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| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > The raging debate continues here... > Alan et al... Help on Might Counterfactuals AGAIN | Forum Quick Jump
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 7/16/2003 1:18 PM (GMT -6) |   | OK - read it and weep! http://www.la.utexas.edu/course-materials/philosophy/bonevac/313q/D10.pdf
Unfortunately this is very long, but does contain a section on what you are calling the "might counterfactuals"-
Much more eloquent than anything I have been trying to say...:) | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 7/16/2003 3:31 PM (GMT -6) | | I'll add jump in for a bit, but due to time current time constraints related to my dissertation and upcoming wedding I will be kinda scarce on this discussion board through the end of September.
Doc wrote:quote:
Premise #1: The traditional view that might counterfactuals are logically subsumed in a corresponding would counterfactual.
Premise #2: If this is so, then the conjoining of antithetical might counterfactuals should be logically equivalent to the conjoining of corresponding antithetical would counterfactuals.
Premise #3: Antithetical would counterfactuals cannot be conjoined.
Premise #4: Might counterfactuals CAN be conjoined.
Conclusion: It cannot be the case that all might counterfactuals are logically subsumed under would counterfactuals.
Some comments for Doc:
First, I'm not sure how "traditional" it is to say that all might counterfactuals are logically subsumable under would counterfactuals. It does seem to me that most discussions of counterfactuals have simply IGNORED might counterfactuals, but I suspect that is more due to oversight than to explicit acceptance of the subsumption thesis.
Second, I think you should spell out what you mean by "logically subsume". I would define it as follows: Proposition P logically subsumes proposition Q when P entails Q. If P is in turn entailed by Q, then P and Q subsume each other, i.e., they are logically equivalent. Logical subsumption is the same thing as logical entailment.
Third, what do you mean by "corresponding" would counterfactual? The most obvious construal is that "X would do Y if Z" is the corresponding counterfactual to "X might do Y if Z". But then it looks like you want to claim that philosophers have traditionally thought that "X would do Y if Z" entails "X might do Y if Z". I seriously doubt that is the case, as the claim seems patently false. It is true, of course, that every might counterfactual is entailed by SOME would counterfactual, specifically by the corresponding NEGATIVE would counterfactual. But then the the converse is also true--every would counterfactual is entailed by SOME might counterfactual.
Fourth, Premise #2 doesn't follow from Premise #1. Logical subsumption does not imply logical equivalence (though the two are compatible as I have defined them). To begin with, as just noted, every might counterfactual is subsumed under (and is in fact equivalent to) its corresponding NEGATIVE would counterfactual. But it doesn't follow that CONJOINED might-counterfactuals are subsumable under CONJOINED would counterfactuals, except in the trivial sense that anything and everything follows from a contradiction, which the conjoined would counterfactuals are. And even that presupposes the disputed and counterintuitive ex falso quodlibet (EFQ) thesis (namely, that anything can be validly inferred from a false premise), but I won't go into that now. Granting, however, that conjoined would counterfactuals logically subsume conjoined might counterfactuals, it doesn't follow that they are logically equivalent because the subsumption need not (indeed, cannot) go the other direction. For example, suppose that "Bob would eat cookies if offered and Bob would not eat cookies if offered" logically subsumes (i.e., entails) "Bob might eat cookies if offered and Bob might not eat cookies if offered". Given EFQ this is true. But we cannot turn this around and say that "Bob might eat cookies if offered and Bob might not eat cookies if offered" entails "Bob would eat cookies if offered and Bob would not eat cookies if offered" because a logically consistent statement cannot entail a logically inconsistent statement.
Fifth, the point that you need to establish for your neo-Molinism is that it is possible to have a TRUE might counterfactual that is not entailed by a TRUE corresponding would counterfactual. For example, we want a case where it is true that "Bob might eat cookies if offered" but not true that "Bob would eat cookies if offered". This is NOT a purely logical point. It has to do with the nature of reality, with what is, in fact, true. Logically we can show that it is possible to conjoin might counterfactuals but not possible to conjoin would counterfactuals--the latter leads to a contradiction, the former does not, it's that simple. To establish the logical possibility of neo-Molinism all we need is to show that it is possible to have a TRUE might counterfactual and a FALSE corresponding would-counterfactual. The ONLY way this could not be possible is if every might counterfactual ENTAILED its corresponding would counterfactual, i.e., if "X might do Y if Z" implies "X would do Y if Z". But that is patently false, "might" obviously doesn't entail "would". Therefore, neo-Molinism is logically possible. The only remaining question then is whether it is TRUE. Is there some case where a might counterfactual is TRUE and its corresponding would counterfactual is actually, not just possibly, FALSE?
In summary, Doc, I think you are too worried about the charge that there are no "independent" might counterfactuals. The charge is simple to defuse. Just point out that "might" does not entail "would". It follows that it is possible to have a true "might" and a false "would". Since that is possible, the claim that it is not actual, i.e., that there ARE no "independent" might counterfactuals, reduces to a metaphysical assumption. Since this is an assumption that open theists reject, to advance it as part of an argument against open theism simply begs the question.
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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John Earp
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| Posted 7/16/2003 6:39 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
And by the way, who talks like this? Who says, "I might AND might not go to the store?" We normally said, "I might OR might not go."
It's like, "I will AND will not go." You can't do both. You can say "I will or will not go." ANd really, as far as communication goes, what's the difference between the following statements?
