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leth
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Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/15/2002 9:17 PM (GMT -6) |   | This is where I am at:
It seems entirely consistent with my experience that my actions are determined fully by past causes. It can not be proven that this is the case, but nonetheless I believe that this is a necessary presupposition to function in a rational and consistent manner, and further that everyone who knowingly functions in such a manner betrays an implicit assumption that this is the case. We clearly believe that a great many things are determined by past causes. It is not obvious that there is any intrinsic qualitiy of any particular type of actions such that we should suppose them to be not fully determined by past causes. I can not imagine the case to be otherwise; it seems as necessary as the belief that my nose is actually there right in front of my face, and that I can see it.
Yet, perhaps I can accept that the future can be open for God in every meaninful sense.
Not because God can not know the future; not because God somehow created agents capable of responding to stimuli in ways that he can not predict; rather I can if God chooses not to definitely and exhaustively infer all future actions, all future states of affairs.
Consider the following: we are free in every meaningful sense in so far as God has not inferred what our actions will be, and within the range that he has proven them to be. I believe that this is the only meaningful sense in which there must be freedom.
When I see the expression "1 + 1", I know that it evaluates to "2". When I see the expression "739 * 7 * 42" I know that it is a meaningful expression, that it has a definite value, that I could prove that its value is within certain bounds without ever determining the actual value, and that I could determine that actual value should I undertake to do so. BUT, I have not undertaken to determine its value.
That I must use a concept such as math and not reality to form the analogy does not detract from what is illustrated, but rather merely makes the point that for a being such as myself who can not perfectly evaluate the present state of affairs, math is as close an analogy as I can appreciate.
Why should we believe that God has exhaustively and definitely inferred all future actions? It seems to be a very unnatural thought to suggest that God can not help but infer all future actions exhaustively and definitely.
Is this compatible with the Open View? Why/Why not?
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leth
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| Posted 7/16/2002 8:25 AM (GMT -6) | | Yet, you ask: If God knows everything, and future states of affairs CAN be inferred exhaustively and definitely, then must we not say that "knowing everything" entails knowing these future states of affairs in this manner?
Clearly we must say that God knows the current state of affairs exhaustively and definitely. That is, at the present, God knows every element of the current state of affairs in this manner. God knows their states perfectly; he knows every attribute and property.
Yet again, it does not seem the belief that God has or somehow must infer all future states of affairs is justified. God is portrayed as a being having thought processes as ourselves. It is not the case that I do by default immediately undertake to discover the value of a mathematical expression upon observing it. Rather by default it seems that I do not do so.
Further, it does not seem that my undertaking to discover the value of the expression is always relevant or important to the present situation. Certainly I could always do so, but there is no reason why I should always do so. When it is the case that discovering the value seems beneficial to my intentions for the current state of affairs, then I do so.
It is not that we say God must "refrain" from undertaking to infer all future states of affairs as if it were the case that he would do so by default. Rather it is the case that God has felt no compelling reason to do so exhaustively.
God's knowledge is based upon observation. God observes all of creation. God knows all things that exist. God knows the number of hairs on our heads.
My future actions are not THINGS that EXIST in the present.
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Iconoclast
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| Posted 7/16/2002 1:03 PM (GMT -6) | | leth
Why should we believe that God has exhaustively and definitely inferred all future actions? It seems to be a very unnatural thought to suggest that God can not help but infer all future actions exhaustively and definitely.
Is this compatible with the Open View? Why/Why not?
Iconoclast
It sure seems compatible to me to although I am not the keeper of the Open View compatibility matrix. I would argue that for this NOT to be true we would have to presuppose that God does NOT have the ability to focus his attention. Or we would have to deny that God has an "attention" at all. Once we assume he is able to focus his attention and not allow ALL possible data values to impact him all at once then it seems that we would have to say that God is able to prevent his mind from automatically inferring all possible future actions.
leth
It seems entirely consistent with my experience that my actions are determined fully by past causes. It can not be proven that this is the case, but nonetheless I believe that this is a necessary presupposition to function in a rational and consistent manner, and further that everyone who knowingly functions in such a manner betrays an implicit assumption that this is the case. We clearly believe that a great many things are determined by past causes. It is not obvious that there is any intrinsic qualitiy of any particular type of actions such that we should suppose them to be not fully determined by past causes. I can not imagine the case to be otherwise; it seems as necessary as the belief that my nose is actually there right in front of my face, and that I can see it.
Iconoclast
I struggle with this statement. It seems logical to me that if this were true then there is no such thing as free will. We cannot actually make a choice because every "choice" we make is determined by past events. If you DO NOT believe in free will then I grant that your belief system is logically consistant. If you DO believe in free will, please help me understand how it is that we are not fully determined by past events and that any "choice" we have is illusory.
Are you familiar with the basic principles of Quantum Mechanics. Specifically, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle?
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson
Edited by - Iconoclast on 07/16/2002 6:06:02 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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leth
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Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/16/2002 4:20 PM (GMT -6) | | Iconoclast:
I would say that we are free in every meaningful sense. There is no ultimate observer that currently knows all that we will ever do. There is no ultimate puppet master that continuously acts so as to meticulously control us.
God does not know what I will do two weeks from Thursday. He does not want to know.
Why should we ask more than this?
No, I do not believe that God can create something whose future states are not fully determined by past states. I do not believe
that God can create something that acts without respect to past causes. I do not believe that God can create something that will function in a manner other than as he specifies.
Suppose that absolutely nothing exists except for God; God begins his creative work. If God creates X, then in the current state of affairs God knows absolutely everything about X. Further, if God introduces stimuli S, then God knows absolutely everything about stimuli S. To say that God can create X capable of responding to S in a way that God CAN NOT know, you must say that even knowing absolutely everything about everything that exists, God can not know how X will respond to S.
Unless some force or process causes a state of affairs that God creates to be different (in some respect other than it existing) than that state of affairs in his mind, you must say that even in his own mind, God simply CAN NOT (DID NOT is not enough) know how X would react if subjected to S. If this were not the case, then God would be CAPABLE of inferring all future states of affairs given any current state of affairs.
