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Mordecai
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2004
Total Posts : 19
| Posted 8/19/2004 4:48 PM (GMT -6) |   | Matthew 19:26
Jesus looked at them and said, "With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible."
Luke 1:37
For nothing is impossible with God."
Luke 18:27
Jesus replied, "What is impossible with men is possible with God."
QUESTION:
Why is it impossible for the God of Open View Theism (OVT) to see ALL of the future free decisions of man as CERTAIN?
Aren't the only things "impossible" with God are things that violate His nature such as believing that false is true, or creating a rock so heavy He can't lift it, or making a round square?
How does knowing all of the future as a certainty violate any part of God's nature? | | Back to Top | | |
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Gerry Attrick
Registered Member
Date Joined Dec 2003
Total Posts : 114
| Posted 8/19/2004 5:39 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Mordecai
Matthew 19:26
Jesus looked at them and said, "With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible."
Luke 1:37
For nothing is impossible with God."
Luke 18:27
Jesus replied, "What is impossible with men is possible with God."
QUESTION:
Why is it impossible for the God of Open View Theism (OVT) to see ALL of the future free decisions of man as CERTAIN?
Aren't the only things "impossible" with God are things that violate His nature such as believing that false is true, or creating a rock so heavy He can't lift it, or making a round square?
How does knowing all of the future as a certainty violate any part of God's nature?
Mordecai,
I will answer your question as a currently informed and up-to-date open theist would likely answer. The issue is not a defect in God. Rather, the issue is that the future does not yet exist as a thing to be known.
There is, of course, a caveat or qualification to this statement because most open theists, now (unlike earlier formulations) affirm that God knows as certain some future things that entail human decisions. Those future human decisions that God knows as certain, however, do not entail moral issues but amoral issues. So, for example, God did not know in advance with certainty that Judas would betray Jesus Christ. Yet, God did know in advance with certainty that Cyrus' parents would give him the name Cyrus.
Gerry | | Back to Top | | |
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Mordecai
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Date Joined Jul 2004
Total Posts : 19
| Posted 8/19/2004 5:55 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Gerry Attrick
Mordecai,
I will answer your question as a currently informed and up-to-date open theist would likely answer. The issue is not a defect in God. Rather, the issue is that the future does not yet exist as a thing to be known.
Gerry
Thank you for the response Gerry. And no, I am not trying to point out any kind of defect in the OVT God. I'm simply trying to determine if there is a logical impossibility for the OVT God. If there is, then that would seem to me a violation of Scriptures which declares that nothing is (logically) impossible with God.
Now you said the future does not yet exist as a thing to be known, you are then saying that it is impossible for the future to be known, right? Can someone explain to me then why knowing all of the future as a certainty is an illogical impossibility similar to God making a round square? | | Back to Top | | |
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JEE
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2004
Total Posts : 1466
| Posted 8/19/2004 6:24 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Mordecai
quote:
Originally posted by Gerry Attrick
Mordecai,
I will answer your question as a currently informed and up-to-date open theist would likely answer. The issue is not a defect in God. Rather, the issue is that the future does not yet exist as a thing to be known.
Gerry
Thank you for the response Gerry. And no, I am not trying to point out any kind of defect in the OVT God. I'm simply trying to determine if there is a logical impossibility for the OVT God. If there is, then that would seem to me a violation of Scriptures which declares that nothing is (logically) impossible with God.
Now you said the future does not yet exist as a thing to be known, you are then saying that it is impossible for the future to be known, right? Can someone explain to me then why knowing all of the future as a certainty is an illogical impossibility similar to God making a round square?
From my perspective, the issue is not whether it would be possible for God to possess exhaustive definite foreknowledge (EDF); the issue is, "What do the Scriptures reveal about God's knowledge?" I find Scripture to reveal that God indeed does face a partly contingent future, and that a contingency is by definition indeterminate until it resolves in real time.
Philosophically, it would of course be possible for God to possess EDF; however, that would also by definition entail absolute determinism.
http://revivaltheology.net | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/19/2004 6:40 PM (GMT -6) | | Mordecai: Why is it impossible for the God of Open View Theism (OVT) to see ALL of the future free decisions of man as CERTAIN? Aren't the only things "impossible" with God are things that violate His nature such as believing that false is true, or creating a rock so heavy He can't lift it, or making a round square? How does knowing all of the future as a certainty violate any part of God's nature?
