 |
| 
Ronald Ricketts
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2002
Total Posts : 50
| Posted 5/28/2003 11:03 AM (GMT -6) |   | I am having a problem with understanding the word "counterfactuals", at least to my satisfaction. I find the subject of Molinism, Middle Knowledge, the wills, the woulds, the mights, the coulds, and Neo-Molinism very interesting. My problem is that the term counterfactual is fuzzy in my thinking. Am I asking too much to ask if there is a simple definition of this term? Thanks for your help. Ron Ricketts
Ronald | | Back to Top | | |
 |
JET
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 5/28/2003 11:28 AM (GMT -6) | |
From: http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/c9.htm#couf
quote:
counterfactual
A conditional statement whose antecedent is known (or, at least, believed) to be contrary to fact. Thus, for example, "If George W. Bush had been born in Idaho, then he would never have become President."
Edited by - JET on 05/28/2003 4:52:17 PM | | Back to Top | | |
|
Paul5388
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2003
Total Posts : 295
| Posted 5/28/2003 4:48 PM (GMT -6) | | JET,
GWB could have still become president, because his career could have been the same in the Idaho setting. He just wouldn't have been the president from Texas. Granted it would have been unlikely, but it could still have been a possibility.
If the example had said "born in Mexico" it would have been a true statement.
Edited by - Paul5388 on 05/28/2003 9:50:55 PM | | Back to Top | | |
|
GregBoyd
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 5/28/2003 6:28 PM (GMT -6) | | A counterfactual is a proposition that is counter to fact. Counterfactuals became important to the issue of God's omniscience when Luis Molina noticed that God must know the truth value not only of all propositions asserting what WILL or WILL NOT happen, but WOULD and WOULD NOT happen in other "possible worlds." Noticing this allowed Molina to construe divine providence in very strong terms without falling into Calvinism.
I applaud the insight, but argue that Molina and his followers failed to notice that WOULD counterfactuals are not the only sort of counterfactuals there are. There are also MIGHT counterfactuals. Since "would" logically implies "might," they assumed that God's knowledge of would counterfactuals, combined with his knowledge of what will and will not occur, covers all possible propositions. What they failed to notice is that while all "would" counterfactuals entail "might counterfactuals", not all "might" counterfactuals entail "would" counterfactuals. And this, I argue, establishes that theres a set of propositions -- what I'm calling "independent might-counterfactuals" -- the truth of which an omniscient being MUST know.
This then establishes that there's not only no incompatibility between God being omniscient, on the one hand, and knowing some of the future as a "maybe" on the other, but that there is an incompatibility between God being omniscient while DENYING that he could know the future as a maybe. Since the major criticism of open theism is that it undermines God's omniscience by holding that he created a world in which some of the future is a "maybe," this argument is significant.
I'm sure I "over-answered" your question. Sorry. I'm a little hyped on this right now.
Blessings
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/29/2003 3:57 AM (GMT -6) | | Ronald: I find the subject of Molinism, Middle Knowledge, the wills, the woulds, the mights, the coulds, and Neo-Molinism very interesting...Am I asking too much to ask if there is a simple definition of this term?
Tom: I WOULD give you a simple definition if I COULD.
Doc: What they failed to notice is that while all "would" counterfactuals entail "might counterfactuals", not all "might" counterfactuals entail "would" counterfactuals. And this, I argue, establishes that theres a set of propositions -- what I'm calling "independent might-counterfactuals" -- the truth of which an omniscient being MUST know.
Tom: Dude. We gotta talk! I'm gonna have to fly to St. Paul before October!
Creating separate sets of might-counterfactuals, one consisting of those entailed by would-counterfactuals and another consisting of those not entailing would-counterfactuals ain't gonna work.
Seems to me that every would-counterfactual logically entails a might-counterfactual and visa versa. But by "entails" I don't mean to say anything about the relative truth-values of either set.