You may say that it is off limits to ask why God CAN NOT (as in lacks the ability to) infer in his own mind how X will react to S, but I would never think to believe it in the first place; upon what grounds?. If not this, you may say that when God actually brings about the state of affairs it is somehow different than the one in his mind, but then God can make no guaruntees, for he can not guaruntee that he can actually bring about what he sets out to create.
Are these thoughts entirely alien to everyone but myself? Did you not find yourself faced with these difficulties?
Edited by - leth on 07/16/2002 9:23:19 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Iconoclast
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| Posted 7/16/2002 5:21 PM (GMT -6) | | leth
No, I do not believe that God can create something whose future states are not fully determined by past states.
Iconoclast
This is a Newtonian physics presupposition. It is a "mechanistic" and deterministic worldview. Newtonian physics, while being a very good approximation of reality, has now been conclusively proven false by Quantum Mechanics. It has been clearly demonstrated by every experiment conceived that reality is NOT "mechanistic" and determined but is rather "probabilistic" and therefore undetermined. Albert Einstein strenuously disagreed with this conclusion by saying that "God does not play dice." He then came up with his most powerful thought experiment to prove Quantum Physics false - The "EPR Paradox". This paradox has since been scientifically proven by experimental evidence. Einstein was wrong! (He was also wrong about one or two other things to shockingly enough) Quantum theory has been confirmed again, again and again by every experiment undertaken.
Bottom line - the scientific evidence, which is mountainous, is that a quantum particle is NOT fully determined by its past states!
Now, if God can create a tiny particle that is not fully determined by its past states why couldn't he create an actual living being who isn't fully determined by its past states? And if you hear me saying that we are not dramatically influenced by our past states then I am saying it wrong.
If you are interested in looking at this scientific evidence let me know and I will recommend a few books. Is is absolutely mind-boggling!
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson
Edited by - Iconoclast on 07/16/2002 10:22:16 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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leth
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Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/16/2002 7:08 PM (GMT -6) | | I know very little about physics. I am very poor at math.
Yet, why have you assumed that God has actually created a particle of this sort? Why should we not say merely, "Yes, WE can not exhaustively predict their behavior"? Is not this the default reply? Should we conclude from the observation that we are unable to predict something that God likewise can not? Such a conclusion seems utterly unfounded.
BUT, Why have I assumed the opposite to be the case? This is a fair question. I will go through this a final time, and I will do my very best to reflect previous criticisms because I am entirely convinced of its truth. If it makes no headway, I will not raise the issue again unless I do so from Scripture.
Again, at one time there was nothing but God; we all agree with this. There was no unpredictable randomness external to God. Could God have been unpredictable to himself; is this why it is the case that God can not exhaustively infer future states of affairs? Presumably God can predict the great majority of his actions; we assume that this is the case. He can indeed guaruntee that he will not flood the world. He will indeed save all of those who have faith. Never will there be an instance of unpredictability where he will violate these guaruntees or where he will act so as to cause it to later be necessary that he should. Certainly we could come up with many more guaruntees that have been made.
Why should we then say that some of God's actions are unpredictable; what are the distinguishing qualities of these unpredictable actions that make this a reasonable conclusion? What particular thing is it about the situation in which they occur that we may identify them? We should be wary of arbitrary seeming conclusions; especially if they are ones that seem to solve a difficult theological problem.
Then even if God can predict himself, could he have still created unpredictable agents? For this I will first direct you to the final paragraphs of my previous reply. Then, why should it be the case that God can not, even in his own mind, with his own constructions, not simply refrain from knowing, but be INCAPBLE OF knowing the specific result of introducing a stimuli into the thought-experiment?
The central problem with the OV claim of free agents:
Can God create a, "polygon with between 5 and 8 sides"? That is, actualize the entity, "a polygon with between 5 and 8 sides". Of course not. It is not a THING which can be actualized. It is an abstract rather than concrete entity. Surely you see this.
I must assume that you agree God can not do this, for there is nothing at all to do. AND, it is no different to suggest that God can actualize the entity, "a being that takes some subset of the set of courses of actions {A1, A2, A3} when subjected to stimuli S1". There is no difference. It is an abstract entity that can not be actualized. It is further like suggesting that God actualize the entity, "a dog". What kind? How many legs?
The described entities can not be actualized. Their being so is contingent upon either God or an external force making the selection of which of the encompassed possibilities will obtain. If we are free as you say, God can not make this determination. If God does not make this determination, no one can; for at one time there existed only God, and there was no entity, no authority, and no process that God could have appealed to make the selection. We do not believe in dualism.
Even if it is God who is the unpredictable one, this objection still must be answered for the OV does not propose agents whose choices are contingent upon God's own unpredictability alone, but agents who are SELF-DETERMINING. Even if God alone is continuingly unpredictable, this does not satisfy the requirements of the OV claim.
Edited by - leth on 07/17/2002 12:13:43 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Iconoclast
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| Posted 7/17/2002 4:33 PM (GMT -6) | | leth
Can God create a, "polygon with between 5 and 8 sides"? That is, actualize the entity, "a polygon with between 5 and 8 sides". Of course not. It is not a THING which can be actualized. It is an abstract rather than concrete entity. Surely you see this.
Iconoclast
I also do not see how God could create a mountain without a valley.
Neither do I see how God can create a free-will being that is fully determined.
These are logical contradictions.
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 7/18/2002 1:30 PM (GMT -6) | | Leth argues:
(1) Suppose that absolutely nothing exists except for God; God begins his creative work.
(2) God creates X.
(3) In the current state of affairs God knows everything about X.
(4) If God introduces stimuli S, then God knows absolutely everything about stimuli S.
(5) If God can create X capable of responding to S in a way that God cannot know, then God does not know absolutely everything about everything that exists.
(6) God does know absolutely everything about everything that exists.
(7) Therefore, from (5) and (6) it follows that God cannot create X capable of responding to S in a way that God cannot know.
I think I would have to agree that (5) and (6) are true and that (7) logically follows.