Tom: You ask what appear to me to be two different questions: (1) Why is it impossible for God to know future free decisions as certain? And (2) How does knowing all of the future as a certainty violate God’s nature? The first (knowing free decisions before the agents responsible for those decisions make them), in my view, falls into the category of things you seem to agree are impossible or incompatible (square circles, unliftable rocks, etc.). The latter (knowing future certainties) isn’t a problem. There’s nothing incompatible with God knowing future certainties. If a future event is certain or determined to happen, surely God believes it will happen. There’s nothing even logically impossible with the notion of the future being exhaustively settled or determinate, in which case an omniscient God would know the future exhaustively as that which “will” and “will not” happen.
JEE hit the nail on the head. The question, Mordecai, is this: Is there anything logically impossible with the notion of an event being a “might and might not” event (that is, an indeterminate event)? Is real contingency logically impossible? If it’s not, then there’s no a priori reason for believing that our future cannot be a mixture of determinate and indeterminate events, that is, a world in which some things “will” happen, others “will not” happen, and others “might and might not” happen. God’s being omniscient cannot in itself tell us what sort of world God in fact chose to create (since “exhaustively determined” and “partly determined and partly indeterminate” are equally logically possible worlds). You have to decide which world is our world on grounds OTHER than the mere belief that God is omniscient (Scripture, experience, etc.).
So, determinate events are not impossible for God to know as determinate. But neither are indeterminate events impossible for God to know as indeterminate. Seems to me that Scripture and our experience of the world give every indication of being the sort of world about which both of these are true. Some things are in fact determined ahead of time and some are not determined ahead of time. The world is the sort of place in which there are some true “x will happen” propositions, some true “y will not happen” propositions, and some true “p might and might not happen” propositions. If that’s the reality of our world then that’s what God knows. God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods. But this belief in and of itself doesn’t tell us what IS true and what IS in fact false about the future of our world.
Why cannot God know as a “will” what is in reality a “might and might not”? Simple. Because God is omniscient; and for God to believe a contingent event is a determinate event (i.e., not contingent), or for God to believe a true “might and might not” proposition is actually false, would mean God is not omniscient.
Let me ask you a question. Why would it be impossible for the world to be other than exhaustively determined in every minute detail? If this is not logically impossible then God’s being omniscient cannot mean it is not in fact the case. And supposing it were not in fact the case, how would it not be impossible for an omniscient God not to know some of the future as that which “might and might not happen” happen?
I find Gerry’s answer interesting but not as informed or up-to-date as he seems to think it is. I’m not aware of any open theist who ever specifically claimed that God can know NO future human decisions as certain. The earlier arguments may not have explored this in the detail they do today, but that’s not to say the earlier formulations “denied” that God knows any future human moral decisions. It’s also inaccurate to claim that open theists argue that the only future human decisions God knows “as certain” are amoral ones. That’s not true. Most open theists I know would agree that Jesus knew that Peter would certainly deny him AND that this was a moral choice. Some (Sanders) believe this was a conditional prediction. But not all open theists do or need to agree with Sanders.
Mordecai: I'm simply trying to determine if there is a logical impossibility for the OVT God. If there is, then that would seem to me a violation of Scriptures which declares that nothing is (logically) impossible with God.
Tom: But you've already agreed that there are some things that ARE impossible for God (making square circles, married bachelors, committing suicide, etc.). So even if it's logically impossible for the future to be partly open, this would not violate the Scripture in question (which doesn't embrace the sort of logical impossibilites we're talking about).
But you are right in saying that if a partly open future can be shown to be logically impossible, then open theism fails. No doubt. I'm all ears.
You can't establish this impossibility simply on the defintion of "omniscience." You'd have to show that "contingency" is by definition a logical impossibility. You'd have to prove that all "might and might not" propositions are by definition false. That's a tall order. Opponents of open theism to date have not even attempted to do this. I wish they would.
Mordecai: Now you said the future does not yet exist as a thing to be known, you are then saying that it is impossible for the future to be known, right? Can someone explain to me then why knowing all of the future as a certainty is an illogical impossibility similar to God making a round square?
