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   Posted 6/28/2001 4:46 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
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TGB

04/01/01 1:02 PM

"Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Philosophers all-

In his Edgren paper, Bruce Ware says the following:

…Alvin Plantinga, who has argued for decades that there is no logical problem with God foreknowing (exhaustively) the future libertarian free choices of his moral creation. To think it does, he says, confuses the necessity of the consequent (invalid) with the necessity of the consequence (valid). That is, to say, “If God knows the future, it is necessary that the future be as God knows” is invalid. God’s knowledge of the future does not somehow change contingent events into necessary events (just as our knowledge of past events does not somehow change those past contingent events into necessary events – just by our knowing them). Whereas, to say, “It is necessary that if God knows the future, the future will be as God knows” is valid. This is both true and valid, but leaves those future occurrences as contingent (insofar as they are contingent).
What of Platinga’s claim? He (and Ware with him) argue that our knowledge of PAST contingent events does not change them to necessary events (obviously!); therefore, foreknowledge of contingent events does not make them necessary either. That is, the relationship between knowledge and events says nothing about the necessity or contingency of the event itself. God can exhaustively foreknow acts of free will without their having to be understood as necessary.

Plantinga is a smart guy, right? Does his argument make sense to anybody? It doesn’t to me.

Ware follows with:

Concerning our knowledge of the past, it would be invalid to say, for example, “If I know that I had a bagel for breakfast, then it is necessary that I had a bagel for breakfast.” My knowing that I had a bagel for breakfast does not render my having chosen a bagel a necessary event. I might have chosen granola, in which case I would now know that I had granola for breakfast. However, it is both valid and true to say, “It is necessary that if I know that I had a bagel for breakfast, then I had a bagel for breakfast.”


Why does this analogy make my brain short-circuit?

Just for fun. I was explaining epistemological “first truths” (i.e. law of non-contradiction; stuff like that) to my 15-year-old daughter the other day. I asked her, “Do you understand what I’m talking about?” She said, “Oh yeah, you’re talking about ‘Duh’ things.”

Good Night,
Tom

P.S. Sorry about posting so much! Is there a limit? I'm just free this week to do so and am dumping some ideas.

Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site



RevivalTheology

04/01/01 5:35 PM

RE: "Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I will point out that Plantinga's analogy of our knowledge of the past with God's supposed knowledge of the future assumes that the future already exists. Further, while our knowledge of the past doesn't make those choices any less contingent, the choices weren't made while they were "past" but rather while we were in the "now". Basically, it is a false analogy, because the future is not analogous to the past at all, and neither is our knowledge of it.

In the Lamb

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



GregBoyd

04/01/01 6:40 PM

RE: RE: "Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The argument Ware puts forward is a common one. William Craig spends a good portion of his essay in FOUR VIEWS ON FOREKNOWLEDGE trying to argue that the Open view commits this fallacy. The argument he (and Ware) think Open theists use is this.

(1) Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.
(2) God foreknows x.
(3) Therefore, x will necessarily happen.

Now Ware, Plantinga and Craig are correct in concluding that this argument is fallacious, for it transfers the logical necessity of the knower (God) to the known (x). The PROBLEM, however, is that exposing the fallacy of this argument doesn’t go far in proving that libertarian freedom is compatible with exhaustively definite foreknowledge. For the "necessity" that renders the classical view of foreknowledge problematic is not a LOGICAL necessity, but an "accidental" or "historical" necessity. (These are common terms in philosophical circles). This is the kind of necessity past events possess. Though past events are logically contingent they are historically necessary, for they cannot now be other than they are.

The problem is that if God eternally foreknows future free acts, then future free acts are "accidentally" or "historically" necessary. Among all the unalterable facts of the past is the content of what God infallibly believes shall come to pass in the future. The definiteness of the future is part of the (now necessary) definiteness of the past. Hence, if God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge, we can exercise no more libertarian freedom with regard to our future acts than we can with regard to any past fact. Both are "accidentally necessary."

Doc

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



springs

(Forum Moderator)
04/01/01 7:30 PM

RE: "Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hey Tom,
We don't have any limits on postings (yet) ha, and new threads are always welcome. You've been coming up with some pretty good ones too.
The only thing I've heard complaining about is when the posts are a dozen pages long. Followed by an equaly long response. If people are short for time, reading on their lunch hour for instance, it makes it almost impossible to stay current with the thread and that in turn cuts down the interaction.

But yer doin' fine
and yer a fine contributor
blessings
springs

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



RevivalTheology

04/02/01 8:20 AM

RE: "Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whoa, Doc, good post. Looks like I had the right answer, but you put it in that nice, philosophical language. I like that!

