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Iconoclast
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Posted 8/20/2003 7:32 PM (GMT -6)

Albert

But the truth of the theorems involved in the mathematics itself is pretty much indisputable.

Iconoclast

I am thinking more in terms of the presuppositions or a priori assumptions being made that the theorems are being based on. For example Euclidean geometry is based on a set of assumptions that lead to the conclusion that parallel lines do not intersect. The logic is as you say unassailable. However, Riemannian geometry throws out one of the assumptions of Euclidean geometry and comes to the conclusion that parallel lines can indeed intersect. Again the logic is unassailable.

The question at hand is: which is a better model of our actual world - Euclidean geometry or Riemannian geometry? I agree that THIS is an empirical question. It turns out that General Relativity says that Riemannian geometry is a more accurate model of our world than Euclidean geometry.

In the same way the question regarding whether deterministic logic is a better model of our world or indeterministic logic is a better model of our world is also an empirical question. The theorems are really only as good (when they are correct) as their underlying assumptions about what is actually true regarding the world we live in.

Albert

We are not dealing here with empirical hypotheses about the world, as in science. Rather, we are dealing with logical/deductive theorems which relate to all possible worlds.

Iconoclast

I would say that today we only know deterministic logic (analogous to Euclidean geometry) and that we need to invent indeterministic logic (analogous to Riemannian geometry) and then use empirical means to test which is a better model for describing our world.

The first test of any model is whether it explains all phenomena. If it does not then it is likely either wrong or limited. I think Tom and Doc have correctly identified that standard logic does not deal well with true possibilities and thus its presupposition of determinism must be challenged to see if a coherent formalism can be found that includes indeterminism. If it can and it is consistent with standard logic in the case of probabilities approaching 1 then (just like Riemannian geometry) it can be empirically tested to see if it fits the real world better than standard logic.

thanks,
Iconoclast

"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson

Iconoclast
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Posted 8/20/2003 7:47 PM (GMT -6)

Albert

However, there is a far more important issue here. You are treating atoms, electrons, and so forth as being real entities. I regard them only as components of an abstract mathematical model that describes regularities in the way God acts in the world. In other words, I reject scientific realism.

Iconoclast

I would agree that science cannot get us into direct contact with what "really is". In my mind science is simply a specific way of approaching model building. We all build models of what is real. Unfortunately we often confuse the map with the territory. I agree that science does not get us directly in touch with the territory - that is only a model of reality - a map.

However, I would similarly say that a chair is also a model of reality. I would challenge you to describe a chair in any other terms that INTERACTIONAL terms no different than how we talk about atoms or electrons. Mass and charge and such are not mathematical terms per se. They are interactional terms no different than how we describe just about anything. I am basically invoking pragmatist thinking here. We only know something by what it does - by how we interact with it. Color is also an interactional property.

Thus, an electron is just as "real" as a chair. No, we do not understand its essence just as we don't understand the essence of a chair. In fact, didn't we come across atoms, electrons and so forth while trying to understand the essence of a chair?

But in any case, the fact is that SOMETHING is happening in the world that we can model using the interactional properties we assign to the concept "electron". And this SOMETHING is what is real and must be accounted for.

thanks,
Iconoclast

"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson

Iconoclast
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Posted 8/20/2003 7:55 PM (GMT -6)

Albert

Iconoclast wrote: My understanding is that "time" is simply "rate of change". Would you agree that "rate of change" is an objective phenomenon in that us humans all agree (at sub-relativity speeds) about the "rate of change" of some event?

Albert replies: Iconoclast, let me try a thought experiment on you. Suppose that God decided to freeze everything exactly as it is, for a period of time from his point of view (perhaps he decided to take a break from the world, and watch a bit of heavenly TV). Then he restarted the world from exactly where it was up to. My question to you is this. Is there any way that we could possibly tell that this had occurred (unless he told us). I don't think so. From our point of view, everything would continue to run smoothly without the slightest hitch. No clock would indicate any halt or difference to what it would have indicated had God not pressed the cosmic pause button. There would be no scientific observation possible which could determine that the pause had occurred.

Iconoclast

I totally agree. However, that does not mean that it would not be an objective phenomenon. All human observers would agree about the rate of change. Isn't the definition of objective that humans agree on something? Color is a good example of this. What is color objectively outside of us humans actually agreeing on it based on its interactional properties with our brains? It can be shown that color is NOT the frequency of electromagnetic radiation (Philosophy in the Flesh - Lakoff and Johnson).

thanks,
Iconoclast

"The benefit overran the merit the first day, and has overrun the merit ever since. The merit itself, so-called, I reckon part of the receiving." - Ralph Waldo Emerson

GregBoyd
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Posted 8/20/2003 7:58 PM (GMT -6)

Albert: There is a possible way for Calvinists to respond to this argument (about the open future in other possible worlds)… But Calvinists could attack your argument by affirming with Spinoza that "God exists and acts of necessity", and that all contingency is an illusion. In other words, if everything is necessary, then this is the only possible world, and it contains no true "might and might nots".

