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TRY in your mind to define the boundary between creation and providence. I’m not sure that I’m up to it—except in the most abstract way. Knowing the “end” before the beginning, that is a pretty useful insight into both how the Creator knows and provides.

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That would be "declaring" the end from the beginning:


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Remember the former things of old: for I am God, and there is none else; I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure.—Isaiah 46:9,10

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Declaring that I will wear white socks tomorrow doesn't mean I see the future.

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Deeper than any doctrinal prejudice, predestination is for St Paul nothing but a conventional form for designating the mystery of God's love, and this love determines or predestines God and not humanity, if one wants to use the concept.

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See, Laika. Any talk of God "forseeing" is evidence of the feeble-ness of both our lingual catagories and our thoughts. Our concepts don't even begin...

As with "justification" we pretty much need all the "pointalistic" (ala the painter Paul Saurat) analogies to even begin to approach the wonder.


.





(Like these paintings, where all the colors have to work together.)

• First, it is incompatible with libertarian free will. Though there are those who argue that no contradiction exists in the claim that God eternally foreknows as definite our free choices, I’m inclined to side with those who argue otherwise.



• Secondly, I believe it to be unscriptural. Scripture portrays God as sometimes “changing his mind” in response to human actions, expecting what does not come to pass (e.g., Isa. 5.1-4; Jer. 3.6-7, 19-20), speaking conditionally about the future (e.g., Ex. 13.17; Jer. 26), and testing people “to know” what is in their hearts. However, if the future is eternally settled in the mind of God, it becomes impossible, in my view, to understand such descriptions as truthful depictions of God’s relatedness to us and we are left with no option but to view God’s speaking in such ways as disingenuous.



• Thirdly, the simple-foreknowledge model affords no providential value whatsoever. If God timelessly knows all of history in the sense argued by advocates of simple-foreknowledge, then he knows his own as well as our choices, and he knows them in one single, timeless sweep. He does not acquire this knowledge in stages; he timelessly possesses it as an attribute. In this case, simple-foreknowledge provides God no providential advantage in governing the universe for the simple reason that God cannot intervene into the story line of history on the basis of such knowledge or access such knowledge in an attempt to determine what his own actions are to be. This includes attempting to prevent undesired events or to bring about what he does desire, warning and guiding people, and prophesying future events. What is foreknown, according to this view, is what actually happens and by definition is already the result of whatever has or has not been done to influence it. Such knowledge cannot then also be the basis of such interaction for the simple reason that this knowledge comes to God too late (logically speaking) for God to use it to influence outcomes.
  
  For example, let us say God timelessly knows that Susan will be in a fatal car accident on her 21st birthday. Granted, this knowledge does not cause her death or determine her choice to go driving with her friends. We’re only talking here about whether or not timelessly definite foreknowledge provides God a basis upon which he is able to act providentially. Can God use his knowledge of Susan’s death to warn Susan not to go driving? Can God act in a miraculous way to prevent this accident? In fact, can God do anything on the basis of his knowledge that Susan will die to prevent her from dying? The answer to these questions is, of course, that God cannot intervene on the basis of simple-foreknowledge in order to prevent this event from happening. Since God’s foreknowledge is infallible, what he foreknows will happen will indeed happen. Not even God can act in order to change what he infallibly knows will come to pass. Simple-foreknowledge, if it existed, would be useless to God in preventing foreknown evil and other undesired events.
  
  The same thing applies to God’s acting to bring about some event he wishes should happen. Why? Because by the time God foreknows what will happen, it’s logically too late to make use of this knowledge in order to bring about this event. The foreknown event is already the result of whatever divine influence contributed to bringing it about. It cannot also be the basis of that influence. On the simple-foreknowledge view, everything that God knows he knows timelessly. He doesn’t gain his knowledge of the future in stages. Therefore, if God were to timelessly possess exhaustively definite knowledge of past, present, and future, such knowledge could not provide him a basis upon which to determine how to act in ways not also timelessly foreknown by him. Thus, there is nothing a God who possesses simple-foreknowledge can do that a God who does not possess such foreknowledge cannot also do. In truth, whatever might be the reciprocal nature of the relationship between God’s actions and ours within the foreknowledge of God, the simple-foreknowledge model offers us no help whatsoever in understanding it. In my exposure to advocates of simple-foreknowledge, it appears the chief reason they hold to this model is because of the perceived providential advantage they believe it gives God and the perceived basis for trust in God they believe it gives them. But once the providential uselessness of simple-foreknowledge is faced, and the providential advantage of infinite intelligence (to be discussed immediately) is understood, one can continue trusting God with the added benefit of not having to embrace beliefs which explain nothing.



