunch that the distinction in the Logox between eternality and specificity also plays out in a distinction between eternal knowledge and specific. Seems simple enough to be true.
Fred | | Back to Top | | |
 |  JET Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2002 Total Posts : 397 | Posted 6/24/2003 6:05 AM (GMT -6) |   | quote: TGB:
Even if one argues that "might and might not" is logically possible, that doesn't prove that there are any TRUE such props.
So the significance of CMC's as a distinct class of propositions is that it proves that omniscience does not rule out "maybes", right?
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 |  ReasonableDoubt Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 655 | Posted 6/24/2003 7:14 AM (GMT -6) |   | | I agree w/ Earp - doesn't 'might" imply "might not"? And the reason being - these modal operators like "might," "possible" - etc are not truth values in and of themselves but are stating the fact that the person's knowledge at the time of making the statement is limited. "Might" means - "it is possible that x". How do you turn this around and say "might not" means "it is not possible that x"? That's not valid. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  PotOnWheel Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 9890 | Posted 6/24/2003 8:04 AM (GMT -6) |   | | | |
 |  PotOnWheel Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 9890 | Posted 6/24/2003 8:17 AM (GMT -6) |   | I don't find anything per se objectionable about many, many, many things being left "open" by the Creator. The "cultural mandate" in Genesis seems to 'shout it from the mountain top!' Right?
Where I *think* that I differ with you, Greg, is that I've always read you as saying that the defined and the undefined sit side by side, and I read created reality as being in two tiers, with the created "structure" being the foundation upon which "creational developement" takes place. If we don't differ here, then maybe we don't differ as much as I sometimes think.
First the outline repeated; and then the application.
Creational Structure is that which God's word establishes -- it includes the very nature of all reality. According to this, humanity is created good.
Creational Development is that which mankind, in his office given him/her/they by God has done and can do. According to this we have sinned. But we have invented the basketball, and Michael Jordan expanded its applications a bit. 
Mights and Maybes, and lost opportunities exist in the Creational Development tier. Nothing in that tier affects the Creational Structure that God forknew before the foundations of the world.
What say y'all? | | Back to Top | | |
 |  PotOnWheel Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 9890 | Posted 6/24/2003 8:22 AM (GMT -6) |   | Viewing this as two uncompeting tiers, I don't seem to feel the stress many of you seem to do here. I see the possitives, the potentiality here. Education is an area FILLED with Mights and Maybes.
Here is a Reformed colleges thoughts on the educational task. hOW DOES THIS DISCUSSION OF YOURS BEAR OUT IN THIS APPLICATION
quote: To understand the nature of education, we must see it against the background of God's mandate to subdue the earth. God called humanity to the task of dressing and keeping the garden, that is, developing and conserving the created order. Moreover, as God's image-bearers, people are capable of fulfilling this mandate, because God, in calling people to his task, also equips them. Education, in its broadest sense, is an essential element in the development and exercise of that capability.
Humanity's ability to develop the creation depends on insight. Consequently, people must study, examine, and understand the world. Furthermore, the results of such study and investigation must be preserved by transmission from one generation to another. Education, therefore, is fundamental to humanity's task of developing and conserving the created order.
Education also relates to the performance of humanity's cultural task in another way, however, God instructed men and women to be fruitful and multiply. This inevitably involves not merely the begetting but also the training of children. Such training, too, reflects the call to develop and conserve, for children must be trained to acquire and exercise insight.
Education, then, is a constituent of life itself, and in its broadest scope refers to all human efforts to gain and transmit insight, whether at the forefront of science in universities and research centers or in the kindergarten class or on mother's lap. Seen thus, education pervades all of life. It is operative in every human relationship. In marriage, it manifests itself in the deepening of understanding between the two partners. In the home, the rearing of children is essentially an educational activity. In the church, we are instructed in the Scriptures. In all other spheres, too, such as commerce, industry, the arts and the media, there is development and conservation which requires growing insight.
Edited by - fred on 06/24/2003 1:25:00 PM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  JET Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2002 Total Posts : 397 | Posted 6/24/2003 8:57 AM (GMT -6) |   | RD: How do you turn this around and say "might not" means "it is not possible that x"? That's not valid.
JET: I think everyone would have to agree with you. "Might not" means "it is possible that not x", as opposed to "it is not possible that x".
The question, if my understanding is correct, is whether "might" means "it is possible that x" or "it is possible that x or not x" or both.
