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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 12/4/2002 8:06 PM (GMT -6) |   | For philosophical types:
After my paper at the ETS ("Can An Omniscient God Learn?") William Lane Craig challenged me on this basis: the open view of God does not affirm that God knows the truth value of all propositions. In the open view, he was suggesting, the principle of bivalence doesn't apply to future tensed propositions (viz. they are true or false). I replied: "Bill, we need to go out to supper, because you keep saying this, and its just not true (though it may be true of some open theists). We went out for supper (with David Clark, Jim Bilbie, Paul Eddy and Mrs. Craig), had a great time, fine food, and enlightening discussion.
Craig's main objection is that if the future is open, God doesn't know whether its true or false that (say) "Jones will be president in 2028." Hence God isn't omniscient. My reply is that the truth value of propositions is "indexed" to possible worlds. God DOES know whether its true or false that "Jones will be president in 2028" in each and every possible world (viz. possible future). But I, in contrast to Craig, don't believe that it is yet decided WHICH possible future will be actualized. Still, the principle of bivalence applies, for it is EITHER true or false in any POSSIBLE future that "Jones will be president in 2028." Our disagreement, then, isn't about the principle of bivalence, but about THE NATURE OF THE FUTURE.
Now, we didn't get to the topic that night, but David Clark raised a potentially strong objection to me afterwards when he remarked that God doesn't know the truth value of the proposition expressing WHICH possible future will be actualized. Suppose we lable each POSSIBLE future "T1, T2, T3 etc..." God doesn't know whether its true or false that (say) "T103 will be actualized."
My reply -- to which I'd like feedback if anyone is interested -- is this: There are three distinct classes of statements about the future that are logically possible. There are "x will occur" statements, "x would occur" statement, and "x might or might not occur" statements. These are NOT logically reducible to each other (Craig conceded this, tentatively). An omniscient God knows the truth value of each set. If "x WILL occur" is true, its false that "x would not occur" and false that "x might not occur". If "x MIGHT occur" is true, its also true that "x might NOT occur" and thus false that "x WILL occur."
Hence there is a logical difference, usually missed in ordinary parlance, between these two propositions:
a) "T103 WILL (certainly) be actualized" and
b) "T103 MAY or MAY NOT (possibily) be actualized."
If "B" is true, "a" is false -- EVEN IF x ends up occuring.
So, if T103 is indeed "open", then God knows that it MAY or MAY not occur, but thereby knows that its FALSE that T103 SHALL occur -- even if T103 ends up occuring.
The principle of bivalence holds, and the future is partly open.
The oddity of this position, of course, is that we have to say that it is false that "Jones will be president in 2028" when spoken in 2003 even if it turns out Jones IS president in 2028. The oddity, I argue, occurs in common parlence only because we remove the "shall certainly" verses "might possibly" that is implicit in all future declarations. If we more specifically say that it is false in 2003 that "Jones shall certainly be president in 2028" even though Jones turns out to be president, the position is not so odd.
The alternatives to my views, while holding to an open future, are either to hold that
a) future tensed propositions are true or false, but God can't know these truths, for they are unknowable (William Haskers position), OR
b) future tensed propositions are neither true or false, for there is no reality that corresponds to them (as Aristotle and Cicero held).
"A" seems to me to count against omniscience. "B" undermines bivalence. My view avoids these two problems.
What do you think of my third alternative?
Doc
"In Christ...the ONLY THING that matters is faith energized by love." Galatians 5:6 | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 12/5/2002 1:24 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
I replied: "Bill, we need to go out to supper, because you keep saying this, and its just not true (though it may be true of some open theists). We went out for supper (with David Clark, Jim Bilbie, Paul Eddy and Mrs. Craig), had a great time, fine food, and enlightening discussion.
A small bit of humourous thinking, from one who's never been to ETS.
I once posted the story from a Christian writer friend who was out to lunch with others in Christian publishing, at a restaurant. The waiter got no response at all when he asked them whether they wanted anything from the bar before dinner. Finally--out of pure mercy to the waiter--a senior person at the table explained to him: "I'm sorry. None of us drink in front of each other." | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 12/5/2002 1:33 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc-
Good stuff. I like your third alternative.
I’m glad you and Craig sat down and discussed this. I enjoyed the interaction between you two in the Four Views book on Foreknowledge, but it was clear there that good would come if the two of you could sit down.
quote:
There are three distinct classes of statements about the future that are logically possible. There are "x will occur" statements, "x would occur" statement, and "x might or might not occur" statements. These are NOT logically reducible to each other (Craig conceded this, tentatively).
If Craig concedes that these are not reducible to each other, then isn’t he immediately in the same boat as open theists? I mean, doesn’t he as well as open theists have to account for propositions of the “may or may not” sort? He has to argue either that a) all propositions of the “x may or may not happen” form are necessarily false, or if they are not false—if they may be true NOW—that b) such knowledge does not amount to God’s being less than omniscient.
As far as I know, Craig argues (a), namely, that all “may or may not” propositions are now necessarily false, for they are (or rather were) attached to the possible worlds God was free to create or not create. Thus, for Craig, “may or may not” propositions only describe what might HAVE been, never what might be (as you noted in the Four Views book). God’s freedom to choose to create one of many possible worlds meant that before choosing which world to create, “may” and “may not” propositions were either true or false. In the absence of God’s choice to create, it was true that “Jones may or may not be president in 2028” (in one or more possible worlds). Since the choice to create, however, Craig would argue that the statement “Jones may or may not be president in 2028” is false. The choice to create falsified all possible worlds (and with them all possibilities) save one, the world God resolved to create.
quote:
Now, we didn't get to the topic that night, but David Clark raised a potentially strong objection to me afterwards when he remarked that God doesn't know the truth value of the proposition expressing WHICH possible future will be actualized.
