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Date Joined Jun 2001
Total Posts : 516
| Posted 6/28/2001 4:37 PM (GMT -6) |   | Message Go To Page 2 3 4 5 >>
GregBoyd
03/02/01 11:32 PM
Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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I'd like to float this intellectual balloon.
I'm now writing a response to Dave Hunt for the forthcoming Four Views on Divine Foreknowledge (IVP, due out this fall). I'd like to try out one aspect of my response with this chat crowd.
In the essay I'm responding to (an excellent, carefully reasoned essay, by the way) Hunt argues for the compatibility of exhaustively definite foreknowledge and free agency. He acknowledges that foreknowledge "locks in" the future behavior of an agent. Given that God foreknows that agent X will do action A, it is not possible for agent X to do other than A (-A). Yet he contends that this lack of alternatives doesn't under X's freedom. He bases his argument largely on an analogy.
The analogy goes like this. Suppose one man (named Black) wants another man (named Smith) dead. Black knows that a third man (Jones) is planning on killing Smith. This is good for Black, but he wants to make sure Jones follows through. So he creates a science fiction device that is capable of both monitoring and, if need be, controlling Jones' mental states. If Jones decides not to kill Smith, the device will immediate activate and control Jones' thought process so he will choose to kill Jones. As it turns out, Jones follows through on his original evil intention and kills Smith.
Hunts point: What Jones did he did freely, even though he couldn't have done otherwise. So it is with God's foreknowledge and our free action.
This is about the strongest analogy for the compatibility of exhaustively definite foreknowledge and freedom I have encountered (I am still waiting for the analogy for exhaustive divine control and free agency by the way). Yet I think the analogy is unsuccessful.
The problem with the analogy, as I see it, is that it defines Jones' decision BEHAVIORALLY instead of INTERNALLY. In terms of behavior Jones can't help but murder Smith. But in terms of Jones' internal decision -- his heart -- he still has a decision. He has alternatives. He can either choose to murder Smith of his own free volition, or (what he doesn't know) murder Smith because a device forced him to. In the first case he is morally responsible. In the second case he is not. I argue that Smith can only murder Jones freely, and with moral impunity, because he could have done otherwise (even if the "otherwise" still involves Smith's death).
Hence, I think Hunt fails to show that freedom does NOT require the possibility of doing otherwise. Hence he fails to show the compatibility of exhaustively definite foreknowledge and free agency.
If indeed free agency requires the genuine possibility of options, then in knowing free agents God knows what they may POSSIBLY choose, not what they WILL CERTAINLY choose.
I'd like to know if you think my refutation is valid or not, and why.
Thanks all.
GB
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Wislawa
03/03/01 12:19 AM
RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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You say: The problem with the analogy, as I see it, is that it defines Jones' decision BEHAVIORALLY instead of INTERNALLY. In terms of behavior Jones can't help but murder Smith. But in terms of Jones' internal decision -- his heart -- he still has a decision.
Me say: Good call. Here is a question I have for the compatiblists. If we do not have this internal decision making ability that even God can’t touch how can we still maintain that we are ontologically distinct from God. One thing that I don’t understand about compatiblism is exactly where God ends and we begin. Can we be more than just an extension of God? Is this not Pantheism?
Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site
writerdad
03/03/01 2:17 AM
RE: RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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One thing I have been absolutely thrilled about this site is having people articulate what I have been pondering but have not been able to put into words. Doc did it when he said the terms exhaustive control and choice together were meaningless unless someone could give him an analogy that would grant the two meaning together and Wislawa your point is exactly what I puzzle over. In exhaustive control, where does anything begin and end? God ends up as dualism, ying and yang, responsible for both good and bad. It doesn't matter whether you say God can't sin. He brings ABOUT the sin, so what's the difference? Thanks for nailing the question on the head...John 17:3 Harold
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
churchmouse522
03/03/01 11:05 AM
RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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Mind if I chime in?
I like the analogy this guy created because it really brings up a good point. It's not the point Greg wants to deal with specifically, but I'm going there nevertheless.