Tom: Illogical impossibilty?  I think you mean "logical impossibility." Anyhow, as JEE pointed out, it's NOT logically impossible for God to know all the future as exhaustively certain, determined, or settled provided the future IS exhaustively determined or settled. The question is, Is the future exhaustively determined? Well, some of it certainly seems to be. But some of it seems NOT to be. Is it then logically impossible that some of the future be determinate/settled and some be indeterminate/contingent? Only if you can prove that indeterminacy, or contingency, is by defintion logically impossible. Go ahead and try.
The Bible disusses the future and describes it sometimes as that which "will" (certainly) come to pass. But God also sometimes describes the future as that which "might" and "might not" come to pass. Only if you decide BEFORE reading the Bible that the world is exhaustively determined can you argue that the "settled" passages of the Bible mean exactly what they say while the "open" passages of the Bible don't REALLY mean what they say, they mean the opposite of what they say (i.e., they're settled!). But if you grant that indeterminacy is not logically impossible then you should at least read the Bible open to the possibility that when it describes the future as settled or certain it means what it says and that when it describes the future as open it means exactly what it says.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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gershom
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Date Joined Aug 2004
Total Posts : 13
| Posted 8/19/2004 7:00 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: ...that’s not to say the earlier formulations “denied” that God knows any future human moral decisions. It’s also inaccurate to claim that open theists argue that the only future human decisions God knows “as certain” are amoral ones. That’s not true. Most open theists I know would agree that Jesus knew that Peter would certainly deny him AND that this was a moral choice. Some (Sanders) believe this was a conditional prediction. But not all open theists do or need to agree with Sanders.
Tom- I'm curious what alternatives there could be to the "conditional prediction" or "amoral choice" positions. Are you saying that God could have known this certainly, and it was still a "moral choice"? I have understood the open view to pretty consistently assert that the only actions God knows with certainty are those which are either (1) determined by his purpose to definitely occur; or (2) unavoidable consequences of cause and effect. So if God can certainly know a "moral choice", how does this fit into the scheme? The only way I can see this fitting in the case of Peter is to say, e.g., that his character was such at that point that there was no possible way for him to not deny Christ those three times- that in essence there was no "might" in the situation because of previous moral decisions which Peter had made to leave him in this state where his response to a future testing was certain failure. In that case, it would seem that the "moral choice" would not be so much the action of denying, but rather it would be those previous moral failures which left his character in this weak state which would be the true "moral choices" where peter had real possibilites to choose otherwise, but failed and thus chose a future pathe which included certain failure. But then I would not say the denial was so much a moral choice as a consequence of previous moral choices. I haven't seen any other suggestion as to how this could be a "morally responsible choice" where Peter had true alternatives to choose from, and yet God could know with certainty which path he would take. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/19/2004 7:24 PM (GMT -6) | | Hey gershome-
gershom: Are you saying that God could have known this certainly, and it was still a "moral choice"?
Tom: Sure, provided the certainty of the choice is grounded in the character of the person. You know the old Augustine phrase: Choices become habits, habits become character, and character determines choices. If free will is a finite, spendable gift, then as we exercise it we “spend” it, and in spending it determine our character, becoming solidified in our choices, and in turn our freely determined characters determine the choices we make.
gershom: I have understood the open view to pretty consistently assert that the only actions God knows with certainty are those which are either (1) determined by his purpose to definitely occur; or (2) unavoidable consequences of cause and effect. So if God can certainly know a "moral choice", how does this fit into the scheme?
Tom: I’m happy to help dispel the myth. In circumstances where our wills are sufficiently determined/solidified over time by our own free choices, it ought to be possible to know ahead of time how we would act in a given situation. Granted, it wouldn’t be possible to know this from eternity. But once our character is in actuality sufficiently solidified, then in principle it can behave “predictably.”
gershom: The only way I can see this fitting in the case of Peter is to say, e.g., that his character was such at that point that there was no possible way for him to not deny Christ those three times- that in essence there was no "might" in the situation because of previous moral decisions which Peter had made to leave him in this state where his response to a future testing was certain failure. In that case, it would seem that the "moral choice" would not be so much the action of denying, but rather it would be those previous moral failures which left his character in this weak state which would be the true "moral choices" where peter had real possibilites to choose otherwise, but failed and thus chose a future path which included certain failure.