However, (5) is conditional. The real question is whether or not it is true that "God can create X capable of responding to S in a way that God cannot know . . ."
As far as I know, the OV does not hold that God ever created an agent capable of responding in a way that God cannot know. The OV merely holds that God has created an agent X that, when introduced to stimuli S, is capable, at a minimum, of response R or not R. Thus, God DOES know absolutely everything about everything that exists. God knows that X when introduced to S at time T is capable of R or not R.
Therefore, according to the OV, it is NOT true that:
(5) "God can create X capable of responding to S in a way that God cannot know . . ."
Rather, God can create X capable of responding to S in more than one way and God knows all such possibilities.
God does know absolutely everything about everything that exists. God does know exactly how X is CAPABLE of responding to S (which may include more than one R). But this does not entail that God knows how X WILL respond to S.
What do you think?
Edited by - JET on 07/18/2002 6:40:52 PM
Edited by - JET on 07/18/2002 6:41:44 PM
Edited by - JET on 07/18/2002 6:45:10 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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leth
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Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/18/2002 2:21 PM (GMT -6) | | Iconoclast:
I also do not see how God could create a mountain without a valley.
Neither do I see how God can create a free-will being that is fully determined.
These are logical contradictions.
Leth:
I apologize if you took me to suggest that this view would hold that we have libertarian free will as defined by the Open View. Clearly the Open View provides as its definition of free agent, and almost exclusively as its definition, an agent that must be capable of selecting from a set of choices, where it is not possible for anyone to infer definitely which choice will be selected. What the view that I have presented would instead say is to replace "not possible for anyone to infer" with "no one has inferred".
I am suggesting that this is sufficient for the theological purpose for free will; at least as sufficient as that implied by the OV.
Further, I believe that the central claim of the OV is faulty.
To the problem with the OV claim of the free agent:
I believe that there are problems with the OV as that which you replied with. I will expand upon it since you took note of it.
First, I will restate it as follows to more sufficiently illustrate the equivalence:
Can God actualize the entity, "A polygon that currently has one of the numbers of sides of the following set {5, 6, 7}"?
And claim that it is analogous to:
Can God actualize the entity, "A being that currently has the desire to take one of the actions of the following set {A1, A2, A3}"?
My answer to both questions is that God can do neither, for nothing meaningful has been requested to be done. Neither is a concrete entity, and neither can be actualized given the absence of an agent, process, or function to select which of the encompassed possible entities obtains. If this agent is God, then the agent is not free according to the OV. If this agent is not God, then God can not know which selection this other agent will make. Yet, this other agent must by definition be a free agent.
Therefore, God can not create a free agent at least unless there already exists a free agent other than himself. Since there was a time when there existed only God and no other free agent, it follows that God could not have created a free agent.
Comments?
edit:
Further, remember that the OV claims that an agent must be "self-determining". If an agent is not so, then the moral responsibility which is a compelling element of the OV is lost.
Edited by - leth on 07/18/2002 7:36:03 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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leth
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| Posted 7/18/2002 2:23 PM (GMT -6) | | Sorry JET, I started that last post before you posted; I didn't mean to ignore you. I will respond if I did not cover it.
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leth
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| Posted 7/18/2002 3:20 PM (GMT -6) | | JET:
Therefore, according to the OV, it is NOT true that:
(5) "God can create X capable of responding to S in a way that God cannot know . . ."
Rather, God can create X capable of responding to S in more than one way and God knows all such possibilities.
God does know absolutely everything about everything that exists. God does know exactly how X is CAPABLE of responding to S (which may include more than one R). But this does not entail that God knows how X WILL respond to S.
What do you think?
LETH:
I was not very clear here, but my problem is actually with the selection. In order for X to be self-determining (and therefore morally responsible) according to the OV, it must be the case that God does not know which action X will take; that is, God knows that X will take some action of the set of actions {A1, A2, A3}, but God is incapable of now knowing which action (or subset of actions). Further, X must desire (not to be confused with general likes/dislikes) to take the action at the time it is taken. If X does not desire to take the action, then according to the OV, I assume that X would not be morally responsible for taking the action (which defeats the whole purpose).
In a previous thread I noted that in order for this to illustrate moral choices (which are the point), we should reword it as follows: God knows that X will take one action of the set of mutually exclusive actions {A1, A2, A3}, but God is incapable of now knowing which of the set of actions X will take.
Then to summarize, I believe that the difficulty is in the combination of the following requirements: 1) God must be incapable of predicting definitely which action X will take or X is not free, 2) The selection of the action to take must be non-arbitrary (not performed by a mechanism that performs random selections given a set of possible selections) or X is not morally responsible for taking the action (and arguably not self-determining), and 3) X must desire to take the action at the time it takes is or X is not morally responsible for taking the action, and 4) X must be self-determining or X is not morally responsible for taking the action.
I will wait and see how you all respond to my previous post.
Thanks.
Edited by - leth on 07/18/2002 8:22:33 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 7/18/2002 5:54 PM (GMT -6) | | Leth,
I'm thinking about your last post. In the meantime, I wonder if you could clarify something for me.
You said:
quote:
Consider the following: we are free in every meaningful sense in so far as God has not inferred what our actions will be, and within the range that he has proven them to be. I believe that this is the only meaningful sense in which there must be freedom.
and:
quote:
Clearly the Open View provides as its definition of free agent, and almost exclusively as its definition, an agent that must be capable of selecting from a set of choices, where it is not possible for anyone to infer definitely which choice will be selected. What the view that I have presented would instead say is to replace "not possible for anyone to infer" with "no one has inferred".
I am suggesting that this is sufficient for the theological purpose for free will; at least as sufficient as that implied by the OV.
As I understand it, the OV's definition of free will is inexorably linked to the OV's rejection of determinism. (Thus, according to the OV, free will entails that God cannot exhaustively and definitely infer future actions.) Since you believe all future states of affairs are determined, why do you find it important or necessary to hold that free will entails that God (could, but) does not infer future actions? If all future states of affairs are determined, what difference does it make if God does or doesn't presently infer them?