OK, follow me and see if this makes sense. For Clark’s objection to stand, must it not also follow that God was NOT free in creating THIS world? If God must eternally know which of the possible worlds he will choose to actualize (if this bit of information was always a certainty in his mind), then the other “possible” worlds which Craig and, I’m assuming, Clark want to argue God was free to create were never really “possible” worlds at all. In other words, if there ever was a time (or a logical moment in God’s experience) God believed these other worlds “could have” been created, then it follows that there was a time (or a logical moment in God’s mind) God was less than certain which world he would end up creating. It seems Clark wants to say that unless God always/eternally knows for certain which of the many possible worlds he will create, God is not omniscient. But if this is true—if this bit of knowledge was never anything other than a certainty in God’s mind—then is it not also true that God was neither free to refrain from creating nor free to create any of the so-called possible worlds other than the one he ended up creating? I’m probably hashing this up philosophically, Doc, but do you see what I’m trying to get at here? Why EVER speak of “possible worlds” God “could have” created if it’s also true that the knowledge of which world “would be” created was never anything but a certainty in God’s mind?
quote:
a) future tensed propositions are true or false, but God can't know these truths, for they are unknowable (William Haskers position)
I could be wrong, but I’m pretty sure this is not Hasker’s view. I’m only doubting this because I recently finished God and Time and corresponded a bit with Hasker about this. I believe Hasker actually argues that the truth value of counterfactuals (of the “x will or will not occur” sort) is false.
Tom
"It might take a year or two to begin to understand Calvinism. But you won't do so by reading books. It's a transformation of outlook." Al & Fred
Edited by - TGB on 12/05/2002 06:44:56 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 12/5/2002 5:14 AM (GMT -6) | | Thanks for the feedback Tom. You really understand the issues well... and I can tell you you are in a distinct minority on this account.
Tom: He (Craig) has to argue either that a) all propositions of the “x may or may not happen” form are necessarily false, or if they are not false—if they may be true NOW—that b) such knowledge does not amount to God’s being less than omniscient.
Doc: Craig argued (and, apparently, will argue in published form in a response to an essay I wrote for Philosophi Christi) that all "would" counterfactuals logically IMPLY "might" counterfactuals. If it is true that "x would do y" then it IS true that "x might do y." The "might" is a subset of "would." So classical Molinist do NOT assume that all "might" counterfactual statements are false.
Now, if this is a principle of logic, so be it. (I only had one course in symbolic logic, and the professor was terrible. I think I need to brush up on all this). But there are two points I made in my discussion with Craig.
a) I don't want to take on the whole logical enterprise, but his point strikes me as counterintuitive. How can "x would do y" imply "x might do y" if "x MIGHT do why" admits of the possibility that "x might NOT do y" whereas "x would do y" logically EXCLUDES "x might not do y"? SOMETHING is screwy here.
b) I don't see that the point Craig is making is very significant. If it is correct -- and again, I hesitate to take on the whole logical establishment, but also hesitate to accept Craig's version of it -- it only shows that I am incorrect in saying classical Molinists assumed all might counterfactuals were false. FOR, even if "x would do y" implies "x might do y," it ISN'T the case that "x might do y" implies "x would do y." And SO, you can have propositions expressing MIGHT counterfactuals that are true or false without any corrolary might counterfactuals. Indeed, if it is true that "x might do y", it is FALSE that "x would not do y." SO, there is STILL a distinct class of propositions that are either true or false that is distinct from "shall" and "would" propositions. And God would have to KNOW the truth value of these propositions. And, again, the truth value of these propositions is not reducible to the truth value of propositions expressing "shall" or "would."
Craig replied that he didn't know what to do with this. But he didn't seem to think it was an important point. To me, it is central.
TOM. The choice to create falsified all possible worlds (and with them all possibilities) save one, the world God resolved to create.
Doc: Sort of. As a Molinist Craig would argue that even after God's choice to actualize THIS one possible world, it is still true or false that "x WOULD do y in situation z" . And in his view, this implies that "x MIGHT do y in situation z." Hence might counterfactuals are also true of false. But the position is odd, I think, for, as I said, "might" logically entails "might not", whereas "would" rules out "might not." Also, as I said, to say "x might do y" does not imply "x would do y."
HOw can "mights" be a subset of "woulds" if "Mights" DON'T logically imply "woulds"? Alan Rhodes, you ought there. You're a logician aren't you. Help us out here. Craig was insistent that "mights" were a logical subset of "woulds," but conceded that you could have "mights" that don't imply "woulds." Is this not contradictory?
Tom: For Clark’s objection to stand, must it not also follow that God was NOT free in creating THIS world? If God must eternally know which of the possible worlds he will choose to actualize (if this bit of information was always a certainty in his mind), then the other “possible” worlds which Craig and, I’m assuming, Clark want to argue God was free to create were never really “possible” worlds at all.
Greg: I touched on this point that night. I think its a strong one. If the classical Molinist position is correct, God could not have created a world with an open future EVEN IF HE WANTED TO. Which is to say, an open future is a LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY. Which means by LOGICAL NECESSITY the future is eternally resolved. Which, I argue, implies fatalism.
Craig's never responded to my question, but he did argue that I confuse logical and psychological categories. To speak of a possible world is to speak of a LOGICALLY possible world, hence a world that is "possible" even if it is eternally certain it will never come to pass. He holds that God "freely" chose to actualize the world he actualized, even though it was eternally certain which world he would actualize, for certainty is a psychological category, but "possible" is a logical one. The "moments" of God's evaluation of possible worlds to decide which world to actualize are not TEMPORAL moments, but LOGICAL moments.
TOM: This In other words, if there ever was a time (or a logical moment in God’s experience) God believed these other worlds “could have” been created, then it follows that there was a time (or a logical moment in God’s mind) God was less than certain which world he would end up creating.
Doc: See, you're making the same mistake as me. "Certain" is psychological, "possible" is logical. He says that "possible" contrasts with "necessary," not certain. My response was, "okay, if I wanted to say in logically correct lingo that God was UNCERTAIN, how could I do it? It seemed to me he was baffled by the question. An omniscient God can't be "uncertain." And THIS is what leads me to suspect that, while my expressions are not formally "tight," they are not necessarily formally wrong. Rather, I strongly suspect there is a hidden metaphysical assume (or set of assumptions) that is driving Craig's formulation of the logical rules. For it does not seem to me LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for God to create a future where some "might propositions" are true, and NOT as subsets of "would" propositions.