I'm assuming in this analogy, Black is the God-figure who can ultimately control the outcome. Let's take the murder scenario a little further. Let's say Black wants to mutilate a little child, and he knows that Jones is planning on this. Whether Jones actually becomes morally culpable and chooses to do it or whether Black has to resort to the control-machine is very much besides the point in my mind. In what moral universe would God want this? Am I missing something? It seems to me that if you use this analogy you're saying that whatever hideous unthinkable event comes about you have two ways of thinking about it: Either God actually controled the perpetrator, or the person chose the action, but it's what God really wanted anyway. You may or may not have salvaged the notion of free agency (I don't think you have by the way) but you're left with the bigger problem of a God who intervenes, not on behalf of the little ones, but to destroy them horribly.
The Mouse
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
BBBCanada
03/03/01 1:39 PM
Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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Greg said:
"If Jones decides not to kill Smith, the device will immediate activate and control Jones' thought process so he will choose to kill Jones."
And for me the operative term is *control.* This seems to me the same thing as Meph's "soft determinism." Why differieniate (sp?) between the internal and the external? The "internal causes" or "ontological state of the person" collaspses back into the *external stimuli* which ultimately has its source in God who is the antecedent cause of the conditions back at the original creative event. God really is the one who is not *ultimately* or *remotely* responsible for evil, but for me is *directly* responsible for evil. I can't get away from "soft determinism" coming around to, in all actuality being "hard-core determinism."
Brandon
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
whasssuuuppp
03/03/01 2:20 PM
RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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The analogy says:
"So he creates a science fiction device that is capable of both monitoring and, if need be, controlling Jones' mental states. If Jones decides not to kill Smith, the device will immediate activate and control Jones' thought process so he will choose to kill Jones."
Am I missing something?? I can't comprehend how Jones is truly free in this instance. If Jones uses his self-determining freedom and decides NOT to kill Smith, then a device placed in his brain kicks in and begins thinking for him, essentially forcing him to kill Smith. His genuine decision was not to kill, but his actual coerced "decision" IS to kill. How is Jones still free? Apparently Hunt is operating with a different definition of freedom than the one to which I hold--I believe that true freedom entails that we have the power to do A AND -A. Jones thinks he is free, because he doesn't know about the device placed in his head. BUT JONES' PERCEPTION OF HIS OWN FREEDOM DOES NOT MAKE IT GENUINE!
I'm also a little confused with the analogy in this way: if one believes in EDF, then they must believe that God know everything that is going to happen for all eternity. Why then does Black (The God figure in the analogy) need to "make sure Jones follows through"? Why would God need to "make sure" of anything? Wouldn't he already know FOR SURE whether or not Jones was going to follow through? Or is all this science-fiction inplanting devices thing something that was also foreknown by God (oh boy this gets complicated...)
Finally, I gotta say this, though I'm not sure it totally relates--I think that to deny that we have self-determining freedom, the ability to deliberate between paths, the ability to do A, -A, +A, *A, etc, insults God's design! Our incredibly complex brains, designed by God, give us this ability. Why suppose that we really don't have the ability to utilize this wonderful machinery? Is it just there for decoration? Come on! I realize that Hunt would say that we are free, we do have the ability to use these brains, but his analogy seems to undermine this.
peace, ms. wassup
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
MrIndifference
03/03/01 5:33 PM
Analogy out of context...
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I don't know about Mr. Jones, but personally if I woke up one morning with a large hole in my skull, when I knew that I had not recently been to the local nerology sergical center to have a tumor or something of the likes removed from my cranium, I would be rather suspiceous about something being up. At the very least I would check into the hospital to see what had happened and if at all possible have the thing removed. This is plain old common sense the way I see it. Of course this could have been planned years in advance under the guise of government or scientific testing, then that would probably be another story. By having this thing removed, aren't you, possibily, regaining that free will wich was to be taken from you? Of course this would be going on the assumption that Mr. Black was not 'God'.
Though the origional analogy supposedly removes all possibility of true free will, I may have found a possibility around it. As you see, I am not playing by the rules. "Like a computer system, some rules were meant to be bent...some were ment to be broken." -Morpheus-
Doesn't the Scientific Device in this analogy represent manipulation? Is manipulation a form of love, or an act of love? From my experience, No it is not. If God is love, then how can he be manipulative? Maybe I am missing something, but something just doesn't seem right here.
