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Holiday
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Date Joined Nov 2003
Total Posts : 22
 
   Posted 10/28/2004 6:01 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Hello people.

I confess I have long been a reader here and never a poster. I'm mostly intimated because most of the time I can't really understand what you guys write. Thus if I say things that are ridiculous or if I ask questions that have long been answered please forgive my ignorance.

O.K. here goes. I was really interested in the discussion on indeterminacy or now that I review the thread "wondering about libertarian freedom." Are they the same thing? Indeterminacy and libertarian freedom?

That is not my real question though.

From what I read, that Alan guys' comment helped me the most.

He said
"I think the main problem with understanding LFW, and why it seems to mysterious, is that we have a deeply ingrained urge to explain things in terms of efficient causes. Very roughly, an efficient cause is one that brings about or influences the coming about of an event by "pushing", "pulling", or some other application of force. Such explanations serve us very well in dealing with the concrete world of material objects, but cannot be total explanations of our choices if LFW is correct."

O.K. so LFW is unique in that it is divorced from efficient causes?

If I assume correct, then how are we to understand Doc's "as I noticed you guys call him" character solidification bit. I thought I remember reading he propounds LFW becomes deterministic freedom as choices are made and individuals become who they are so to speak. So then does the nature of LFW change in that it does become subject to efficient causes of the agent itself?

I hope I formulated that so it is at least coherent. Please read between my mistakes if I'm not clear. I think I got enough right to at least ask the question.

thanks much for taking the time to read my questions?
Holiday....ooo a code name I've never done that before...kind of fun.
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rossfadeinout
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Date Joined Oct 2002
Total Posts : 428
 
   Posted 10/28/2004 9:13 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Hey holiday,

Good to see you on board. I was the one that started the tread on LFW. Most of us around here affirm LFW, but it is tough to make sense of how we exercise LFW (thanks to Alan for helping me better phrase that.)

There are defenders of LFW like Robert Kane who depend on indeterminancy at the quantam level to make sense of LFW. He does this because he's not much for the idea of agent causation.

In Satan and the Problem of Evil, I seem to remember Doc saying that he didn't like the term indeterminancy for LFW, because it implies that an indeterminate choice would be random.

We need more than indeterminacy to make sense of LFW. If our decisions are random, we don't have any more responsibility than if we were causally determined. Some theory of agent causation which lifts the causation out of the realm of the material seems necessary to make sense of LFW.

Hope that you enjoy your time here Viking

Ross


"Let us remember how common the folly is of going from one faulty extreme into the opposite." -Thomas Reid

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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
 
   Posted 10/28/2004 12:03 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Holiday: O.K. so LFW is unique in that it is divorced from efficient causes?

Tom: Not really. LFW is divorced from efficient causes OUTSIDE of the agent's own will. But the agent IS the efficient cause. So LFW choices aren't absolutely "causeless." They're just caused BY THE AGENT.

Tom
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SwanLake
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 116
 
   Posted 10/28/2004 12:11 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
quote:
Originally posted by TGB

Holiday: O.K. so LFW is unique in that it is divorced from efficient causes?

Tom: Not really. LFW is divorced from efficient causes OUTSIDE of the agent's own will. But the agent IS the efficient cause. So LFW choices aren't absolutely "causeless." They're just caused BY THE AGENT.


Is it the frequent traversal of the Amsterdam airport that makes you so smart?

Eyebrow


"We tend to scoff at the beliefs of the ancients.
But we can't scoff at them personally, to their faces,
and this is what annoys me." -- Jack Handey

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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
 
   Posted 10/28/2004 12:25 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Swan: Is it the frequent traversal of the Amsterdam airport that makes you so smart?

Tom: Nay, my son, but the frequent traversal of the Twin Cities, where I am able to sit at the feet of Blues artists at Famous Dave's and contemplate the world as God meant it to be.

Gorgeous
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
 
   Posted 10/28/2004 6:02 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
Tom,

quote:
Tom: Not really. LFW is divorced from efficient causes OUTSIDE of the agent's own will. But the agent IS the efficient cause. So LFW choices aren't absolutely "causeless." They're just caused BY THE AGENT.


