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honorman
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| Posted 11/6/2002 11:30 AM (GMT -6) |   | In Geisler's book on open theism "The Battle For God," he dedicates a whole chapter on God's simplicity. I am at a loss at to why God's simplicity is an important issue. Can anyone tell me (I would also like a easy (if possible) definition of it) why it is important? Also how do open theists view God's simplicity in contrast with classical theism?
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 11/6/2002 3:01 PM (GMT -6) | | I'd like to see this answered too.
Then, I'd like to, for myself, try and figure out whether "simplicity" is part of Orthodoxy, or merely of the "classical" (meaning: Western, substance-based) theology.
There is a difference.
Edited by - Al2Si2H4O9 on 11/06/2002 8:02:17 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 11/6/2002 3:20 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
In Geisler's book on open theism "The Battle For God," he dedicates a whole chapter to God's simplicity. I am at a loss at to why God's simplicity is an important issue. Can anyone tell me (I would also like a easy (if possible) definition of it) why it is important? Also how do open theists view God's simplicity in contrast with classical theism?
When reading Geisler, it is important to remember that he is a Thomist in his overall metaphysical outlook (a Thomist is one who follows the thinking of Thomas Aquinas). Aquinas' arguments for God's simplicitly in the Summa Theologiae are aimed at perserving what he saw as a proper distinction between Creator and creation. By saying that God is simple, he means that God is NOT COMPLEX in various specific ways. In God, he argues, there must be no distinction between substance and accident, between act and potency, or between existence and essence. Any being that was complex in those ways, thinks Aquinas, could not be the self-sufficient, necessarily existing cause of the created world. Take, for example, the distinction between existence and essence. The essence of a thing defines WHAT that thing is; it limits or defines the being of a thing. The existence of a thing consists in the fact THAT it is. Ordinarily, we can fully understand what something is without it following that it is. For example, one could have a complete understanding of what it means to be a unicorn, but it would still be a further question whether there are any. In other words, essence does not normally imply existence. Because the essence of a unicorn does not imply existence, it is a CONTINGENT matter whether or not unicorns exist. Aquinas argues that the only way to account for contingently existing beings it to appeal to a non-contingent being, one whose essence IS to exist, i.e., a NECESSARY being. Any other kind of being, argues Aquinas, could not adequately account for the existence of the world. That's why the doctrine of divine simplicitly is so important for Geisler. As he sees it, a non-simple God would have to be contingent and therefore could not ultimately explain the existence of other things. On his view, and Aquinas', the very Godhood of God is at stake.
Today the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) is not in much favor, except among Thomists. It has come under serious attack by several Christian philosophers (e.g., Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Morris, Christopher Hughes, etc.), who basically claim that the doctrine is incoherent. One problem with DDS is that it seems to imply that all of God's properties are equally essential and that all of God's properties are identical with each other. But this seems absurd. It would mean that God's omniscience IS His omnipotence IS His goodness, etc. It would also mean that God's property of knowing that He has created a world and His property of knowing that Peter denies Christ are both essential and identical. But obviously those properties are neither. God could have refrained from creating anything. Other problems arise when one tries to explain how God could be both metaphysically simple AND triune, or how He could remain metaphysically simple AND become incarnate.
If we reject the DDS, how then do we respond to the argument that a non-simple God must be contingent and therefore cannot be God? I haven't fully thought this through, but here's a suggestion. Before the Copernican revolution it was thought that the STATE of motion of a thing had to be explained; after the revolution it was thought that only CHANGES in the state of motion of a thing needed to be explained (think of Newton's law that an object in motion continues in the same state of motion unless some force acts upon it). Suppose we make a similar revolution in our approach to metaphysics. Aquinas (and Geisler) think that the STATE of being of the universe (the mere fact of its existence--Why is there something rather than nothing?) must be explained by appealing to a necessary being (one whose essence and existence are identical). But why should we accept this? What if we say instead that only CHANGES in the state of being of a thing require explanation (e.g., what caused the universe to COME INTO being?). If this approach to metaphysics, or something similar, works, then the ultimate explanation for things will have to be a being that neither came into being nor is such that it ESSENTIALLY changes. That kind of God would be wholly compatible with open theism as far as I can tell, whereas Aquinas' God definitely is not. Now I'm not sure if this approach is entirely adequate, but it's not obviously implausible, and it seems to give us a plausible way of denying the starting metaphysical assumption that Aquinas and Geisler use to argue for the DDS.