Mr. Indifference
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Wislawa
03/03/01 9:22 PM
RE: RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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Excellent point!!! Hunt’s analogy leaves us with two options: One the one hand God is morally evil and the person is also morally evil so God doesn’t have to control him or, God is evil but the person is not. I don’t know about anyone else but this leaves much to be desired for me.
–Wislawa
Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site
MetroIceberg
03/08/01 10:30 PM
RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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Dr. Boyd.
Let us cast aside the actions in the anology and understand the essence of the idea...
Replace Smith with action A, and we can get to the heart of it. Black wants Jones to do A. Jones is already intending to do A. Jones, in the end, DECIDES not to do A, for whatever reason. But Black still wants Jones to do A, so Black surrepticiously affects Jones so that he does A, seemingly of his own volition.
It seems very clear that free agency, in this type of anology, cannot exist. How can one freely choose not to do something, and yet do it anyway? Where is their choice? Where is the free and independant action that is the essence of free will? What Hunt seems to say here, in my understanding, is that we do not have actual free agency, but only the appearance, the mirage, if you will, of such. In other words:
10 do A
20 if choice <> A, then do A
30 goto 10
Semblance of free agency is not the same as the actuality of free agency. Thank you.
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
MetroIceberg
03/08/01 10:35 PM
RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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As an addition:
I understand Hunt to be saying that this illusion of free-agency is only to mollify us so that God's end will be achieved. Now does this sound like love?
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
Mephi2K
03/09/01 6:06 AM
Meph Attempts to Catch The Intellectual Balloon...Once Again...
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Hmmm...oh, well, why not...
On Hunt's Analogy
I want to deal with this, piece by piece, ok?
"Suppose one man (named Black) wants another man (named Smith) dead."
Meph:
Ok. This is what I get from this statement. Black has purposes such that Smith death's is part of those purposes. One thing that has not been ascertained is whether or not this attribution of purpose is necessary or arbitrary. I mean "necessary" to the extent that, without Smith's death, Black's ultimate purposes will not be fulfilled. But then again, WHY does Black's ultimate purposes have to be fulfilled at all? Hmmm...lots of unanswered, important questions here...but let's simplify this. We will currently take the assumption, for the sake of argument, that Smith's death is a completely arbitrary choice. This will heighten the tension, I suppose.
"Black knows that a third man (Jones) is planning on killing Smith."
Meph:
Now this is fairly important. HOW does Black know about Jones? Unless this is sufficiently answered, then the entire analogy has problems. I'm assuming that this is placed in completely HUMAN terms, which precludes certain avenues of knowledge. But these terms need to be clearly defined. Again, HOW does Black know Jones' intentions, capability to pull it off, methodology, etc? Very important question...that goes unasked and unanswered.
"This is good for Black, but he wants to make sure Jones follows through."
Meph;
SMUGGLED ASSUMPTION ALERT!!!! Let's read this statement and see what it's saying. This is the beginning of the main problem with this analogy. It appears that Hunt, at least implicitly, accepts the idea of "power to the contrary" here. How? Read it. "...but he wants to make sure Jones follows through.."? This statement implies that it is POSSIBLE for Jones to will OTHER than killing Smith by his own personal volition, contrary to Black's ultimate wishes. Bad move. TERRIBLE move. (Remember my problem with Hasker?) He sets himself up for what follows later.
"So he creates a science fiction device that is capable of both monitoring and, if need be, controlling Jones' mental states."
Meph:
Crud. The downward spiral continues. Now we have micromanagement in effect that TACITLY admits to violating personal volition on the deepest level. Why? Because he bought into the "power to the contrary" thing. Sheeeh...
"If Jones decides not to kill Smith, the device will immediate activate and control Jones' thought process so he will choose to kill Jones."
Meph:
"IF Jones decides not to kill Smith..." Well, I guess this was inevitable. Talk about Hari kari. LOL. This validates what I've been saying about Hunt assuming that freedom of the will necessarily has to do with "power to the contrary" He's made the analogy so that Jones can effectively choose not to kill Smith and then, IN RESPONSE, the machine goes off to control Jone's thought processes. What the heck was Hunt thinking here? Surely, he had to have realized that this action completely takes the discussion out of "willful choice by an agent" in ANY realm.
"As it turns out, Jones follows through on his original evil intention and kills Smith."