• Lastly, the integrity of divine-human relations and God’s knowledge of tensed facts require, in my view, the abandonment of the timeless view of God in favor of temporal eternity. God engages in real relations with a changing temporal world and has perfect knowledge of tensed facts. These entail his being temporal. I would also argue, though the open view does not require it, that the integrity of God’s triune personhood suggests there is in some sense of the words a “before” and an “after” that characterize God’s own inner triune life irrespective of his relating to creation—the eternal, loving fellowship that exists between Father, Son, and Spirit and that constitutes God’s own experience and enjoyment of himself. God is not an “eternal, unblinking, cosmic stare”; he is from eternity actively self-related and personal.

• First, as we’ve already seen, if God possessed timeless knowledge of every move I make in life, it would do him no good. He could not use this knowledge to strategize, plan, or respond to any of my moves, for every move he ever makes is equally foreknown in the one timeless act of knowing. Timeless knowledge is providentially useless.



• Secondly, in the open view, possibilities give God room to move and act, room which timeless knowledge cannot provide. It accounts for how we actually live our lives and relate to God as well as for how God is able to act providentially in the world.



• Thirdly, God’s glory and greatness are increased if we understand him as infinitely intelligent and facing a partly open future. Who is more glorious? A God who timelessly faces a future he can do nothing about or a God who achieves his purposes by perfectly knowing and preparing for all possible futures? Who do we admire more? A chess player who plays you with a computer printout of all the moves you will make, or a chess player who, facing genuine novelty as the game proceeds, and perfectly attending to every possible move and the constantly changing probabilities, is nevertheless creative and resourceful enough to guarantee the final victory? I’m genuinely surprised that anyone would call into question the orthodoxy of somebody who chooses to believe the latter describes the greater God.

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Lastly, as amazing as it may seem, the simple-foreknowledge model seems to me to be…

…nothing more than pre-recorded open theism!

Tom

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John Earp

(The following is meant partially as humorous banter, partially as serious reflection).

"God writes straight with crooked lines" = "Up is down, black is white, right is wrong, and good is evil." Yada, yada, yada. Typical Calvinistic nonsense. Where do we find statements like "God writes straight with crooked lines" in the Bible (or even the implication that such is the case)?

(I mean that in the nicest possible way).

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Don't beg for mercy from an artist if you 'bail out for the dirt' by a fastball that says "God writes straight with crooked lines." If a Chaplain ducking bullets in Iraq can dish it up, you with your four walls and three meals can just deal with it. Keep your "Yada, yada, yada" and put catsup on it!


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Jean Luc-Godard said, "Sometimes reality is too complex. Fiction gives it form."
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Grow up and recognize the utility of forms of word-usage that deal with the "real" complexities of reality, and not just paper over the surface tensions, providing easy rationals.


POW!

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Grow up and recognize the utility of forms of word-usage that deal with the "real" complexities of reality, and not just paper over the surface tensions, providing easy rationals.

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For the Eastern Church, God is never the primary cause, but the Creator. It is creation "in the image" of the Creator which places the "second freedom" outside any causal determinism, and the patristic conception of humankind as autexousia, self authoritative, rightly defines its mysterious capacity to transcend every necessity and the very condition of the creature over against divine freedom: to see oneself as microtheos, as God-in-miniature. One can even say that God, the Lover of humankind, is much more determined himself by his creation and his covenants than the creature by his Creator: "The Lord has sworn and he will not change his mind" (Ps 110:4). The Incarnation appears as God's reply to his own promise: the divinizing of his creature. The fall of man reveals the titanic fullness of our freedom, which in turn, determines our own destiny. Satan did not lie in saying: "You will be as gods." Man has created something which never existed before. We created evil and introduced it into our innocent nature. What is more, our salvation determines the shape of the Incarnation as Love crucified. Divine blood has been shed to safeguard our freedom in grace, for, according to the Fathers' saying, "God is not able to force anyone to love him."

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John Earp quote:
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Grow up and recognize the utility of forms of word-usage that deal with the "real" complexities of reality, and not just paper over the surface tensions, providing easy rationals.
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I don't think believing nonsense helps anyone grow up. But I suppose you believe in Santa and the tooth fairy, too. ;)

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For the Eastern Church, God is never the primary cause, but the Creator. It is creation "in the image" of the Creator which places the "second freedom" outside any causal determinism, and the patristic conception of humankind as autexousia, self authoritative, rightly defines its mysterious capacity to transcend every necessity and the very condition of the creature over against divine freedom: to see oneself as microtheos, as God-in-miniature. One can even say that God, the Lover of humankind, is much more determined himself by his creation and his covenants than the creature by his Creator: "The Lord has sworn and he will not change his mind" (Ps 110:4). The Incarnation appears as God's reply to his own promise: the divinizing of his creature. The fall of man reveals the titanic fullness of our freedom, which in turn, determines our own destiny. Satan did not lie in saying: "You will be as gods." Man has created something which never existed before. We created evil and introduced it into our innocent nature. What is more, our salvation determines the shape of the Incarnation as Love crucified. Divine blood has been shed to safeguard our freedom in grace, for, according to the Fathers' saying, "God is not able to force anyone to love him."