Hope that helps. Any further thoughts/questions welcome,
Alan
Edited by - Alan Rhoda on 11/07/2002 5:24:55 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 11/6/2002 5:49 PM (GMT -6) | | I especially enjoyed your post, Alan.
Here is what I clipped:
quote:
Alan: Take, for example, the distinction between existence and essence. The essence of a thing defines WHAT that thing is; it limits or defines the being of a thing. The existence of a thing consists in the fact THAT it is.
quote:
Alan: If we reject the DDS, how then do we respond to the argument that a non-simple God must be contingent and therefore cannot be God? I haven't fully thought this through, but here's a thought.
quote:
Alan:If this approach to metaphysics, or something similar, works, then the ultimately explanation for things will have to be a being that neither came into being nor is such that it essentially changes. That kind of a God would be wholly compatible with open theism.
You know your stuff. At least I feel confindent. I don't know Thomas. But I've read of him in books by Orthodox. (I'm an Evangelical who reads, ans who gets 'tons' out of Orthodox liturgies.) You wrote in the first quote, "The essence of a thing defines WHAT that thing is; it limits or defines the being of a thing." That idea sounds real familiar, from contexts where it is contrasted with Byzantine theology. I've been clogging up the thread on "Time" (sorry Newcome!) with quotes from Lossky and Zizioulas. A few illustrate clearly what theology is like if you do not do, as Thomas does, begin with Essence, and begin instead -- as the Greek Fathers do -- with Person. (I'll link below.)
The second quote is "...the argument that a non-simple God must be contingent and therefore cannot be God..." Hypostasis is free. God's "mode of being" is "Communion." The Greek Fathers have this all worked out. On that: Vladimir Lossky is very good to read -- I'll link to some free chapters online. (Meyendorff's books are good too.)
The third quote has "will have to be a being that neither came into being nor is such that it essentially changes." I'd love to discuss whether what Lossky has to say fits this, or not. First blush it does. (I've been posting to Tom on the "Time" thread.) Interestingly, or concerningly, though, I'm not sure about the other part: "That kind of a God would be wholly compatible with open theism." I value that both the "open theism" and Orthodoxy show God as "open." But Tom has been arguing strongly, passionately, and a bit desperately (He won't like me saying that; but I think he feels that a lot is on the line.) that while the "open view" espouses the part about God being "a being that [did not come] into being", he (Tom) eschews and rejects, even, that God does not "essentially change." (Though for Tom, on the Time thread, God's change is a staying the same. He said that "God has a history" and "There's a before and after that characterize God's inner triune life"? Note: All written after 3:00 AM.)
But I'd say that Orthodoxy would be interesting for you to look into. And the careful examination that the Russians and the Greeks have had to do to work themselves out of their "Latin Captivity," as it were, provides us, in their writings, an examination of the West that can be valuable to us; just as their Western contemporary's interst in Patristics did help spawn their own "Byzantine Revival."
Check out "Time" if you can stand my long clips. (Short compared to what they came from.) www.gregboyd.org/gbfront/forum/topic.asp?ARCHIVE=&whichpage=8&TOPIC_ID=1306 Check out two Lossky Chapters: God in Trinity www.jbburnett.com/lossky/lossky-trinity.html and Procession of the Holy Spirit www.jbburnett.com/lossky/lossky-filioque.html . And ask me if you have any questions.