Meph:
This heightens what I said in the previous phrase. Black's action is REACTIONARY. Luckily, Jones used his power to the contrary in favor of killing Smith, so Black didn't have to do anything. This, in and of itself, places the discussion in a certain context in which Hunt's entire notion was doomed to failure.
*****************************
Doc said this:
"This is about the strongest analogy for the compatibility of exhaustively definite foreknowledge and freedom I have encountered (I am still waiting for the analogy for exhaustive divine control and free agency by the way)."
Meph:
Doc, I can't believe that you said this. This analogy was terribly inadequate, in my humble opinion. (Sorry, Dr. Hunt) But then again, maybe I can see why you said what you said. See, it's obvious that your ENTIRE IDEA of "free will" is based upon the "power to the contrary" Surely, you know that once anyone ACCEPTS that notion, they are completely at your mercy and your terms. I'm surprised that Dr. Hunt didn't see this. Perhaps you only accept as valid those analogies that employ the power to the contrary idea. I seem to think so. Doc, Hunt's analogy was doomed to failure by the second sentence. For real.
I'm going to say this again, Doc. You will NEVER find the analogy that you seek. There is one simple reason why. Your idea of free agency is inextricably tied to the "power to the contrary" idea. In your view, anything that defies that, BY DEFINITION, renders the idea of "free will" meaningless. Do you see what I'm saying? This is why I'm betting that none of William Lane Craig's stuff will work against you either. Craig's thinking, from what little I understand of it, works on principles of causality. Though he makes it clear that numerous choices are open to agents, he still has to say that, whatever an agent's choice was, it was still determined by the agent and his milieu such that the power to the contrary doesn't exist ON THE HIGHEST METAPHYSICAL LEVEL. I'm surprised that no one has caught this stuff by now. For any analogy to satisfy you, they have to be able to couch human freedom in terms such that power to the contrary exists on the highest metaphysical level. How do I know this? Remember my storywriter analogy thing? (Actually, I thought it was pretty good...) You said the following...
"1) Meph is convinced Bob is not fated in Vallie’s play. He says “Any sense of fatalism means that Bob couldn't do anything else EVEN IF HE WANTED TO. But this is not the case with Bob. Bob could have done something else (not murdered Vallie), but he made the CHOICE to kill her within the context of the script.”
and...
"Think about this carefully. Bob is “HER character, after all.” The screenwriter WROTE Bob. So the screen writer writes that her character, Bob, will OF HIS OWN VOLITION murder Vallie.
Which is it Meph? Is Bob WRITTEN by the screenwriter? Is Bob “the character” OF the screen writer? Or does Bob do what he does OF HIS OWN VOLITION???"
and...
Perhaps Meph will say, “Both, Doc. And you only insist that it can’t be BOTH because you presuppose that Bob must be AUTONOMOUS FROM the screenwriter to have his own volition. You presuppose your autonomous libertarian free will.”
Well, I don’t want to insist on anything, at least not for the moment. I’m still trying to understand what on earth your saying!!!
{NOTE: Now it was here that I think Doc may have cheated a little bit. Doc KNEW what I was going to say. It's clear as day that he's advocating autonomous free will with respect to the highest metaphysical level. But he "didn't want to insist anything" Yeah, right.}
and...
"UNLESS, of course, they are free to rebell against the script (as they SHOULD if it involves murder). But THAT would mean the screen writer didn't exercise exhaustive control over the agent -- which was the point of the analogy in the first place!!!!
And my final piece of evidence from THIS thread...
"Hence, I think Hunt fails to show that freedom does NOT require the possibility of doing otherwise. Hence he fails to show the compatibility of exhaustively definite foreknowledge and free agency.
Meph:
When I composed my analogy, I composed it with as many of the factors in mind as possible. Analogously, it explained HOW God would know what he knew, the interaction of human will and divine will, etc. And it was CLEAR that my analogy precluded any type of autonomous free will. Look at Doc's last sentence above. I am going to contextualize it to fit the meaning theologically.