Every TRUE would-counterfactual "x would do y in z" entails a) the FALSE might-counterfactual "x might (or might not) do y in z," and b) the FALSE would-counterfactual "x would not do y in z." And every TRUE might-counterfactual "x might do y in z" entails the FALSE would-counterfactuals "x would do y in z" and "x would not do y in z."
Depends on what you mean by "entail." If one proposition "entailing" another means the entailed proposition possesses the same truth-value as the entailing proposition then NO would-counterfactuals entail might-counterfactuals and and visa-versa, since in terms of their truth-values, would-counterfactuals and might-counterfactuals are incompatible. But if one proposition "entailing" another simply means that for every true proposition x, every other proposition on proposition x's square of opposites is necessarily false (which is demanded by the Principal of Bivalence), then ALL would-counterfactuals entail might-counterfactuals and visa versa. Make sense?
Problem is, I don't see any way to understand "entail" so that would-counterfactuals ALL come out entailing might-counterfactuals but only SOME might-counterfactuals (namely, your 'independant might-counterfactuals) entail would-counterfactuals.
I'm cookoo for Coco Puffs!
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 05/30/2003 05:23:57 AM | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/29/2003 4:20 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc and others-
Does this work?
Let it be given that omniscience means: God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods.
P1 God is omniscient
P2 The principal of bivalence is universally true.
P3 God knows the truth-value of all propositions (from 1 and 2)
P4 Propositions about the future are of three sorts:
“X will do Y”
“X would do Y”
“X might do Y”
P5 No two of these types of propositions may share the same truth-value (from 2)
P6 There are some true propositions of the type “X might do Y”
P7 God knows the future partly as what “might” or “might not” be (from 3, 4, 5, and 6)
The only weakness is P6, whether or not there are true might-counterfactual propositions.
Tom
| | Back to Top | | |
|
GregBoyd
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 5/29/2003 9:32 AM (GMT -6) | |
TGB: Every TRUE would-counterfactual "x would do y in z" entails a) the FALSE might-counterfactual "x might (or might not) do y in z," and b) the FALSE would-counterfactual "x would not do y in z." And every TRUE might-counterfactual "x might do y in z" entails the FALSE would-counterfactuals "x would do y in z" and "x would not do y in z."
Doc: Interesting. Insightful. Bravo. So its not just that there is a class of "might counterfactuals" that are not logically encompassed by would counterfacts. I'm granting too much to the classical shema in saying this. It's that "might counterfactuals" and "would counterfactuals" are ON EQUAL FOOTING. The "mights" encompass the "woulds" as much as the "woulds" encompass the "mights." Yet, God knowing ONLY would's would not be adequate, for would's don't DRIVE all the mights. Some MIGHTS drive the woulds.
This is getting clearer, and more exciting. VERY helpful... I think.
YOU DA MAN. (Unless Alan the man shows up and demonstrates that we are both idiots.
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
|
JET
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 5/29/2003 10:01 AM (GMT -6) | | TGB: The only weakness is P6, whether or not there are true might-counterfactual propositions.
JET: I wouldn't say this is a weakness. This merely shows that the debate is really about the nature of reality and not how we understand God's omniscience.
| | Back to Top | | |
|
Starkman
Registered Member
Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1747
| Posted 5/29/2003 12:06 PM (GMT -6) | | The problem I still have is that under a might-counterfactual there are only two possible would-counterfactuals: would or would not (no matter whether there are several options that would or would not happen; there are still only a yea and a nay option).
Whether x might or might not do y seems logical to say also that it is true that x would or would not do y, regardless of whether it's definitely known whether x might/would or might/would not do y. there are only two options: either the event will or will not happen, REGARDLESS of whether it's framed in a might or would context The would or would nots seem, therefore, to be just as built into the might-counterfactuals as the might-counterfactuals are built into the woulds.