Tom: It seems Clark wants to say that unless God always/eternally knows for certain which of the many possible worlds he will create, God is not omniscient. But if this is true—if this bit of knowledge was never anything other than a certainty in God’s mind—then is it not also true that God was neither free to refrain from creating nor free to create any of the so-called possible worlds other than the one he ended up creating?
Doc: I think you're nailing it Tom. But their response would be that you are psychologizing God's freedom. It perhaps comes down to this: can you have a meaningful concept of freedom that is not sequenced? I don't see how. God was free NOT to create this world even though it is eternally certain he would create this world.
Tom: I believe Hasker actually argues that the truth value of counterfactuals (of the “x will or will not occur” sort) is false.
Doc: I could be wrong on this. Does Hasker say that future tensed propositions are NEITHER true or false? (Heh, want not invite Hasker to join this thread. I'd love his input.
Thanks for the feedback.
Greg
"In Christ...the ONLY THING that matters is faith energized by love." Galatians 5:6 | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 12/5/2002 2:31 PM (GMT -6) | | Very interesting. I recall, Greg, when I first read your discussion of 'might-counterfactuals' in the Four Views book it struck me as a simple conceptual distinction that devasted Craig's objection that open theism denied bivalence (a.k.a., the law of excluded middle). I wondered at the time how Craig might respond to you. It's nice to see some dialogue between you and Craig. Craig's a good scholar, very bright, and much more open to discussion on these issues, I gather, than fellows like Ware, Piper, and Geisler.
Doc: Craig argued ... that all "would" counterfactuals logically IMPLY "might" counterfactuals. If it is true that "x would do y" then it IS true that "x might do y." The "might" is a subset of "would." So classical Molinists do NOT assume that all "might" counterfactual statements are false.
Alan: I think that what Craig has in mind is the principle that actuality implies possibility. If it is the case the "x would do y" or that "x would not do y" then it must be LOGICALLY possible that "x does y", which Craig seems to equate with its being true both that "x might do y" and that "x might not do y". Thus a would-counterfactual implies the truth of the corresponding might-counterfactual. As for the claim that the "might" is a subset of the "would", this is clearly false as it stands. If, as seems reasonable, we take "mights" to refer to pure possibilities and "woulds" to world-relativized actualities, then the converse is true: "woulds" are a subset of "mights", not vice-versa. For there may well be pure possibilities or mights that would-not be actualized in any possible world. In fact, Craig's Molinist approach to the problem of evil presupposes that this is the case. Craig's too good a thinker to make that obvious a slip, so I think he meant not that "mights" are a subset of "woulds" but that all "woulds" imply a corresponding "might". To that extent I think he is correct, as long as we are talking about LOGICAL possibility.
Doc: Now, if this is a principle of logic, so be it. ... But there are two points I made in my discussion with Craig.
a) ... How can "x would do y" imply "x might do y" if "x MIGHT do y" admits of the possibility that "x might NOT do y" whereas "x would do y" logically EXCLUDES "x might not do y"? SOMETHING is screwy here.
Alan: You are on to something here, Doc. Craig is correct as long as we are talking solely about LOGICAL modality (or modality de dicto). You are correct if we are talking about ONTOLOGICAL modality (or modality de re). Many philosophers who talk a lot about possible worlds overlook this distinction, or overlook its importance, or forget it at times and conflate the two. When Craig says "x MIGHT do y" he means merely that it is logically possible that "x do y". When you say "x MIGHT do y" you mean something more. You mean that it is not only logically possible but REALLY possible that "x do y". Modality de re is more restrictive than modality de dicto, so conclusions that follow under the latter case don't necessarily follow under the former. "Woulds" imply de dicto "mights" but not de re "mights". For example, "if circumstances C obtain, Peter would deny Christ" implies that it is possible de dicto that "if C, then Peter deny Christ" and that "if C, then Peter does not deny Christ". But all that means is that Peter's denying or not denying Christ in C is not a logically contradictory notion. But that is a far cry from saying that it is possible de re that "if C, then Peter does not deny Christ." As you point out, Greg, if the would-conditional is true then that implies that, given C, it was not within Peter's power to refrain from denying Christ. In terms of modality de re, it is false that Peter might not deny Christ.
Doc: b) I don't see that the point Craig is making is very significant. If it is correct ... it only shows that I am incorrect in saying classical Molinists assumed all might counterfactuals were false. FOR, even if "x would do y" implies "x might do y," it ISN'T the case that "x might do y" implies "x would do y." ... Indeed, if it is true that "x might do y", it is FALSE that "x would not do y." SO, there is STILL a distinct class of propositions that are either true or false that is distinct from "shall" and "would" propositions. And God would have to KNOW the truth value of these propositions. And, again, the truth value of these propositions is not reducible to the truth value of propositions expressing "shall" or "would."
Alan: I concur.
Doc: How can "mights" be a subset of "woulds" if "mights" DON'T logically imply "woulds"? ... Craig was insistent that "mights" were a logical subset of "woulds," but conceded that you could have "mights" that don't imply "woulds." Is this not contradictory?
Alan: I think you are right here and that Craig is wrong. The converse is true: "woulds" are a logical subset of "mights".
Doc: If the classical Molinist position is correct, God could not have created a world with an open future EVEN IF HE WANTED TO. Which is to say, an open future is a LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY. Which means by LOGICAL NECESSITY the future is eternally resolved. Which, I argue, implies fatalism.
Alan: I think this is correct if we are thinking of "mights" as de re possibilities. The reason is that in classical Molinism each possible world in DEFINED by the set of "woulds" and "will" that are true in that world. Since "woulds" imply the falsity of de re "might nots", in each possible world everything is already settled. The only truly open decision in classical Molinism is God's decision to create possible world x as opposed to possible world y. Once he does so, everything else is settled.
Tom: Must it not also follow that God was NOT free in creating THIS world? If God must eternally know which of the possible worlds he will choose to actualize (if this bit of information was always a certainty in his mind), then the other “possible” worlds ... were never really “possible” worlds at all.
Alan: Craig would answer this by saying that God's eternal knowledge of all actualities is LOGICALLY, though not temporally, subsequent to his free decision to create world x. That may not be ultimately coherent, as Greg suggests, but it will not be easy to SHOW that.