Thanks,
JET
Edited by - JET on 07/18/2002 11:02:19 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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leth
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Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/20/2002 8:13 AM (GMT -6) | | JET:
If all future states of affairs are determined, what difference does it make if God does or doesn't presently infer them?
LETH:
If the Bible portrays God as not having definite knowledge about many future events, then presumably such a view would explain why this is so; this is one aspect of why it would be important. What difference does it make to us in an emotional sense if all things are determined but God chooses not to know what is determined? Well, if you find yourself having the belief that despite your desire to do what you did, and despite seeing it as the best choice at the time, you still feel that life is just a sham if you didn't get to choose, then the distinction that this view would draw would make no difference to you. However, we do not seem capable of consistently acting as merely disinterested observers. Our emotions (including our commitment to God) and our nature compel us to be interested; we find it satisfying to be interested.
If God is indeed the interested observer that the Bible makes him out to be, and if he does indeed have a nature and an emotional state as the Bible makes him out to have, then why should it make a difference for God? If there is no other life to have, then it seems only reasonable that you should be interested in this one; God is interested in this one. Further, it seems fair to conclude, along with the OV, that God finds it more desirable to not know the future definitely than instead to know it as such.
About my argument about the entity being abstract:
I believe that it follows as presented, but later today I will attempt to better illustrate just why what it argues against in fact argues against the OV's claim of the free agent.
Thanks
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 7/20/2002 11:09 AM (GMT -6) | | Ok, explain to me how when God divides a shape over and over again he ends up with a five-sided form.
(Think about it.) | | Back to Top | | |
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leth
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| Posted 7/21/2002 8:56 AM (GMT -6) | | My analogy argues against the original creation of a morally responsbile free agent. However, it does not as presented argue against the case that God has created a morally responsible free agent only after having created non-morally responsible free agents. In fact, I believe that someone such as Iconoclast would posit just this: God first created non-morally responsible free agents (indeterminate quantum particles), and this unpredictibility gave rise to morally responsible free agents. This does seem to be a relatively reasonable sounding proposition; let us examine it.
Let us suppose that these quantum particles do not desire to take the actions that they take, but that they are nonetheless not definitely predictable. Can a similar analogy easily be made to apply?
I would present:
Can God actualize the entity, "A polygon that currently has one of the numbers of sides of the following set {5, 6, 7}"?
And claim that it is analogous to:
Can God actualize the entity, "A quantum particle that currently has one of the states of the following set {S1, S2, S3}"?
I would say that he can actualize neither. I will not defend this conclusion, because I think that it is entirely obvious.
BUT, you would argue, why should it be that it must be indeterminate the instant it is created? Let us instead suppose that God knows what initial state it will be in, but does not know the next state that it will be in.
I would present:
Can God actualize the entity, "A polygon that will in the next state of affairs have one of the numbers of sides of the following set {5, 6, 7}"?
And claim that it is analogous to:
Can God actualize the entity, "A quantum particle that will in the next state of affairs have one of the states of the following set {S1, S2, S3}"?
We are here supposing three things. First we are supposing that the "next state of affairs" will be the second state of affairs in which the polygon has existed. Second, we are supposing that God has determined (thereby bypassing the first analogy) which number of sides the polygon will have in the first state of affairs. Third, we are supposing that the polygon will in fact have one of the numbers of sides of the set {5, 6, 7} in the next state of affairs.
We might say that the polygon itself possesses energies such that in the next state of affairs it will come to have a number of sides of the set {5, 6, 7}. For the polygon to be a free agent, it must be the case that God can not know which of the numbers of sides it will come to have.
To say that the polygon can make this selection is to say that the polygon acts according to a process which makes a selection given a set of possible choices such that God can not know which will be selected. To say that there exists such a process is to say that there exist rules that this process functions according to. If these rules are sufficient such that a process functioning according to them will make a single selection, then, and I think that this is very obvious, the selection that will be made can be known if we know the initial conditions and these rules.
If it is not the case that the rules are sufficient such that a process functioning according to them will make a single selection, then either it is the case that a selection will not be made, or it is the case that these rules rely upon some other process which obeys some other set of rules.
Of course we can not have an infinite regress of processess and rules, and so we conclude that it is the case that either no selection will be made (the process could not produce a single selection), or it can be known which selection will be made.
To say that these rules are not well defined, is I believe to violate the conclusion of the first analogy (ie: it might be claimed that God did not know what these rules were when he created the polygon that makes a selection according to a process which functions according to these rules).
Comments?
Edited by - leth on 07/21/2002 2:00:57 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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anewbeginning
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| Posted 7/21/2002 9:07 AM (GMT -6) | | Hi Leth:
I think your argument boils down to this (correct me if I am wrong):
"It is impossible for God to create an object without first determining it's characteristics therefore it is impossible for God to create a self-determining being."
Is that a fair summary?
It's an interesting argument but I think it fails on a couple of points. First let's compare apples to apples. I don't think the impossibility of a non-existant, indeterminate polygon rules out freedom for existant beings, namely us. Perhaps you should try to argue that "it is impossible for God to create a polygon and then instill in it the ability to change into a state he didn't coerce." This is how I feel the Bible describes God's creation of true morally responsible (hence, self-determining) humans.
Second, it is difficult for me to rule out libertarian free will on the basis of "the unbroken causal chain". I believe all events are certainly caused, but individual causes don't necessarily generate one possible effect. I feel that our brain, with it's 10^11 nerve cells and 10^15 synapses are sufficiently complex (the most complex object in the known universe in fact) that to compare them with any polygon is unfair. It's from this complexity that I feel our consciousness and subsequent "freedom" arises as an emergent property. (As an interesting aside Stuart Hameroff, of the University of Arizona, feels the "microtubules" of each neuron may in fact be a subcellular computing system giving EACH NEURON the computing power of a desktop computer. Our estimates of the brains complexity may be incorrect by orders of magnitude!)