Okay, wait. This is really important to me (and I think to this discussion). The game of chess has many, but not infinite, amount of moves. Altogether, there's probably a zillion combinations of moves that can be made, all known by God. But . . .
However, consider the human being. There aren't just specific moves for the human as there is for the game of chess. There are abstracts: emotion, thought (shaded, but not specific), spontaneity, whim. Now, just because humans are finite, are we forced to conclude, then, that all of these abstracts must therefore be capable of being put into the category of the finite (in terms of how many different combinations there can be? In other words (you know, we say "in other words," but why didn't we just say it in those words in the first place?), because the human is finite, are all human abstract "movements" finite in number? I'm incline to think that the abstracts are not finite, but infinite. Not in numbers of moves, like chess, but in that an abstract simply cannot be measured in number counts.
If an abstract cannot be numbered like chess moves, then not only would God not know WHAT the next move a human would make, He wouldn't know what move there was to make in terms of divisible distinction; He'd only know the KIND of move a human can make (when it is, in fact, an abstract and not a specific context). This, of course, takes into consideration that God knows the heart and mind of individuals and that all these abstract KINDS of movements are possible, but not dividable.
Otherwise, I'm struggling a bit here with seeing might-counterfactuals as completely unrelated to would-counterfactuals. Doc's "Critique" of Pinnock helped, but it's still murky for me in them there waters!
Starkman
Am I right? I say, am I right?
Charlie Brown
Edited by - Starkman on 05/29/2003 6:06:24 PM | | Back to Top | | |
|
ReasonableDoubt
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 655
| Posted 5/29/2003 12:50 PM (GMT -6) | | Here's my question about middle knowledge and counterfactuals - about what is God's knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom. Could the truth of counterfactuals of freedom related to a person be dependent on the person's actions? It seems that they could not be, because the facts that make them true were available to God at the creation (via the middle knowledge), before he had decided to create anything, let alone this specific person. So the facts, like God's decision, must have been ontologically prior, it seems, to any act of this person. So it seems that it could not be in thisperson's power to act that any actually true counterfactual of freedom relating to him would not have been true.
So in other words, middle knowledge doesn't really get rid of the "problem" of determinism.
What do you think?
People demand freedom of speech as a compensation for the freedom of thought which they seldom use.
--Søren Kierkegaard | | Back to Top | | |
|
GregBoyd
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 5/29/2003 1:09 PM (GMT -6) | | TGB, I reworked the section in the light of your insight that would and might counterfactuals BOTH have logical implications for one another. I'm trying to express the independence of might counterfactuals... they aren't "merely" logical implications of would counterfactuals. I try to here show it by demonstrating that a might counterfactualcould be true while both corresponding would counterfactuals are false. Here's the relevant section from the article.
To begin, it is usually assumed that that propositions of the form "x will do y" or "x will not do y" cover the whole of future. But this is the case only if we assume the classical view that the whole of the future is eternally and exhaustively definite. In this case future events either will (definitely) or will not (definitely) happen. Hence, propositions that correspond to these eternally definite realities are either true or false. And the omniscient God of course knows them as such.
But if we don’t make this metaphysical assumption – an assumption, note, which is strictly about the nature of the world God created, not about the scope of God’s knowledge – then we immediately see that there’s no reason to assume that everything about the future can be expressed in this "will" or "will not" form. If the world is as open theists claim, then the future in part consists of things that "may" or "may not" happen. Propositions that express these "maybes" must be included as among the propositions in P2 that an omniscient God would know.
In my estimation, one of most significant omissions in the classical tradition’s reflections on the nature of omniscience was that it never considered the distinctive set of what we might call "might-counterfactual" propositions. To be sure, Molinists considered the set of "would-counterfactual" propositions and thus held that God not only knows what will and will not happen, but also what would happen in every alternative possible world (God’s "middle knowledge"). Would-counterfactuals in this schema are essentially "will" and "will-not" propositions applied to counterfactual worlds. What classical Molinists fail to see, however, is that the set of would-counterfactual propositions logically requires the logically distinct category of might-counterfactual propositions. For the negation of a would-counterfactual is not a would-not counterfactual, but a might-not counterfactual.