1. Tonight, I might go to the movies, and I might not go to the movies.
2. Tonight, either I will go to the movies, or I will not go to the movies.
Don't they mean, in basic english, the same thing? Both just mean I have not yet decided what i will do. Try to falsify either of them right now - you can't (unless again the person is consciously lying).
I think the operative distinctive word is #2 is "either." This modifies the meaning of subsequent "will" statements to "mights," practially speaking. "Will" and "will not" are mutually exclusive, while "might" and "might not" (at least in English) are mutually assumed. Might always implies might not. I know some here have disputed this last point, but I really don't see how might does not always entail might not. It's a maybe.
"The Discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world." Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology.
revivaltheology.net
Edited by - John Earp on 07/17/2003 12:59:26 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/16/2003 8:01 PM (GMT -6) | | RD: I'm not saying "might and might not" is in fact false for humans. I'm saying it's non-verifiable - it is hypothetical, or assumptive. All the phrase represents is that a person has not yet decided what they will do. It's a statement of deliberation. So it is neither true nor false.
RD: I appreciate your sticking in there RD. Thanks. But I’m afraid you are confusing psychological states with logical truths. Logic isn’t concerned with psychological states. Nor is it concerned with what can and can’t be verified. To help you get out of this confusion, we should just talk about what GOD knows – that is to say, with what is IN FACT the case. If God knows (if in fact it is the case) that "you WILL do y if z," then it is FALSE that you "may or may not do y if z." If it is true that you "may and may not do y in z," then it is false that " you will do y if z." What YOU believe to be true ahead of time is irrelevant to the logical point of discussion.
RD: I might go to the store tonight. I might not go to the store tonight. God knows the truth or falsity of the statements at the time they are made. It's not the case that the statements are always false. It depends on the person's intent.
Doc: If God knows that its true that you might and might not go to the store, then God knows that is FALSE that you will or will not go to the story. For "might" is the logical antithesis of "will not" and "might not" is the logical antithesis of "will." The person’s intent is irrelevant to the point of discussion.
RD: And by the way, who talks like this? Who says, "I might AND might not go to the store?" We normally said, "I might OR might not go." It's like, "I will AND will not go." You can't do both. You can say "I will or will not go."
Doc: The phrase "might and might not" is important because "might or might not" is not incompatible with "would" or "would not", but "might AND might not" is. The conjunction negates both "would and would not." Logically, "might" can entail "would" and "might not" entail "would not." But "might" when conjoined to "might not" CANNOT entail either "would" and "would not." The truth value of any proposition expressing conjoined might counterfactuals stands alone and must be known by God as such. Hence God's middle knowledge must include rather than exclude conjoined might counterfactuals.
This isn’t the ordinary way of talking, but we’re in the realm of logic here, and logicians often talk odd ways to bring specificity to things ordinary language isn’t as equipped to handle.
*** sorry, I couldn’t down load the article you cited.
Alan: First, I'm not sure how "traditional" it is to say that all might counterfactuals are logically subsumable under would counterfactuals. It does seem to me that most discussions of counterfactuals have simply IGNORED might counterfactuals, but I suspect that is more due to oversight than to explicit acceptance of the subsumption thesis.
Doc: THANKS Alan for joining us, especially in light of your dissertating and wedding prep. You are right. The tradition ignored might counterfactuals. But given the way classical Molinist have treated would counterfactuals, by implication they have regarded all conjoined might counterfactuals as false.
Alan: But we cannot turn this around and say that "Bob might eat cookies if offered and Bob might not eat cookies if offered" entails "Bob would eat cookies if offered and Bob would not eat cookies if offered" because a logically consistent statement cannot entail a logically inconsistent statement.
Doc: This is exactly my point. The conjoined might counterfactuals force a contradiction IF one assumes that all might counterfactuals are logically subsumed by would counterfactuals.
Alan: …we want a case where it is true that "Bob might eat cookies if offered" but not true that "Bob would eat cookies if offered". This is NOT a purely logical point. It has to do with the nature of reality, with what is, in fact, true. Logically we can show that it is possible to conjoin might counterfactuals but not possible to conjoin would counterfactuals--the latter leads to a contradiction, the former does not, it's that simple.
Doc: YES. But you’re defining reality as "this actual world" whereas reality also includes "all possible worlds" (as logically possible). My point here is not to argue that the actual world includes true conjoined might counterfactuals, but that God must know conjoined might counterfactuals as true in SOME possible worlds. (Indeed, he must know conjoined might counterfactuals in THIS and EVERY possible world, even if one thinks this and other possible worlds are exhaustively settled. For in these cases he would know them AS FALSE.)
In any event, showing that some possible worlds contain true conjoined might counterfactuals this is enough to defeat the claim that an omniscient God CAN’T know conjoined might counterfactuals as true. And, given that this is the driver of the traditional view, this is a significant point.
Alan: Therefore, neo-Molinism is logically possible. The only remaining question then is whether it is TRUE.
Doc: Yes, we now need other arguments (e.g. the ones typically offered by open theists) to argue that THIS world exemplifies true conjoined might counterfactuals. But this will be MUCH easier if it is conceded that God MUST know some possible worlds as including true conjoined might counterfactuals, and every possible world as including the truth value of conjoined might counterfactuals, even if he knows them as false.
JE: Might always implies might not.
Doc: I used to think this. But on a strictly logical analysis, at least according to the classical logical categories, it is not the case. Hence the need for an explicit conjunction to drive the point home.
Blessings all
Greg
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10.