Sorry for the rabbit trail. Getting back to your argument, as Iconoclast alredy noted, the Newtonian idea of a universe with absolute space, time and even matter has been laid to rest by modern physics and mathematics. The future state S2 is not implicit in the past state S1. If you had absolute knowledge of the universe, you could not predict state S2 in terms other than in PROBABILITIES. It seems this is the way God chose to create.
So, you may be correct that in creating, God limited hiself. I just feel His limited knowledge is not not due to his deference, but is actually a property of creation.
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leth
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| Posted 7/21/2002 9:25 AM (GMT -6) | | (o):
Ok, explain to me how when God divides a shape over and over again he ends up with a five-sided form.
(Think about it.)
LETH:
Well, I assume that you want something other than for me to describe how this works geometrically (by bending a side along its length and altering the angles of the intersections of some of the other sides), but I am not quite sure what it is that you want.
Are you objecting to my use of a polygon for the analogy and saying that a polygon is simply a mathematical concept? Well, I could certainly suppose that polygon to have a certain width, and depth, and mass, and substance, and it would not make any difference to the analogy, but I thought that I would spare everyone those obvious details. Am I missing something; are you suggesting that the analogy could no longer hold if this were the case? I can't see what the reason could possibly be.
You obviously have something in mind. Please explain.
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leth
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Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/21/2002 10:15 AM (GMT -6) | | anewbeginning:
I think your argument boils down to this (correct me if I am wrong):
"It is impossible for God to create an object without first determining it's characteristics therefore it is impossible for God to create a self-determining being."
Is that a fair summary?
LETH:
Well, I think that the value is in the details (WHY the conclusion of the summary is reasonable), but it is a generally fair summary, and I would rather that you try to address certain points of my argument as it has progressed rather than a summary (and I would ask that you give me some leeway and address the points that seem most relevant, as I am certainly allowed to refine or recant points when problems are pointed out).
anewbeginning:
First let's compare apples to apples. I don't think the impossibility of a non-existant, indeterminate polygon rules out freedom for existant beings, namely us.
LETH:
I thought that this was clear, and my post immediately prior to this one (after yours, admittedly) states as much, but I could easily explicitly note the polygon itself to have the properties required for actual existence (length, width, volume, or whatever you want) and it would make no difference to the analogy, but I did not want to clutter the analogy further, and thought that this was entirely obvious.
anewbeginning:
Perhaps you should try to argue that "it is impossible for God to create a polygon and then instill in it the ability to change into a state he didn't coerce." This is how I feel the Bible describes God's creation of true morally responsible (hence, self-determining) humans.
LETH:
In what sense meaningful to the analogy does instilling the ability after the initial creation differ from actualizing the entity with the ability already instilled. Please describe in detail in what way relevant to the analogy having the entity already exist is important. I will do as you ask, but since I have at the moment put a considerable amount of content out, I will wait to see how you all deal with it.
anewbeginning:
Second, it is difficult for me to rule out libertarian free will on the basis of "the unbroken causal chain". I believe all events are certainly caused, but individual causes don't necessarily generate one possible effect. I feel that our brain, with it's 10^11 nerve cells and 10^15 synapses are sufficiently complex (the most complex object in the known universe in fact) that to compare them with any polygon is unfair.
LETH:
Yes, it is unfair in that if we were attempting to describe a full human being with all of its particularities, it would be rather silly to ascribe all human attributes to our polygon. However, that is not what the argument wishes nor needs to do. Please describe in detail what particular human attributes that can not be ascribed to a polygon make the analogy faulty for its purposes.
anewbeginning:
It's from this complexity that I feel our consciousness and subsequent "freedom" arises as an emergent property. (As an interesting aside Stuart Hameroff, of the University of Arizona, feels the "microtubules" of each neuron may in fact be a subcellular computing system giving EACH NEURON the computing power of a desktop computer. Our estimates of the brains complexity may be incorrect by orders of magnitude!)
LETH:
I agree entirely that how we work must be extremely complex. However, an argument from our apparent complexity is entirely unconvincing when dealing with God. If you believe that it is convincing, please describe the level of complexity that a thing must have in order for it to present problems for God's inferrential ability, and indicate which properties or implications of an entity with this level of complexity give us reasons to believe that this is so while not giving us reason to believe that it is so in the case of less complex entities.
anewbeginning:
Sorry for the rabbit trail. Getting back to your argument, as Iconoclast alredy noted, the Newtonian idea of a universe with absolute space, time and even matter has been laid to rest by modern physics and mathematics. The future state S2 is not implicit in the past state S1. If you had absolute knowledge of the universe, you could not predict state S2 in terms other than in PROBABILITIES. It seems this is the way God chose to create.
LETH:
Again, why are you assuming this to be the case? Findings of human physicists are not a basis for saying that God knows things as probabilities and not with certainty (surprisingly enough, the no-infer view that I have present DOES have God knowing many things as only probabilities). Newtonian physics are not the BASIS for my assumptions. It may very well be the case that so far as human physicists will ever be able to know, certain things are not definitely predictable; this has no bearing whatsover on my argument. My assumptions are that if we suppose things to be indeterminate for God, then we must make certain concessions about God that none of us are probably willing to make, or at least to tell others about. I have noted these particular assumptions several times. Please indicate either why you belive them to in fact be acceptable assumptions, or why you believe that they must not be made.
anewbeginning:
So, you may be correct that in creating, God limited hiself. I just feel His limited knowledge is not not due to his deference, but is actually a property of creation.
LETH:
This is central to my argument. Do you believe that it is a property of creation, or do you believe that it is an inherent property of all things that has always coexisted with God? One of the points of my argument is that I believe if you want to say this is so, then you must say that it has always coexisted with God.
Please, do not simply say that my assumptions about GOD are those of Newtonian physics and therefore wrong. It is entirely unrelated to this dicussion.
Edited by - leth on 07/21/2002 3:23:59 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Iconoclast
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Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1227
| Posted 7/22/2002 4:03 PM (GMT -6) | | leth
I would present:
Can God actualize the entity, "A polygon that currently has one of the numbers of sides of the following set {5, 6, 7}"?
And claim that it is analogous to:
Can God actualize the entity, "A quantum particle that currently has one of the states of the following set {S1, S2, S3}"?