Tom: Right. But the choice to deny Christ was still a choice Peter was morally responsible for since he freely chose himself into being the sort of person who would act that way in that given situation. Somebody who freely drinks themselves over time into alcoholism and then on a given Friday night drives drunken over a pedestrian is still accountable for the pedestrian’s death.
gershom: But then I would not say the denial was so much a moral choice as a consequence of previous moral choices.
Tom: But a consequence the person is morally accountable for.
gershom: I haven't seen any other suggestion as to how this could be a "morally responsible choice" where Peter had true alternatives to choose from…
Tom: Don’t mistake “morally responsible behavior” for “libertarian free will” always. It usually is. But “compatibilisitc free will” can be morally accountable behavior provided WE are the ones determining the level of compatibilism.
Ah heck, Doc’s the expert on this, not me.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Mordecai
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2004
Total Posts : 19
| Posted 8/19/2004 8:11 PM (GMT -6) | | Thanx for the input everyone!
Dear Tom,
quote:
Originally posted by TGB
I find Gerry’s answer interesting but not as informed or up-to-date as he seems to think it is. I’m not aware of any open theist who ever specifically claimed that God can know NO future human decisions as certain. The earlier arguments may not have explored this in the detail they do today, but that’s not to say the earlier formulations “denied” that God knows any future human moral decisions. It’s also inaccurate to claim that open theists argue that the only future human decisions God knows “as certain” are amoral ones. That’s not true. Most open theists I know would agree that Jesus knew that Peter would certainly deny him AND that this was a moral choice. Some (Sanders) believe this was a conditional prediction. But not all open theists do or need to agree with Sanders.
Remember that we are speaking of God's Omniscience which includes what God knows from eternity about the future. If what you're saying is true and God can definitely know (from eternity) some future free human decisions, then why is it impossible for Him to know them all?
Now, you gave Gershom the following response which didn't make sense to me...
quote:
Originally posted by TGB
Tom: I’m happy to help dispel the myth. In circumstances where our wills are sufficiently determined/solidified over time by our own free choices, it ought to be possible to know ahead of time how we would act in a given situation. Granted, it wouldn’t be possible to know this from eternity. But once our character is in actuality sufficiently solidified, then in principle it can behave “predictably.”
But if it has to take "over time" then it was not part of God's Omniscience. And despite the "predictability" that one could solidify into, it still cannot be said as an "infallible predictability". Therefore, this cannot be what you meant by God knowing some future free human decisions. Please clarify. Thanx. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/19/2004 8:31 PM (GMT -6) | |
Mordecai: Remember that we are speaking of God's Omniscience which includes what God knows from eternity about the future. If what you're saying is true and God can definitely know (from eternity) some future free human decisions, then why is it impossible for Him to know them all?
Tom: I wouldn’t agree that God knows from eternity some free choices of persons he’ll create. That would ground the determinateness of free choices in something OTHER than the wills of the persons making the choices (since those persons are not eternal), which by definition would make them other than free. If God foreknows as certain a ‘morally responsible choice’, it’s foreknown from the moment that choice becomes certain. And it only becomes certain when the person makes it certain by some previous course of action they are responsible for.
Mordecai: But if it has to take "over time" then it was not part of God's Omniscience.
Tom: Why is that? Are you thinking that knowledge only counts as “omniscient” knowledge if it’s known from all eternity? That doesn’t follow. All omniscience means is “God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods.” If the world is constantly changing, then what’s true and false about the world is constantly changing. And how could an omniscient God’s knowledge of such a world NOT change with time? So if it takes time for a person to freely choose their way into an addiction that’s perfectly predictable, then there’s no problem with an omniscient God knowing this.
Mordecai: And despite the "predictability" that one could solidify into, it still cannot be said as an "infallible predictability". Therefore, this cannot be what you meant by God knowing some future free human decisions. Please clarify. Thanx.
Tom: Why couldn’t the solidification we cement ourselves into ever yield a 100% predictability rate? That’s pretty much how I understand it to be possible for God to know that “Agent x WILL do morally responsible action y in situation z.” If it’s a “will” then strictly (logically) speaking it’s not conditional. And if it’s a morally responsible choice, then the certainty that it ‘will’ happen must rest in the person herself.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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gershom
Registered Member
Date Joined Aug 2004
Total Posts : 13
| Posted 8/20/2004 3:10 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Mordecai: And despite the "predictability" that one could solidify into, it still cannot be said as an "infallible predictability". Therefore, this cannot be what you meant by God knowing some future free human decisions. Please clarify. Thanx.