Interesting that we appear to have interests in the same direction. I like that.
Al (not my name)
Edited by - Al2Si2H4O9 on 11/06/2002 10:53:57 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 11/6/2002 6:06 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan , if I can reduce John Zizioulas' book "Being as Communion" to two paragraphs or so, this might suffice to tell you whether you want to follow the Lossky links:
quote:
Zizioulas organizes for us with respect to what God's "eternality/immortality/" is: "we ascribe the being of God to His personal freedom"; and "God, as Father, and not as substance, perpetually confirms through "being" His free will to exist", because "the one divine substance is consequently the being of God only because it has these three modes of existence, which it owes not to the substance but to the one person, the Father."
This shows powerfully: "If God the Father is immortal, it is because His unique and unrepeatable identity as Father is distinguished eternally from that of the Son and of the Spirit, who call Him "Father." If the Son is immortal, He owes this primarily not to His substance but to His being the "only-begotten" (note here the concept of uniqueness) and His being the one in whom the Father is "well pleased." Likewise the Spirit is "live-giving" because He is "communion" (2 Cor. 13:14). The life of God is eternal because it is personal, that is to say, it is realized as an expression of free communion, as love. Life and love are identified in the person: the person does not die only because it is loved and loves; outside the communion of love the person loses its uniqueness and becomes a being like other beings, a "thing" without absolute unique and unrepeatable, whereas life for the person means the survival of the uniqueness of its hypostasis, which is affirmed and maintained by love."
And, if I might, when you wrote "One problem with DDS is that it seems to imply that all of God's properties are equally essential and that all of God's properties are identical with each other." it reminded me of the issue of whether God's "external qualities" (Lossky) -- which I think the 'classical theologians' call his "divine attributes" are compelling upon God, dominating his personal freedom. (Sorry, I don't write well.) Something from Lossky on this matter is: "...the external qualities of God– intellect, will, or love– are introduced into the interior of the Trinity to designate the relations between the three hypostases..." With the full paragraph:
quote:
When Roman Catholic theology presents the relations of origin as notional acts and speaks of two processions per modum intellectus and per modum voluntatis, it commits from the point of view of Orthodox triadology– an inadmissible error of confusion concerning the Trinity. In effect, the external qualities of God– intellect, will, or love– are introduced into the interior of the Trinity to designate the relations between the three hypostases. This line of thought gives us a divine individuality rather than a Trinity of persons– an individuality which in thought is conscious of its own essential content (generation of the Word per modum intellectus) and which, in knowing himself, loves himself (the procession of the Holy Spirit ab utroque, per modum voluntatis or per modum amoris). We are here confronted with a philosophical anthropomorphism having nothing in common with Biblical anthropomorphism; for the Biblical theophanies, while showing us in human guise the acts and manifestations of a personal God in the history of the world, also place us face to face with the mystery of His unknowable [87] Being, which Christians nevertheless dare to venerate and to invoke as the unique Being in Three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, who live and reign in the inaccessible light of their essence.
Vladimir Lossky -- The Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Trinitarian Doctrine, Chapter 4 of In the Image and Likeness of God (SVS Press, Crestwood, NY), pp. 71-96.
I hope that is helpful. | | Back to Top | | |
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honorman
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| Posted 11/6/2002 7:01 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan, thanks a lot. That certainly helped. I did know Geisler is a Thomist, but I didn't know what that implied.
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 11/7/2002 3:23 PM (GMT -6) | | Al, I appreciate the feedback, especially the connections you see between some of my comments and Orthodox theology. Unfortunately, my aquaintance with Orthodox writers is negligible. It is somewhat difficult for me to appropriate Orthodox thought because of my unfamiliarity with it. At some point when I have a little extra time I will have to look into it more closely.