To illustrate, if God knows that it is false that "George would eat a cookie if offered," God knows that "George might not eat a cookie if offered," not that "George would not eat a cookie if offered." God may of course also know that, as a matter of fact, George would not eat a cookie if offered. But this piece of information is distinct from his simply knowing the falsity of the proposition "George would eat a cookie if offered." The only thing God knows by virtue of his knowing this proposition as false is that "George might not eat a cookie if offered."
The ramifications of this insight are significant. For it means that there is a set of counterfactual propositions the truth value of which an omniscient God must know but which have not been given serious consideration in the church’s theological tradition. If God knows the truth value of would counterfactuals, he must by logical necessity know the truth value of might-counterfactuals.
(HERES THE NEW SECTION)
What is more, the content of might-counterfactuals cannot be reduced to would-counterfactuals. Might counterfactuals have logical implications for would-counterfactuals, and would-counterfactuals have logical implications for might-counterfactuals. But one cannot reduce might-counterfactuals to a subset of would-counterfactuals any more than one can reduce would-counterfactuals to a subset of might-counterfactuals.
To illustrate, if God knows George would eat a cookie if offered, God knows George might eat a cookie if offered. But merely by virtue of knowing George might eat a cookie if offered, God does not thereby know that George would eat a cookie if offered. He of course knows that its false that George would not eat a cookie if offered, for this is the negation of it being the case that George might eat a cookie if offered. But there’s no way of expressing the truth of what God knows – viz. that George might eat a cookie if offered – if we restrict God’s knowledge to what George would and would not do. For it may very well be the case that its true that George might eat a cookie if offered by false that he would or would not eat a cookie if offered. The truth of the might-counterfactual that George might he a cookie if offered stands alone, and must therefore be known by God independent of God’s knowledge of would-counterfactuals. And this demonstrates that there is no logical incompatibility between affirming that God is omniscient, on the one hand, while affirming that he knows some of the future as what might and might not happen, on the other.
It was, I believe, a metaphysical assumption about the eternally and exhaustively definite nature of reality on the part of classical theologians that led them to assume that "will" and "will not" ( and, by extension to possible worlds, "would" and "would-not") propositions exhaust the set of propositions in P2 that an omniscient God would know. Jettison this assumption – which again, is an assumption about the nature of the world God created, not an assumption about the scope of omniscience – and one sees that P2 must include propositions about what "might" and "might not" happen.
What do you think?
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/30/2003 12:25 AM (GMT -6) | | Starkman: The problem I still have is that under a might-counterfactual there are only two possible would-counterfactuals: would or would not (no matter whether there are several options that would or would not happen; there are still only a yea and a nay option).
Tom: Yeah, for sure. What’s the problem?
Starkman: Whether x might or might not do y seems logical to say also that it is true that x would or would not do y
Tom: Not really. “Might” and “might not” ARE the same thing. They imply one another. If “x might do y” is true, then “x might not do y” is also true. They have the SAME truth value. But it doesn’t work with “would” and “would not” prop’s (or with “will” and “will not” prop’s). These are mutually exclusive. If “x would do y” is true, then “x would not do y” is false.
Starkman: Otherwise, I'm struggling a bit here with seeing might-counterfactuals as completely unrelated to would-counterfactuals.
Tom: Dude! Feel like you’re sinking in quicksand? Feel like fire ants are climbing up your legs? Feel like you’re suspended over... Welcome to my world!
Might-counterfactuals ARE related to would-counterfactuals. They are logically connected through the principal of bivalence. If a might-counterfactual describing future event p is true, then the would-counterfactuals (both the “would” and the “would not”) that describe p are false. Right? If “Kathy might wash her car if the sun come out” is true, then “Kathy would wash her car if the sun comes out” is false. So, might’s and would’s have implications for one another. True might’s entail false would’s and will’s. True would’s entail false might’s. This is a sort of logical connection.