"Unless human beings are FREE to rebel against God's ultimate plan in at least SOME way, human beings are not free"
This is the clear conclusion of Doc's sentiments...and THIS, my friends, is nothing short of autonomous free will. Why doesn't he come out and admit this? It's not that hard for anyone to see, really. This is why I say that Doc will NEVER find his analogy. Autonomous free will and "power to the contrary" are flipsides of the same coin. You accept one, you must accept the other. If any attempt is made to try to place these two concepts under the rubric of "control", the whole thing turns MEANINGLESS. Sound familiar? "Give me meaning! Give me meaning!" Sigh. As a voice crying in the wilderness, I still maintain this fact: Meaning is ultimately conditioned by one's presuppositions. Things are meaningless to a person for a REASON. If you discover one's presuppositions, you understand WHY certain things are meaningless to certain people.
I'm going to make this known. Here are some questions that I want Doc to answer. This will show what his suppositions are...
Questions:
1) Do you hold to the idea of "power to the contrary"? If so, why? If not, why not?
2) Do you believe that human freedom is ONLY TRULY POSSIBLE if human beings have "power to the contrary" with respect to the highest metaphysical level? If so, why? If not, why not?
3) Do you see "power to the contrary" as NECESSARILY leading to the idea of autonomous free will? If so, why? If not, why not?
4) Would you agree or disagree with the following statement:
"Unless human beings are FREE to rebel against God's ultimate plan in at least SOME way, human beings are not free."
Justify your answer.
Ok, Doc. I'm going to ask you as a friend and Christian brother. PLEASE just answer my questions forthrightly. Please don't try to use any tactics to obscure or dodge my essential points. Please don't try to bring in all types of red herrings and stuff. Please don't try to sidestep the main issues being raised here. You know I know what's going on...so let's all just be upfront, ok? I'm asking you sincerely and politely.
Summing Up:
The intent of this post was
1) Show the problems that I saw with Hunt's analogy and why it failed.
2) Show why Doc's analogy will NEVER be forthcoming.
3) Attempt to get Doc to come completely clean about his presuppositions.
I'm hoping this post will fulfill all of my expectations. But I need YOUR help to do that, Doc. So...
Always In Christ,
Mephi2K
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
MetroIceberg
03/09/01 8:10 AM
RE: Meph Attempts to Catch The Intellectual Balloon...Once Again...
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Well, Meph. Here I come to throw in my two cents.
The last facet of free, autonomous agency, at least in the context of a Judeo/Christian God, is what happens after the conversion event. My opinion on this matter is rather convoluted, but I'll try to summarize.
After conversion, henceforth to be called AC in this post, free agency still exists, but with some odd caveats. The human, AC, is still able to choose to do anything of his own will. However, we find that, often, the choice of an AC agent is, as is said in the Lord's Prayer, "Thy will be done, on earth, as it is in heaven."
Now does free agency exist even in this? I say emphatically, Yes! It is just that the choice is to be controlled by the one who gave you the choice in the first place.
In essence, God, in the begining, gives the power of choice to man. Man, because of the promise of the Gospel, returns this power of choice to God. This is not to say that God continues to control after the "controls are turned over to God." God still leaves open the choice to decide against His will to man's will. (This is what I call sin, in this context.) This power of choice, fully consistant with God's love, is always a matter of giving it back to the one that each party believes to which it belongs.
Now, bring on the comments, and I'll try to fill in the holes I fell I have probably left.
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
snowbunny222
03/09/01 9:26 AM
RE: Analogy out of context...
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you brought up a good point on whether manipulation is a form of love or not, and I don't think that the argument is as clear cut as that. First of all, I give you this example... suppose that Jones(Im getting them mixed up but you'll see my point) wants to kill himself and Black does not want him to, so then assume that Jones does make the decision to kill himself but through sci-fi miracles is saved from doing so... or what about death? God plans for us to die, but we cannot choose the details (i.e. I am going to live til Im 75)...so in essence we are still deciding something yet inevitably something else will happen... so there are things in life that we can make a decision on but will most certainly not happen...
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
GregBoyd
03/09/01 10:21 AM
RE: RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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Metroberg says:
I understand Hunt to be saying that this illusion of free-agency is only to mollify us so that God's end will be achieved. Now does this sound like love?
No my friend. Hunt is providing this analogy as a way of DEFENDING the idea that we DO have free will though God eternally foreknows what we shall do (hence we cannot do otherwise).
