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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 9/17/2004 4:38 AM (GMT -6) |   | Hey Jeff-
Sorry about the length!
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ME: Satan's heart was not iniquitous 12 hrs. prior to his "fall." But I don't know what that would "entail" other than his heart was not iniquitous.
Not that, but rather, what has to be true about the state of affairs “Satan’s falling” 12 hrs prior to his falling? Well, assuming his fall wasn’t determined by God, then it has to be true that “Satan might and might not fall.” THAT this might and might not happen is itself a state of affairs which preexists Satan’s actual fall. That’s the point of P6. If you know a thing, say, present state of affairs S, infallibly, and state of affairs S itself amounts to or entails both the possibility that some OTHER state of affairs T ‘might’ happen and the possibility that T ‘might not’ happen, then to know S infallibly is to know T ‘might and might not’ occur. God would not infallibly know reality 12 hrs prior to Satan’s falling if he didn’t also know that Satan might and might not fall.
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P7: At any given point in time God has infallible knowledge of reality at that point in time (or God infallibly knows present reality).
ME: God knew infallibly what was in Satan's heart prior to his "fall."
And if that heart is a libertarian one regarding some things (like choosing to fall or not), then God knows that Satan ‘might and might not’ fall prior to Satan’s actually falling if God infallibly knows Satan at any given point in time. Satan IS his possibilities, as are we. That possibility is a state of heart (or affairs) for Satan that exists prior to his fall. It’s what makes his fall even possible.
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P8: At any given point in time, God has infallible knowledge of what reality at that point in time entails (from P6 and P7). ME: Per my response to P6:, though Satan's heart was yet innocent at this point in time, I don't know what that "entails."
It’s not his being innocent that entails the possibility of his falling. It’s his being free that entails the possibility of his falling. Try reasoning FROM the actuality of Satan’s rebelling BACK to ANY point in time prior to Satan’s rebelling. What has to be real or true about his (libertarian) falling prior to his falling? Anything? What else but that Satan ‘might and might not’ fall? If that’s NOT real and true before he falls, how is it possible that he falls? So possibilities have to precede actuality. It must be true about whatever occurs that it was possible that it occur. Here’s the point of P6 (and P8). If possibilities are real states of affairs that predate actualities, then they exist at each point in time prior to those actualities, and if God infallibly knows reality at any given point in time, then he knows what’s possible for the future at any given point in time.
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P9: At any given point in time, reality renders it determinately the case that some states of affairs will obtain, renders it determinately the case that some states of affairs will not obtain, and renders it indeterminately the case that some states of affairs obtain (cf. P5)
ME: I don't know that it was a "state of affairs" that rendered Satan's future iniquity possible.
Well, try to make sense of some actual libertarian (undetermined) event on the supposition that prior to that event it was NOT the case that it might and might not occur. If it was possible that he fall prior to his fall, then something or someone is responsible for its being the case that he might and might not fall. If his fall was libertarian, then it's God who is responsible for that freedom but Satan who was responsible for actualizing the possibility. If it was determined that Satan fall, then God is the most likely candidate for being the one who determined Satan’s fall. Either way, it’s true before Satan falls that he either “will fall,” “will not fall,” or “might and might not” fall. Those are the only three future-tense propositions we have to express the event. You seem to be saying that whereas God must know “Satan will fall” if that is what is in fact true, that he must know “Satan will not fall” if that is what is in fact true, but that God can decide whether or not he wants to know “Satan might and might not fall” if that is in fact what’s true, and that he decides whether or not he knows it based upon its relevancy to his purposes.
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Rather, I only know Satan is capable of libertarian free-will. Hence, it is that capacity that renders certain future actions possible by such agents, not merely a prior "state of affairs," unless you are including capacities as "states of affairs."
That’ll do! Yes. And this “capacity,” is it libertarian? Yes. Which by definition means it “might and might not” actualize certain possibilities. Here’s the question of the syllogism: Assuming omniscience means God infallibly knows our present capacities, how can that NOT entail God’s knowing infallibly what those capacities are? And what does “knowing what a person’s capacities are” mean if not at least knowing what the person’s possibilities are?