Al: I value that both the "open theism" and Orthodoxy show God as "open." But Tom has been arguing strongly, passionately, and a bit desperately (He won't like me saying that; but I think he feels that a lot is on the line.) that while the "open view" espouses the part about God being "a being that [did not come] into being", he (Tom) eschews and rejects, even, that God does not "essentially change."
Alan: A basic principle of metaphysics is that the ultimate explanation for anything cannot be something that itself stands in need of the very same sort of explanation--in which case it wouldn't be the ULTIMATE explanation. On my proposal that CHANGE in the state of being of a thing requires explanation but the STATE of being of things does not, it follows that the ultimate explanation for things must not lie in a being that is necessarily BEING CHANGED by something else. But perhaps that is consistent with supposing that the ultimate explainer, namely God, necessarily CHANGES in virtue of the active nature of the intra-Trinitarian relationships. Maybe. If that makes sense, then Tom and I may be able to reconcile on this point.
One way of contrasting Aquinas' overall approach to metaphysics with my proposal concerns their ramifications for creaturely autonomy.
On the Thomistic view, the BEING of things must be accounted for. All that is, insofar as it is contingent, MUST DEPEND COMPLETELY on the sustaining activity of a noncontingent being, i.e., God. But if we concede this then it follows that the causal relationship between God and creation is strictly ONE-WAY: Creation depends utterly on God and God, with respect to His creation, must be impassible. Furthermore, God must BE CONTINUALLY CREATING the world in order for it to continue to exist. But then it is very difficult (impossible I think) to make room for genuine creaturely autonomy. In fact, the very notion of creaturely autonomy is a contradiction in terms within the Thomistic system.
On the view I am proposing, the being of things need not be accounted for, only the BECOMING of things needs to be explained. If that is so, then we have a metaphysical principle analogous to Newton's law of the conservation of momentum: Things that exist continue to exist unless some external force acts upon it and effects and change in it. Let us call this the law of the conservation of BEING. If that law is true, then there is no problem supposing that God created beings with the innate potential of self-determination. Once God creates a being, on this view, it will continue to exist unless annihilated by some external force. Thus God can create the world in 6 days (however one interprets that) and then truly REST. Whereas, on the Thomistic view, God's creative activity must continue as long as creation continues--there can be no genuine Sabbath rest for God.
It seems to me that Open Theism, with its contention that God's creatures can make a REAL DIFFERENCE to how things turn out, must reject the Thomistic approach to metaphysics and move in the sort of direction that I am indicating.
Hope that was intelligible. For myself, I'm having a lot of fun just kicking around these ideas  (that's why I'm a philosopher). God bless y'all.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 11/7/2002 5:02 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan: Al, I appreciate the feedback, especially the connections you see between some of my comments and Orthodox theology.
Al: Some of the underlying issues overlap, in interesting ways. But you are doing several things very differently. I'll touch on two.
Alan: (edited by Al) "Things that exist continue to exist unless some external force acts upon it and effects and change in it. ... "Law of conservation of BEING" = created beings with the innate potential of self-determination -- it will continue to exist unless annihilated by some external force."
Al: I think that this sounds like "Uhrwerk." (Freshman 'Achtzehnhundertjahr Deutche Literatur' at Bethel College.)
It also, kind of resembles Thomas' "Created Grace." Both of those would definitely not be Orthodox. The Son upholds the world. Even in the incarnation, and the crucifixtion on the cross, that very cross was upheld by Our Lord and Savior.
Maybe you have to nuance this a whole lot. I recall there being a sense in which "being" corrodes as one dies spritually. But that is a discription of one's spiritual health, not the physicality of the creation. I'm inclined not to confuse the two.
Like I said, it seems very much still within the influence of Thomas to have a creation that has its own proxy-power. (This makes two ways that OV seems very much built upon the same Thomism that it declares battle against. IMHO.)
Alan: "But perhaps that is consistent with supposing that the ultimate explainer, namely God, necessarily CHANGES in virtue of the active nature of the intra-Trinitarian relationships."