Tom: Why couldn’t the solidification we cement ourselves into ever yield a 100% predictability rate? That’s pretty much how I understand it to be possible for God to know that “Agent x WILL do morally responsible action y in situation z.” If it’s a “will” then strictly (logically) speaking it’s not conditional. And if it’s a morally responsible choice, then the certainty that it ‘will’ happen must rest in the person herself.
I would see this as a function of the world which God chose to create. If we consider that God knew beforehand all "will" and "might" facts about every possible world, it would seem (in Peters case) that Peter's previous "libertarian free will choices" resulted in the realization of a world where his future course of action was no longer a "might" proposition but now certain "will happen" proposition, for which no alternative was *provided* by God as a consequence of the prior choices. Peter had actual choices before, but as he made certain wrong choices, he locked himself into a world where God only provided a path of failure. Pete would still be morally responsible because this world was realized as a result of his choices, but I would still tend to view the "moral choice" as occuring prior to the denial.
One of the things about the open view that intrigues me is that in theory there really could be very few honest-to-goodness libertarian free will choices; it does not require absolute libertarian free will at all times as some other perspectives seem to assume.
To me this seems consistent with the idea of God "testing" people. I think that God can arrange times and circumstances where people really are brought to a good understanding of the moral choice they face- a testing time- where they truly are free to go one way or the other. These testing times, depending on whether we go one way or the other, can largely determine the future course of events in our lives.
The open view seems most consistent to me with this experiential truth. I could imagine under the open view that it would be possible for even as few as 2 or 3 instances of true "libertarian free will" in a persons life, and that the rest of a persons life is largely determined, and only "open" on the basis of these 2 or 3 decisions. This to me would seem to very largely put the "open view world" right next to a Calvinistic world in terms of God's "working all things", yet still maintain moral accountability and true libertarian free will. While in reality I suspect that each of us have been granted a good bit more than just 2 or 3 "truly free" choices, I do think the possibility that there are very few true "testing times" granted each man by God is a very real possibility under open view theology. What I think is interesting about OVT is that it seems particularly define these instances of free choice as a specific, intentional act of God in creating the world to provide a truly free choice to the agent at that point, as compared to other views which seem to assume an unbounded libertarian free will as an inherent part of man's nature which is always unbounded.
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Gerry Attrick
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Date Joined Dec 2003
Total Posts : 114
| Posted 8/20/2004 4:14 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by TGB
I find Gerry’s answer interesting but not as informed or up-to-date as he seems to think it is. I’m not aware of any open theist who ever specifically claimed that God can know NO future human decisions as certain. The earlier arguments may not have explored this in the detail they do today, but that’s not to say the earlier formulations “denied” that God knows any future human moral decisions. It’s also inaccurate to claim that open theists argue that the only future human decisions God knows “as certain” are amoral ones. That’s not true. Most open theists I know would agree that Jesus knew that Peter would certainly deny him AND that this was a moral choice. Some (Sanders) believe this was a conditional prediction. But not all open theists do or need to agree with Sanders.
Tom
Tom,
Please excuse me and indulge me while I show you that I am informed and up-to-date concerning open theism and what open theists advocate. Please do not forget or ignore the historical transmogrification that open theists have engaged. When I say “transmogrification,” I mean something different from “development.” “Theological development” does not entail equivocation or contradiction. “Theological transmogrification” does entail equivocation or contradiction, the kind of equivocation and contradiction that accompanies the “morphing chart” of open theism.
You claim, “I’m not aware of any open theist who ever specifically claimed that God can know NO future human decisions as certain.” Permit me to show you that Greg Boyd made just such a claim.
In Greg Boyd’s Letters from a Skeptic he argues this same point: “If we have been given freedom, we create the reality of our decisions by making them. And until we make them, they don’t exist. Thus, in my view at least, there simply isn’t anything to know until we make it there to know. So God can't foreknow the good or bad decisions of the people He creates until He creates these people and they, in turn, create their decisions”(p. 30).