Edited by - JET on 06/24/2003 1:57:50 PM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  ReasonableDoubt Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 655 | Posted 6/24/2003 9:40 AM (GMT -6) |   | "x might AND might not do y in situation z" - I don't get what the difference is between that sentence and "x might do y in situation z". Let's say, as an example - "Bob might go to the basketball game tonight if it doesn't rain." Now, "Bob might and might not go to the basketball game tonight if it doesn't rain." What exactly does that sentence tell us? The 2 sentences mean the same thing as far as common sense is concerned. The sentences mean there's a chance he may go, there's a chance he may not, we don't know which yet. If we're talking about the veracity of the latter sentence - it is true, unless there is some physical impossibility of going to the game - that is, that he is in the hospital paralyzed. For any given proposition, it is true that a person might or might not do it - again, unless there's some physical prohibition. So how is it meaningful?
What am i missing? | | Back to Top | | |
 |  JET Registered Member
 Date Joined Jun 2002 Total Posts : 397 | Posted 6/24/2003 11:11 AM (GMT -6) |   | This is what I’m hearing:
1. Doc is speaking of “might” in a narrow sense that apparently is used in formal logic where “might” means “logically possible”. So “might” is implied by “would” (because “logically possible” is implied by “would”). Hence, the need for a different term for “maybe/maybe not” situations. Doc is merely proposing a new term, “conjoined might counterfactuals” (CMC’s), to distinguish “maybe/maybe not” from “logically possible” for purposes of formal logic semantics.
2. Initially, Doc said if CMC’s have truth value, “we may lay to rest the standard argument that omniscience rules out God knowing anything as a maybe”. Later, however, Doc made the less modest claim that “far from omniscience ruling out ‘maybes,’ it requires it.” But TGB and I have suggested that all CMC’s could be false, logically speaking.
3. John Earp and RD are using the term “might” in the sense of “maybe/maybe not”–the same sense that Doc is now referring to as “CMC's”.
4. However, RD is using the term in a strictly epistemological sense, whereas everyone else is assuming that “might” (and/or “might and might not”) propositions can have ontological truth value.
5. If “might” doesn’t always entail “might not”, TGB is wondering how we can know that “might” ever entails “might not”. In particular, how can we know that any “might-type” statements attributed to God in Scripture allow for a “might not”? It seems to me this question is answered by asking how the ancient Hebrew term is being used by the ancient Hebrew author. Assuming Doc is merely referring to a technical issue regarding the language of modern, western formal logic, then presumably this would have little bearing on the exegetical issue, right?
Edited by - JET on 06/24/2003 4:14:02 PM | | Back to Top | | |
 |  PotOnWheel Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 9890 | Posted 6/24/2003 4:32 PM (GMT -6) |   | | | |
 |  GregBoyd Registered Member
 Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 1818 | Posted 6/24/2003 5:51 PM (GMT -6) |   | In ordinary language "might" means "might not." But in formal logic, it does not. I discovered this in my initial argument against Molinism in which people assume that all "mights" are covered by "woulds." Hence God knows all possible propositions by knowing what WILL and what WOULD occur. Yet, it CAN'T be the case that ALL mights are logically subsumed by woulds, for if that were the case it COULDN'T be the case that conjoined might-counterfactuals have meaning while conjoined would counterfactuals do not.
Now, could all conjoined might-counterfactuals be false? Its logically possible for God to create a world in which all might counterfactuals would be false. But this would be a CONTINGENT falsification. And it wouldn't destroy the fact that omniscience REQUIRES God knows conjoined might-counterfactuals, for God would still know that in OTHER possible worlds some conjoined might-counterfactuals are true.
If one wishes to argue that there are NO possible worlds in which conjoined might-counterfactuals are true, they are saying that conjoined might-counterfactuals arel NECESSARILY false. But something can be NECESSARILY false only if it is logically impossible -- viz. self-contradictory.
And WHAT, pray tell, is logically contradictory about the sentence, "x might and might not do y"?