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POW, I think this is a very interesting statement. Does the author mean what I think is meant? On another thread I was trying to differentiate between two types of "freedom": (1) freedom as "power" to do X or not-X versus (2) freedom as God-given ability to "create". Or as the author of the above quote says: freedom as "second cause" versus "second freedom" ("second creators"?)

JET

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"...Think back to the moment when Jesus Christ was dying on the cross. Incidentally, let me tell you what John Sanders, one open theist, says about the cross. He says that God the Father had no knowledge that His Son would end up being crucified. And at that particular moment, when God the Father looks down from heaven and sees His Son hanging on the cross, John Sanders put it in language somewhat like this, "Oops, I guess we have to switch to plan B." Because, you see, to these open theists, God is completely surprised by any large number of events that happened in the world. But this poor, impotent deity, who is described by the open theists, this finite God of open theism, had no way of knowing at the time that Jesus was dying if even one human being would accept His Son as Savior. This poor, impotent deity faced the possibility that the suffering of His Son on the cross would bring about the salvation of no one...."

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Ok, first of all, I’m not real sure about what John Sanders believes or doesn’t believe; however, with regards to, “God the Father had no knowledge that His Son would end up being crucified” seems an unnecessary conclusion. My question to you is why does Nash take this as a logical conclusion for the Open View of the Future? As far as I know, God knows all possibilities and contingencies perfectly and God knows all things God determines his/herself to do, soooo…God must have known that Jesus would be crucified at least as a possibility, secondly, I don’t remember ever seeing any type of surprised language or shock & awe that God the Father had with regards to the Son’s death. Furthermore, I do believe as an Open Theist that God the Son self determined himself to die on a tree to break the curse (I’m not going to get into the whole theology for the cross because I don’t believe that this answers the original accusation).

Now, with regards to nash’s anti-openness rhetoric,
“God is completely surprised by any large number of events that happened in the world. But this poor, impotent deity, who is described by the open theists, this finite God of open theism, had no way of knowing at the time that Jesus was dying if even one human being would accept His Son as Savior. This poor, impotent deity faced the possibility that the suffering of His Son on the cross would bring about the salvation of no one.”

I find it sad that he needs to use trash talk rather than just stating the case.

Warmly in Christ,
Tiggers





“The notion that God uses evils as a means to such higher goods is, … incompatible with the doctrine that he is omnipotent, and therefore does not need to use deplorable means to achieve his ends” (J.L. Mackie).

Edited by - Tiggers on 04/12/2003 6:14:38 PM

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Rom. 5.7-8: “Why, one will hardly die for a righteous man -- though perhaps for a good man one will dare even to die. But God shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us.”

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Bob, if God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge, that is, if he eternally knows only what “shall” come to pass (and never what “may” come to pass), then in what sense then did Christ die for us “while we were yet sinners”? In the accompanying analogy, Paul contrasts the rare willingness of a person to die even for somebody who (relatively speaking) deserves to be saved with Christ’s death for people who (in contrast to the righteous man) offer no guarantee of a return on the investment. That is, we may die for a righteous or good man because good men are likely to “pay it forward” via their goodness. Something will come of our death. Our readiness to die in this case is determined by the likelihood that the person we are dying for will make our death worthwhile.

However, Paul CONTRASTS this with Christ’s death for us “while we were yet sinners.” Think through the implications of this. Both the deterministic and simple-foreknowledge views of the future rob this analogy of its force and effect, for the needed contrast between the analogy of how/why we die only rarely for good people and how/why Jesus died for us “while we were sinners” is entirely lost. If a) Christ dies for those he has elected from eternity only, or if b) God foresees that so-and-so will in fact receive him, become a righteous person, and bring forth fruit, then Christ dies for us with THIS in mind, and it then makes no sense to contrast Christ’s death for me “while I was a sinner” with our willingness to die for people who promise a return on our investment. If God is certain of the return he gets on his investment because he already knows those individuals for whom Christ’s death will be effective, then Christ’s death is not dissimilar to the way we die for others. But Paul insists it IS different.