God bless,
Alan
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 12/5/2002 2:43 PM (GMT -6) | | Regarding the principle of bivalence in general, it seems to me that there may be good reason to deny it in some cases.
The principle says that, for any proposition p, it is either true or false that p.
Charles Peirce argued that the principle breaks down in the face of vagueness. Take a vague term like 'rich'. Is it true or false that 'I am rich'. Well, that depends on how you define the term. In order to apply bivalence you have to make the term 'rich' precise by giving it a definite extension. For example, we might define 'rich' to mean 'makes over 30K per year'. On that definition I am not rich. On other definitions I would be rich. Until the boundaries of the vague term have been made precise, there is no definite truth of the matter as to whether or not I am rich. The proposition has no determinate truth value.
Now suppose that vagueness is not just a feature of language or of our thinking but a fundamental truth about reality. To the extent that reality is vague, bivalence is not true. And to impose bivalence on own understanding of the world in all situations will be to force the world to fit into nice neat conceptual categories. Maybe that can't be done. If not, then insisting that we cling to bivalence as Craig does may be a mistake.
Food for thought.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 12/5/2002 6:02 PM (GMT -6) | | If lack of a degree doesn't disqualify one...
quote:
Greg: I touched on this point that night. I think its a strong one. If the classical Molinist position is correct, God could not have created a world with an open future EVEN IF HE WANTED TO. Which is to say, an open future is a LOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY. Which means by LOGICAL NECESSITY the future is eternally resolved. Which, I argue, implies fatalism.
Al: I don't know all the details. I just look for trends, for Gestalts, for patterns. Seems to me that currency is given above to things that can be measured in quantity. Like number of choices. That seems common to the Open View. So, were I to be imagining it here, it is that commonness that I'll blame. But I think its there. "Open" future seems to be measured in numbers of possibilities. Rather than quality of freedom. Quantity of choices versus quality of freedom.
In this respect, I find the dicussion of "Time as the freedom to love" from Timothy (Kallistos) Ware's The Inner Kingdom (the stuff I posted on the Time thread) to be of great interest.
The quantity versus quality might be my own thoughts. They might have been something I read over a year ago. I feel dejavu, like I put something like that here over a year ago. I don't know. But the focus on quantity of choices is a problem for the OpenViewists.
Was it Greg/Doc who wrote: For it does not seem to me LOGICALLY IMPOSSIBLE for God to create a future where some "might propositions" are true, and NOT as subsets of "would" propositions.
Al: I'll vote, intutitively, for that one. WHY NOT? It seems to me to be intrinsically creative. I bet so. along with the qualitative focus (I was reading Alan's psychological versus logical with interest...), a few potentialities and opportunities seem to fit the mix.
(Have I frustrated any logicians?  )
Doc: It perhaps comes down to this: can you have a meaningful concept of freedom that is not sequenced? I don't see how. God was free NOT to create this world even though it is eternally certain he would create this world.
Now, THAT one is just too, TOO easy! So easy that I won't offer it to solve any of the problems you are trying to solve.
In the Triunity of the Godhead, the Personal freedom of God's communion is not sequenced. At all. And it is truly free.
It is not a form of radical suffering of one for/against the other. There is no oppostition of persons, or relationships. None of that have I ever seen in what little, but attentively read portions of Patristic texts or Byzantine revival literature that I've been privvy to.
So, I'll leave this night with my signature quote intact.
+
The reality of the Godhead, so to speak, is intrinsically relational - or, as Basil of Caesarea put it, God is 'a kind of continuous and indivisible koinonia, (Letter 38, Migne, PG 32, 332a). - FERGUS KERR OP | | Back to Top | | |
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Chucks3371
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Date Joined Oct 2002
Total Posts : 28
| Posted 12/6/2002 8:08 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
a) "T103 WILL (certainly) be actualized" and
b) "T103 MAY or MAY NOT (possibily) be actualized."
The little modal operator "(certainly)", that was sublty inserted, changes everything. The question should be posed "Is it possible for Jones to be elected president in 2028?", which is a variation of (b) and equivalent to (a). Presumably God knows whether it is possible or not for Jones to be elected.
The answer to (a) is not necessarily "false". If Jones will be elected in all possible worlds, then the answer to (a) is "true".
However, the question "Will Jones be elected ..." (without a modal operator) is ultimately indeterminate, because even up to election day, it has no deterministic answer; right after election day the question suddenly becomes "was Jones elected in 2028?", which is usually answerable.
BTW, what is so sacred, so to speak, about the principle of bivalence?
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Chucks3371
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| Posted 12/6/2002 1:58 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
BTW, what is so sacred, so to speak, about the principle of bivalence?
To continue: The principle of bivalence is not a fundamental axiom of logic since it can be denied without fear of contradiction. As a matter of fact, two of the greatest logicians in history -- Aristotle and C. S. Peirce -- both denied this principle.
The relevance? Aristotle denied it, particularly in the case of statements about the future, since he claimed it would lead to a justification for determinism or fatalism.
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Tom
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| Posted 12/9/2002 1:00 PM (GMT -6) | | Good stuff all!
1. Actually, William Hasker did register with the board and has tried to post on this thread without success. Let's hope he gets through!
2. Alan, I like your thinking. Few things:
a) Assuming that there may be circumstances when the principle of bivalence doesn't hold true, is the truth value of 'would' and 'might' counterfactuals one such circumstance? My guess is it's not.
b) I wish Craig were here. Dang.
c) What about Craig's point that speaking about "certainty" as an attribute of God's knowledge under any circumstance is psychologizing God, or psychologizing his freedom? If everybody agrees on what the propositions under question ("will," "would," and "might" propositions) mean, then the question of God's certainty is perhaps unecessary. If "x will do y in 2028" and "x would do y in 2028" are properly understood as logically excluding both "x might..." and "x might not do y in 2028," then the 'certainty' I'm talking about IS there, NOT as a psychologizing of GOD, but as an attribute of a PROPOSITION which logically excludes "x might..." and "x might not do y in 2028." If x will do y, then it's certain that x will do y (and thus certain that x will not do -y). I don't have any problem dropping the word "certain" out of this and simply saying that if "x will do y" is true, then it follows that x WILL do y and x will NOT do -y.
