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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 9/12/2004 5:57 PM (GMT -6) |   | [If you're not an open theist and don't believe God knows true "might and might not" propositions, don't comment. I wanna stay focused here. Thanks.]
About timeless truths, I was just thinking (just tossing this out without much review of it)…
P1 Timelessly true (or false) propositions have timeless truth values
P2 Truth values are determined by truth conditions or states of affairs
C1 Thus, timeless truths express timeless conditions or states of affairs
P3 The only timelessly obtaining states of affairs are logically necessary ones
C2 Therefore, the only timelessly true propositions are necessary truths.
Craig is incorrect in arguing that any proposition may be rendered timelessly true. It’s one thing to argue that timelessly obtaining states of affairs yield timelessly true propositions and therefore may be expressed with tenseless grammar. But it’s another thing to argue that since any proposition may be rendered grammatically tenseless and temporally indexed all temporally indexed propositions therefore necessarily possess one timeless, unchanging truth value.
A presentist can affirm the above argument, and add to it:
P4 Logically contingent truths express logically contingent states of affairs
P5 Logically contingent states of affairs are by definition temporal states of affairs
P6 Temporal states of affairs obtain at some point in time and not before
C3 Obtaining temporally and not before, contingent truths cannot be timelessly true
Problem:
It would seem that all possibilities are eternal (and so necessary), for if the obtaining of some state of affairs was ever possible, it was always possible. But this would suggest that such possibilities are necessary states of affairs (not the actualizing of what might and might not obtain, just the state of affairs of its being true that some possibility might and might not obtain--be careful!). So there was never a time that the proposition expressing the possibility that God might and might not create this world was not true. That seems obvious. Does this mean then that all true “might and might not” propositions (i.e., possible futures) are necessary truths like mathematical truths? I don’t see how, for whereas necessary truths (like mathematical truths) REMAIN true, the proposition “God might and might not create this world” is no longer true after God creates this world. So propositions expressing genuine possibilities can’t be logically necessary truths since they cease to be true when they either obtain or fail to obtain (or give way to determinacy), and logically necessary truths can never change their truth value. But if on the other hand “God might and might not create this world” is a contingent truth, then doesnt it follow that there was a time when it ‘became’ true that “God might and might not create this world.” But this too seems to be wrong. For if it ever was possible before God created this world that God create this world, it was always possible that God create this world before he created it. But after such possibilities are actualized, they cease to exist. So are truths expressing such possibilities logically necessary or contingent?
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 9/13/2004 1:20 PM (GMT -6) | | Perhaps all Q propositions contain an implied temporal qualifier such that:
P1: Q (God creates this world)
is the equivalent of:
P1': At all times prior to T1 (where T1 is the hypothetical time at which God creates this world), it is true that God might and might not create this world.
1. Wouldn’t P1' be true both before and after God created this world?
2. If all Q propositions contain an implied temporal qualifier, would this support your argument that Q only applies to historical states of affairs and not logical states of affairs?
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 9/13/2004 2:36 PM (GMT -6) | | Thanks JET! I'm thinking on it. Wife's flying out in the morning so we're trying to get her packed and ready.
Q (I write tomorrow)!
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Newcomb
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 116
| Posted 9/19/2004 6:36 AM (GMT -6) | | Briefly, I think part of Craig's error is that he considers time to be created, therefore, contingent.
If it is, as I propose, as all dimensions are, necessary, then we have a simple linear cascade where at any given time the future holds possibilities and probabilities, and as time progresses, as you assert, and as decisions are made and actions are taken, these possibilities become either realities or unrealities.
Once God created, then it was no longer a possibility that God would not create (unless you are Hindu).
It is not possible for me to win the past lotteries because the time has passed. It is not probable that I will win a future lottery 1) because the probability of any winning ticket is small and, 2) because I don’t buy them.
Though I still have the ability to exercise that right for future lotteries, past experience indicates I won’t buy a ticket, and as the time for that choice expires, the probability reduces to zero and becomes an impossibility, or unreality.
"Neuk'em" | | Back to Top | | |
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