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geebob
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 94
| Posted 8/29/2003 8:41 AM (GMT -6) |   | I'm writing this topic in response to some valid criticism of Greg Boyd's usage of the term "neo-molinism." A fello moderator at a forum I help moderate mentioned that he was confused as to how Boyd could call himself a neo molinist when he was studying the issue of foreknowledge and free will. Also, I see it is mentioned around here quite a bit that we open theists are still working out our semantics. Well here, I want to promote the semantics of softness.
If any body should be called neo molinists, it should be your typical average molinist along the lines of william lane craig or Alvin Plantinga. They revived molinism. They updated it with modern philosopical devices such as possible worlds ontology. They speak it in the modern philosophical vocabulary while remaining most faithful to molina in suggesting that there is a fact of the matter about the way we would act in any circumstance and in holding that God has EDF.
Now I'm not against the usage of the term molinism though I'm not particularly excited about it, but I think the confusion could be avoided. Instead of "neo" molinism, which just suggests that we hold to the modern version of molinism (which is fairly misleading give that most modern molinists are not open theists) I would suggest the adjective "soft." So the difference would be where the basic molinist claim that there is a fact about what we would do in any situation we could find our selves in, the soft molinist would say that there is a fact about our actions for every situation but some of those facts are in terms of what we would do (which are of course not libertarian free actions) and other facts are in terms of what we may or may not do. This is a good title for it because it does indicate more explicitely that we are mitigating the molinist claim a bit.
that leads to the next two areas I would promote softness from the perspective of open theists. I love the notion placing 'mights' and 'woulds' on aristotle's square of opposition and explianing the truth of the future in those terms. It's pure genius. But alot of open theists say that one reason why God doesn't know what we will do in the future is because the future doesn't exist and knowledge is only of what exists. But of course I believe that God knows what will happen often and of course there are unconditional prophecies. I can't help but think that these are truths about the future. And this leaves us with an even bigger problem with the past since the truth of history is so important to us and absurd to deny. So instead of a rigorus presentism that denies the existence of past and future claiming only the present as existent, I would claim that we hold to soft presentism which affirms the existence of the past and future but holds that the present is not exclusively existant but merely ontologically priviledged. So the past and future exist. Now I don't know how they exist but I think we can leave it a mystery and say that their existence is sufficient that we can speak of them meaningfully. Now although I think we can leave it a mystery for metaphysicians to tinker with, I do have two strategies for explaining the existence of the future. The future we could say is a projection of what will and/or may and may not come to pass. The second strategy would be something along the lines of explaining the past and future in terms of possible worlds ontology. The future and past of an indeterministic world could be explained in terms of all of the possible worlds that share our past though they may have different futures with some details that may be the same in all of the possible worlds in that set and some details that are different and those variations represtent what may and may not happen. Now these are not necessarily different strategies or they at least do not necessarily exclude each other. But I think I recognize an area of improvement for the second in that I never really recognized presentism within the possible worlds themselves. I do think of them in presentists terms now but that didn't fit with my old stategy and I wanted to mention it so I could provide a seque to my next suggestion for softness.
I saw that albert mentioned that treating possible worlds as real is too much like david Lewis' possibilism where the actual world is no more real than other possible worlds. Of course this won't do for the open theist as such a view leads to determinism, and besides, it is just a really weird view such that Lewis mentiones that it garners him many "incredulous stares". But like with presentism, we can hold to a soft actualism where the actual world is ontological priveledged and the other possible worlds do exist but their existence is ontologically inferior.
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yxboom
Registered Member
Date Joined Aug 2002
Total Posts : 7
| Posted 9/7/2003 8:06 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by geebob
I'm not sure if your following everything here. Greg Boyd is wanting to call open theism "neo-molinism". I just thought I'd suggest a clearer prefix here.
I am following and I think the notion to be at most ridiculous, at least confusing and misguided even as much as I joke that Molinism is when-I-grow-up-I-wanna-be-open-theism. Molinism still upholds EDF which can not coincide with open theism. But again this is where I think the views within OVT branch for instance those such as myself who believe the future does not exist to be known and reality flows in a manner that God experiences it instead of in a timeless state vs. those who believe that God is in an eternal state and could know the future but chooses not to. One school of thought (the latter) may have more weight into being labeled as "neo-molinist", although I still think it faulty whereas the former would seem absurd to be put under the "neo-molinist" umbrella as there is virtually no points of contact.
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I would give the past a bit more existence then that. Suppose we reject the notion that God exists in all possible worlds, or we just say that God has choosen to make a world but decided not to know it completely even though he could, and suppose this world is indeterminant and has events that come to pass. Even though no one will have a complete memory of it, I'd still insist that this world has an objective history.
In creation it is based on the knowledge of God and He would be the source of said memory, ergo everyone not knowing of it's existence is still upheld by God's knowledge of it, eg. unnamed star clusters
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I'm just leaving it open as to how that history has it's being only requiring that there would be meaningful propositions about it.
Well sure cause those who don't remember history is bound to repeat it 
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There's a philosopher I'm currently reading, Peter Van Inwagen who will speak of a concept, like the law of nature and proceed to argue from it even though he admits that he doesn't know the concept fully. But he states that even though the concept is not fully known, it is still a concept that we have. I'm pretty much suggesting that for the past and somewhat for the future.
Is this in relation to God's understanding or experience of past and future or man's?
Deuteronomy 32:41 If I whet My glittering sword, and My hand takes hold on judgment, I will render vengeance to My enemies, and repay those who hate Me.” ’ | | Back to Top | | |
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