Edited by - GregBoyd on 07/17/2003 01:08:39 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 7/16/2003 8:09 PM (GMT -6) | | John: "Will" and "will not" are mutually exclusive, while "might" and "might not" (at least in English) are mutually assumed. Might always implies might not. I know some here have disputed this last point, but I really don't see how might does not always entail might not.
Tom: I know how you feel, but...
There do seem to be a class of "maybe's" that do not imply "maybe not." How about the class of necessary truths? Necessary truths are by definition "possible." But they by definition exclude "possibly not" since they are "necessarily" true. In other words, necessary truths are logically possible. But their falsification is not logically possible, therefore, "might" (meaning "logically possible that") doesn't always imply "might not."
I don't like using "might" and "maybe" for these sorts of truths, but the establishment is entrenched here. There ya go.
So, whereas "will" and "will not" are never compatible, "might" and "might not" are usually compatible, but sometimes not (as in the case of necessary truths). But this is OK. All Doc's trying to show is that if there exists one case where "might and might not" is true, then not all "mights" and subsumed by "wills." And if God knows the truth-value of this latter class of propositions ("might and might not" props) then he knows the future as partly open to possibilities.
I'm still confused about when "might" ought to mean "logically possible that" and when it means more, namely, "physically possible that" (i.e., "might and might not"). If "logically possible that" is THE established meaning of "might" for discussions in logic, then Doc has first to LOGICALLY establish that "might and might not" has meaning. Isn't this necessary?
Tom
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John Earp
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| Posted 7/16/2003 8:17 PM (GMT -6) | | If something is logically necessarily true, isn't it a "will," not a "might?"
Edited by - John Earp on 07/17/2003 01:20:19 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 7/17/2003 1:17 AM (GMT -6) | | Hold up. I think I’m getting this. Because Neo-Molinism is logically possible, as Alan says, then Molinists must claim that there can be a possible world W where neo-Molinism is true even though that world is counterfactual to our world. Restated, Molinists MUST ADMIT that there is at least a possible world W where true conjoined might counterfactuals exist (ie there exists a possible world W where some locus of indeterminacy in inherent in the building blocks of Creation). Because of God’s omniscience, God would have to those true C-M-Cs as true in terms of world W even though they are false in terms of the actual world. If God didn’t know this information, then God wouldn’t be omniscient in any real type of sense. So, Molinism ITSELF has to admit that if it is true that C-M-Cs can exist, then God MUST know them as such, given God's exhaustive knowledge of all possible worlds.
Sounds simple to me. I don’t see how Molinists could argue against this. 
"Smile. It could be worse." --from a good friend.
Edited by - MephEternal on 07/17/2003 06:20:11 AM
Edited by - MephEternal on 07/17/2003 06:20:57 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 7/17/2003 3:01 AM (GMT -6) | | Alan: Just point out that "might" does not entail "would". It follows that it is possible to have a true "might" and a false "would". Since that is possible…
Tom: First, I want everyone to notice that I spelled Alan’s name correctly!
Question: How are you using “might” here? Is this the “might” of discourse about logic and the square, that is, “might” means “is logically possible that”? Or do you mean MORE than this? If we mean more than merely “is logically possible that” then don’t you have to defend introducing this latter meaning into a discussion about logic? Isn’t this what the debate is all about?
How does it follow from “‘might’ doesn’t entail ‘would’” (“might” might rather be subsumed under a “will” for example) that it is possible to have a true “might” and a false “would”? Again, if we’re employing the standard meaning of “is logically possible that” for “might” is discussing logical relations, then every “would” and “will” entails a “might.” To argue that there are true “mights” and false corresponding “woulds” is to assume a meaning for “might” other than “is logically possible that,” since every “would” entails the “might” of logical possibility. I want to know where we’re getting this other meaning for “might,” this more than “logically possible” meaning. And can we say what this other “might” means? Does it mean “is physically possible that”? Is “physically possibile” as opposed to merely “logically possible” what it gets at? Somebody on the other side is going to say, prove that “might” ever means more than “is logically possible that” (in logical discourse).
I must be missing something.
Tom
PS John, "God exists" is, you and I believe, necessarily true. God exists necessarily. It is there also true that God's existence is possible. It's logically possible that God exist. But since this is a necessary truth, it doesn't follow that it's being "possible" entails that it is also "not possible." In logic they'd say the logical possibility that God exists is expressed in "God might exist." But it doesn't follow that "God might not exist."
Edited by - TGB on 07/17/2003 08:04:21 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 7/17/2003 3:16 AM (GMT -6) | | I think we've lost sight of what a counterfactual really is...from the article (from Univ. of Texas Austin Philosophy Dept) that I attempted to let everyone read..."Typically expressed in the subjunctive mood in English, these conditionals are called counterfactual conditionals, or more simply, counterfactuals, because they generally come with the presupposition that the antecedent is false." (and they are stated in an "if....then....." form).
And counterfactuals do indeed have to do with what reality is, not merely a logical exercise..."Countefactuals are crucial to reasoning concerning cause and effect and to decision making."
And on to "might counterfactuals":
"To capture Lewis' theory of counterfactuals, we need to add to C two more variants of reiteration. Both involve might-counterfactuals. Before presenting those rules, therefore, let's examine Lewis' definition of might.