Greg Boyd offered not the slightest hint of any qualifier so as to allow for any future human decisions that God could know–good, bad, or morally indifferent. In fact, Greg reinforces the absoluteness of his denial that God could know any future human decision when he responds to his father’s question in his following letter of response even as he equivocates. Greg’s father, Mr. Edward K. Boyd, responded to the statement above by saying, “It seems like your view of God is much more ‘human’ than what I've always thought God was supposed to be. I'm no authority on the Bible, but isn't God here seen as knowing the future?” (p. 32). Greg’s reply letter poses a logical and philosophical inconsistency for his earlier statement, noted above. Greg says, “This view doesn’t maintain that God doesn’t know anything about the future. It only maintains that God doesn’t eternally foreknow the free decisions people will make in the future. If there are aspects of the future which are already determined, either by present circumstances or by God’s own will, these God would know for they are presently there to know. Future free acts, however, aren’t” (p. 33). In other words, Greg Boyd insists that God cannot know his creatures’ future free decisions prior to their making those free decisions. The only future things God can know to some extent are things that for some reason outside of God are determined by “present circumstances” (but not by “free decisions people will make in the future” or “by God’s own will,” which of course, by definition cannot entail future human free decisions).
Again, in God of the Possible, Greg Boyd asserts,
quote:
“If God does not foreknow future free actions, it is not because his knowledge of the future is in any sense incomplete. It’s because there is, in this view, nothing definite there for God to know! His lack of definite foreknowledge of future free actions limits him no more than does the fact that, say, he does not know that there is a monkey sitting next to me right now. As a matter of fact, there is no monkey sitting next to me, so it’s hardly ascribing ignorance to God to insist that he doesn’t know one is there. In just the same way, one is not ascribing ignorance to God by insisting that he doesn’t foreknow future free actions if indeed free actions do not exist to be known until free agents create them” (pp. 16-17).
Again, Greg Boyd asserts,
quote:
“Except in cases in which a solidified character or God’s predestining plan makes people predictable . . . Scripture teaches us that God literally finds out how people will choose when they choose. He made us self-determining agents, and prior to our determining ourselves in one direction or another, the only reality that exists for God to know concerning our future action is the possible directions we may take” (p. 66).
Once again, Greg Boyd asserts,
quote:
“The most compelling reason for Bible-believing Christians to think this [“Why do you think God can’t foreknow future free actions?”] is simply that the Bible depicts God as not knowing future free actions, on the one hand, while also depicting God as knowing all of reality, on the other. This entails that future free decisions do not exist (except as possibilities) for God to know until free agents make them” (p. 120).
So, please excuse me for not simply conceding that your claim is correct on the basis that you do not recall what I recall vividly. Contrary to your claim that no open theist “ever specifically claimed that God can know NO future human decisions as certain,” Greg Boyd himself made such claims repeatedly. If you need the information, I could demonstrate the same from Clark Pinnock's assertions and from John Sanders's claims also. But I think this should suffice! 
Gerry | | Back to Top | | |
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Sisters of Cain
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2004
Total Posts : 431
| Posted 8/20/2004 4:23 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Gerry Attrick
Please excuse me and indulge me while I show you that I am informed and up-to-date concerning open theism and what open theists advocate. Please do not forget or ignore the historical transmogrification that open theists have engaged. When I say “transmogrification,” I mean something different from “development.” “Theological development” does not entail equivocation or contradiction. “Theological transmogrification” does entail equivocation or contradiction
How about a five point calvinist and a four point calvinist that hold opposite/contradictory views on the one point of TULIP they disagree with?
five point versus four point = opposite views on one point
five point versus three point = opposite views on two points
five point versus two point = opposite views on three points
four point versus three point = opposite views on one point
four point versus two point = opposite views on two points
three point versus two point = opposite views on one point
.
.
.
"Most of Calvin's writings reflect the supralapsarian bias, but sometimes he seems to lapse into the infralapsarian view--so it's hard to classify exactly which view Calvin himself held."
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gershom
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Date Joined Aug 2004
Total Posts : 13
| Posted 8/20/2004 4:34 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
You claim, �I�m not aware of any open theist who ever specifically claimed that God can know NO future human decisions as certain.� Permit me to show you that Greg Boyd made just such a claim.