Blessings Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  ReasonableDoubt Registered Member
 Date Joined Jan 2003 Total Posts : 655 | Posted 6/24/2003 6:07 PM (GMT -6) |   | I'll admit I am now confused beyond all recognition - and that's probably my fault. But as far as "And WHAT, pray tell, is logically contradictory about the sentence, "x might and might not do y"? " - I don't think there's anything logically contradictory. It's just that the sentence does not tell us anything meaningful. "I might go to the movies tonite, and I might not go to the movies tonite." Tell me, what does that mean to you? Does it give you any indication about what actually will occur? Say tomorrow, after I've said the statement tonite, you ask me, "so did you go to the movies?" I say,"no I did not." So the truth of the matter is the event in question did not occur.. Does that falsify my statement of last night? No. Does it verify it? No. Contrapose that with "I will go to the movies tonite." Tomorrow I tell you I did not. So the statement is false, b/c it is verifiable that I did not in fact do what the statement says. I see this "might and might not" jargon as being modal logic operators which are not subject to being measured for truth values. Perhaps I am way off base and don't understand, I am willing to admit that. | | Back to Top | | |
 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 6/24/2003 8:21 PM (GMT -6) |   | JET: 5. If “might” doesn’t always entail “might not”, TGB is wondering how we can know that “might” ever entails “might not”.
TGB: Right. I think it is possible to look BACK on a particular "might" and conclude that it was a "might and might not" if the event DID NOT happen. Jer. 26.3 for example: "Israel might listen to me." Now, if this is a "might" that is entailed in a "will" then Israel would have listened. But "mights" are not entailed in "will not's." Israel did NOT listen, so God's "Israel might listen" is not the sort of "might" that's subsumed under "will." It's an independant "might and might not." See? God says "they might listen" but they DON'T. Consequently, this is an example of "might and might not."
I don't know if Doc would agree, but it seems to me that even if "might" is compatible with "will" and "would", "might and might not" is NOT compatible with "will" and "would." Would you agree Doc? But then we are aruging that the word "might" in "x might do y in z" where this is entailed by "x will do y in z" means something different than "might" in "x might and might not do y in z." Same word, opposite meanings. And this is part of the problem. There's no recognized philosophical language for speaking of contingent events. Using "might and might not" is very good. But it's complicated by the fact that "might" is also used with a different meaning when entailed by "will" and "would." Now we have a "might" of "x might do y" which is entailed in "x will do y" (a non-contingent event) and "might" of "x might do y" which is REALLY "x might and might not do y" (a contingent event). Arhghgh!
Tom
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 |  Tom Registered Member

Date Joined Jul 2001 Total Posts : 10353 | Posted 6/25/2003 12:31 AM (GMT -6) |   | Hi all-
I'm on vacation in Cyprus, online in the hotel lobby paying $1.00 per minute, so I gotta think fast and write without correcting my typos! Man am I addicted to this site!
OK, from the start of discussions on might-counterfactuals I've argued that "might" entails "might not" because both describe a contingent event--an event which is NOT settled or determined--an event which might and might not happen (this would be Doc's "might and might not").
I don't understand formal logic enough to even engage Doc and Alan on why "x will do y" and "x would do y" both entail "x might do y," so I'll just trust them. But after hearing Doc explain it (and talking offline to a few others) it seems clear to me now that Doc and Alan (and the formally logical folks) are giving "might" two different meanings: First, there is the "might" of "might and might not"--that is, the might of what I'll call event-contingency; then there's, secondly, the "might" of event-capability--that is, the "might" of logical possibility. Hold on...
On the second meaning, "might" is entailed by all true "will's" and "would's", since in order for it to be true that an event either "will" or "would" happen, it must be POSSIBLE that it happen. It must not be logically self-contradictory. It must describe a logically possible state of affairs. This is ALL that "might's" entailed in "will's" and "would's" mean. "x will do y in z" entails something like "It's possible that x do y in z" or "x is capable of doing y in z". It's not logically incoherent or self-contradictory.
But when we speak of "event-contingency", or of events which may or may not happen, we're describing something incompatible with it's being true that the event either "will" or "would" happen. Doc and Alan, I presume, would agree with this. An event's occuring cannot be both non-contingent and contingent, cannot both be definite and indefinite.
Given the prevailaing formal use of "might" in describing what is logically possible, then we will have to admit not only that "will" and "would" entail "might" but that "might and might not" entail "might," for before it can be true that an event "might and might not" occur, it must be logically possible that the event occur and not occur. So now "might and might not" entails "might." See how confusing that is?
THere is a "might" entailed by all true "will's" and "would's" AND "might and might not's"! And this "mights" is DIFFERENT in meanig from the "might" of "might and might not."
It it's logically required to speak this way, then let's at least point it out ahead of time so that people don't make the mistake of thinking we are using "might" consistently. We're NOT. As long as we recognize this, then I'm OK. It's saying exactly what I've been saying all along. I just choose to avoid using "might" to describe the sort of "logical possibility" that's entailed in all true "will's" and "would's".
Oh well.
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 06/25/2003 05:37:03 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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