Let's shift the "certainty" that Craig objects to away from GOD'S emotional state of mind and understand it as qualifying "will" and "would" PROPOSITIONS. Make sense?
d) Still, I think Doc's question to Craig, "If I wanted to say in logically correct lingo that God was UNCERTAIN, how could I do it?" is a great one. Craig was baffled by it.
e) What I have always understood "certainty" in these regard to apply to was not some psychoanalyzing of God, but rather to the "determinateness" of the truth value of counterfactual propositions. Where's this "determinateness" or "definiteness" (better terms than "certainty"!) come from? In the Four Views book Craig actually objects to the very question. And Doc noted it. Craig takes the truth value of would counterfactuals as a metaphysical surd. It's just there. The principle of bivalence I suppose actually creates the truth value of such propositions. What else can Craig say? He agrees that this definiteness does NOT come from God. And (as Doc noted in the 4 Views book), Craig denies that we ourselves are responsible for the definiteness of counterfactuals describing how we would act, for this definiteness eternally precedes us. Whence this definiteness? Craig disallows the question.
My brain is empty. Love this topic though. Doc and Alan, please say more! I'm taking notes.
Tom
"It might take a year or two to begin to understand Calvinism. But you won't do so by reading books. It's a transformation of outlook." Al & Fred
Edited by - TGB on 12/09/2002 6:17:50 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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Starkman
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Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1747
| Posted 12/9/2002 1:35 PM (GMT -6) | | I HATE it when we . . . when you guys get into these conversations. I go from "Yes, I see" to "Yeah, that makes sense", to "Okay, I think I have it. That wasn't to hard", to "Wait, what was that again", to finally, "Crap! I'm lost, and worse, this isn't all that complicated. What am I, absent a few bricks from a building?" AND THEN I GET MAD! (I'm still the Starkman, though!)
Well, I'll have to go back now and read the whole thread again, only to loose it all half way through. Why, God, why wasn't I born with smarts in this area? Frustrating!
The Starkman
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 12/9/2002 3:06 PM (GMT -6) | | 2 questions:
Can you DANCE to it?
and
What's it got to do with salvation?
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JET
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Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 12/9/2002 4:49 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom said:
quote:
Craig denies that we ourselves are responsible for the definiteness of counterfactuals describing how we would act, for this definiteness eternally precedes us.
From the articles on his website, I have understood Craig as arguing that we ARE responsible for the definiteness of counterfactuals describing how we would act (DESPITE the fact that this definiteness eternally precedes us) based on the distinctions between "sensus compositus" and "sensus divisus", the distinction between "hard facts" and "soft facts", and the idea of time travel. (All of which sounds to me like retroactive causation, although I believe Craig denies retroactive causation.)
See http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/menus/omniscience.html
Which explains in part my attraction to the OV. I was a big fan of Craig's Molinism (before I was introduced to the OV) because it seemed to me, at least, that Craig takes seriously the idea of self-determining freedom. But Craig does this through a very complicated logic that includes these distinctions (between "sensus compositus", "sensus divisus", "hard facts", "soft facts", etc.). If there were no other options available, I suppose I would have to spend more time trying to understand where he's coming from. But the only reason I can see for holding onto such a complicated compatabalism is in order to hold onto EDF. And I just can't see why EDF is worth holding onto. There are just too many philosphical and Biblical problems associated with it. And Doc persuasively argues that the OV postulates a more intelligent God than the proponents of EDF. So the OV avoids the problems of EDF, it postulates a more intelligent God, and it is so dang . . . simple.
Has anyone else argued for the OV on the philosophical principle of Ockham's razor?
Edited by - JET on 12/09/2002 9:55:18 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 12/10/2002 1:27 AM (GMT -6) | | quote: "Craig takes seriously the idea of self-determining freedom..."
Now, can you dance to that?
Is 'self-determining freedom' "dancing to a different drummer?"
Inquiring minds want to know. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 12/10/2002 2:40 AM (GMT -6) | | Fred: Can you DANCE to it?
Tom: The real question is: Who WOULD (counterfactual!) dance to that?
Fred: What's it got to do with salvation?
Tom: With ‘getting’ saved, nothing. With the journey, a good deal.
JET: I have understood Craig as arguing that we ARE responsible for the definiteness of counterfactuals describing how we would act (DESPITE the fact that this definiteness eternally precedes us) based on the distinctions between "hard facts" and "soft facts" and the idea of time travel. (All of which sounds to me like retroactive causation, although I believe Craig denies retroactive causation.)
Tom: Wow. I’ll have to check that out. I remember Craig ripping Hunt (who made a LOT out of hard and soft facts) apart in the Four Views book. Hmmm. So, Craig denies retroactive causation but claims the definiteness of our actions both comes from us and eternally precedes us. Interesting. And time travel? In his Time and Eternity Craig argues the tensed theory of time as well as that God is temporally eternally (not both temporal and timeless). Now God does time travel?
Starkman! You gotta be kiddin me man. Come on! Please tell me you grasp this! 
Tom 
"It might take a year or two to begin to understand Calvinism. But you won't do so by reading books. It's a transformation of outlook." Al & Fred | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 12/10/2002 3:49 AM (GMT -6) | | I should have said Craig argues that we are responsible for the definiteness of counterfactuals describing how we would act despite the fact that God (from eternity) knows how we would act. I think he would deny that the definiteness of counterfactuals describing how we would act eternally precedes us. Rather, I think he argues that we have it within our power to "bring it about" that God (from eternity) knows that we would act in a certain way (which he claims is different from having the power to "cause" a past event.)
I'm not summarizing Craig very well. Check out his articles, particularly his earlier reponse to Hasker.