In Greg Boyd�s Letters from a Skeptic he argues this same point: �If we have been given freedom, we create the reality of our decisions by making them. And until we make them, they don�t exist. Thus, in my view at least, there simply isn�t anything to know until we make it there to know. So God can't foreknow the good or bad decisions of the people He creates until He creates these people and they, in turn, create their decisions�(p. 30).
Greg Boyd offered not the slightest hint of any qualifier so as to allow for any future human decisions that God could know�good, bad, or morally indifferent.
It seems to me there is a very clear qualifier there, because he says, "If we have been given freedom". So the question still seems open here as to whether we have been given freedom in every activity.
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Sisters of Cain
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Date Joined Mar 2004
Total Posts : 431
| Posted 8/20/2004 4:41 AM (GMT -6) | | I know that many people will go to church on Sunday, does that prove I have knowlege of the future free choices of people?
I know more people will eat pizza than broccoli in the cafeteria today, my knowlege of people's free choices is comprehensive.
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Gerry Attrick
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Date Joined Dec 2003
Total Posts : 114
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:05 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by gershom
quote:
You claim, "I'm not aware of any open theist who ever specifically claimed that God can know NO future human decisions as certain." Permit me to show you that Greg Boyd made just such a claim.
In Greg Boyd's Letters from a Skeptic he argues this same point: "If we have been given freedom, we create the reality of our decisions by making them. And until we make them, they don't exist. Thus, in my view at least, there simply isn't anything to know until we make it there to know. So God can't foreknow the good or bad decisions of the people He creates until He creates these people and they, in turn, create their decisions"(p. 30).
Greg Boyd offered not the slightest hint of any qualifier so as to allow for any future human decisions that God could know--good, bad, or morally indifferent.
It seems to me there is a very clear qualifier there, because he says, "If we have been given freedom". So the question still seems open here as to whether we have been given freedom in every activity.
gershom,
No. Please read Greg Boyd's argument much more carefully. His initial supposition--"If we have been given freedom . . ."--does not qualify his assertion that God does not and cannot know future human decisions. His supposition grounds his assertion that God does not and cannot know future human decisions.
Gerry
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Gerry Attrick
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Date Joined Dec 2003
Total Posts : 114
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:17 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Sisters of Cain
quote:
Originally posted by Gerry Attrick
Please excuse me and indulge me while I show you that I am informed and up-to-date concerning open theism and what open theists advocate. Please do not forget or ignore the historical transmogrification that open theists have engaged. When I say “transmogrification,” I mean something different from “development.” “Theological development” does not entail equivocation or contradiction. “Theological transmogrification” does entail equivocation or contradiction
How about a five point calvinist and a four point calvinist that hold opposite/contradictory views on the one point of TULIP they disagree with?
five point versus four point = opposite views on one point
five point versus three point = opposite views on two points
five point versus two point = opposite views on three points
four point versus three point = opposite views on one point
four point versus two point = opposite views on two points
three point versus two point = opposite views on one point
.
.
.
"Most of Calvin's writings reflect the supralapsarian bias, but sometimes he seems to lapse into the infralapsarian view--so it's hard to classify exactly which view Calvin himself held."
Sisters of Cain (strange name),
So, what's your point? If you mean that various individual theologians diverge from full-fledged Calvinism, that is obvious. If your point [Who knows? You're much too cryptic for me to be clear about it.] is that this represents "theological transmogrification," then you have misunderstood my point. I have shown that Greg Boyd's theology has undergone "transmogrification," which entails serious equivocation. When you, then, respond by making the case that a four-point Calvinist disagrees with a five-point Calvinist, you are talking about a very different thing than what I have argued.
But, hey, I'm not going to bite on your red herring. Deal with the substance of what I have demonstrated rather than divert the discussion to your red herring.
Gerry | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:18 AM (GMT -6) | | gershom: Pete would still be morally responsible because this world was realized as a result of his choices, but I would still tend to view the "moral choice" as occuring prior to the denial.
Tom: I don't follow ya. If Peter is "morally responsible" for the denial, how is the denial not also a "moral choice"?
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Gerry Attrick
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Date Joined Dec 2003
Total Posts : 114
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:19 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Sisters of Cain
I know that many people will go to church on Sunday, does that prove I have knowlege of the future free choices of people?
I know more people will eat pizza than broccoli in the cafeteria today, my knowlege of people's free choices is comprehensive.
What is your point?
Your knowledge is only actuarial knowledge. That is hardly divine!