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Conclusion: At any given point in time, God has infallible knowledge of what “will,” “will not,” and “might and might not” obtain.
ME: I would say that at any given point in time, God has infallible knowledge of ranges of possiblities if He so chooses to consider all those possiblities.
So God keeps “possibilities” stored on shelves in boxes labeled “ranges of possibilities” and is free to open any box and inspect it if he wants to or not? Some thoughts:
(1) What problem does this fix? If God CAN open any range of possibilities and examine the contents, then what is problematic about his being smart enough to know what the contexts of all the boxes are at any given point in time? What problem are you avoiding by claiming that God doesn’t know the individual contents of the boxes until he opens them up?
(2) If God doesn’t know the individual contents of any box, then how does he know which box to open in the event his providence requires knowledge of specific possibilities? How does one decide which possibilities are RELEVANT to providence without knowing the possibilities ahead of time?
(3) I’d like to know the difference between knowing a “range of possibilities” and knowing the possibilities that comprise the range?
I fire a gun at a target with circles of values marked 100 (for bull’s eye), 75 (next circle out), 50 points (next circle out), 25 points (next circle out), and zero. Define the “range of possibilities” you say God DOES know. Here they are:
I can fire and entirely miss the target and score zero
I can fire and strike 25
I can fire and strike 50
I can fire and strike 75
I can fire and strike 100
That’s the “range of possibilities.” God knows this “range,” which we might describe as “The possible scores between zero and 100 that Tom might and might not make on firing at the target.” So tell me, Jeff, how is God’s knowing “Tom might strike any of the available scores between zero and 100 on the target” different that God’s knowing “Tom might score zero, 25, 50, 75, or 100 points” except that in the former God doesn’t know what the available scores are between zero and 100? But in this case, in what sense does God really "know" the range of possibilities if all he knows is the lowest and highest OF the range without knowing how many possible scores then are in between, what they are, whether they’re increments of five, ten, are odd or even, etc? How is believing THAT helpful? I guess I’d give this more consideration if I knew what problem is avoided by believing this is how God knows the future. But I can’t think of any problems in God’s knowing “Tom might score zero, 25, 50, 75, or 100 points” that are solved by arguing that God only knows the range “Tom might score zero, 100, or any of the available scores in between which I don’t know but which I can know if I want to”?
(4) How does God choose to NOT know the other possible scores without first knowing them so he can then choose to not know them? How does he know what NOT to know? How do you tag for NOT KNOWING what you ALREADY KNOW? And if you didn’t already know it, then how did you CHOOSE to not know it?
(5) Then there are two-member ranges of possibilities, like the range of possibilities “Tom fires at the target” and “Tom doesn’t fire at the target.” Can God know this “range” without knowing its members? But if God only knows top and bottom members of “ranges” but not the members, does he even know that there ARE any members? Would he know the difference between two-member ranges of possibilities and ranges of possibilities with members of more than two? Does God always knows how many members a “range” has or does God choose not to know this as well?
(6) Then, lastly, there are possibilities that are NOT uniformly related as are the members of the range of “possible scores between zero and 100 in increments of 25.” Knowing a range of possible scores THIS WAY is knowing what DEFINES membership in the range as well as knowing the top and bottom members, and it’s no different than knowing that “Tom might and might not score zero, 25, 50, 75, or 100.” But—and this is issue—possible “choices” are not so uniformly distributed. The metaphysical space (so to speak) between each choice isn’t so even. In fact, one could argue against calling possible choices “ranges of possibilities” since they’re not evenly defined and distributed. For example, I have to decide about what to do for breakfast tomorrow: I could accept an invitation from a pastor friend to meet at Crackle Barrel, I could have breakfast with my kids when I get them up for school, I could have breakfast with my wife mid-morning after her appointment, I could eat by myself at the house, I could eat by myself at some other restaurant, and on and on. Which of these marks the top and bottom members of the range? There ARE NO top and bottom members. They’re not defined in mathematical terms as a range of members who qualify for membership by meeting the definition. But what definition applies to my breakfast options other than being possible breakfast choices? So what does it even mean to speak of possible libertarian choices as comprising a "range" of choices?