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PotOnWheel
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Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 12/10/2002 5:39 AM (GMT -6) | | From Chucks3371 on "Predecessors to Open Theism" thread:
quote:
Chucks3371 quote:
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"Spirituality as the Performance of Desire: Calvin on the World as a Theatre of God's Glory"
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quote:
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. . . It can be said reverently, provided that it proceeds from a reverent mind, that nature is God; but because it is a harsh and improper saying, since nature is rather the order prescribed by God, it is harmful in such weighty matters, in which special devotion is due, to involve God confusedly in the inferior course of his works
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I sensed that Calvin's theology, rightly understood, is quite msytical. As a matter of fact, there are a couple of reviewers on Amazon -- non-Christians -- who are attracted to Calvinism for this mystical element.
A couple of weeks ago, I heard Neil Walsch (of Converstions with God fame) interviewed on the Art Bell show. In Neil's world, everything is an action of God, including humans who are little centers of consciousness acting out God's will. Basically, the world as drama, though the actors are unaware of their roles within it. Much like a universalist Calvinism, which calvinism would be if they stop redefining worlds like "all" and "world".
quote:
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Recent scholarship in Calvin Studies has emphasized that the sixteenth-century Genevan Reformer's theology was not so much governed, as traditionally thought, by an over-arching "system" centered on a unifying doctrine of (for example) predestination, as it was by "the constant reappearance of favorite images, metaphors, or figures of speech."
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This exemplifies the adage that a great thinker does not always get the followers he deserves.
I liked what Chucks3371 posted!
Tom and JET,are you two describing something more Calvinistic than Calvin?
Edited by - fred on 12/10/2002 10:43:22 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 12/10/2002 6:46 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom: "It might take a year or two to begin to understand Calvinism. But you won't do so by reading books. It's a transformation of outlook." Al & Fred
Then you had better get started SOON!
Here's suprising, challenging, and delightful help!:
Edited by - fred on 12/10/2002 11:49:38 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 12/10/2002 7:21 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
There are "x will occur" statements, "x would occur" statement, and "x might or might not occur" statements. These are NOT logically reducible to each other (Craig conceded this, tentatively).
But:
quote:
Craig argued . . . that all "would" counterfactuals logically IMPLY "might" counterfactuals.
I hope Craig clarifies his views on "might" counterfactuals. Seems to me the question of "might counterfactuals" is the same as the question of self-determining freedom. Craig (who is not a Calvinist) wants to affirm self-determining freedom while holding to EDF. If I’m understanding Craig, he attempts to do this by arguing that:
P (at T1) has the power to "bring it about" that God (from eternity) knows that P would do X at T1.
Sure sounds like retroactive causation.
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 12/10/2002 9:01 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Sure sounds like retroactive causation.
quote:
"Most modern Western thinking and acting and living is based on the ground motive of Determinism versus Freedom: things are either determined or free, never both. Such a ground motive is dualistic in nature: it pits two things against each other as irreconcilable opposites. In information technology, for instance, this dualism has given rise to two main camps: the rationalists and the interpretivists. "
"Approaches based on nominalism find integration and inter-communication. . .difficult."
www.basden.u-net.com/Dooy/summary.it.html
"Cosmonomic Philosophy"
(with special relevance to Information Technology)
A Summary of Dooyeweerd's Main Ideas
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Tom
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| Posted 12/10/2002 9:40 AM (GMT -6) | | Hi all-
Bill Hasker was having trouble posting but wanted to comment, so he's forwarded some thoughts on to me and I'm posting them for him.
Tom
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Greg seems to be right in saying that "X will certainly occur" is the contradictory of "X may not occur." One would need to work out the formal logic of this, but I see no reason to doubt that this could be done.
What is not correct, however (in my opinion), is that *all* future-tense statements claim that so-and-so will *certainly* occur. Suppose I say, "The Indianapolis Colts will be playing in the 2003 Super Bowl." I am not saying that it is now *certain* that they will do this; I just think they will. Now you, being a benighted fan of the Kansas City Chiefs, may reply, "They may or they may not." Have you disagreed with me? In a way you have; you are implying that I don't have the right to be as positive about the Colts being in the Super Bowl as I am. But you haven't said, or implied, that it is *false* that they will be in the Super Bowl, so you have not directly contradicted me. I haven't, after all, claimed that they will *certainly* be in the Super Bowl -- only that they *will* be in it.
Now once we recognize this category of statements about the future, statements that say what *will* happen but do not imply that it is *certain* that this will occur, the whole problem comes back again. One could say that these statements simply don't have a truth-value at the time they are made, and I see no absolute objection to this. (Why is the principle of bivalence sacrosanct, anyway?) Or, one might say that the statement *does* have a truth-value because of the *actual* future event, which is the line I've taken. And then one will go on to say that, if the event is genuinely contingent, it is logically impossible for it to be known before it occurs. And I don't see why that should be a problem. It is just foolish to accept a definition of "omniscience" which requires that an omniscient being should know things it is logically impossible for anyone to know!
Bill Hasker
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"It might take a year or two to begin to understand Calvinism. But you won't do so by reading books. It's a transformation of outlook." Al & Fred
Edited by - TGB on 12/10/2002 3:05:44 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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gguskid
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Date Joined Oct 2002
Total Posts : 32
| Posted 12/10/2002 10:21 AM (GMT -6) | | I would like to throw this question out there and see if it sticks, if anywhere.
Can we talk about predictability when it comes to God's knowledge of future events? I.e., God in His intimately perfect knowledge both of His will and of His creation is able to predict with 100% accuracy what will happen in the future.
God is 100% accurate in prediction. He is not so much seeing future events prior to them occurring--as if they are simultaneously occurring in time yet not until that time comes--but rather, knowing them because He knows His creation with intimate perfection and predicts with 100% accuracy what will actually occur in their lives. This would allow for God to know, not based on seeing the future but rather on understanding so completely the disposition of His creation, namely humanity in this respect, that His accurate predictions give Him the "view of the future."
This may or may not have implications for the immediate discussion but while reading through the thread it prompted me to pose the question, both here and on a new thread: “100% Accuracy Of Prediction.”
Until That Time…
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PotOnWheel
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Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 12/10/2002 10:50 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
from: "Cosmonomic Philosophy"
A Summary of Dooyeweerd's Main Ideas (with special relevance to Information Technology)
"Most modern Western thinking and acting and living is based on the ground motive of Determinism versus Freedom: things are either determined or free, never both. Such a ground motive is dualistic in nature: it pits two things against each other as irreconcilable opposites. In information technology, for instance, this dualism has given rise to two main camps: the rationalists and the interpretivists. "
"Approaches based on nominalism find integration and inter-communication. . .difficult."
http://www.basden.u-net.com/Dooy/summary.it.html
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 12/10/2002 2:16 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
Thanks for passing Hasker's post on to us.