I would say that he can actualize neither. I will not defend this conclusion, because I think that it is entirely obvious.
Iconoclast
But this is the very conclusion that you are using to support your entire argument. You are asking us to accept this as self-evident. It is not obvious to me at all that God cannot actualize a quantum particle with indeterminate states. In fact, all the known scientific evidence very strongly supports it.
To me it is like saying that the Sun goes around the earth and then when evidence is produced to the contrary saying that you won't defend it because it is entirely obvious. On the other hand, Einstein had a hard time accepting it too - it just doesn't fit with our normal day experience of how matter behaves. By the way, how many years did it take the church to accept that the Earth went around the Sun? And do we today believe that because the Earth is not the center of the universe then God is somehow less omnipotent?
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 7/22/2002 5:55 PM (GMT -6) | | Leth, thanks for recognizing the soccer ball in my post; and the lotis blossom, banana sections, etc. (Five and other odd sided shapes created by division by twos.)
I was just ruminating on how when something shifts, or things combine, the unexpected can result--really easily.
I was not at all objecting to anythign specific or partiular that you were saying. I was just reminding myself that often more diversity is possible, and real than we might first expect.
(Its been a little while--so that is all that I can remember.)
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leth
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/23/2002 12:55 PM (GMT -6) | | LETH:
I've been absolutely overwhelmed trying to meet a deadline for work, and so I apologize for being slow to respond.
(from before)
I would present:
Can God actualize the entity, "A polygon that currently has one of the numbers of sides of the following set {5, 6, 7}"?
And claim that it is analogous to:
Can God actualize the entity, "A quantum particle that currently has one of the states of the following set {S1, S2, S3}"?
Iconoclast:
But this is the very conclusion that you are using to support your entire argument. You are asking us to accept this as self-evident. It is not obvious to me at all that God cannot actualize a quantum particle with indeterminate states. In fact, all the known scientific evidence very strongly supports it.
LETH:
First, note (and I see why it was unclear) that I am not asking you to accept that the conclusion is self-evident. I am claiming that it is self-evident that God can not actualize the entity of the first statement, and that it is self-evident that the two statements are analogous for the purposes at hand. I am claiming that given these two things, the stated conclusion follows (God can actualize neither). If you object, you imply either that you do not believe that the two statements are analogous for the purposes at hand, or you are implying that God can actualize the entity of the first statement. If you know in particular what you find wrong, I would ask that you please point out what that may be. Also, as I noted in my post on the previous page of this thread , I do not believe that the analogy above proves the whole matter on its own, but I do believe that it's acceptance is crucial to the remainder of the argument.
Further, if you accept that the analogy above holds, you do not concede that indeterminism is false. If you do accept that it holds, then I am eager to see you address the remainder of my argument in that post, or to respond to any questions that you may have.
Iconoclast:
To me it is like saying that the Sun goes around the earth and then when evidence is produced to the contrary saying that you won't defend it because it is entirely obvious. On the other hand, Einstein had a hard time accepting it too - it just doesn't fit with our normal day experience of how matter behaves. By the way, how many years did it take the church to accept that the Earth went around the Sun? And do we today believe that because the Earth is not the center of the universe then God is somehow less omnipotent?
LETH:
Given as I noted in my previous paragraph that I am not claiming my conclusion to be self-evident, I will not repeat what I said before. I am not at all interested in empirical observations; not because I do not believe that they have value, but because I believe they are irrelevant to the discussion. For the record, I have no problem accepting that it very much seems to be the case that we can not and never will be able to definitely know the future state of certain particles. However, this is again irrelevant, as I am claiming simply that to say that this is the case for God, we must make certain concessions about the nature of God and God's existence relative to other things that I take Open Theists and other Christians alike to find theologically unacceptable.
I'll try to get back to you all sooner next time.
Edited by - leth on 07/23/2002 6:00:23 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Iconoclast
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Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1227
| Posted 7/23/2002 6:06 PM (GMT -6) | | leth
In regards to the indeterminate sided polygon thing: What I have heard you argue is that since we all find it meaningless for God to create an indeterminate sided polygon that we can then map that logic to the impossibility (or meaninglessness) of God being able to create any indeterminate object. All that is required for this assertion to be falsified is to find an object where indeterminacy is NOT meaningless - where indeterminacy makes perfect sense and is, in fact, required for certain phenomena to be intelligable. An electron is such an object. Its actual behavior can only be described accurately by postulating that it is an indeterminate object. Therefore it is NOT meaningless to say that it is an indeterminate object and therefore your assertion that the meaninglessness of an indeterminate polygon is conclusive about whether God can create an indeterminate object is falisfied.
leth
It seems entirely consistent with my experience that my actions are determined fully by past causes. It can not be proven that this is the case, but nonetheless I believe that this is a necessary presupposition to function in a rational and consistent manner, and further that everyone who knowingly functions in such a manner betrays an implicit assumption that this is the case.
Iconoclast
It turns out that it can be proven and, in fact, has been proven that determinism is NOT a necessary presupposition to function in a rational and consistent manner. Electrons in aggregate obey precise statistical laws (they are "probabilistic" particles). Yet a single electron can "interfere" with itself and can in fact suddenly disappear and reappear on the other side of an impenetrable barrier. A single electron's behavior cannot be predicted from past events. Are you familiar with the double-slit experiment? No math required - just a willingness to suspend all current beliefs about how matter really behaves.
Now, if you persist in the argument that this fact is irrelevant then I would assert that you must drop any argument that is based on the impossibility (or meaninglessness) of an indeterminate sided polygon.
Back to determinism being a necessary presupposition: we all behave in a way that assumes that the sun will come up tomorrow. I would like to assert that it is possible that the sun will NOT come up tomorrow - yes, it is very unlikely but it is certainly possible. The key point here is that we can behave rationally because we operate based on probabilities. And in the aggregate the probabilities we face day to day are pretty stable. The probability of the sun coming up tomorrow is about the same as it was yesterday and will remain that way for some time to come.
leth
Then to summarize, I believe that the difficulty is in the combination of the following requirements: 1) God must be incapable of predicting definitely which action X will take or X is not free, 2) The selection of the action to take must be non-arbitrary (not performed by a mechanism that performs random selections given a set of possible selections) or X is not morally responsible for taking the action (and arguably not self-determining), and 3) X must desire to take the action at the time it takes is or X is not morally responsible for taking the action, and 4) X must be self-determining or X is not morally responsible for taking the action.