Doc
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
TGB
03/09/01 10:44 AM
RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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Doc-
A guy is in a room which has two doors. He decides to leave the room. He gets up, opens door "A" and leaves. The entire time, however, door "B" was locked and he didn't know it. He couldn't have left via door "B" anyhow. Was his choice free?
Tom
Posted Originally From: Open Theism Information Site
snowbunny222
03/09/01 11:20 AM
RE: RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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If you are saying that with the door example, my response would be that if that were the norm, then no one would no for sure if we have free will, thereby igniting a destiny argument... his decision was based on free will, but then to use this example, and if you are applying this to human nature, then it could conceivably be true that we really do not know free will, rather we are merely making accidental decisions
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
GregBoyd
03/09/01 2:21 PM
Meph on the Power of Contrary Choice
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Mephi critiques Hunt's analogy, finding its main fault to be that he buys into the view that freedom is "the power of contrary choice."
In point of fact, Hunt's whole analogy (taken from Frankfurt -- its actually rather famous) was to SUPPORT Mephi's view that freedom does NOT mean "the power of contrary choice."
Since Meph agrees that the analogy does not work, I'd like him to offer a better one. Meph believes that we are morally responsible and free, though we cannot do otherwise. So does Hunt. Hunt tried to render this position intelligible, or at least meaningful, by offering an analogy. Meph agrees with me that it fails.
In its place he offers....?
Love'n on all ya
in the radical goodness of
the sovereign God!
Doc
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
GregBoyd
03/09/01 2:32 PM
RE: RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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TGB says:
"A guy is in a room which has two doors. He decides to leave the room. He gets up, opens door "A" and leaves. The entire time, however, door "B" was locked and he didn't know it. He couldn't have left via door "B" anyhow. Was his choice free?"
This is another version of Frankfurts story. He was free to CHOOSE door A or B, even though (it turns out) he wasn't free to LEAVE THE ROOM by either door A or B. If he has a Franfurt device -- or, what comes to the same thing, if the Holy Spirit -- "locks" all CHOICES except the choice to go out of the room by door A, THEN he was not free. If you replace going out door A with murdering someone, we would not hold him responsible.
AND THIS is the problem with Calvinism, and rally any "blueprint" view that wants to say that everything we choose fit into God's providential plan. If we could not do otherwise, and cannot be morally responsible for what we do.
(Unless, of course, our inability to do otherwise is the result of a determined character we ourselves chose to acquire. If Jone's himself stupidly locked Door B and threw away the key a long time ago, it is HIS fault he now can't go through it. This is "habitus acquiritas" (as Ghost Dog Girl tells me).'
Doc
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
GregBoyd
03/09/01 2:36 PM
RE: RE: Can a Person Be Free Who Can't Do Other Than They Do?
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TGB says:
"A guy is in a room which has two doors. He decides to leave the room. He gets up, opens door "A" and leaves. The entire time, however, door "B" was locked and he didn't know it. He couldn't have left via door "B" anyhow. Was his choice free?"
This is another version of Frankfurts story. He was free to CHOOSE door A or B, even though (it turns out) he wasn't free to LEAVE THE ROOM by either door A or B. If he has a Franfurt device -- or, what comes to the same thing, if the Holy Spirit -- "locks" all CHOICES except the choice to go out of the room by door A, THEN he was not free. If you replace going out door A with murdering someone, we would not hold him responsible.
AND THIS is the problem with Calvinism, and rally any "blueprint" view that wants to say that everything we choose fit into God's providential plan. If we could not do otherwise, and cannot be morally responsible for what we do.
(Unless, of course, our inability to do otherwise is the result of a determined character we ourselves chose to acquire. If Jone's himself stupidly locked Door B and threw away the key a long time ago, it is HIS fault he now can't go through it. This is "habitus acquiritas" (as Ghost Dog Girl tells me).'
Doc
Posted Originally From: Christus Victor Ministries
BBBCanada
03/09/01 3:19 PM
Meph on the Power of Contrary Choice
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Greg said:
"In its place he offers....?"
Homo sapien chooser theory!
I would still like to know what is wrong with the "presupposition" that the power to choose to the contray cannot be a meaningful one. If you don't have it, then you have a contradiction, not a paradox.
Brandon
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