WH,
Hope you're able to overcome that technical problem soon. When posting make sure that you are logged in. I don't know if that's the problem, but I've been frustrated several times when posting because I thought I was logged in when I wasn't.
Tom: Assuming that there may be circumstances when the principle of bivalence doesn't hold true, is the truth value of 'would' and 'might' counterfactuals one such circumstance? My guess is it's not.
Alan: I'm still thinking much of this through along with you, so don't take this as my final word. It seems to me that if the principle of bivalence fails in the face of vagueness, then there is a good case to be made that it fails in the case of 'would' and 'might' counterfactuals of freedom (CF for short). My thinking is this. Granting libertarian freedom, what shape the future will take depends in part on our choices. But choices usually aren't made instantaneously. There's a process during which an idea gradually takes hold of us as we mull over the options. In other words, there's a phase during which what shape the future will take is indeterminate--it could go either way and as we deliberate the probabilities of its taking shape one way or another fluctuate between 0 and 1. Making the choice is like collapsing the wave packet in quantum mechanics. What was indeterminate collapses into determinacy. Now this indeterminacy is a kind of ontological vagueness. To deny this implies that our choices always take place between fully determinate options, that when shifting from one alternative to another we make an instanteous jump from one discrete possibility to another. This seems implausible to me.
Tom: What about Craig's point that speaking about "certainty" as an attribute of God's knowledge under any circumstance is psychologizing God, or psychologizing his freedom? If everybody agrees on what the propositions under question ("will," "would," and "might" propositions) mean, then the question of God's certainty is perhaps unecessary. If "x will do y in 2028" and "x would do y in 2028" are properly understood as logically excluding both "x might..." and "x might not do y in 2028," then the 'certainty' I'm talking about IS there, NOT as a psychologizing of GOD, but as an attribute of a PROPOSITION which logically excludes "x might..." and "x might not do y in 2028." If x will do y, then it's certain that x will do y (and thus certain that x will not do -y). I don't have any problem dropping the word "certain" out of this and simply saying that if "x will do y" is true, then it follows that x WILL do y and x will NOT do -y. ... Let's shift the "certainty" that Craig objects to away from GOD'S emotional state of mind and understand it as qualifying "will" and "would" PROPOSITIONS.
Alan: I like your thinking here, Tom. Fact is, we use the word "certain" is two very distinct senses. (1) First, there is the subjective sense, as when someone says "I am certain that ...". Subjective certainty simply means having a very high degree of confidence that some proposition is (or will be) true. This is psychological meaning of the word. Second, there is the objective sense of certainty, as when someone says "IT is certain that ...". Objective certainty has nothing to do with certainty or psychology. To say that something is objectively certain is to say that it is completely reliable, that it WILL BE whether anyone thinks so or not. So we can talk about God's subjective certainty that, say, Peter will freely deny Christ. And we can talk about the objective certainty that Peter denies Christ. But I don't think it makes sense to talk, as Molinists do, about the objective certainty that, in world W, Peter FREELY denies Christ. If that fact was objective certain logically or temporally prior to Peter's choice, then, simply put, Peter was not free in the libertarian sense to refrain from denying Christ.
Tom: What I have always understood "certainty" in these regard to apply to was not some psychoanalyzing of God, but rather to the "determinateness" of the truth value of counterfactual propositions. Where's this "determinateness" or "definiteness" (better terms than "certainty"!) come from? In the Four Views book Craig actually objects to the very question. And Doc noted it. Craig takes the truth value of would counterfactuals as a metaphysical surd. It's just there. The principle of bivalence I suppose actually creates the truth value of such propositions. What else can Craig say? He agrees that this definiteness does NOT come from God. And (as Doc noted in the 4 Views book), Craig denies that we ourselves are responsible for the definiteness of counterfactuals describing how we would act, for this definiteness eternally precedes us. Whence this definiteness? Craig disallows the question.
Alan: I love your thinking, Tom. You really are a very clear thinker (and writer, I might add). You express well the dilemma that confronts any Molinist. If you attribute the definiteness of CFs to us, then how could God possibly have known (with objective certainty) what any creature would freely do prior to that creature's choice? If you attribute the definiteness of CFs to God, then how do you avoid divine determinism? So Craig refuses the choice, at the price of leaving the definiteness without any metaphysical grounding. As you say, it seems like on his view the principle of bivalence (a logical principle) grounds the ontological determinateenss of these CFs. But that is a serious category error on his part. As someone famous who I can't remember once said, "Thought imposes no necessity on reality". Logical principles, as such, govern our concepts, our thinking. From them NOTHING FOLLOWS about what is the case. That's the fallacy behind the ontological argument and all strictly rationalistic attempts to prove the existence of God.
Loving the discussion. Feedback appreciated.
Alan
Edited by - Alan Rhoda on 12/11/2002 3:31:17 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 12/10/2002 6:49 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan: You are on to something here, Doc. Craig is correct as long as we are talking solely about LOGICAL modality (or modality de dicto). You are correct if we are talking about ONTOLOGICAL modality (or modality de re).
Doc: I’m thinking your de re/ de dicto distinction is important. I’m definitely talking de re.
Alan: I think this is correct if we are thinking of "mights" as de re possibilities. The reason is that in classical Molinism each possible world in DEFINED by the set of "woulds" and "will" that are true in that world. Since "woulds" imply the falsity of de re "might nots", in each possible world everything is already settled. The only truly open decision in classical Molinism is God's decision to create possible world x as opposed to possible world y. Once he does so, everything else is settled.
Doc: Yes, but even the "openness" of God’s decision regarding which world to actualize is dubious, since it is eternally certain. Might one say that it is a de dicto openness, not a de re openness?