...Think about how to negate might conditionals. Suppose it's not true that, if Nicholas were to write the proposal, it might be approved. Then, it seems, if Nicholas were to write the proposal, it wouldn't be approved. To say that it's false that Japan might have invaded California if the US had lost at Midway seems to amount to saying that, if the US had been defeated at the battle of Midway, Japan still wouldn't have invaded California. In general, then, sentences of the form "if it were the case that A, it might be the case that B" appear to be equivalent to negations of sentencs of the form "if it were the case that A, it wouldn't have been the case that B." ...The definition says, in effect, the the sentences in each of these pairs are contradictory:
a. This match would light if it were struck.
b. This match might not light if it were struck.
a. If Mitch were to have an affar, Harriet would divorce him.
b. If Mitch were to have an affair, Harriet might not divorce him.
a. Had Hitler attacked at Dunkirt, he'd have been able to take all of Europe.
b. Had Hitler attacked at Dunkirt, he still might not have been able to take all of Europe.
... SO assume this match might not light if it were struck. If we change the world only as much as we must to make it true that the match is struck, then among the possible outcomes is a world in which the match does not light." | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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| Posted 7/17/2003 3:30 AM (GMT -6) | | ReasonableDoubt
quote:
I think we've lost sight of what a counterfactual really is...from the article (from Univ. of Texas Austin Philosophy Dept) that I attempted to let everyone read
RD, I was able to download it. I'm going to drop a copy off at Dr Boyd's church this afternoon. No, I haven't read it yet but the symbols sure look pretty. 
quote:
a. If Mitch were to have an affar, Harriet would divorce him.
gossip, gossip, gossip
Edited by - Laika on 07/17/2003 08:32:45 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/17/2003 6:08 AM (GMT -6) | | MephEternal: Because Neo-Molinism is logically possible, as Alan says, then Molinists must claim that there can be a possible world W where neo-Molinism is true even though that world is counterfactual to our world.
Doc: True true. But see, if neo-Molinism is logically possible, then it IS true, whether this world exemplifies a true CMC or not. For even in THIS world God must know conjoined might counterfactuals… he just knows them all as FALSE (which knowing them as also true in other possible worlds). If CMC’s are logically possible – viz. not necessarily false – then God must know them or be guilty of lacking omniscience.
TGB: To argue that there are true "mights" and false corresponding "woulds" is to assume a meaning for "might" other than "is logically possible that," since every "would" entails the "might" of logical possibility.
Every "would" certainly entails a might. If True that X would, then false that x might not. If false that x would, then true that x might. It’s also true that every might entails a would. If true that x might, then false that x would not. If false that x might, then true that x would. But, the question is, do all "mights" entail their CORRESPONDING "would." That is, if true that x might, true that x would." THAT is the question. And, I’m submitting, the best way to show that this is NOT the case, hence the best way to establish "mights" as a class of propositions distinct from "would" propositions and about which God must know their truth value, is to CONJOIN them. For might AND might not does RULE out both "would" and "would not." The "might" rules out "would not" and the "might not" rules out "would."
RD: these conditionals are called counterfactual conditionals, or more simply, counterfactuals, because they generally come with the presupposition that the antecedent is false." (and they are stated in an "if....then....." form).
Doc: I’m not sure what point you’re trying to make with this citation RD. But I will acknowledge that I’m beginning to suspect there’s something funky in calling all these counterfactuals. For this seems to presuppose that they are ALWAYS about propositions that are COUNTER to fact… which implies that FACT is NEVER "maybe." And this is not a logical deduction, but merely a metaphysical assumption.
Lovin it lovin it lovin it
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 7/17/2003 6:12 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom: How does it follow from “‘might’ doesn’t entail ‘would’” (“might” might rather be subsumed under a “will” for example) that it is possible to have a true “might” and a false “would”? Again, if we’re employing the standard meaning of “is logically possible that” for “might” is discussing logical relations, then every “would” and “will” entails a “might.” To argue that there are true “mights” and false corresponding “woulds” is to assume a meaning for “might” other than “is logically possible that,” since every “would” entails the “might” of logical possibility. ... I must be missing something.
Alan: Yes, you are missing something, Tom. You are correct that "would" entails "might". My point is that the CONVERSE is not true--"might" does not entail "would". And THAT is sufficient for establishing that it is possible (logically possible, that is) to have a true "might" and a false corresponding "would". The only arrangement of truth values that is logically impossible is for a TRUE P to imply a FALSE Q. Since "might" doesn't entail "would", a TRUE "might" can never entail a FALSE "would" (or a TRUE "would", for that matter). Therefore, it is logically possible to have a TRUE "might" and a FALSE "would". Remember, "would" entails "might" but "might" does not entail "would"--if it did, they "might" and "would" would be logically equivalent and "might and might not" would mean the same thing as "would and would not".
Thanks for the feedback,
Alan
Edited by - Alan Rhoda on 07/17/2003 11:24:20 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 7/17/2003 9:16 AM (GMT -6) | | I feel like on the mad tea-cup ride at Disney’s The Magic Kingdom in Orlando. I keep reading the same things over and over again and each time I understand less!
Doc: Every "would" certainly entails a might. If True that X would, then false that x might not. If false that x would, then true that x might.
Tom: If true that X would then false that x might not. Fine. But if false that x would, then true that x might? That doesn’t seem right at all. It is false that “Tom would slam dunk a basketball under his own power if he was a quadriplegic.” How is true then in any sense of the word “might” that “Tom might slam dunk a basketball under his own power if he was a quadriplegic”? I can think of many false “would’s” that don’t entail true “might’s.”
Doc: It’s also true that every might entails a would. If true that x might, then false that x would not.
