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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/11/2003 3:00 AM (GMT -6) |   | Its been twenty three years since I've had a course on formal logic. I forget all the technical names of the logical moves etc (e.g. modus tollens?). I promise I will pick up a book and refresh myself soon. But, in the meantime, I'd like help formalizing the conjoined might counterfactual argument. I think it would work best as a reductio ad absurdemargument. I want to argue:
Premise #1 the traditional view that might counterfactuals are logically subsumed in a corresponding would counterfactual.
Premise #2 if this is so, then the conjoining of antithetical might counterfactuals should be logically equivalent to the conjoining of corresponding antithetical would counterfactuals.
Premise #3 Antithetical would counterfactuals cannot be conjoined
Premise #4: might counterfactuals CAN be conjoined
Conclusion: it cannot be the case that all might counterfactuals are logically subsumed under would counterfactuals.
What's the best way to express this formally??? I'm thinking something like this.
‡A = would A
A = might A
1. ‡A -> A
2. ‡A & ‡-A -> A &-A
3. - (‡A & ‡-A)
4. A &-A
Ergo: -(‡A -> A)
I suspect this is terrible, but its my first attempt, and you get my intuition. Logicians out there -- especially Alan!!! -- help me out if you will.
thanks
Doc
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JET
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| Posted 7/11/2003 3:35 AM (GMT -6) | |
From the other thread, I understood that Premise #1 is based on the fact that “might” has traditionally been used (for purposes of formal logic) to mean “logically possible”.
However, this can’t be the meaning of “might” in Premise #4, because “logically possible” can’t be conjoined with “not logically possible”.
Does “might” have the same meaning in Premise #4 as it does in Premises #1?
Thanks,
JET
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JET
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| Posted 7/11/2003 4:43 AM (GMT -6) | | I think I’ve answered my own question.
“Would not A” assumes “logically possible that not A”, but does NOT assume “not logically possible that A”
So Premises #4 simply means “logically possible that A” can be conjoined with “logically possible that not A".
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/12/2003 1:22 AM (GMT -6) | |
So Premises #4 simply means “logically possible that A” can be conjoined with “logically possible that not A".
Doc: Yes, but the result of the argument, I think, is that it shows that there's something incomplete in the standard way western logic has treated "mights." If "mights" meant simply "is logically possible that," then there should be no way they are not logically subsumed under "woulds." Yet, when conjoined, they can't be subsumed under "woulds." Hence, "might and might not" is saying something more than "is logically possible."
Indeed, as I've thought about it, the incompleteness of the standard approach may even be reflected in calling "mights" "might counterfactuals." For conjoined "mights" are not
COUNTERfactual. The very terminology presupposes a settled FACT they are supposedly over-and-against. Yet, conjoined might counterfactuals are not over-and-against any FACT. They ARE the fact.
I think we're sniffing out a prejudice for the settled that has inadvertantly slanted our thinking on this stuff in the western philosophical tradition.
Doc
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 7/12/2003 3:03 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Indeed, as I've thought about it, the incompleteness of the standard approach may even be reflected in calling "mights" "might counterfactuals." For conjoined "mights" are not
COUNTERfactual. The very terminology presupposes a settled FACT they are supposedly over-and-against. Yet, conjoined might counterfactuals are not over-and-against any FACT. They ARE the fact.
I think we're sniffing out a prejudice for the settled that has inadvertantly slanted our thinking on this stuff in the western philosophical tradition.
Doc, this sounds very interesting. (But I feel like the kid who is following 2-1/2 blocks behind the group.) Can you provide an illustration?
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Tom
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| Posted 7/12/2003 9:31 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc: If "mights" meant simply "is logically possible that," then there should be no way they are not logically subsumed under "woulds."
Tom: In addition (as we agreed somewhere else): if “might” simply means “is logically possible that,” then “x might not do y in z” cannot falsify “x would do y in z.” On the contrary (as you state), the latter would entail the former. It can’t also be falsified by it.
Doc: Indeed, as I've thought about it, the incompleteness of the standard approach may even be reflected in calling "mights" "might counterfactuals." For conjoined "mights" are not COUNTERfactual.
Tom: Exactly. But also, if “might” simply means “is logically possible that,” then NO “might” (and not just conjoined "mights") is a COUNTERfactual.
Peace,
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 07/12/2003 2:33:08 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/13/2003 2:37 AM (GMT -6) | |
Tom: In addition (as we agreed somewhere else): if “might” simply means “is logically possible that,” then “x might not do y in z” cannot falsify “x would do y in z.” On the contrary (as you state), the latter would entail the former. It can’t also be falsified by it.