I would suspect that Alan meant "blind" efficient causes, as opposed to intelligent final causes. So if that's what HOLIDAY meant by efficient causes, wouldn't you agree that character solidification (in the bad sense) would be due to the strengthening of "blind" efficient causes? In a sense, such impulsive and/or impotent agents are characterized by a lack of intelligent self-determination - hence, the idea of blind, efficient causation.


wjs

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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
 
   Posted Today 2:55 PM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
We've accepted the idea that for every effect (Z) there is a single necessary and sufficient cause(Y). If so, and if the Liebnizian principle of sufficient reason stands (for every Y there is a Z), then we have to acdept we live in a exhaustively deterministic universe.

But where did the revelation about one necessary and sufficient cause come from? We need a NECESSARY cause for an event not to be capricious, but we need to have a non-sufficient cause for an event not to be deterministic. Both quantum theory and our own experience reveals this. Free acts have a necessary, but non-sufficient, cause. Given Y, Z and Z1 and Z2 and Z3 would all be intelligible (not not necessitated). The use of cause and effecdt to rule out freedom presupposes a deterministic understanding of cause and effect, but this presupposition is utterly arbitrary.

Doubt this helps, but I'm glad you posted Holiday.

Blessings

Greg


"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10.

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PotOnWheel
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
 
   Posted 11/9/2004 2:12 AM (GMT -6)    Quote This PostAlert An Admin About This Post.
You might want to see this quote by Paul Evdokimov (put on this site a while back) that addresses at least some of this (I'm also "Fred", the poster):

    NOT YOUR FATHER AUGUSTINE’S PREDESTINATION
    http://gregboyd.org/gbfront/forum/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=1643

    quote:
    (From: “IN THE WORLD, OP THE CHURCH”, by Paul Evdokimov, SVSP)

    Predestination

    Eschatology sheds light on the destiny of man, on our participation in being saved or lost. Grace makes us feel the "breath of the Spirit." Grace "provokes attention" and thus, according to the Fathers, protects free will not only in action but also in choice (Acts 16:14). "If anyone listens and opens the door, I enter" (Rev 3:20). Rendered attentive by the Spirit, man is able therefore to decisively formulate his yes or no.

    We can define the relations between God and his creature in the categories of causality. In this case, God is the first cause who puts all things in motion, shows the way and returns all to this path. Human freedom is only the secondary instrumental cause drawing its origin from the primary, and determined by it. If the secondary cause sins, it is only because the primary tolerates it. Causal determinism is fatally situated in time, the primary movement finds itself inevitably there. That which establishes the primary cause is the universal pre-cause of all, and the prefix "pre" introduces time into the eternity of God. Humankind does not appear except inevitably, as the object of divine action. In such a causal scheme, the dubious Augustinian idea is led, through the iron logic of Calvin, to its conclusion: predestination to glory, condemnation to hell. The circle is buckled in upon itself without any possible exit: "Therefore according to the end for which humankind is created, we say that it is predestined to death or to life." (Instututions, VIII, p. 62.)

    For the Eastern Church, God is never the primary cause, but the Creator. It is creation "in the image" of the Creator which places the "second freedom" outside any causal determinism, and the patristic conception of humankind as autexousia, self authoritative, rightly defines its mysterious capacity to transcend every necessity and the very condition of the creature over against divine freedom: to see oneself as microtheos, as God-in-miniature. One can even say that God, the Lover of humankind, is much more determined himself by his creation and his covenants than the creature by his Creator: "The Lord has sworn and he will not change his mind" (Ps 110:4). The Incarnation appears as God's reply to his own promise: the divinizing of his creature. The fall of man reveals the titanic fullness of our freedom, which in turn, determines our own destiny. Satan did not lie in saying: "You will be as gods." Man has created something which never existed before. We created evil and introduced it into our innocent nature. What is more, our salvation determines the shape of the Incarnation as Love crucified. Divine blood has been shed to safeguard our freedom in grace, for, according to the Fathers' saying, "God is not able to force anyone to
    love him."

    But all autonomy pushed to the breaking point is against nature, for it encloses man in his lower nature, hardens our "selfhood," destroys our ontology, our very being in the form of God. On the contrary, when man ceases to see himself in his pure subjectivity and rather in relationship to the divine Other, there we discover our "identity by grace," our being "eternally accepted." (These are frequent expressions in the writing ofSt Maximus the Confessor.) Then hell's isolation is destroyed and man is lifted toward the joy of the friend of the Bridegroom, St John the Baptist, and the Servant of the Lord, the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Mother of God.