Tom: Now this one also seems weird to me. I can think of some true “might’s” that do not imply or entail false “would not’s.” Let’s suppose that it is false that “Tom would not come to the party if you asked him” (because he is previously engaged in the study of counterfactuals!). It remains true, however, that “Tom might come to the part if you asked him.” Tom’s coming to the party is a logical possibility.
This is the thing that keeps this discussion confusing. We all keep offering examples of entailment and not, but we don’t FIRST declare what meaning we are attributing to “might.” Just “logically possible that”? Or something more? The “might” in “might and might not” is, I understand Doc to be assuming, more than the “might” of logical possibility.
Alan confused me a bit too, because one doesn’t know what definition of “might” is operating. Alan, are you using "might" uniformly? Does it always mean the same thing for you in this discussion?
Doc: If false that x might, then true that x would.
Tom: How does this follow? I can think of a lot of false “might’s” that don’t entail true “would’s.” It may be that “x might do y in z” and “x would do y in z” are BOTH false. Example: “Tom might slam dunk a basketball under his own power if he were a quadriplegic” and “Tom would slam dunk a basketball under his own power if he were a quadriplegic” are BOTH false. So it’s not true that “If false that X might, then true that x would.”
Doc: But, the question is, do all "mights" entail their CORRESPONDING "would." That is, if true that x might, true that x would." THAT is the question. And, I’m submitting, the best way to show that this is NOT the case, hence the best way to establish "mights" as a class of propositions distinct from "would" propositions and about which God must know their truth value, is to CONJOIN them. For might AND might not does RULE out both "would" and "would not."
Tom: Only if “might” means more than merely “is logically possible that.” If “might” only means “is logically possible that” then “x might and might not do y in z” seems perfectly compatible with “x would do y in z” or “x would not do y in z” (obviously not at the same time; for “x would” and “x would not” cannot both be true).
Define “might” at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end. Define might. Define might. Define might.
Tom
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 7/17/2003 9:43 AM (GMT -6) | | TGB- I 'm agreeing with you here.
And yes- a "counterfactual"- is exactly that - a fact that is counter (opposite) of reality. So as I was saying before, that means that you have to have a proposition in order to negate (Counter) it.
The first part of the 'if...then' in a counterfactual is supposed to be the opposite of what actually happened, so then the second part tells you, if in fact the opposite of what actually happened occurred, in another possible world, then Y would have happened.
So these "might-might not" things probably should not be called counterfactuals at all, to eliminate confusion (if that's even possible:) )
"Suppose it's not true that, if Nicholas were to write the proposal, it might be approved. Then, it seems, if Nicholas were to write the proposal, it wouldn't be approved." In general, then, sentences of the form "if it were the case that A, it might be the case that B" appear to be equivalent to negations of sentencs of the form "if it were the case that A, it wouldn't have been the case that B."
So what he's saying is the opposite of the "might" is in fact the "would not".
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DLW
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| Posted 7/17/2003 10:18 AM (GMT -6) | | At great risk, I'm going to post on this link...
I think language is often one way we manipulate others. Mights tend to suggest a state of the world that could possibly occur or flow from current behavior. As such in suggesting a might, you are meaning to make someone consider some consequence of their action that they might not be currently considering.
In writing in my profession, we often have to describe the "implications" of the analysis of non-experimental data. I.e., since people aren't running around treadmills in cages all day when they economically interact with each other and can't be interbred to derive genetically-equivalent beings, there are always a lot of uncertainties in how we interpret observed correlations. Also, since we tend to be professionally conservative, especially on politically-charged topics, the word might is used as a shield that allows for more exploratory consideration of what might be the case. As would would since this stresses the tentative nature of understandings.
Overall, I think Alan nailed it when he suggested that Doc was worried too much about Might-Counterfactuals that rested on an ontotheological premise that ran counter to OpenViewTheism.
The real question is what would be instructive ways to understand the openness of reality. This can and does go beyond whether we accept or refuse a relationship with God. My academic-god-father in grad-school Warren Samuels stressed the legal-economic nexus as where the rules of the game or tentative answers to the ubiquitous different forms of the problem of order are given and that there is truly volition or room for valid disagreement in the selection of the onto-theological concepts that guide our interrelationships.
dlw
I-uh-scream-uh,
You-uh-scream-uh,
We-all-uh-sceam-uh for
Ice-uh-cream-uh!!!
Roberto Bernigni in
Down by Law.
ahehmAmericanzituhsen! This,varrrrrybaadfuryur
Cuntry! Varrrrrrrybaadfuryur
Cuntry!
Roberto Benigni in
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 7/18/2003 1:13 AM (GMT -6) | | I am ONE CONFUSED COOKIE.
Alan: Yes, you are missing something, Tom. You are correct that "would" entails "might". My point is that the CONVERSE is not true--"might" does not entail "would". And THAT is sufficient for establishing that it is possible (logically possible, that is) to have a true "might" and a false corresponding "would".
Tom: If “might” means merely “logically possible that,” then “might” does not entail “would.” Quite right. But I don’t see that this helps us much, for one could simply reply that all “might’s” not entailed by “would’s” are therefore entailed by “will’s.” This makes sense if “might” only ever means “is logically possible that.” One can agree that “might” does not entail “would” and still not be any closer to a view of counterfactuals that concedes the logical possibility of the open view.