Doc: "x might do y in z" DOESN'T falsify "x would do y in z." Alan showed us that. It was the vulnerable point in my first version of Neo-Molinism. But "x might AND MIGHT NOT do y in z" DOES falsify "x would do y in z. Viola... the vulnerable point has been corrected.
Tom: if “might” simply means “is logically possible that,” then NO “might” (and not just conjoined "mights") is a COUNTERfactual.
Doc: Wrongo... One could say that in possible world x where x is not the actual world (hence COUNTERfactual), "John might do y in situation z." (Wait, that means that "John might AND might not do y in z" CAN be counterfactual, since the whole state of affairs is counterfactual. But in the actual world, might and might not is not counterfactual. hmmm. got to think some more about this).
Fred: can you give me an illustration (of how might and might not are not counterfactual).
Doc: Its a FACT that I might and might not go to a party tonight. The FACT is that I'm open to either possibility (and, let us assume, its not the case that present circumstances render it certain I will or will not, even though I don't know it). Hence, the "might" in this situation is not COUNTERfactual, just factual.
Alan, I know you're dissertating.... but I need help on the formalization of this argument.
smooches
Greg
Peace,
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 07/12/2003 2:33:08 PM
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Tom
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| Posted 7/13/2003 4:27 AM (GMT -6) | | Dear Smooches-
quote:
Tom: In addition (as we agreed somewhere else): if “might” simply means “is logically possible that,” then “x might not do y in z” cannot falsify “x would do y in z.” On the contrary (as you state), the latter would entail the former. It can’t also be falsified by it.
Doc: "x might do y in z" DOESN'T falsify "x would do y in z." Alan showed us that. It was the vulnerable point in my first version of Neo-Molinism. But "x might AND MIGHT NOT do y in z" DOES falsify "x would do y in z. Viola... the vulnerable point has been corrected.
I don’t know about “x might do y in z” falsifying “x would do y in z” (it obviously doesn’t, but did anybody argue it did?), but I remember you (and Alan) arguing on the basis of the square of opposition that “x might NOT do y in z” falsifies “x would do y in z.” I don’t remember Alan changing his mind on this though you did agree that "x might not do y in z" does not falsify "x would do y in z" if "might" only means "is logically possible that."
But the same carries for “might and might not.” If “x might and might not do y in z” is to falsify “x would do y in z,” then “might” must mean MORE than merely “logically possible that,” for “It is logically possible that x do y in z AND logically possible that x not do y in z” [i.e., “x might and might not…”] cannot falsify “x would do y in z” if "might" is taken to mean “is logically possible that.” "Might and might not" don’t falsify a “would” if the "might" means only "is logically possible that." It seems rather to be compatible with “would.” For “x might and might not do y in z” to falsify “x would do y in z” “might” in this case must mean more than “is logically possible that.” That’s all I was getting at.
Clear as mud?
Tom
adiaphora, can we add a new funny face for me to choose from? One that's cross-eyed? 
Edited by - TGB on 07/13/2003 3:05:42 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 7/13/2003 9:56 AM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 7/13/2003 2:05 PM (GMT -6) | | I think we have to wonder why up until now no philosophers have touched on this "might-might not" counterfactual. Is it because they are ignorant to it, or is it b/c it really is not relevant? I think the latter.
When you are saying, at 3 pm, "i might or might not go to the party tonight" - what does that mean? It means that the result has not yet been determined. You haven't yet decided. You may wait up until the very last second, when your friend is pounding at the door, to say, "OK, OK, I will go with you to the party." It is at that time, then, that a determination has been made, that can be falsified or verified.
Like it's been said ad nauseum, this has much to do with internal intent, which is unknown to other humans and thus not verifiable. If I say at 3 pm that I may or may not go to the party, but yet, I know full well that I'm not going, then yes, the determination has already been made and now I am lying I(maybe I don't want to hurt my friend's feelings, etc.). But if I sincerely have not yet decided, then the determination has not yet been made, and thus it is irrelevant - it is not true or false yet, bc we haven't yet gotten to the point of a decision being made by the person.
If we are to go with this theory of "might-might not" counterfactuals- of what relevance is it? We could say that the minute someone is born, everything they will do consists of "might -might not" counterfactuals. Until that time that they actually make the decision, whether internally or externally, there is nothing to verify or falsify.
Of course,w hen we're taling about what does God know, as an omniscient being- well he knows the truth or falsity of every proposition. But a proposition cannot be made unless a person has deliberated and actually MADE a statement. The time for the verification or falsification necessarily comes after the human makes hte statement of intent-w hat I am going to do or what i'm not going to do. If the person merely says, "I might or might not do this "- well then the time has not yet come - a decision has not yet been made - I really don't see the big deal with this.