In THIS logical sense all might’s entail would’s and all wouldn’s entail might’s. But the relative truth-values of one set of prop’s are not entailed in the truth-value’s of prop’s in the other set. Like I said, it seems to me that if one proposition "entailing" another means the entailed proposition possesses the same truth-value as the entailing proposition then NO would-counterfactuals entail might-counterfactuals and and visa-versa (i.e., there is no relation between them), since in terms of their truth-values, would-counterfactuals and might-counterfactuals are incompatible. For example, not every true might-counterfactual gives way to a true would-counterfactuals. A might-counterfactual may be true (e.g., “Kathy may wash her car if the sun comes out next Saturday”) and consequently become false (e.g., Saturday arrives, the sun comes out, and Kathy chooses not to wash her car) without the would-counterfactuals describing this event ever becoming true. This is how might’s and would’s are NOT related.
Every true “would” requires a previously true “might” describing the event. For “Kathy would wash her car” to be true, the proposition “Kathy might wash her car” must HAVE BEEN true but must NOW BE false. But—and here’s the thing that complicates this—though “Kathy might was her car” must NOW BE false if “Kathy would wash her car” is true, it must remain the case that “It is possible for Kathy to wash her car.” THIS is the hidden bug in the system. Kathy must remain “capable” of washing the car for “Kathy would wash her car” to be true EVEN THOUGH “Kathy might was her car” is false.
Don’t confuse might-counterfactuals with the “possibility/capability to perform.” “Kathy might wash her car” and “It is possible for Kathy to wash her car” ARE NOT the same thing. The former is a proposition describing the future (a might-counterfactual). The latter is a proposition describing the present.
Tom
| | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/30/2003 12:27 AM (GMT -6) | | RD: So in other words, middle knowledge doesn't really get rid of the "problem" of determinism.
Tom: Bravo.
Tom
| | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/30/2003 12:28 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc-
Nice. Just the next to the last paragraph though:
Doc: To illustrate, if God knows George would eat a cookie if offered, God knows George might eat a cookie if offered. But merely by virtue of knowing George might eat a cookie if offered, God does not thereby know that George would eat a cookie if offered.
Tom: You’re gonna hate me I bet. I’m not making this easy am I? (BYW, using parentheses to identify the prop’s would be helpful.)
If God knows “George would eat a cookie if offered” God CANNOT know that “George might eat a cookie if offered.” What is true about the relationship here is that God must FIRST know that George MIGHT eat a cookie if offered before he can know that George WOULD eat a cookie if offered. Oh, oh, does this help? -- Would-counterfactuals are BUILT on might-counterfactuals, not visa verse. They require PREVIOUSLY true might-counterfactuals, not SYMULTANEOUSLY true might-counterfactuals (which is what you have). Right?
Just thinking out loud here; is this helpful?
“If God knows that George would eat a cookie if offered, it must have first been the case that God knew George might eat a cookie if offered. For before it can be true that an event “would” take place, it must first be true that it “might” take place. However, it is not the case that if an event “might” take place it necessarily “would” take place. Merely by virtue of knowing George might eat a cookie if offered, God does not thereby know that George would eat a cookie if offered.”
Doc: But there’s no way of expressing the truth of what God knows – viz. that George might eat a cookie if offered – if we restrict God’s knowledge to what George would and would not do.
Tom: Nice.
Doc: For it may very well be [the case that its] true that George might eat a cookie if offered by false that he would or would not eat a cookie if offered.
Tom: For it may very well be…true that George might eat a cookie if offered but (or and?) false that he would or would not eat a cookie if offered.
Sounds good Doc!