Al: First, I think that you have to establish the "active nature" of the Son being eternally begotten, yet eternally dwelling in the Father. Same for the Spirit. Maybe you don't, IF you stick with Thomism. Roman Catholicism has its "principle of relations of opposition." But, Alan, I think that if you follow that line, trying to escape what you seem to be trying to escape, you will find yourself back with the original problem -- an essence based Trinity.
Lossky: "One cannot deny the logical clarity of this process of reasoning, which seeks to base hypostatic diversity on the principle of relations of opposition[u/]. This triadological principle, formulated by Thomas Aquinas, becomes unavoidable the moment that the doctrine of the procession of the Holy [77] Spirit ab utroque is admitted. It presupposes the following conditions: (1) That relations are the basis of the hypostases,{9} which define themselves by their mutual opposition, the first to the second, and these two together to the third. (2) That two persons represent a non-personal unity, in that they give rise to a further relation of opposition. (3) That in general the origin of the persons of the Trinity therefore is impersonal, having its real basis in the one essence, which is differentiated by its internal relations. The general character of this triadology may be described as a pre-eminence of natural unity over personal trinity, as an ontological primacy of the essence over the hypostases."
Al: It seems to me that your "intra-Trinitarian relationships" are formed on this "principle of relations of opposition." But, IRONICALLY, by taking the emphasis off of the person to put it on the relations "between" them you will end up placing the focus on divine attributes. Know the territory? I think this leads us back to your first post on Thomas above.
(Just trying to be helpful.)
Al
Edited by - Al2Si2H4O9 on 11/07/2002 10:03:45 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Mephi2K
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| Posted Yesterday 4:05 AM (GMT -6) | | Alan:
quote:
If we reject the DDS, how then do we respond to the argument that a non-simple God must be contingent and therefore cannot be God? I haven't fully thought this through, but here's a suggestion. Before the Copernican revolution it was thought that the STATE of motion of a thing had to be explained; after the revolution it was thought that only CHANGES in the state of motion of a thing needed to be explained (think of Newton's law that an object in motion continues in the same state of motion unless some force acts upon it). Suppose we make a similar revolution in our approach to metaphysics. Aquinas (and Geisler) think that the STATE of being of the universe (the mere fact of its existence--Why is there something rather than nothing?) must be explained by appealing to a necessary being (one whose essence and existence are identical). But why should we accept this? What if we say instead that only CHANGES in the state of being of a thing require explanation (e.g., what caused the universe to COME INTO being?). If this approach to metaphysics, or something similar, works, then the ultimate explanation for things will have to be a being that neither came into being nor is such that it ESSENTIALLY changes. That kind of God would be wholly compatible with open theism as far as I can tell, whereas Aquinas' God definitely is not. Now I'm not sure if this approach is entirely adequate, but it's not obviously implausible, and it seems to give us a plausible way of denying the starting metaphysical assumption that Aquinas and Geisler use to argue for the DDS.
Sup, man. In Doc's "Trinity and Process", he basically said that God's essence is God's essential existence. He did this using his use and reconstruction of Hartshorne's process metaphysic...and, from what I remember, he largely expresses there what you say here. Isn't that right, Doc?
Holla,
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Tom
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| Posted Yesterday 1:27 PM (GMT -6) | | Al: I'm not sure about the other part: "That kind of a God would be wholly compatible with open theism." I value that both the "open theism" and Orthodoxy show God as "open." But Tom has been arguing strongly, passionately, and a bit desperately (He won't like me saying that…
Tom:  No problem at all!
Al: …but I think he feels that a lot is on the line)
Tom: I actually tried to emphasize the point that I didn’t think much of anything was at stake in the debate about whether God was “temporal” or “timeless” in the absence of Creation. I believe I could go either way. That God is temporal since Creation (and not both timeless and temporal--a self-contradictory claim I think) is not uniquely "openness."