So long as we concede that “might” means only “is logically possible that,” I don’t see that the open view will stand up in the court of logic. Because “logical possibilities” are compatible with an exhaustively determined world, open theists give away any possibility of establishing their case regarding future openness by embracing “is logically possible that” as THE meaning of “might.”
I still can’t understand whether Doc’s conjoined “might and might not” arguments is designed to argue FOR a meaning for “might” other than “is logically possible that” or to argue FROM a meaning for “might” other than “is logically possible that.”
If “might” only ever means merely “logically possible that,” then…
* “x might do y in z” = “It is logically possible that x do y in z”
Assuming this is true, then it is compatible with “x would do y in z,” “x would not do y in z,” “x will do y in z,” and “x will not do y in z” (where this latter prop follows from a necessary truth; for example, “God might not exist tomorrow” is not compatible with “God might exist tomorrow” because God’s existence is a necessary truth. Necessary truths cannot be expressed as “might and might not” props, for they are necessarily true.).
* “x might not do y in z” = “It is logically possible that x not do y in z”
This is also compatible with “x might do y in z,” “x would do y in z,” “x would not do y in z,” “x will do y in z,” and “x will not do y in z.”
If “might” means merely “logically possible that,” then the only real difference between “might” and “might not” vs conjoined “might and might not” propositions is that whereas “might” and “might not” may express BOTH the logical possibility or impossibility of necessary truths AND contingent truths (e.g., “God might exist tomorrow” is necessarily true, while “Tom might live to be 50” contingently true), “might and might not” may ONLY express the logical possibility of a contingent truth (one cannot say of necessary truths that they “may and may not” be, as in “God may and may not exist tomorrow”; one can only express contingent truths with “may and may not,” i.e., “Tom may and may not live to be 50.”)
If “might” is taken to mean “is logically possible that,” then all that conjoined might-counterfactuals assert is that the event in question is logically contingent, which does nothing to falsify “would’s,” “would not’s,” “will’s” or “will not’s,” for it may be compatible with all of these.
Unless one first establishes a meaning for “might” other than “is logically possible that,” then open theists have nothing going for them in this particular front, as I see it. I like Doc’s conjoined “might and might not.” I think it works. But I think it works because (like him I think) I take “might” to mean more than merely “logically possible that.” What’s needed is to get the other side in the debate (like Craig) to admit that “might” may mean more than “logically possible that.” Conjoining “might” with “might not” does not establish this other meaning for “might,” since “might and might not” is perfectly meaningful as “is logically possible that p and logically possible that not-p.” It says nothing to falsify a “would” or “would not” NOR a “will” or “will not” to simply assert “It is logically possible that x do y in z in and logically possible that x not do y in z.”
RD: And yes- a "counterfactual"- is exactly that - a fact that is counter (opposite) of reality.
Tom: A “counterfactual” is not a “fact” that is counter to reality. There are no “facts” that are “contrary to” reality. This would mean reality is contra se (contradictory to itself), which of course is impossible. Rather, a “counterfactual” is a “proposition” (as opposed to a “fact”).
RD: The first part of the 'if...then' in a counterfactual is supposed to be the opposite of what actually happened…
Tom: We’re discussing future-tense counterfactuals, in which case the “if” clause posits what is believed to be a possible future state of affairs. There’s nothing to run opposite what happened, for nothing has happened yet. “If Nick submits a proposal…” doesn’t run opposite “what happened.”
RD: So these "might-might not" things probably should not be called counterfactuals at all, to eliminate confusion (if that's even possible:) )
Tom: Not a bad point! To say “x might do y in z” is true is not to assert something that is “counter” the facts. It is rather to lay claim to what is the fact, not a “possible fact,” but a “fact of possibility.” Noticing the difference is at the heart of what’s up here.
RD: "Suppose it's not true that, if Nicholas were to write the proposal, it might be approved.” Then, it seems, if Nicholas were to write the proposal, it wouldn't be approved.
Tom: It all depends on what you mean by “might.” Do you mean only “is logically possible that”? Or do you mean something more? If “might” means “...is logically possible that,” then…
* “Nicholas’ proposal might be accepted” = “It is logically possible that Nicholas’ proposal be accepted.” Then, you’re supposing this to be false. That is, you are supposing that “It is not logically possible for Nicholas’ proposal to be accepted.” And if it’s not logically possible for his proposal to be accepted, then, as you say, if Nicky were to submit the proposal it “would not” be accepted (for what is not logically possible cannot happen). So I agree with you IF “might” means “is logically possible that.” If:
a) “might” means “is logically possible that” and if
b) the acceptance of Nick’s proposal is not logically possible (that is, if it is false that “Nick’s proposal might be accepted if he submitted it”), then
c) the proposal “would not” be accepted if he submitted it.
But, conjoin “might and might not” as Doc is suggesting, like this:
* “Nicholas’ proposal might and might not be accepted if he submitted it.”
If “might” STILL means “is logically possible that,” then this prop can be expressed this way:
* “It is logically possible that Nick’s proposal be accepted and logically possible that it not be accepted.”
Now you have a different animal. So, let’s falsify this to keep with your example above. Here it is:
* “It is not true that it is logically possible that Nick’s proposal be accepted AND logically possible that it not be accepted.”
Careful now. All this means is that the acceptance of Nick’s proposal is NOT logically contingent. All that’s denied is that “possibly be accepted” and “possibly not be accepted” are BOTH true. What is true? Either BOTH are false or only ONE is true. All that is falsified is that the acceptance and refusal of Nick’s proposal are both logically possible. Both may not be logically possible (in which case it “would not” be accepted), or only one may be logically possible (depending on which one, either “would” or “would not” is the case). Falsifying this “might and might not” doesn’t tell us which is the case. All it tells us is that the outcome of Nick’s presentation, should he give it, is now certain.