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Tom
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| Posted 7/13/2003 5:56 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi RD-
I don't want to take Doc's thread here off track, 'cause he's looking for specific help on how to phrase HIS argument. So naturally will want to give preference to those who agree with Doc's positions. But getting a little off-track isn't SO bad!
I have no idea why philosophers have not touched on this issue before (if in fact they haven’t). I’m not sure this has much bearing on whether or not it ought to be considered important or even (my goodness!) revolutionary, since I don’t doubt that the ancient Greeks also asked themselves why the philosophical and logical answers they proposed weren’t thought of before. I sure hope “ignorance” and “irrelevance” aren’t the only two explanations.
On to might-counterfactuals. Participating in the several threads we’ve had regarding these critters has been both frustrating and pleasant. Frustrating because it’s especially hard to ask (as Doc did) for help in working out one’s thoughts while having to defend them at the same time. If you discover in the process that the way you’ve worded things isn’t entirely accurate, some might think that another reason for believing your view to be weak or wrong. It’s been pleasant because in a forum like this your ideas are refined and bettered by being beaten up over and over again. If they survive, you just may have something there!
Anyhow…
RD: When you are saying, at 3 pm, "i might or might not go to the party tonight" - what does that mean? It means that the result has not yet been determined.
Tom: A perfect open theist answer (which I’m sure you’ll explain!). What eternally grounds God’s knowledge of the event, RD? You argue God eternally knows the result. The result is “definite.” What makes it definite? What renders my going or not going to the party “definite” in God’s mind? It can’t be ME because I’m not eternal?
RD: You may wait up until the very last second, when your friend is pounding at the door, to say, "OK, OK, I will go with you to the party." It is at that time, then, that a determination has been made, that can be falsified or verified.
Tom: The “determination” can be verified or falsified at that time. But we’re not talking about verifying and falsifying “determinations.” We’re talking about verifying and falsifying “possible determinations.”
RD: Like it's been said ad nauseum, this has much to do with internal intent…
Tom: Intent certainly plays a part in how we go about determining our choices. But again, that’s not the issue with might-counterfactuals at all. By “might” in this case we do not mean an expressed uncertainty about the future. What is meant by “might” in the case of might-counterfactuals is a true proposition about the possible ways the future may resolve itself. Our intention is one among many influences that contribute to what the future ends up becoming, yes, but the possibilities overarch these and are perfectly known to God.
RD: …which is unknown to other humans and thus not verifiable. If I say at 3 pm that I may or may not go to the party, but yet, I know full well that I'm not going, then yes, the determination has already been made and now I am lying I (maybe I don't want to hurt my friend's feelings, etc.).
Tom: Why aren’t you an open theist? What would happen if you approached Scripture this way? For example, you here admit that if one knows the outcome is determined but describes it as undetermined, that is, as a “maybe,” one is lying? What of God’s use of “maybe’s”? Is God lying when GOD describes the future in terms of what “might” happen? Why does “might” imply contingency and “indefiniteness” when WE use the word, but not when God uses it?
RD: But if I sincerely have not yet decided, then the determination has not yet been made…
Tom: Sounds like open theism to me.
RD: …and thus it is irrelevant - it is not true or false yet, bc we haven't yet gotten to the point of a decision being made by the person.
Tom: Try this: If the determination has not been made, if it’s truly a “might,” then does it not follow that certain things are true and false about it? Like this: “Tom might and might not attend the party tonight.” Let’s assume this is true. If I’m following you, this being true means I have not yet determined whether I’m going or not. In this case, is it not then FALSE that “Tom WILL go to the party tonight” (even if I end up going)? And FALSE that “Tom will not go to the party tonight” (even if I end up not going)? If you want to say the these latter two propositions are neither true nor false, fine. But at least you appear to be affirming the TRUTH of “Tom might or might not go to the party tonight.” And if this is a truth, wouldn’t God know and believe it? Wouldn’t God believe that I might or might not go to the party tonight? And if God believes this, then isn’t this what a least SOME of the future is like?
RD: If we are to go with this theory of "might-might not" counterfactuals- of what relevance is it? We could say that the minute someone is born, everything they will do consists of "might -might not" counterfactuals. Until that time that they actually make the decision, whether internally or externally, there is nothing to verify or falsify.