Iconoclast
I do not see the difficulty with these statements as long as we presuppose that it is possible for God to create an indeterminate object.
leth
However, this is again irrelevant, as I am claiming simply that to say that this is the case for God, we must make certain concessions about the nature of God and God's existence relative to other things that I take Open Theists and other Christians alike to find theologically unacceptable.
Iconoclast
I apologize but I am not comprehending what these are. Would you be willing to state what these concessions are again?
thanks,
Iconoclast
"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson
Edited by - Iconoclast on 07/23/2002 11:10:14 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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leth
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/23/2002 7:41 PM (GMT -6) | | Oh come now. I appealed to the common sense of posters once before to take into consideration that I am, as are you, free to retract and to refine as needed what is have presented, and that in the interests of making the best use of all of our efforts, that I would oblige you to make every effort to reply to what seems most relevent at this point in the discussion. Clearly I did not start this thread with a definite conception of how my argument would procede, and so certainly you sould look to the end of this progression in the interests of fairness. You have entirely ignored the development of my argument and instead chosen to address what seemed most easy to attack. In fact, I dare say that I find it to be disingenuous on your part that those things with which you have taken issue are in large part those things which are clearly irrelvant to the points of my argument at this stage of its progression, and also those which I have put considerable efforts into answering as this thread has progressed; either you have not taken the time to address these (and you are not obligated to), or you have are not interested in doing so. You previous addressed the first portion of the latest presentation of my argument, to which I responded in a considerate manner and suggested where the discussion might best go from there; you ignored my suggestions with no qualifications.
I am not being disingenous in any sense, and am trying my very best to present what I, an ordinary layman, am thinking about these issues with a good faith belief that you all acknowledge these circumstances and take them into acount. If you find it tedious to deal with someone such as myself who is not trained in the formal presentation of such thinking and argumentation, then I hold nothing against you if you give me no further thought and will consider my argument to have failed at my own hands.
Yet if not, since my argument against Open Theism now seems to be the central topic of this thread, I will address those of your new comments to my original statements which are relevent, and then I will, in detail, lay out my argument as it stands at this point so that I may be clear on my points, and so that others can easily determine which points are relevent at the current stage of the progression of this thread.
Thank you. I look forward to this dialogue continuing, and will present what I have stated I will present when time allows.
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PotOnWheel
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 7/24/2002 5:04 AM (GMT -6) | | There is a really cool little book called "Time and Man" by Manzaridis. The selection of a title betrays the fact that, for us men and women, time is not just a standard metering of equal durations. (I know how to define a sphere as the set of all points equidistant from one point; but I'm not sure how to define "time.") In layman's terms I could define time for a bouncing soccer ball (superatomic--not 'subatomic'--considerations only for me thankyou) with standards called seconds, and the duration of all seconds being equal to each other. That suits soccerballs just fine. But for us men and women, the "second" just before the soccerball hits the top of the man's head while he talks to his wife on the sidelines is "longer" than most other seconds.
This thread seems to me to be about a soccer ball world. It seems to be about "actions" that are soccerball actions. In the accident above, that last second is very different for those who know something is about to happen than those who don't. And to anyone who feels that they can stop the accident, it is also different. And to anyone who succeeds in preventing the hurt it is also different.
"Inferring future actions", it seems to me, is about soccerball time. Given the same events and the same situation, what each one MAKE OUR OF IT is entirely different than mere soccerball facts.
The worry that gestates this thread is, to me, a red herring.
NO BOUNCING SOCCER BALL LIMITS OUR FREEDOM.
(The more central issue needs to be what consitutes freedom.)
Edited by - (o) on 07/24/2002 10:06:01 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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leth
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2002
Total Posts : 26
| Posted 7/24/2002 12:39 PM (GMT -6) | | LETH:
I have produced a compilation of the current progression of what I have claimed in my most recent posts. I did not come to this board, or even start this thread with this figured out in advance. Thus I have produced this compilation in the interests of making the best use of all of our respective time and efforts.
My primary concern is with how God created the very first created free agent; that is, how it occurs that things are unpredictible for God. There are three options, either 1) There has always been unpredictibility, 2) The initial state of a created thing is unpredictible, or 3) Some future state of a created thing is unpredictible. And so, if I can argue convincingly that God could not have created a first created free agent, then this is sufficient to argue against the claim made by Open Theism that there are currently a great many created free agents. I find it helpful for this specific end to remind myself we affirm that at some point in history, nothing existed except for God.
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First, I will present the following refined analogy so as to make it clear that it is an integral part of my argument, what conclusion I claim follows from it, and why I finding it self-evident, almost trivial that it follows. This is not the main thrust of my argument as it does seem rather trivial, but it is however, important to my argument as a whole. I will refer to this analogy as Analogy1. Please note, that I am not suggesting that a rock behaves similar to a quantum particle in the sense that we might commonly observe either, but rather that for the purposes of this first analogy, for "A X that", it is irrelevant was X is (I will explain this later).
Analogy1:
I would present:
Can God actualize the entity, "A rock that currently is in one of the states of the following set of distinct, complete states {S1, S2, S3}"?
And claim that it is analogous to:
Can God actualize the entity, "A quantum particle that currently is in one of the states of the following set of distinct, complete states {S4, S5, S6}"?
To clarify, I will introduce the following three qualifications, and they will perhaps seem to be relatively complex qualifications, but I wish to demonstrate my good intentions to take into account all comments and criticism leveled against my argument:
1) In every respect not having to do with the particulars of any one state, the rock possesses the requisite qualities and properties to be a concrete, actualizable entity.