Tom 
Edited by - TGB on 05/30/2003 06:26:18 AM
Edited by - TGB on 05/30/2003 11:42:37 AM | | Back to Top | | |
|
Laika
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2003
Total Posts : 2433
| Posted 5/30/2003 2:52 AM (GMT -6) | | TGB said:
quote:
.
.
.
P6 There are some true propositions of the type “X might do Y”
.
.
The only weakness is P6, whether or not there are true might-counterfactual propositions.
My question is whether there are ever any false might-counterfactuals.
proposition (E will happen) is false if E doesn't happen
is proposition (E might happen) false if E doesn't happen?
If I tell my kids, "after homework, we will get ice cream" and we don't, they can validly claim "but dad you said will, you didn't tell the truth"
But if I tell them, "after homework, we might get ice cream" and we don't, I can claim "I said we might, I told the truth"
In the former case they can claim I lied, told a falsity. In the latter they can never claim I lied. It's true every time.
the negation of (will) is (will not)
the negation of (might) is?
to me, (might not) is the same as (might)
(will) and (will not) are binary/bivalance
(might) is ambiguous and, IMHO, not condusive to being modelled by binary/bivalance
Am I loopy?
Even though the skies are blue, don't they let the sunshine through?
Edited by - Laika on 05/30/2003 08:21:23 AM | | Back to Top | | |
|
ReasonableDoubt
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 655
| Posted 5/30/2003 3:28 AM (GMT -6) | | No, Laika, I think you're right on here. If I say "I might go to the store today" - there is no way to falsify that. It remains true if i go to the store, or if i do not go to the store. The only way it would be false is if I said the statement while it physically was impossible to go to the store- such as if i was paralyzed in the hospital.
But yes, saying, I might go, is the same thing as saying, I might not go.
People demand freedom of speech as a compensation for the freedom of thought which they seldom use.
--Søren Kierkegaard | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/30/2003 6:59 AM (GMT -6) | | Laika: proposition (E will happen) is false if E doesn't happen
is proposition (E might happen) false if E doesn't happen?
Tom: Proposition "E might happen" is not proven to have been false if E doesn't happen because "E might happen" means "E might not happen." They're the same thing.
You're wondering if there can ever be a fasle might-counterfactual. Certainly. Every true "will" and "would" prop entails a false "might" prop. But (and maybe this is what's confusing you), all those false "might" props that are entailed in true "will" and "would" props were ONCE TRUE!
Laika: the negation of (will) is (will not)
the negation of (might) is?
to me, (might not) is the same as (might)
Tom: Well, "will not" certainly negates "will." But it's not the only way to negatve a "will." A "might" also negates a "will." If it's true that "x might do y" then it's false that "x will do y" and false that "x would do y."
The negation of a "might" prop is a true "will" or "would" prop.
You're right: "might not" is the same as "might."
Laika: Am I loopy?
Tom: Most definitely.
Edited by - TGB on 05/30/2003 12:01:29 PM | | Back to Top | | |
|
Laika
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2003
Total Posts : 2433
| Posted 5/30/2003 7:05 AM (GMT -6) | | TGB
quote:
You're wondering if there can ever be a fasle might-counterfactual. Certainly. Every true "will" and "would" prop entails a false "might" prop. But (and maybe this is what's confusing you), all those false "might" props that are entailed in true "will" and "would" props were ONCE TRUE!
Tom: Well, "will not" certainly negates "will." But it's not the only way to negatve a "will." A "might" also negates a "will." If it's true that "x might do y" then it's false that "x will do y" and false that "x would do y."
The negation of a "might" prop is a true "will" or "would" prop.
You're right: "might not" is the same as "might."
"a true will (or would) entails a false might"
OWWWW, MY HEAD!!!!!!!!!!
Let me think about this for a while. Let's meet back here in twenty years.
I'm still thinking mights are supersets of wills and woulds.
Even though the skies are blue, don't they let the sunshine through?