Tom: Exactly…well, almost. Some things about a person are determined the moment they’re born (or even conceived). For example, the moment a white baby girl is born it is determined that she’ll never win the Miss Black USA beauty pageant. For a black baby born to slaves in the USA in 1820 a great many things were determined at birth, like, say, “This baby will not become the President of the United States” was then true. Not everything is a “might” or “might not.” Some of it is. Some isn’t. God knows which is which even if we don’t. All the open view argues is that there genuinely exist some “maybe’s” that makes up our futures. At birth most of our future is perhaps a “maybe” (within the limits we inherit at birth—race, gender, social status, country, etc.). As we grow and choose certain possibilities over others, our “possible” futures narrow. As our choices form our characters over time, we become those choices, and our futures narrow even more.
RD: Of course, when we're talking about what does God know, as an omniscient being- well he knows the truth or falsity of every proposition. But a proposition cannot be made unless a person has deliberated and actually MADE a statement.
Tom: Not quite. Propositions about future events can be made NOW. There are three sorts of props about the future: “x will happen,” “x would happen,” and “x might happen.” If you want to argue that “will” and “would” props are neither true nor false until they occur, fine. I don’t think there is any reason to go that route, but that’s OK. My point is, the indeterminate nature of future choices we have NOT yet settled on do not disallow our attributing truth-value to “might” and “might not” props about those choices. In fact, this is just what “mights” are designed to express: the truth of indefinite future events.
RD: The time for the verification or falsification necessarily comes after the human makes hte statement of intent- what I am going to do or what i'm not going to do. If the person merely says, "I might or might not do this "- well then the time has not yet come - a decision has not yet been made - I really don't see the big deal with this.
Tom: The big deal is this: You have just assigned truth-value to “I might or might not do this,” and a truth-value independant of "will's" and "would's" to boot. You deny “this” (whatever “this” event is) yet exists; it is rather indeterminate. Indeterminate is what it IS. In this case “might and might not” truthfully expresses this indeterminateness. And if this IS the truth of the situation, then (assuming God is omniscient) this is the situation God knows. God knows part of the future as indeterminate.
Welcome to the open view.
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 07/13/2003 10:59:35 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/14/2003 3:30 AM (GMT -6) | | [TGB: Clear as mud?
Doc: Gotcha. What made it muddier for me was that I USED to think that "might" entailed "might not" (it certain DOES" intuitively, but not in formal logic), hence if "would" negates "might not" it also negated "might" – yet the square of oppositions, I’m told" says the opposite.
Frankly, I’m beginning to suspect that there’s something seriously missing, or seriously in error, in the western philosophical tradition regarding mights. It just might be that, as we get clear on things, we’ll come back to our intuitive conviction that "might" entails "might not" and DOES negate BOTH "would" and "would not". But, for right now, I’m satisfied to show that at least "might AND might not" contrasts with "would" and "would not."
RD: I think we have to wonder why up until now no philosophers have touched on this "might-might not" counterfactual. Is it because they are ignorant to it, or is it b/c it really is not relevant? I think the latter.
Doc: Discovers ARE made in logic and math. Now, new claims take years upon years to fully verify, and especially given that I am admittedly not a professional logician, I am totally open to being disproven on this conjoined might counterfactual claim. I suspect Tom, Alan and the rest share in this sentiment. Thus far, however, I’ve heard and seen nothing that disproves it. I have an article coming out in Philosophi Christi next month that will be followed (in the same edition) by a (yet unknown to me) philosopher critiquing it. This may lay it to rest. Or not.
If this claim is not disproven, it will show, I suspect, a presupposition about reality that has jaundiced our logic. We’ve assumed, I suspect, that reality is exhaustively settled, and our language and logic reflects it.
RD: Like it's been said ad nauseum, this has much to do with internal intent, which is unknown to other humans and thus not verifiable.
Doc: RD, you’re the only one saying this. But the response has always been, internal intent and verification have absolutely NOTHING to do with what we’re talking about. We’re talking strict logic. Is it true or false that "RD might and might not come to agree with Greg and Tom," or is it rather true that "RD will come to agree" or "RD will not come to agree"? And this leads to the question, "What does God know to be true about RD’s agreement or disagreement with Greg and Tom"? What RD knows or believes is utterly utterly irrelevant, and what WE can or cannot verify is utterly utterly irreleveant.
RD: But a proposition cannot be made unless a person has deliberated and actually MADE a statement. The time for the verification or falsification necessarily comes after the human makes hte statement of intent-w hat I am going to do or what i'm not going to do.
Doc: Again, and as Tom eloquently pointed out, the person’s deliberation, making the statement, or anyone verifying the statement, is completely irrelevant. It comes down to this: God knows the truth value of all meaningful propositions. "X might and might not do y in z" is a meaningful proposition. Hence God knows the truth value "x might and might not do y in z." Hence God’s omniscience includes rather than excludes knowledge of possibilities. Aman.