Alan: suppose that vagueness is not just a feature of language or of our thinking but a fundamental truth about reality. To the extent that reality is vague, bivalence is not true. And to impose bivalence on own understanding of the world in all situations will be to force the world to fit into nice neat conceptual categories. Maybe that can't be done. If not, then insisting that we cling to bivalence as Craig does may be a mistake.
Doc: Ohhhhh, I think this line has possibilities (excuse the pun). In my paper at EPS ("Can an Omniscient God Learn?") I argued that all temporal theists must affirm that God does learn. For, whatever God foreknows, he doesn’t know it is "now" until it IS "now." The experience of "now" adds to his propositional foreknowledge. He LEARNS what it is to experirence "x" as "now," even if he foreknew x perfectly. The addition, I argued, was "definiteness, richness, concreteness." My argument was that eternal perfect propositional knowledge cannot capture the "definiteness, richness and concreteness" of present actuality.
If accepted, one could argue – as Hartshorne and others have argued – that the future is distinct from the present in that it LACKS the "definiteness, concreteness and richness" of the present. It is, in a word, VAGUE. And, if your point about Pierce is accepted, this would mean that the principle of bivalence wouldn’t exhaustively apply to it.
This needs work, however. There is a difference, it seems, between admitting that "john is rich" is neither true or false because "rich" is vague, on the one hand, and saying "john will be president in 2028" is neither true or false because IT is vague. The vagueness of the first proposition attaches to the definition of "rich" whereas the vagueness of the second attaches to REALITY. Is there an example of a proposition expressing a state of affairs IN THE PRESENT that would be neither true or false because of the vagueness of reality?
Here’s a possible one: "Particle x is located at y going at a velocity z." Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Isn’t this a perfect illustration of the vagueness of present reality? (Yet, even this doesn't work perfectly, for the Heisenberg principle wouldn't apply to an omniscient being. Perhaps it is enough to simply note that NO propositions can perfectly capture the actual EXPERIENCE of what the propositions are ABOUT.)
Al: (in response to my question about the meaningfulness of non-sequential love). Now, THAT one is just too, TOO easy! So easy that I won't offer it to solve any of the problems you are trying to solve. In the Triunity of the Godhead, the Personal freedom of God's communion is not sequenced. At all. And it is truly free.
Doc: Oh. Why didn’t I think of that! Its so much more difficult, hence true.
Chuck3371: the question "Will Jones be elected ..." (without a modal operator) is ultimately indeterminate, because even up to election day, it has no deterministic answer
Doc: Even to God? If it is indeterminate even to God – because it IS indeterminate in reality (viz. not true in every possible world that might be actualized), then it is false to say "Jones WILL be elected." It is true to say "Jones MAY or MAY NOT be elected."
TGB: I wish Craig were here. Dang.
Doc: I asked him to correspond. He doesn’t type.
JET: From the articles on his website, I have understood Craig as arguing that we ARE responsible for the definiteness of counterfactuals describing how we would act (DESPITE the fact that this definiteness eternally precedes us)
Doc: Yes we ARE responsible for the definiteness of our acts, but we don’t CAUSE the definiteness in God’s eternal knowledge. It is, strictly speaking, UNCAUSED. Hence it is an eternal metaphysical surd. I think this implies a kind of eternal dualism. Eternally there exists two uncaused realities: God AND the settledness of all reality.
JET: Has anyone else argued for the OV on the philosophical principle of Ockham's razor?
Doc: No, but THAT is a very interesting approach. Go for it!
JET: I think he (Craig) would deny that the definiteness of counterfactuals describing how we would act eternally precedes us. Rather, I think he argues that we have it within our power to "bring it about" that God (from eternity) knows that we would act in a certain way (which he claims is different from having the power to "cause" a past event.)
Doc: The definiteness of counterfactuals DOES eternally precede us, in Craig’s view. But you’re right in saying he holds we have the power to "bring it about" that God eternally knew what we would do – while denying that we CAUSE what God eternally knew. He leverages everything on the distinction between hard and soft facts. I (and Helm) argue that all God’s beliefs must be HARD facts (in the Four Views book).
Hasker: Greg seems to be right in saying that "X will certainly occur" is the contradictory of "X may not occur." ….What is not correct, however (in my opinion), is that *all* future-tense statements claim that so-and-so will *certainly* occur.
Doc: True, in ordinary parlance. But this is really just a way of saying "x might occur and I think they will." When spoken by an omniscient being – and in reality – to say "x WILL occur" means "it is not the case that x might not occur."
Hasker: Or, one might say that the statement *does* have a truth-value because of the *actual* future event, which is the line I've taken. And then one will go on to say that, if the event is genuinely contingent, it is logically impossible for it to be known before it occurs.
Doc: I can’t rule this out as a possible line of defense for the open view. But it just strikes me as odd to have a proposition that IS true or false but is not knowable. It seems tantamount to postulating an UNKNOWABLE reality. The truth of a future tensed proposition is REAL, but not KNOWABLE. What makes it unknowable?
Qquskid: God is 100% accurate in prediction…. This would allow for God to know, not based on seeing the future but rather on understanding so completely the disposition of His creation, namely humanity in this respect, that His accurate predictions give Him the "view of the future."
Doc: The view works fine ON THE ASSUMPTION that all future reality is a working out of present dispositions. But, in this case, its very difficult to affirm libertarian freedom.
Alan: Now this indeterminacy (created by libertarian freedom) is a kind of ontological vagueness.
Doc: YES. (See my earlier point).
Alan: Logical principles, as such, govern our concepts, our thinking. From them NOTHING FOLLOWS about what is the case. That's the fallacy behind the ontological argument and all strictly rationalistic attempts to prove the existence of God.
Doc: I agree with your main point Alan. But I’m not sure we can say that NO concepts imply ANYTHING about reality. More specifically, I would argue that the concept of "necessary existence" attaches to "greatest conceivable being" and must BY DEFINITION either exist or NECESSARILY not exist. Hence, I think the ontological argument shows that God can only fail to exist if the very concept of a necessary being is logically impossible (viz. if existence is necessarily contingent). But THAT is a different issue, and lets not get into it.
Final word: Hasker said might concept of "might or might not exist" in distinction to "will exist" needs to be formalized. Can anyone help here?
Lov’n it.
Doc
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