So then: If…
a) “might” means only “is logically possible that” and
b) “Nick’s proposal might and might not be accepted if it were submitted” is false, then…
…it does not follow that it “would not” be accepted if he presented it. It might be that it “would” be accepted if he presented it. The outcome is now determinate or definite, but the proposition doesn’t tell us definitely what (“would” or “would not”).
The question is does “might” only ever mean “is logically possible that.” To repeat what I said above. I still can’t understand whether Doc’s conjoined “might and might not” argument is designed to argue FOR a meaning for “might” other than “is logically possible that” or FROM a meaning for “might” other than “is logically possible that.”
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 07/18/2003 06:25:28 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 7/18/2003 2:38 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: Alan, are you using "might" uniformly? Does it always mean the same thing for you in this discussion?
Alan: I think I am using it uniformly to mean "is logically possible". I realize that in some contexts the word "might" means something more than this, but it never means less.
Tom: If “might” means merely “logically possible that,” then “might” does not entail “would.” Quite right. But I don’t see that this helps us much, for one could simply reply that all “might’s” not entailed by “would’s” are therefore entailed by “will’s.”
Alan: "Will" and "would" both entail "might" (=logically possible), but you're suggestion that all “might’s” not entailed by “would’s” are therefore entailed by “will’s” strikes me as both unsubstantiated and clearly false. First of all, I don't see any relevant logical difference between "would" and "will" counterfactuals: "X would do Y if Z" and "If Z then X will do Y" both seem to say the same thing. So you need to articulate clearly how "will" and "would" counterfactuals differ if your point is to stand any chance of being persuasive. Second, it seems quite clear to me that it is logically POSSIBLE for there to be true "mights" that are not entailed by either true "woulds" or "wills", hence your claim is false. That possibility can be established simply by observing that "might" does not entail "would" OR "will".
Alan: Yes, you are missing something, Tom. You are correct that "would" entails "might". My point is that the CONVERSE is not true--"might" does not entail "would". And THAT is sufficient for establishing that it is possible (logically possible, that is) to have a true "might" and a false corresponding "would".
Tom: So long as we concede that “might” means only “is logically possible that,” I don’t see that the open view will stand up in the court of logic. Because “logical possibilities” are compatible with an exhaustively determined world, open theists give away any possibility of establishing their case regarding future openness by embracing “is logically possible that” as THE meaning of “might.”
Alan: Again, I don't think this is a problem. Open theism CAN'T be established AS TRUE OR AS FALSE simply by logic. Neither can determinism. All logic can tell us is that an idea is consistent, that it is true in some logically possible world. Metaphysical claims concern the ACTUAL world, and apart from logically necessary truths, logic alone can't tell us what is true in the actual world; for that we need observation, experimentation, revelation, common sense, etc. So defining "might" as "logically possible" poses no difficulty. What I have been arguing is that there is no good reason for thinking that open theism is logically inconsistent in claiming that there can be true "mights" that are not entailed by true "woulds" or "wills". In fact, the denial of that claim seems logically indefensible. Therefore, open theism seem to be a logical possibility. Whether is it true or not is not something logic alone can tell us.
Enjoying the discussion, Tom.
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 7/18/2003 3:38 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: So long as we concede that “might” means only “is logically possible that,” I don’t see that the open view will stand up in the court of logic. Because “logical possibilities” are compatible with an exhaustively determined world, open theists give away any possibility of establishing their case regarding future openness by embracing “is logically possible that” as THE meaning of “might.”
Alan: Again, I don't think this is a problem. Open theism CAN'T be established AS TRUE OR AS FALSE simply by logic. Neither can determinism. All logic can tell us is that an idea is consistent, that it is true in some logically possible world. Metaphysical claims concern the ACTUAL world, and apart from logically necessary truths, logic alone can't tell us what is true in the actual world; for that we need observation, experimentation, revelation, common sense, etc. So defining "might" as "logically possible" poses no difficulty. What I have been arguing is that there is no good reason for thinking that open theism is logically inconsistent in claiming that there can be true "mights" that are not entailed by true "woulds" or "wills". In fact, the denial of that claim seems logically indefensible. Therefore, open theism seem to be a logical possibility. Whether is it true or not is not something logic alone can tell us.
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GregBoyd
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Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 7/21/2003 3:31 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom, you MIGHT or MIGHT NOT be one confused cookie. But IF Doc and Alan could speak this stuff more clearly, THEN you WOULD be able to understand better, though it is false that Reasonable Doubt WOULD come around to embrace Open Theism on this account.
Okay, dude, I want to assert in Clintonesque style even while biting my lower lip and making my voice quiver that "I share in your pain buddy. Yep. I'm there with ya. But I did not have...." Okay, move along.
See, here's where I'm at.
I AGREE with you that "might" usually (but not always) means MORE than "is logically possible" in ordinary language. When we say "Meph might join us" we mean more than "its logically possible Meph will join us." We mean something like, GIVEN THE ACTUAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD LEADING UP TO NOW AND INCLUDING MEPHI, THERE'S A CHANCE Mephi will join us, or something like this. It atleast means "its more true to say he will than that he will not...." so we say "he might and might not". (I personally think a number of philosophical conundrums or errors arise because confuse LOGICAL POSSIBILITY with what we might call "HISTORICAL POSSIBILITY. For example, some argue that an agent is free if it was "possible" for them to do otherwise... but they mean simply that it was LOGICALLY possible for them to do otherwise. This of course is compatible with compatiblism. But it is also TOTALLY inadequate for a definition of freeodm, for it applies to a mosquito as much as a human.)