2) In every respect not having to do with the particulars of any one state, the quantum particle possesses the requisite qualities and properties to be a concrete actualizable entity.
3) I understand that "state" has a particular technical meaning in the context of quantum particles; I here explicitly note that the use of "state" in this analogy is not intended to refer to or to in any way be analogous to the technical meaning of "state" as it may be in the context of quantum physics. One "state" of the quantum particle for the purposes of the analogy may in fact indicate that the quantum particle is in two, or perhaps three "quantum states", or that it is "in two places at once"; if that is important to you.
I will now illustrate why I find it to be self-evident that God can not actualize the first entity. "A rock", is not an entity with a state, it is not a concrete entity; rather it refers to a class of entities. I am assuming that this is not a matter of debate. In order that God might actualize the entity, "A rock", it is further assumed that God has in mind several possible states, thus the set.
Now, I wish to be absolutely clear on this matter. "A rock" is not the portion of the statement that I am concerned with. Neither is "the following set of distinct complete states" the portion of the statement that I am concerned with.
I am concerned with the portion, "ONE [state] of the STATES". I arrive at the conclusion that God can not actualize the entity of either statement as it currently is because it seems self-evident, trivial, that a selection must be made of a state from among states. Thus, the point of Analogy1 is that God can not actualize the entity until a selection is made. (Note that it is not my intention at this point to say anything at all about future states; that is the second portion of my argument.)
How does this relate to the matter at hand? It argues against a possible scenario that might be proposed by the Open Theist as to how God created the first created free agent. It argues against proposal (2), that the initial state of a thing is unpredictible; that is that God created a free agent in some way as a result of actualizing an entity for which he did not know which initial state it would be in. To this I add that if God makes the selection as to which of the possible encompassed entities obtains, then God would of course know the initial state of this entity, and no uncertainty for God results unless we were to make serious concessions about God's knowledge of the present and of his own actions. I add further that it can not be the case that some other entity makes the selection in such a way that God does not know which it will choose, for this entity must in order to satisfy this, be a free agent. Thus for this option to work, we would have to concede that God coexisted with an uncreated free agent external to himself. Obviously we will make neither of these two concessions.
More importantly however, noting that this selection must be made is crucial to the second portion of my argument.
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Now, a more popular claim (proposal (3)) seems to be that God knew the initial state of the entity, but that he did not know some future state of the entity. For the purposes of argument, we can suppose that it is the next state of the entity that God does not know.
We might suppose that this claim can be discounted by presenting a similar analogy, however it is not as straightforward that God can not actualize an entity of this sort, and so it is more advantageous to simply consider a propsition. The proposition suggests that God can actualize an entity of the sort whose future state will be within certain bounds, but whose exact future state within these bounds can not be known by himself. I will refer to this proposition as proposition P1. Again, for "A X that", it is irrelevant what X is for the purposes of the argument, but I have choosen "a cat" so as to make the example more tangible; I could have just as easily choosen X to be "a quantum particle". Again, I will show that P1 is false.
P1:
God can actualize the entity, "A cat that will in the next state of affairs be in one of the states of the following set of distinct, complete states {S1, S2, S3}".
We are here supposing three things. First we are supposing that the "next state of affairs" will be the second state of affairs in which the cat has existed. Second, we are supposing that God has selected which state the cat will be in in the first state of affairs, and that with this selection the cat is a concrete, actualizable entity before considering the matter of whether the requirement of its indeterminate future state can be fulfilled. Third, we are supposing that the cat will in fact next be in one of the states of the specified set (as of course if it is not, then God has failed to actualize the specified entity).
Let us suppose as has been said, that God actualizes the cat in its initial state; this is the first state of affairs. Now, in order for God to have actualized the cat in the statement (rather than just a cat that will not alter its state), it must be the case that the requirement for the cat of being in the next state in one of a set of states, can be fulfilled.
We can very easily imagine that it is God who selects the next state of the cat from the set of possible states. However, this is not what we want, for then God would have known which selection would be made unless we concede that God can not know which selection he will make (if you wish to argue that this is acceptable, please let me know). Also, it can not be the case that some other entity makes the selection in such a way that God does not know which it will choose, for this entity must in order to satisfy this, be a free agent. Thus for this second option to work, we would have to concede that God coexisted with an uncreated free agent external to himself.
Of course neither of these two options are particularly appealing, and probably neither would be endorsed by the Open Theist as possibly giving rise to a free agent. Instead, we might say that the cat itself will select which next state it will be in; this sounds like what we want. For this to be the case, it must be the case that God is incapable of knowing which selection the cat will make.
Now, the cat must somehow make a selection. That is, the cat, by making this selection will bring it about that it (the cat) is in one state of the set of distinct, complete states {S1, S2, S3}.
In order for the cat to make the selection, it must do so according to a process. We are speaking here of God's perspective. P1 claims that God has created a cat and that it is guaranteed that it will select one state from a set of states. If there is no process, there is no selection.
What is a process? A process is a collection of rules such that given particular inputs, when the process is applied, particular outputs result. If you wish to object to this, please say so.
Now, the issue here has now become whether or not God could have created a process, and more specifically, a set of rules composing a process such that when the process is applied to a set of states, one particular state is choosen such that God was incapable of knowing in advance which would be selected.
Unless we wish to make consessions about God's knowledge of the present or of God's effectualness in performing an act that he immediately wills (foremost so as to act upon it); that is that he does not try to create a rock and instead gets a chicken, then there is only one way that a process can produce a selection while at the same time it being the case that God is incapable of knowing which selection will be made (and I will expand upon this if you wish; just ask, but I think that it is very obvious). It must be the case that God does not know which rule will be created.
Thus we may propose the question:
God can actualize the entity, "A cat that functions according to a process, such that the process possesses at least one rule, such that this rule is currently in one of the states of the following set of distinct, complete states {S4, S5, S6}?
This is, very obviously (the "one rule" portion directly) analogous to Analogy1. Thus it it is the case, by the conclusion of Analogy1 that God can not actualize such a rule, and therefore that God can not actualize such a process, and therefore that God can not actualize such a being; specifically, a free agent.
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