Doc: They could ASSERT this, of course, but they cannot logically prove it unless they show that "might and might not" is logically contradictory, hence necessarily false.

Albert replies: I don't think that calling might "historical" or "feasible possibility" actually tells us anything precise. Those are intuitive definitions, which are OK so far as they go, but are too vague. On my view, the meaning of "might" is quite clear. It is rigorously defined. However, you and Tom have yet to provide anything like a rigorous definition of "might".

Doc: hmmmm. How about: "Feasible ‘Might’ (fm): For any agent x, y is an action that constitutes a fm if and only if x performing y can theoretically be given a probability value short of 1 (100%) and greater than 0 when said probability is referenced to all variables that have and continue to affect x. ?

Albert: To be specific, on my definition of "will", "might", and so forth, conjoined "might and might not" statements make perfect sense, and also (A) entails (I) (as I've proved) and (E) entails (O) (which I haven't presented a proof of but is easy to do). So I don't see that you can make the claim that you are making.

Doc: But you GRANT that if "(I) & (O)" then "- [(A) v (E)]. Yet, I still don’t see how "logically possible x" (I) or "logically possible –x" (O) contradict "will x" (A) or "will not x" (E). Only a necessary truth contracts a logical possibility.

Tom: You state again that "indeterminate things don't exist," which of course I’ve agreed they don’t. But neither do future events that are determined. They don’t exist either, yet you treat them differently than indeterminate events.

Doc: Bingo. I agree with Albert that only actuality is fully concrete. Even the actual occurrence of a predestined event adds concreteness to the event, otherwise there could be no distinction between the event as predestined and the event as OCCURING or OCCURRED. Yet, we acknowledge that there is a difference between a future predestined event and a future contingent event. The difference can only be that the predestined event is MORE concrete/ definite/ "specified" than the future possible event. YET NEITHER IS ACTUAL. And this, I submit, requires that we acknowledge that REALITY includes not only the actual, but THE SPECTRUM OF "THINGS" BETWEEN A) MERELY LOGICALLY POSSIBLE AND B) FULLY ACTUALIZED.

Iconoclast: And come to think of it - it shouldn't be any more complex than Quantum Mechanics. Didn't Quantum Mechanics simply introduce indeterminacy into the picture?

Doc: Now THAT is encouraging.

Iconoclast: If it is true that God is constantly acting on this world to change it in a regular way that includes indeterminacy then wouldn't it be appropriate to say that possibilities truly exist now as God's dispositional intent to continue to regularly act on this world to change things in a way that includes indeterminacy?

Doc: Nice argument. Now, Albert would say, I think, that the "law" (or disposition, or in classic terms, the "habit") of God’s activity is simply the abstracted regularity of his acting. It has no "reality". BUT, what if root in disposition in God’s will. God DECIDES to act on and in the world in such and such ways. If God’s WILL is actual, how can we deny that the WILL TO ACT IN SUCH AND SUCH WAYS (viz. the "Law" of God’s abiding will) is NOT actual?

Cool.

Doc

Ps. I’m processing the Prior article. Thanks for the lead Tom. I remember reading about Prior in a few of Hartshorne’s essays, but don’t recall reading his stuff first hand. I now think I need to get back to Hartshorne as well. He did a lot with Pierce’s Tychism and was by training a logician. Aghhh… so much exciting work to do – and so many other demands that make it prohibitive.!

"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10.

Tom
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Posted 8/20/2003 8:33 PM (GMT -6)

Al and Icon, you two are rocking on the science stuff! Wish I was stronger in that area.

Albert: However, you and Tom have yet to provide anything like a rigorous definition of "might".

Doc: How about: "Feasible ‘Might’ (fm)” = For any agent x, y is an action that constitutes a fm if and only if x performing y can theoretically be given a probability value short of 1 (100%) and greater than 0 when said probability is referenced to all variables that have and continue to affect x.

Tom: Very nice. So, an abbreviated version might be: “a state of affairs the obtaining of which has a probability value greater than 0 (= "will not") and less than 1 (= "will") relevant to the present state of reality.”

Tom

John Earp
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Posted 8/20/2003 8:51 PM (GMT -6)

quote:
Originally posted by albert
I'm just pointing out that time in the physical world is just change caused by God acting.

This does not seem to follow. Time being the measurement of change holds true whether God directly acts or not in any given situation.

quote:
In other words, objective, physical time is secondary to subjective time for God.

So we must assume then, based on your above statement, that God's time and our time are different? Are you sure your name's not PoW? Big Smile

But seriously, it seems to me that God, being the ultimate observer (and of course, actor) has absolutely perfect knowledge of time as it passes, and that to posit two different kinds of time in the sense you seem to plays into the "eternal now" or "divine timelessness" view. Certainly God is "above" time in the sense that he never grows old or wears out, but it seems to me that you have made God's perception of time false (subjective vs. objective). I apologize if I have misunderstood you.