Edited by - Laika on 05/30/2003 12:06:45 PM | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/30/2003 7:12 AM (GMT -6) | | RD: If I say "I might go to the store today" - there is no way to falsify that. It remains true if i go to the store, or if i do not go to the store.
Tom: This is what "might" and "might not" mean. If you deny this, you deny that the word "might" has ANY meaning at all.
One can easily falsify "x might do y" by showing it to be true that "x will do y" or that "x would do y." Yes, this is sometimes hard for US to do. But it's not difficult for an omniscient God to know what the score is.
I can think of several might props that are clearly false:
God might not love us.
God might not be omniscient.
The word "might" might not mean anything.
Might-counterfactuals might not exist.
RD might become an open theist.
I might fly to America tomorrow.
My wife might commit adultery tonight on the way to the store.
I might remember where I put my wallet.
Tom
| | Back to Top | | |
|
might-be-don
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2001
Total Posts : 830
| Posted 5/30/2003 7:18 AM (GMT -6) | | Hey! Isn't there a scripture somewhere about using my name in vain?
peace and love, MIGHT-be-don
---
"You cannot step twice into the same river; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you." Heraclitus | | Back to Top | | |
|
ReasonableDoubt
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 655
| Posted 5/30/2003 7:42 AM (GMT -6) | | "A counterfactual assertion is a conditional whose antecedent is false and whose consequent describes how the world would have been if the antecedent had obtained.The counterfactual takes the form of a subjunctive conditional: "If P had obtained, then Q would have obtained". In understanding and assessing such a statement we are asked to consider how the world would have been if the antecedent condition had obtained. For example, "If the wind had not reached 50 miles per hour, the bridge would not have collapsed" or "If the Security Council had acted, the war would have been averted." We can ask two types of questions about counterfactual conditionals: What is the meaning of the statement, and how do we determine whether it is true or false? A counterfactual conditional cannot be evaluated as a truth-functional conditional, since a truth-functional conditional with false antecedent is ipso facto true. (That is, "if P then Q" is equivalent to "either not P or Q".) So is it necessary to provide a logical analysis of the truth conditions of counterfactuals if they are to be useful in rigorous thought.There is a close relationship between counterfactual reasoning and causal reasoning.If we assert that "P caused Q (in the circumstances Ci)", it is implied that we would assert:"If P had not occurred (in circumstances Ci) then Q would not have occurred." So a causal judgment implies a set of counterfactual judgments. Symmetrically, a counterfactual judgment is commonly supported by reference to one or more causal processes that would have conveyed the world from the situation of the antecedent to the consequent. When we judge that the Tacoma Narrows Bridge would not have collapsed had the wind not reached 50 miles per hour, we rely on a causal theory of the structural dynamics of the bridge and the effects of the wind in reaching the consequent.How do we assign a truth value to a counterfactual statement? The most systematic answer is to appeal to causal relations and causal laws. If we believe that we have a true causal analysis of the occurrence of Q, and if P is a necessary part of the set of sufficient conditions that bring Q to pass-then we can argue that, had P occurred, Q would have occurred. David Lewis (1973) analyzes the truth conditions and logic of counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds (possible world semantics). A counterfactual is interpreted as a statement about how things occur in other possible worlds governed by the same laws of nature. Roughly: "in every possible world that is relevantly similar to the existing world but in which the wind does not reach 50 miles per hour, the bridge does not collapse." What constitutes "relevant similarity" between worlds is explained in terms of "being subject to the same laws of nature." On this approach we understand the counterfactual "If P had occurred,Q would have occurred" as a statement along these lines: "P & {laws of nature} entail Q".This construction introduces a notion of "physical necessity" to the rendering of counterfactuals: given P, it is physically necessary that Q. Lewis, David K. 1973." Counterfactuals. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods,edited by Michael Lewis-Beck(University of Iowa), Alan Bryman (Loughborough University), and Tim Futing Liao. SagePublications.