I
m further inclined to agree with you that "might" must mean more than "logical possible" even in formal logic. And I think that one implication of the CMC argument IS that it shows this. How? Because as you say, if "might" = "logically possible," then how does MIGHT AND MIGHT NOT mean MORE than simply MIGHT? "Logically possible x" already entails "logically possible not x." So what does the conjoined ADD? Nothing. Yet, with mights, even on the square of oppositions, the conjoining ADDS something. For it rules out "would or would not" thereby showing the independent status of this class of conjoined might counterfactuals. (Do you see this? Might OR might not is compatible with Would OR would not. But Might AND might not is NOT compatible with Would or would not.)
Now, I'm NO expert AT ALL in formal logic -- which is why I am commiting myself to a year long study of it starting three days ago -- but I suspect (this is why I'm studying it now) that our confusion is due to an inadequacy in the western tradition regarding "mights." I think they've been largely ignored, owing (I suspect) to the influence of blueprint assumptions. I suspect there's a LOT of work that needs to be done here. I ALSO suspect -- but again, I'm no expert.... just following my "nose" -- that a pursuit of the meaning of "might" will lead into the domains of FUZZY LOGIC. (It may be that this trail has already been blazed, but I simply don't know about it.)
In any case, TGB, for right now I'm content to leave the meaning of "might" fuzzy so long as the logical equations work. And, given the square of oppositions and the meaning of OR and AND, the CVC argument works so far as I can see. And by "works" I mean not simply that open theism is logically possible, but that there's a class of might counterfactuals that can't be logically subsumed under would counterfactuals that an omniscient God MUST know in ANY possible world (if only as false). It thereby refutes the driving assumption behind the academic opposition to openness that knowing anything as a might is contradictory to omniscience.
voila
So, being a confused cookie in this domain is, at least on this issue, a compliment. I think you're seeing the ambiguity of cookiness and the fuzzy boundaries of the cookie jar. In short, I think you're one smart cookie for being confused when many other cookies are certain they're NOT confused.
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 7/21/2003 4:44 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc and Alan, I sent you both an email two days ago about this. Did you get it?
Tom
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 7/21/2003 4:44 AM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 7/22/2003 5:36 AM (GMT -6) | | Where does this man get all those cool photos?
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 7/27/2003 12:37 PM (GMT -6) | | TGB, you get some of the credit for this if its correct. If its stupid, I'll swallow all the blame. (how righteous
The Square of Opposition doesn't allow for conjoined might counterfactuals. For
1. if true "x might"
2. false "x would not" (contradictory)
3. hence false "x might not" (sub-alteration)
*** Hence it can never be true that "x might AND might not"
(TGB, can you diagram this on the board. I don't know how)
Now, this means either
a) all conjoined might counterfactuals are logically impossible, absolutely meaningless OR...
b) there is a class of propositions not covered by the Square of Opposition.
Good luck defending a. You might and might not succeed 
Pursuant to "b," what we need is this...
The contrasting "mights" in the Square are brought together by the AND. Hence, they function not as two distinct propositions with two distinct truth values, but ONE proposition with One truth value.
Hence, instead of a Square, we have a Triangle of opposition.
1. If true "x would",
2. false "x might and might not"
3. false "x would not"
And
1. If true "x might and might not"
2. false "x would"
3. false "x would not"
And
1. If true "x would not"
2. false "x might and might not"
3. false "x would"
(TGB, can you diagram this on the board? I again don't know how.)
This may reflect that the square of opposition was based on a settled view of reality -- one that caused people to overlook the true value of conjoined might counterfactuals. For only if conjoined might counterfactuals are true is reality unsettled, genuinely open, indeterminate, etc...
And, I'm now wondering, why did we ever disjoin "mights" in the first place? Maybe the square missed mights altogether. Maybe all mights are (as I previously thought) implicitly conjoined mights. Might implies "might not." This certainly seems intuitively correct -- the square of opposition notwithstanding.
What think ye?
Doc
ps. As some of you know, I have always argued that THREE is more fundamental to reality than any other reality.... so I'm intuitively inclined to suspect that a logic based on THREE variables is going to be more fundamental, and more accurately encompassing of reality, than a logic based on FOUR. But that's neither here nor there... unless your already a member of
THE CULT OF THREE
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 7/27/2003 6:04 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by GregBoyd
Doc
ps. As some of you know, I have always argued that THREE is more fundamental to reality than any other reality.... so I'm intuitively inclined to suspect that a logic based on THREE variables is going to be more fundamental, and more accurately encompassing of reality, than a logic based on FOUR. But that's neither here nor there... unless your already a member of
THE CULT OF THREE
Hey, Doc. FOURS have been in the news in the last week.
ANYONE HAVE ANYTHING ON THAT? | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 7/27/2003 6:32 PM (GMT -6) | | Corrected Square (for those who are sick enough to still be interested!):
The A -- E
I -- O relationship would look like this:
All logicians are professors -- All logicians are not professors
Some logicians are professors -- Some logicians are not professors
Counterfactual Squares look like this:
x would do y in z -- x would not do y in z
x might do y in z -- x might not do y in z
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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