In the Lamb

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries




Message


TGB

04/01/01 1:02 PM

"Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Philosophers all-

In his Edgren paper, Bruce Ware says the following:

…Alvin Plantinga, who has argued for decades that there is no logical problem with God foreknowing (exhaustively) the future libertarian free choices of his moral creation. To think it does, he says, confuses the necessity of the consequent (invalid) with the necessity of the consequence (valid). That is, to say, “If God knows the future, it is necessary that the future be as God knows” is invalid. God’s knowledge of the future does not somehow change contingent events into necessary events (just as our knowledge of past events does not somehow change those past contingent events into necessary events – just by our knowing them). Whereas, to say, “It is necessary that if God knows the future, the future will be as God knows” is valid. This is both true and valid, but leaves those future occurrences as contingent (insofar as they are contingent).
What of Platinga’s claim? He (and Ware with him) argue that our knowledge of PAST contingent events does not change them to necessary events (obviously!); therefore, foreknowledge of contingent events does not make them necessary either. That is, the relationship between knowledge and events says nothing about the necessity or contingency of the event itself. God can exhaustively foreknow acts of free will without their having to be understood as necessary.

Plantinga is a smart guy, right? Does his argument make sense to anybody? It doesn’t to me.

Ware follows with:

Concerning our knowledge of the past, it would be invalid to say, for example, “If I know that I had a bagel for breakfast, then it is necessary that I had a bagel for breakfast.” My knowing that I had a bagel for breakfast does not render my having chosen a bagel a necessary event. I might have chosen granola, in which case I would now know that I had granola for breakfast. However, it is both valid and true to say, “It is necessary that if I know that I had a bagel for breakfast, then I had a bagel for breakfast.”


Why does this analogy make my brain short-circuit?

Just for fun. I was explaining epistemological “first truths” (i.e. law of non-contradiction; stuff like that) to my 15-year-old daughter the other day. I asked her, “Do you understand what I’m talking about?” She said, “Oh yeah, you’re talking about ‘Duh’ things.”

Good Night,
Tom

P.S. Sorry about posting so much! Is there a limit? I'm just free this week to do so and am dumping some ideas.

Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site



RevivalTheology

04/01/01 5:35 PM

RE: "Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I will point out that Plantinga's analogy of our knowledge of the past with God's supposed knowledge of the future assumes that the future already exists. Further, while our knowledge of the past doesn't make those choices any less contingent, the choices weren't made while they were "past" but rather while we were in the "now". Basically, it is a false analogy, because the future is not analogous to the past at all, and neither is our knowledge of it.

In the Lamb

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



GregBoyd

04/01/01 6:40 PM

RE: RE: "Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The argument Ware puts forward is a common one. William Craig spends a good portion of his essay in FOUR VIEWS ON FOREKNOWLEDGE trying to argue that the Open view commits this fallacy. The argument he (and Ware) think Open theists use is this.

(1) Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen.
(2) God foreknows x.
(3) Therefore, x will necessarily happen.

Now Ware, Plantinga and Craig are correct in concluding that this argument is fallacious, for it transfers the logical necessity of the knower (God) to the known (x). The PROBLEM, however, is that exposing the fallacy of this argument doesn’t go far in proving that libertarian freedom is compatible with exhaustively definite foreknowledge. For the "necessity" that renders the classical view of foreknowledge problematic is not a LOGICAL necessity, but an "accidental" or "historical" necessity. (These are common terms in philosophical circles). This is the kind of necessity past events possess. Though past events are logically contingent they are historically necessary, for they cannot now be other than they are.

The problem is that if God eternally foreknows future free acts, then future free acts are "accidentally" or "historically" necessary. Among all the unalterable facts of the past is the content of what God infallibly believes shall come to pass in the future. The definiteness of the future is part of the (now necessary) definiteness of the past. Hence, if God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge, we can exercise no more libertarian freedom with regard to our future acts than we can with regard to any past fact. Both are "accidentally necessary."

Doc

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



springs

(Forum Moderator)
04/01/01 7:30 PM

RE: "Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hey Tom,
We don't have any limits on postings (yet) ha, and new threads are always welcome. You've been coming up with some pretty good ones too.
The only thing I've heard complaining about is when the posts are a dozen pages long. Followed by an equaly long response. If people are short for time, reading on their lunch hour for instance, it makes it almost impossible to stay current with the thread and that in turn cuts down the interaction.

But yer doin' fine
and yer a fine contributor
blessings
springs

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries



RevivalTheology

04/02/01 8:20 AM

RE: "Duh Things"


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whoa, Doc, good post. Looks like I had the right answer, but you put it in that nice, philosophical language. I like that!

In the Lamb

Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries






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