TGB: If the determination has not been made, if it’s truly a "might," then does it not follow that certain things are true and false about it?
Doc: TGB, you have an extremely impressive knack for asking exactly the right questions!
ALAN!!!!
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 7/14/2003 3:51 AM (GMT -6) | | I understand what all of you are saying. I simply don't agree- that's all. We're all entitled to our own opinions, I hope.
To TGB- I'm not an open theist b/c all the things you commented on are true for humans, but not for God. And I know that we're talking about the possibility of might-might not- not about the person's intent- but what makes it true or false is what actually happens - and that has a lot to do with intent.
I'm in good company with a lot of philosophers on this one, so I am going to sign off. I'll let you guys go on about it. Thanks.
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/14/2003 6:10 AM (GMT -6) | |
RD: To TGB- I'm not an open theist b/c all the things you commented on are true for humans, but not for God. And I know that we're talking about the possibility of might-might not- not about the person's intent- but what makes it true or false is what actually happens - and that has a lot to do with intent.
Doc: What makes it (a conjoined might counterfactual) true or false is NOT what actually happens. What makes it true or false is whether or not it is actually the case that "x might and might not do y in situation z." You're simply presupposing that God knows all conjoined might counterfactuals to be FALSE.
Now, if you want to argue your case RD, you can do so in one of two ways. If indeed all conjoined might counterfactuals are false, they are so either necessarily or contingently. So,
a) If you want to argue that they are so necessarily, you must show them to all be logically contradictory, for only logical contradictions are necessarily false. Go for it. But here you are not "in good company" with philosophers, for no philosopher in history (that I know of) has argued this.
b) If they are so contingently -- God simply rendered them all false in the actual world -- you simply need to give the grounds for thinking this. Here you are in good company with the history of the philosophical tradition. BUT...
I offer you an additional problem. For even if God rendered all conjoined might counterfactuals false in the actual world, he would STILL know them in other possible worlds (for only necessarily false propositions are false in ALL possible worlds). There are CONCEIVABLE worlds where "x might and might not do y in situation z." And this is enough to show that God's omniscience includes rather than excludes conjoined might counterfactuals.
If you want to argue for the necessary falsehood of all conjoined might counterfactuals, I await your argument.
If you want to argue for the contingent falsehood of all conjoined might counterfactuals, we are back to the standard arguments for or against the tradition vs. the open view. Fine. But you must concede that omniscience does not rule out conjoined might-counterfactuals. If you are unwilling to concede this much, I await your grounds for doing so.
Blessings
Doc
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Tom
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| Posted 7/14/2003 6:15 AM (GMT -6) | | Good thoughts Doc!
RD: I understand what all of you are saying. I simply don't agree - that's all. We're all entitled to our own opinions, I hope.
Tom: Very entitled. For sure!
RD: To TGB- I'm not an open theist b/c all the things you commented on are true for humans, but not for God.
Tom: This is C-R-U-C-I-A-L. Two things:
1. If God is omniscient, RD, (if his knowledge is exhaustive and infallible), then what God believes to be the truth about a situation or state of affairs (like the status of your future choices) IS the truth. This goes without saying. God’s truth IS the truth, and it’s the truth for us and not just for God. It follows, does it not, that what WE believe to be the truth about a situation is only “true for us” if it coheres with God’s view on the matter? In other words, if we disagree with God, we’re wrong. We may believe X to be true for us, but if God believes X to be false for us, aren’t we just mistaken? So, it doesn’t really seem possible for something to be “true for me” but not true “for God” if we’re talking about our beliefs in what reality is. If God believes X to be determinate, then it’s determinate, period. If I believe it’s true for me that X is not determinate, then I’m simply wrong.
2. Secondly, claiming that our beliefs about the indefiniteness of undetermined choices are true for us but not for God only WORKS if we don’t believe this to be the case. For life to work this way we must genuinely believe in the indefiniteness of undetermined future choices. But you claim to know otherwise. You claim to know that the omniscient God infallibly believes the opposite of what you believe about the indefiniteness of your future choices. You “believe” that it’s “true for you” that your future choices are indefinite or indeterminate, but you also claim to “believe” that it’s “true for God” that these same choices are eternally definite and determinate. Let me lovingly suggest to you that this is not possible and that you likely feel the force of the open argument at this point, are reluctant to face the implications, and are taking refuge in the hope that somehow, in a way you know will never make sense to you, both God and you are right in your opposing beliefs about the future. But we both know that it is simply impossible for us to believe self-contradictory claims. We cannot demonstrate both beliefs existentially. That is, you cannot consciously act, choose, and otherwise live in such a way as to demonstrate both beliefs at this point.