Al: …that while the "open view" espouses the part about God being "a being that [did not come] into being", he (Tom) eschews and rejects, even, that God does not "essentially change." (Though for Tom, on the Time thread, God's change is a staying the same.
Tom: Wow. Actually, I embrace the belief that "God does not essentially change." What I'm not convinced of is the belief that this entails God's being "timeless." Now, it's my understanding also that open theists all (OK, 99.9 % of them) reject the notion that God's "unchanging" nature means "timelessness." So I'm not alone.
Al: He said that "God has a history" and "There's a before and after that characterize God's inner triune life"? (Note: All written after 3:00 AM.)
Tom: And I’m writing this at 2:30 AM! [sleepy face] Actually, "God has a history" is Wolterstorff's phrase.
Alan: …it follows that the ultimate explanation for things must not lie in a being that is necessarily BEING CHANGED by something else. But perhaps that is consistent with supposing that the ultimate explainer, namely God, necessarily CHANGES in virtue of the active nature of the intra-Trinitarian relationships. Maybe. If that makes sense, then Tom and I may be able to reconcile on this point.
Tom:
And Mephi, it’s good to hear your voice.
Tom
"Kind of like donut holes--no one's ever eaten a donut hole because they don't exist." Starkman
Edited by - TGB on 11/09/2002 04:15:12 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted Yesterday 4:26 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan: ...But perhaps that is consistent with supposing that the ultimate explainer, namely God, necessarily CHANGES in virtue of the active nature of the intra-Trinitarian relationships. Maybe...
Al: Hey, Alan. Could you describe this "active nature of the intra-Trinitarian relationships?"
Hope so. I'd like to read it. Thanks. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted Yesterday 9:37 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Alan: ...But perhaps that is consistent with supposing that the ultimate explainer, namely God, necessarily CHANGES in virtue of the active nature of the intra-Trinitarian relationships. Maybe...
Al: Hey, Alan. Could you describe this "active nature of the intra-Trinitarian relationships?"
Honorman-
Buckle your seat belt, return your chair to its upright position, and place your tray back in its upright and locked position. Al, you beat me up too badly on the canvas of the "Time" thread. I'm in recovery. Alan, I'm tagging up with you for a relief fighter.
Tom
"Kind of like donut holes--no one's ever eaten a donut hole because they don't exist." Starkman
Edited by - TGB on 11/09/2002 04:16:12 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted Today 7:31 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Al, you beat me up too badly on the canvas of the "Time" thread. I'm in recovery. Alan, I'm tagging up with you for a relief fighter.
Tom
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 11/14/2002 3:53 AM (GMT -6) | | Meph: In Doc's "Trinity and Process", he basically said that God's essence is God's essential existence. He did this using his use and reconstruction of Hartshorne's process metaphysic...and, from what I remember, he largely expresses there what you say here. Isn't that right, Doc?
Doc: And I still stand by it. Allan said it about as well as it can be said.
"In Christ...the ONLY THING that matters is faith energized by love." Galatians 5:6 | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 11/18/2002 6:47 PM (GMT -6) | | The Catholic theologian de Regnon wrote: "The Latin considers personality as a mode of nature..." and "...the Greek considers nature as the content of the person."
This bears on what is being discussed. But I think this might go where some do not anticipate it going.
Al
Edited by - Al2Si2H4O9 on 11/19/2002 11:06:48 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 11/27/2002 5:32 PM (GMT -6) | | 1.
quote:
Meph: In Doc's "Trinity and Process", he basically said that God's essence is God's essential existence.
2.
Zizioulas points out (as a different view) that God's mode of existence is communion: The substance of God, "God," has no ontological content, no true being, apart from communion. ...
CAN SOMEONE COMPARE AND CONTRAST THESE TWO FOR ME?
Fred
Edited by - fred on 11/27/2002 10:33:45 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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