Pardon me for the long quote - but I just am trying to figure out how a might-counterfactual can have a truth value, when even a would-counterfactual does not seem to have a truth value.
TGB:
You're wondering if there can ever be a fasle might-counterfactual. Certainly. Every true "will" and "would" prop entails a false "might" prop. But (and maybe this is what's confusing you), all those false "might" props that are entailed in true "will" and "would" props were ONCE TRUE!
Perhaps this is why there seems to be support that counterfactuals do not have measurable truth values - CONFUSION!! :)
And you say, Tom, how is this clearly false? "I might fly to America tomorrow."
You do not INTEND to fly to American tomorrow - but you don't know what may happen. What if a relative in America suddenly takes ill and you need to get here? Then suddenly 'I might fly to America tomorrow" does not seem so wrong, does it? The fact is, you can't judge the truth value of the statement either BEFORE or AFTER tomorrow, b/c right now, the statement really means nothing - your intent to not fly to America is true, but the reality has not yet occurred. And AFTER tomorrow, you may or may not be in America, depending upon circumstances that arise in the interim.
Again, if God does not know the future, he also does not know what you may actually do tomorrow due to unforeseen circumstances.
Just think about it- I say, off hand to a coworker- I might buy a lottery ticket after work. He says, oh really? Are you or aren't you?
I say, I can't verify the truth of the statement "I will buy a ticket" or "I will not buy a ticket." The statment "I might buy a ticket means neither of the preceding two.
And I'm very interested - NOT trying to challenge anyone- just don't understand- if you could clear it up...
People demand freedom of speech as a compensation for the freedom of thought which they seldom use.
--Søren Kierkegaard | | Back to Top | | |
|
Laika
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2003
Total Posts : 2433
| Posted 5/30/2003 8:07 AM (GMT -6) | | O.K. how about this?
Mights are possibilities whose probabilities P range from 0.0 <= P <= 1.0
Within this range are the probabilities 0.0 and 1.0, which are the "wills"/"will nots" and "would/would nots".
So a true "will" is also a true "might" and a false "will" is also a true "might" (since we agree "might" == "might not")
But a true "might" is not necessarily a true "will" or "would"
I just don't see the mutual exclusivity of "will" and "might"
Even though the skies are blue, don't they let the sunshine through? | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 5/30/2003 8:30 AM (GMT -6) | | Laika: I just don't see the mutual exclusivity of "will" and "might"
Tom: If you already agree that "might" = "might not," then it should be clear that a true "will" cannot = a true might, for this amounts to a true will = a true might not, which is clearly not possible. If "x will do y" is true, it cannot also be true that "x might not do y."
And you're still loopy!
Tom
| | Back to Top | | |
|
Laika
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2003
Total Posts : 2433
| Posted 5/30/2003 8:49 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: If you already agree that "might" = "might not," then it should be clear that a true "will" cannot = a true might, for this amounts to a true will = a true might not, which is clearly not possible. If "x will do y" is true, it cannot also be true that "x might not do y."
And you're still loopy!
arigatou sensei
Sou da kara, kon ban no yasumi wa yoku yotei desu......
Even though the skies are blue, don't they let the sunshine through? | | Back to Top | | |
|
ReasonableDoubt
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 655
| Posted 5/30/2003 9:43 AM (GMT -6) | | | Are not "Might-counterfactuals" considered a form of modal logic, which as opposed to propositional logic, does not state a truth value? | | Back to Top | | |
| 400 posts in this thread.
Viewing Page : |
| Forum Information | Currently it is Monday, November 09, 2026 2:54 PM (GMT -6)
There are a total of 97,718 posts in 6,040 threads.
In the last 3 days there were 0 new threads and 0 reply posts. View Active Threads
|
Forum powered by dotNetBB v2.42EC SP3
dotNetBB © 2000-2026 |
|
|