Gerry | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:20 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Sahid
quote:
Why is it impossible for the God of Open View Theism (OVT) to see ALL of the future free decisions of man as CERTAIN?
Why is it impossible for the God of non-Open View Theism to see ALL apples as blue? Maybe because all apples are not blue.
Exactly! It's impossible for God to know as determined future free contingent choices precisely because God IS omniscient.
Tom
NB I've never seen a blue apple.  | | Back to Top | | |
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Sisters of Cain
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2004
Total Posts : 431
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:23 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Gerry Attrick
So, what's your point?
calvinism has "developed" and "transmogrified" and "changed" and "splintered" and "evolved" and has more branches than the mouth of the Ganges.
quote:
"Most of Calvin's writings reflect the supralapsarian bias, but sometimes he seems to lapse into the infralapsarian view--so it's hard to classify exactly which view Calvin himself held."
And even within it's founder, confusion reigned.
That's my point.
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Sisters of Cain
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2004
Total Posts : 431
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:25 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Gerry Attrick
quote:
Originally posted by Sisters of Cain
I know that many people will go to church on Sunday, does that prove I have knowlege of the future free choices of people?
I know more people will eat pizza than broccoli in the cafeteria today, my knowlege of people's free choices is comprehensive.
What is your point?
Your knowledge is only actuarial knowledge. That is hardly divine!
"actuarial"? Webster says:
a. 1. Of or pertaining to actuaries; as, the actuarial value of an annuity.
If you mean statistical, why can't God's foreknowlege be statistical? There's nothing to indicate it isn't.
So how you going to prove me wrong?
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gershom
Registered Member
Date Joined Aug 2004
Total Posts : 13
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:27 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
quote:
It seems to me there is a very clear qualifier there, because he says, "If we have been given freedom". So the question still seems open here as to whether we have been given freedom in every activity.
gershom,
No. Please read Greg Boyd's argument much more carefully. His initial supposition--"If we have been given freedom . . ."--does not qualify his assertion that God does not and cannot know future human decisions. His supposition grounds his assertion that God does not and cannot know future human decisions.
Gerry- it seems that you are speaking of any "future human decisions" but boyd always speaks of "future free acts". You are leaving off the qualifier, "free"- which Boyd always includes.
My understanding is that God can know with certainty *many* "future human decisions"- but that would mean that they are not "free" in the sense of man having true libertarian freedom (a genuine ability to choose between alternatives)- they are either determined by God, or necessary as causal consequences of current conditions. | | Back to Top | | |
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Gerry Attrick
Registered Member
Date Joined Dec 2003
Total Posts : 114
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:28 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by TGB
quote:
Originally posted by Sahid
quote:
Why is it impossible for the God of Open View Theism (OVT) to see ALL of the future free decisions of man as CERTAIN?
Why is it impossible for the God of non-Open View Theism to see ALL apples as blue? Maybe because all apples are not blue.
Exactly! It's impossible for God to know as determined future free contingent choices precisely because God IS omniscient.
Tom
NB I've never seen a blue apple.
Tom,
Earlier you said, "I’m not aware of any open theist who ever specifically claimed that God can know NO future human decisions as certain."
Now you have said what you claimed earlier that you were unware that any open theist has ever said: "It's impossible for God to know as determined future free contingent choices precisely because God IS omniscient."
You have made my point, if your words mean anything.
Gerry | | Back to Top | | |
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Sisters of Cain
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2004
Total Posts : 431
| Posted 8/20/2004 5:30 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Gerry Attrick
quote:
Originally posted by Sisters of Cain
I know that many people will go to church on Sunday, does that prove I have knowlege of the future free choices of people?
I know more people will eat pizza than broccoli in the cafeteria today, my knowlege of people's free choices is comprehensive.
What is your point?
Your knowledge is only actuarial knowledge. That is hardly divine!
"actuarial"? Webster says:
a. 1. Of or pertaining to actuaries; as, the actuarial value of an annuity.
If you mean statistical, why can't God's foreknowlege be statistical? There's nothing to indicate it isn't.
So how you going to prove me wrong?
Me and God, statistical foreknowlege or exhaustive foreknowlege.
For starters, I could make more statistical predictions that will come true than God has made predictions listed in scripture. | | Back to Top | | |
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