    "I knock at the door," says the Lord, and he knocks at the door of his own image in man, at the image of divine freedom in us. God empties himself. He "waits," determining nothing. God's decrees and even the predictions of the Apocalypse reveal a conditional character (Jer 18:7-10;26:2-3,13). Human freedom has the power to change even these.

    The miracles of faith, the absolute newness of holiness, the charism of prophecy, all lead to the marriage-like relation between God and man, where love reigns, love which transforms all submission and subordination into the "complete otherness" of the Kingdom. The mystery of the Deisis or "Supplication" icon of Christ the King, seated between John the Baptist and the Virgin, discloses this. This icon is placed at the very heart of the icon screen which stretches across the front of the sanctuary, before the altar. Its aim is to present the image of judgment and at the same time its own transcendence through the image of the marriage feast of the Lamb.

    God persuades, "not by power, nor by might, but by his Spirit."13 Now, "where the Spirit is, there is freedom." The error of ^^destination and of prescience is to introduce into God the Creator the temporal "before." The primary cause placed in time foresees and predestines, determines all. They're- deforms the "eternal" character of God and the capacity of faith to surpass the framework of time. Freedom bears the only interior necessity: to express oneself in choosing. Its fullness contains the most fearful choice; that of a revolt and a determination of oneself against God. Its archetype, the first choice of Lucifer before any concrete existence of evil, reveals that even in the initial state of innocence, freedom is safeguarded intact, and it is God who protects against his own omnipotence.

    In non-Orthodox commentaries on Romans 8:29, predestination is conditioned by God's prescience or foreknowledge and the "we" of Ephesians 1:8-12 is taken in the limited and arbitrary sense of only "the elect." Now, according to St Paul, those thus called "elect" are the Christians, the two being synonymous. Despite terminology often confusing and inadequate to his vision, his theology is strongly volun-tarisric. The principal theme of the letter to the Romans is salvation by faith and by the grace-filled life conformed to faith. The Pauline opposition is not at all between faith and works but between the works of faith and the works of the law. Deeper than any doctrinal prejudice, predestination is for St Paul nothing but a conventional form for designating the mystery of God's love, and this love determines or predestines God and not humanity, if one wants to use the concept. It is rather yrnptomatic that in Romans 5:19 "For just as by the one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, so by the one man's obedience the many will be made righteous," the Greek terms pa.ra.ko6 (disobedience) and hypakoe, (obedience) are extremely rare even in classical Greek. Their rarity points to a meaning of something most unusual. To the abyss of disobedience corresponds the abyss of obedience. The transgression of limits here is not juridical but ontological. Christ's obedience is that of the Son to his Father, of the life within God. His indescribable fullness and "the image of the Son" leads us towards "another humanity," the mysterious humanity of the age to come according to the phrase ofSt Gregory ofNyssa.14

    In Romans i and 9, St Paul speaks of the "historiosophic" mystery of Israel, that is, the action of divine Wisdom in human history and, as in the case of Jacob and Esau, this has mostly to do with the paradoxes of Providence, the historical theme, of the metahistorical meaning of the history of salvation. Even here, the image of the potter only reveals but one of the multiple aspects of divine Wisdom, but does not describe exhaustively the totality of the infinite, the completely inexhaustible range of the relationships between God and humankind. St Paul has a sufficient enough sense of true mystery not to slip toward such a simplification. Certainly it is God who brings to birth and will and action, but there is also the reverse of this: Work out your salvation in fear and trembling.

    God has imprisoned all in disobedience so that he may be merciful to all (Rom 11:32). To every limiting rationalization Paul responds by the confession of the true mystery: how inscrutable are his ways. It is fitting for us to honor these in silence. The docta ignorantia ("learned ignorance") is opposed to every "asylum of Ignorance." The Savior's plan, that all be saved (i Tim 2:4; Rom 8:32) is infinitely more mysterious and impenetrable than predestination which is so human and so impoverished in its rectilinear logic. The "complex of the elect" is a morbid state, symptomatic of an unhappy conscience, and anxiety about hell.
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