I have been where you are. I can only encourage you to not fear following the argument wherever it leads you. God will be there.
RD: I'm in good company with a lot of philosophers on this one, so I am going to sign off.
Tom: You can always find a precedent for doing things the wrong way. But how much comfort can your believing what others before you have believed provide you if you also concede both the contradictory nature of your beliefs and the impossibility of consciously embracing such beliefs in your manner of living?
Tom 
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 7/14/2003 7:23 AM (GMT -6) | | Here's what I think in a nutshell - from a philosophy prof:
"Then if we represent the MI (-->) (material implication) with "it is possible that", that is:-
P "if I were Tony Blair" `it is possible that` q "I would not be a socialist"
we can see because the argument is hypothetical (subjunctive) and the
connective is uncertain and forms a cross reference between P and q which cannot be removed.
If I were not Tony Blair "it is possible that"....... is exactly the same as If I were Tony Blair....."it is possible that"
then because it does not matter what q represents we can have
P "it is possible that" q or
P "it is possible that" not q which in all cases are assumptive by their very nature therefore the answers are not definite and can be possibly right or possibly wrong - in other words it is impossible to assign a Truth Table to Subjunctive or Hypothetical arguments of this kind. "
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Tom
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| Posted 7/14/2003 8:19 AM (GMT -6) | | RD, I have to tell ya...I though I understood this stuff. But I understood absolutely zero from what you posted. I'm sure it's me. No worry. I'm taking a sleeping pill and going to bed.
Peace out!
Tom
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Laika
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| Posted 7/14/2003 8:49 AM (GMT -6) | | ReasonableDoubt
quote:
P "it is possible that" q or
P "it is possible that" not q which in all cases are assumptive by their very nature therefore the answers are not definite and can be possibly right or possibly wrong - in other words it is impossible to assign a Truth Table to Subjunctive or Hypothetical arguments of this kind. "
It is possible that ReasonableDoubt has red colored hair. This is a statement that is true. It is possible that RD has red colored hair.
It is possible that ReasonableDoubt has thirsty colored hair. This is a statement that is false. It is not possible that RD has thirsty colored hair.
What's the problem with assigning truth values to those two statements?
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 7/14/2003 9:05 AM (GMT -6) | | What I posted was a more complicated way of saying that counterfactuals employing modal logic do not lend themselves to truth tables- It is possible that Q, or It is possible that Not Q - end up being the same thing....Saying 'it is possible that" is the same thing as "it might occur" or "it may be the case that".
Now TGB- you say that if something is the case for God, it must be the case for us. Where did you come up with that? God is omniscient, so there are many things that are not possible for humans to know that God indeed knows. Those true propositions, God knows them as truth - and i haven't said we know them as false - just that we cannot know them until they actually occur. God knows them before they occur.
I'm saying that the "mightmight not" counterfactuals are just hypotheticals - they can't tell us much, if anything truthful as humans - since we cannot know the truth of the propositions until that time which they are supposed to occur and do occur, or do not occur.
"Doc: What makes it (a conjoined might counterfactual) true or false is NOT what actually happens. What makes it true or false is whether or not it is actually the case that "x might and might not do y in situation z.""
SO what does "actually the case" mean if not "what is true - or what is happening, or coming to pass'?
Trying to think of an example - "George might and might not eat spaghetti when going to a restaurant tonight." (x might and might not do y in situation z.)
We can rephrase by saying 'It is possible that George will eat spaghetti tonight" and "It is possible that George will not eat spaghetti tonight."
Both of these are logically possible. It's logical that he might eat it, logical that he might not. So how can we tell whether this statement is true or not then? It is just an hypothesis- it's the same as saying - we do not know what George will eat tonight. He could eat it, maybe he won't eat it. We don't know until the appointed time (tonight) has occurred.
However, God knows now whether George will eat it or not at the appointed time (tonight).
George himself may know as well - even if he makes the 'might might not" statement- it could indeed be the case that his intent is that he will definitely eat it. Or he could be allergic, in which case his statement is false, b/c there's no way he could be eating it and he knows that full well.
Everything "might and might not" actually be the case (with limited exceptions.) I might and might not get up right now. I might and might not watch TV in ten minutes. But these are all just other ways of saying- as a human, I have choices to make, that, aside from physical restraints, i have yet to make. (And remember that determinism never says that people do not have choices, simply that choices are caused.) However, God knows only true or false propositions- he knows that in 10 minutes, I will be watching TV, even if I myself think that I may not be watching it.