This suggests to me that a) God’s love is so infinite that he sent Jesus to do whatever it took (die for us) to secure a people for himself, and b) God did not die for those he knew via foreknowledge or election would receive him. Does this have to mean that God has no idea that anybody would accept him or that it was only “dumb, blind, luck” that got God his church? No. God can “know for certain” that he’ll have a bride because he’s certain of his own abilities to persuade, the power of his love, etc. Was it “technically” possible that no individual would ever respond? Yes. I think so. But this technical possibility is like it being “technically” possible that my eight year old boy who plays chess will defeat Kasparov in a match. Is that possible? Well, yes, technically. Does this reduce Kasparov’s victory over my eight year old to “dumb, blind, luck”? No. Is Kasparov going to ever lose in such a match. Never. Can Kasparov know that he’ll win in every such match? Yes.

So, does it follow logically from libertarian freedom and the open view that it was possible no individual would ever respond to the gospel? Yes, technically. Does this reduce God’s victory and the existence of the church to “dumb, blind, luck”? Only for dumb, blind theologians. God can know certainly that he’ll have a church without either having to elect certain persons to salvation or foreknowing which one’s would believe.

Nash: “Oops [God speaking], I guess we have to switch to plan B.” Because, you see, to these open theists, God is completely surprised….

Tom: Two things. First, Bob, you have to decide whether you’re going to stay the course in objectively thinking through these issues, postponing judgment for a year or two until you’ve taken sufficient time to wade through the evidence, or whether you’ll find people like Nash who will say things you wish were true and just let them do your thinking for you. Which is it gonna be?

Secondly, Nash’s comment here is pure poppycock. In the open view, God never says “ooops” and is never “completely” surprised. If there exist possibilities, Bob, and if God knows them perfectly, then nothing ever happens which God did not (eternally) foreknow as at least a possible outcome. And in this case, God would be (eternally) prepared for the event as if it was the only thing he had to think about and prepare for since the beginning of creation. The only “ooops” I hear is my own ooops in “Ooops. I thought Nash was more academically together than this.”

Bob: Ah, this [Nash’s comments about Aristotle] is beginning to make more sense to me. I have seen alot in here about Plato and Socrates (including Boyd's and I think some others quotes attached to their posts) and kept thinking, "But they were not Christian men, were they?" but Nash's comments tie togehter for me the relevance. It was they who first really began this Open Theistic thinking, yes? Would I be correct in saying that?

Tom: It’s not so cut and dry. Like everybody else, Aristotle believed and said some things that were right on and other things that were not. Same is true of Nash and Einstein! Aristotle’s not being a Christian has absolutely nothing to do with whether or not he is right or wrong about the truth-value of future-tense propositions. So, don’t think that because it comes from Aristotle that a statement is necessarily false, or that because it comes from Nash it’s true.

Now, the two biggest synthesizers of Greek philosophical thought and Christian theology were not open theists, they were Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The ideas of God as the “unmoved mover,” of perfection as “unchanging,” and other similar notions that influenced the classical view (which open theists are challenging rather than propagating) are Hellenistic. So, to answer your question, you would not be correct in saying Plato and Socrates were the first to really begin “this open theistic thinking.” Way off. But something tells me that you want to believe Nash is right and are more comfortable where you are.

Bob: This confirms many of my own thoughts as I have been reading what has been posted here in attempts to explain Open Theism. He [Nash] says, "This is not my God. This is a very different God" and to that I have to say "AMEN!" because I have felt that way also and said that very same things many times in response to things I've read in here.

Tom: Well, I’m happy that you’re happy at least.

Bob: I read things and think…

Tom: You may read things, but right now Nash is doing your thinking for you.

Bob: Do you believe that God did not know that Jesus would be crucified?

Tom: I think the Father knew he would be crucified, yes. You can believe this and still be an open theist.

Bob: Do you believe in "luck"?

Tom: Define luck. I do believe in genuine “chance” at the quantum level. This is science, pure and simple. It’s a big can of worms, but quantum indeterminacy does not leave us with a random unpredictable universe.

Bob: Does open theism's teachings derive themselves from Plato and Artistotle's?

Tom: Absolutely not. Do MORE reading Bob.

Bob: If Nash has said things that misrepresent the true teachings of Open Theism, then please refute them.

Tom: I think I have. But you seem very eager to believe Nash at first hearing regardless. How open are you to being convinced otherwise? Are you looking for the truth at all costs or are you looking for quick answers to comfort yourself in the belief that you couldn’t have been wrong in believing something for so many years?

Bob: I know that takes alot of time though.

Tom: It does indeed! And it’s “a lot” (two words), not “alot” (forgive me, it’s weakness of mine! )

Blessings,
Tom

Edited by - TGB on 04/13/2003 01:54:07 AM

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Don't beg for mercy from an artist ...

Grow up and recognize the utility of forms of word-usage that deal with the "real" complexities of reality ...

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