"The Discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world." Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology.

revivaltheology.net

Tom
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Posted 8/20/2003 9:12 PM (GMT -6)

Albert-

Excellent objection to the "probability" of choices. It doesn't do away with indeterminacy, but it's a good point. One objection to the denial of attributing probability to choice is of course the finiteness of self-determining free will. That is, if we can become "increasingly solidified" for good or evil, it appears to follow that probability attaches to our choices. We become more likely to do good or evil as we are increasingly solidified. Denying probability attaches to choice seems to entail the denial of an "increasing" solidification process.

Tom

Tom
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Posted 8/20/2003 11:36 PM (GMT -6)

Albert: Each choice is itself radically free, but its underlying meaning is chosen in relation to the perspective that the person holds. That perspective itself is the product of their previous choices. If we choose to believe God when he reveals himself, then that becomes a part of our meaning framework and perspective, and again changes the context from which we act.

Tom: Sounds like an argument in support of recognizing the probability of choices. Hmmm.

"Each choice is radically free" and we choose "in relation to the perspective we hold to which is itself a product of previous choices" appear to me less than compatible. If every choice is made from within the context of a world-position formed by previous choices, that world-position still becomes increasingly oriented toward good or evil based on the steady stream of choices we make over time and thus it is still the case that our choices are less "radically" free as time goes on.

To deny that probability attaches to choice is to deny the meaning of habits and addictions.

Doc? Icon?

Tom

Tom
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Posted 8/21/2003 4:13 AM (GMT -6)

If we are uncomfortable defining "might" in terms of probabilities, let me restate what I suggested earlier for "might": "x might happen" means a) x is obtainable in this world given all the variables of this world, and b) it is neither necessary nor inevitable that x obtain or not obtain. This is what I understand indeterminacy to mean with regard to future contingent events.

Again, to attribute such indeterminacy to an event is every bit as much an assertion of fact as is "x will happen," yet no logic recognizes a single operator for this indeterminacy, nor does the square permit a propositionally singular claim expressing what is now the case when what is now the case is that x's obtaining and not obtaining are neither necessary nor inevitable.

Tom

Tom
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Posted 8/21/2003 6:39 AM (GMT -6)

Another thought floating through my brain…

Albert: For the subject, existence precedes essence, and essence is created by action.

Tom: And the combined essence of choices made over time solidifies our world-view which in turn determines the nature of the influence (whether for good or for evil) bearing upon the choices we make. I think you agree with this, though you see no meaning in saying “It is more probable that an alcoholic will get drunk than that Mother Teresa will get drunk.” I do see meaning in this. I totally appreciate the concern to not boil ‘choice probability’ down to randomness, for that would be fatal (I suppose). If there is no way to affirm choice probability without avoiding reducing them down to randomness, then I’m bailing ship and tossing my library into the Mediterranean and canceling my trip to St. Paul this October! Yuck!

So, my response is to question the claim that all probability entails randomness.

Tom Bandit

GregBoyd
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Posted 8/24/2003 3:09 AM (GMT -6)

Tom: Very nice. So, an abbreviated version might be: "a state of affairs the obtaining of which has a probability value greater than 0 (= "will not") and less than 1 (= "will") relevant to the present state of reality."

Doc: Yep. The chief value of this is that it distinguishes between mere "logical possibility," on the one hand, and a feasible course of action – a genuine "might" – on the other. If "probability" talk about free actions is problematic, as Albert contends (more on this below), I think we could find a more general alternative. Something like, "for any action x, x is fm at t if and only if it lies within the agents power at t to perform x or not perform x."

Albert replies: We now come to another crucial disagreement. The notion of probability only has meaning in relation to the notion of randomness. To say that there is an x% probability of something happening, implies randomness is involved. Otherwise, I have no idea what it means. And I am no more happy with saying that human choices are random, then I am with the hard determinist idea that they are causally determined.

Doc: This would seem to make every action equally likely and unlikely. I grant that given the free will variable, probability distributions cannot be assigned PRECISELY – even by God. There isn’t ONE equation per possible action. But this doesn’t destroy probability. Indeed, this much is true of quantum particles in superposition. It only means we have to talk about a "probability wave function" that "collapses" when agents make a choice.

Tom: To deny that probability attaches to choice is to deny the meaning of habits and addictions.

Doc: Yes. Every action becomes equally likely and unlikely.

Albert: It doesn't mean that their will is not completely free and could not have either written or not written the essay. It just means that I have provided overwhelming incentive to do the action. I have altered the context of the action. The context which a person acts from does not influence or bias the "will" or subject that acts in any way. It is just the perspective from which they act. All psychological statistics about people's actions, in my view, reflect only the context of the actions, and do not say anything about the acting subject per se.

Doc: But albert, how can you divorce the acting agent from the context in this way? We aren’t free "in a vacume." We choice OUT OF a context, which includes the on-going effects and solidified character of our previous choices. This does "bias" the will, though not necessarily viciously (viz. 100%).

ALBERT: Might statements would still be true or false even if no creatures with free-will existed, but the definition Greg gives contradicts this.

DOC: No. My definition applies to all possible worlds as much as it does the actual world.

Lovin the discussion
Greg

"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10.

Tom
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Posted 8/25/2003 6:27 PM (GMT -6)

Blessings on ya Albert!

Tom

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