Anyway, I have a splitting headache and work to do too, so will go now. | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/15/2003 6:16 PM (GMT -6) | | RD: P "it is possible that" q or P "it is possible that" not q which in all cases are assumptive by their very nature therefore the answers are not definite and can be possibly right or possibly wrong - in other words it is impossible to assign a Truth Table to Subjunctive or Hypothetical arguments of this kind. "
Doc: What do you mean by "assumptive by their very nature"? And how does it follow from this, whatever this means, that "the answers are not definite and can be possibly right or possibly wrong"? Also, its not clear how can you argue its impossible to assign a Truth Table (do you mean truth VALUE derived from the Truth Table?) to such statements? Seems to me we do this all the time.
e.g. I say to my daughter, "If you go over to Lexi's house, you may find her home." If this statement cannot be true or false, then I can't possibly be telling the truth or lying. But suppose I KNOW Lexi is not home?
Another example,
e.g. The Lord says to Ezekiel "...you shall go like an exile from your place to another place in their sight. Perhaps they will understand, though they are a rebellious house." If this statement cannot be true or false, God cannot be speaking truth or falsity in saying it. But, suppose God KNOWS the Israelites WON'T understand?
Nevertheless, RD, I am the first to concede (indeed, insist) that classical logic is ill equipped for handling might counterfactuals. Indeed, as Jan Lukasiewics (polish logician, 1897-1956) demonstrated, it is not even equipped to effectively handle "it is possible that" as applied to future contingencies. This has given rise to the whole enterprise of "fuzzy logic." The paradox conjoined might-counterfactuals pose to would-counterfactuals (when, as in classical logic, it is assumed that would-counterfactuals logically subsume all might counterfactduals) is I believe an illustration of the limitations of classical logic.
I've decided to dive into logic to figure this out.
Still, it seems to me that my argument that conjoined might counterfactuals constititue a distinct set of coherent propositions which an omniscient God must know works, even on classical assumptions. I believe it exposes a "prejudice for the settled" that jaundiced classical logic, especially middle knowledge theorists. The question it forces -- and the one I've been trying to force on YOU -- is Why think all conjoined might counterfactuals are FALSE (in reality and thus to God)? Classical theism ASSUMES this... and thus assumes the future is exhaustively settled in the mind of God. But on what logical grounds can this be assumed????
Doc
Edited by - GregBoyd on 07/16/2003 08:46:53 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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John Earp
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| Posted 7/15/2003 6:26 PM (GMT -6) | | I have been reading _Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views_, and have especially noted Craig's assertion that God must believe no falsehoods (or, that the principle of bivalence holds true for future free choices of moral agents). I know you guys hashed this out some time ago, but it seems to me that the principle of bivalence as applied to the future ignores the complexity of creation. In addition it seems to assume that a future event is either "this way or that way" when in fact it could be neither, or even in some cases, both.
For instance, the OT prophecies concerning the coming of the Messiah, during the intertestamental period (and probably still to this day, among conservative observant Jews) had some predicting the Messiah would come in a certain way (suffering servant), some in another (conquering deliverer of Israel), and some yet in another (prophet like unto Moses). While it probably seemed quite contradictory to the scribes, Pharisees, Zealots, and Essenes, as we know now, it was not an either/or but a both/and. Make sense?
Why can't the future contain true "maybes" instead of only definites?
Edited by - John Earp on 07/16/2003 01:02:13 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/15/2003 9:00 PM (GMT -6) | | RD: 'm saying that the "might/might not" counterfactuals are just hypotheticals - they can't tell us much, if anything truthful as humans - since we cannot know the truth of the propositions until that time which they are supposed to occur and do occur, or do not occur.
Doc: What you’re missing, RD, is that "x might and might not" IS a proposition which has truth value, and it must therefore be known to God. If "x will" is true, then "x might and might not" is false. What you are presupposing is that all "might and might not" propositions are false and thus known by God to be false. And (as I said in my a previous post) what I’m dying to know is, why do you think that?
Another way of making the same point is to ask, "Why think all conjoined might counterfactuals are hypotheticals?" Claiming this exposes the ASSUMPTION that reality itself never illustrates conjoined might-counterfactuals. Why think that?
RD: "Doc [said] What makes it (a conjoined might counterfactual) true or false is NOT what actually happens. What makes it true or false is whether or not it is actually the case that "x might and might not do y in situation z."" RD responds: SO what does "actually the case" mean if not "what is true - or what is happening, or coming to pass'?
Doc: What "actually is the case" is that "x might and might not do y in situation z." RD, don’t you see that you are presupposing that "actually is the case" = x WILL or WILL NOT do y in situation z" which is logically equivalent to presupposing that "it is FALSE that it is actually the case that x MAY or MAY NOT do y in situation z." And what I’m dying to know is, why do you think that? Is the falsity a necessary falsity or a contingent one? And why do you conclude one way or another? (See my previous post).
RD: Everything "might and might not" actually be the case (with limited exceptions.) I might and might not get up right now.
Doc: If your view is that IN FACT (viz. as God knows things) everything about the future is a "will or will not," then in your view, NOTHING "might and might not" actually be the case. We only THINK this because we are deficient in our knowledge. But the truth of all propositions expressing "might and might not" is IN FACT FALSE in your view. And what I’m dying to know is, WHY do you think this? Is the falsity a necessary falsity or a contingent falsity?
John Earp: Why can't the future contain true "maybes" instead of only definites?
Doc: Obviously I think that the future can contain maybes. But you needn’t deny bivalence to affirm this. It is either true or false that "x might and might not do y in situation z." If it is true, then it is false that "x WILL or WILL NOT do y in situation z," for "will" negates "might not" and "will not" negates "might."
Later. Time to go night night.
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10.
Edited by - GregBoyd on 07/16/2003 08:50:34 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 7/15/2003 9:13 PM (GMT -6) | | One more thing. How does this work as a formal argument? Alan?
(the symbols get mixed when I transfer my word document to HTML, but it doesn’t matter.
A = all
E = at least one
M = might counterfactual
W = would counterfactual
1. Ax -(Wx & -Wx)
2. Ex (Mx & -Mx)
Ergo: Ex -(Wx = Mx)
Broken down.
1. For all would counterfactuals, it is not the case that "would and would not"
2. For some (at least one) might counterfactuals, it IS the case that "might and might not"
Conclusion: Not all woulds equal mights.
Hence I argue that God's middle knowledge must include and not exclude conjoined might counterfactuals. Anyone who denies that God knows some things as a "might and might not" is thereby denying omniscience. (Unless they can prove that "might and might not" statements are self-contradictory).
What do you think RD?
And how can this be improved Alan (or anyone)?
Okay, NOW and AM going to bed!
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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ReasonableDoubt
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Total Posts : 655
| Posted 7/16/2003 7:34 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc: "If your view is that IN FACT (viz. as God knows things) everything about the future is a "will or will not," then in your view, NOTHING "might and might not" actually be the case. We only THINK this because we are deficient in our knowledge. But the truth of all propositions expressing "might and might not" is IN FACT FALSE in your view."
First - I differentiate between what is known by an omniscient vs. a non-omniscient being. In other words, humans don't know the truth or falsity of every proposition until the requisite action has occurred, whereas , God does know before the requisite action (which makes it true or false) does occur.
I'm not saying "might and might not" is in fact false for humans. I'm saying it's non-verifiable - it is hypothetical, or assumptive. All the phrase represents is that a person has not yet decided what they will do. It's a statement of deliberation. So it is neither true nor false. I will qualify that by saying it IS possible for the "might and might not" statement to be false when exactly what you've said above happens - ie if you tell your daughter her friend may be home but you know full well she isn't. YOu've just conceded that the truth or falsity of the statement may be related to the person's intention who makes the statement.
Now, for God, a prop. is either true or false. it's not "up in the air" as it could be for humans. So God knows, when the proposition is made, if it is true or false, and the reason is b/c he knows everyone's intent. If I say, "I might or might not go to the store tonight" - without knowing what I am going to do, and then the night comes, and I do go to the store. All we need to do is parse the complex proposition into two simple sentences. I might go to the store tonight. I might not go to the store tonight. God knows the truth or falsity of the statements at the time they are made. It's not the case that the statements are always false. It depends on the person's intent. If I had no intention of going to the store, then the "i might" statement is false, b/c I knew when I made it that I would not be going, no ifs about it. If I say "i might" with the intention of going, and either I do go or do not go, then the statement is true b/c there really did indeed exist a chance that I would go. And vice versa for the "might nots." | | Back to Top | | |
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ReasonableDoubt
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| Posted 7/16/2003 7:45 AM (GMT -6) | | And by the way, who talks like this? Who says, "I might AND might not go to the store?" We normally said, "I might OR might not go."
It's like, "I will AND will not go." You can't do both. You can say "I will or will not go." ANd really, as far as communication goes, what's the difference between the following statements?
1. Tonight, I might go to the movies, and I might not go to the movies.
2. Tonight, either I will go to the movies, or I will not go to the movies.
Don't they mean, in basic english, the same thing? Both just mean I have not yet decided what i will do. Try to falsify either of them right now - you can't (unless again the person is consciously lying). | | Back to Top | | |
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