Jeff, you gotta come up with some real advantages to going this route. I don’t see any. All I see right now are MORE problems.
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If, on the other hand, He chooses to respond to such a "state of affairs" in some certain manner, He need not even consider all those possibilities, as they may be irrelevant to Him.
Yeah, we’ve definitely been here before. Now I remember. I’ll ask you here what I asked then: How does God established the relevancy that knowing a particular possibility would have to some response of his without knowing the possibility? You FIRST know the possibility, THEN you establish its relevancy to something else. If God knows only top and bottom members of “ranges” of possibilities (which seem to me to include uniformly distributed and defined possibilities but exclude libertarianly free choices), then how does he determine that some unknown member of a range of possibilities is “relevant”?
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Just as I don't consider all possibilites when responding to circumstances.
Ah but you DO “know” them, and on the basis of “knowing” them you then decided, “This isn’t relevant,” or “That’s not relevant,” “I’m not taking this into account in determining my response,” or “I’m not figuring that into the equation for determining what to do here.” See?
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My own volitional and purposeful responses to "states of affairs" render irrelevant to me a vast number of possible outcomes of those "states of affairs."
Only after knowing them and so determining “They’re not relevant to this particular choice.”
Tell me, Jeff, how does God avoid overlooking “unknown possible futures” that ARE relevant to some choice of his? Hmm?
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How much more so might this be the case with God, who has complete control over all "states of affairs" and is yet only acting providentially towards a finite set of ends which may or may not be affected by the vast majority of "affairs."
Who determines that God’s purposes “may or may not be affected” by some possible event? God? Yes, of course. God knows whether or not some possible event affects some specific purpose of his. The question is, how does God know whether a possible event affects some specific purpose if he doesn’t know that possible event?
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For example, did the actions of North American Indians from 2000 BC to 1000 BC really have any influence on God's providential purposes? I can't see how.
God’s purposes for whom? If you’re talking about God’s purposes for the North American Indians during that time, then most definitely their actions influence God’s choices. If you’re talking about God’s getting Israel out of Egypt at that same time, then you’re right, the Indians’ actions almost certainly didn’t influence God’s choices. But this is only established in God’s mind by knowing the actions of the Indians. THEN God knows what such actions do influence and what they do not influence. This doesn’t seem to need defending it’s so straightforward. Now, I don’t think God wastes time doing this. He’s pretty smart. He doesn’t divide up his time or intellectual powers contemplating all true propositions. He can know and collate a billion billion propositions without investing any more concentration or spending any more intellectual power than it takes him to know 1 + 1 = 2.
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And if not, why would God even have to consider all the possible outcomes of their volitions?
How did God determine that their actions don’t impact some purpose of God for other people?
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First, as I said earlier, I know of many verses that boast of God's amazingly wise responses to the world's affairs…
That belief fits equally well with it’s being true that God knows all possibilities SO LONG AS THEY EXIST.
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…but know of no biblical or philosophical reasons to believe that God is eternally aware of all possible contingencies.
No philosophical reason? Really?
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Second, it seems more harmonious with my view of God's complete goodness that He not be eternally contemplative of zillions of horrid and morbid contingencies if such a contemplation is not necessary to Him or His purposes.
Well, there’s the motive for your view. Now we’ve gotten to the basement of this whole issue. And I won’t rehash what we discussed back some time ago. Everything I’ve said so far applies here. How in the world would God establish the relevancy which foreknowing some future set of horrible contingencies would or would not have for any of his purposes without first foreknowing them? To my eyes at least your view is self-contradictory and so incoherent.
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So, if my contention is possible, true election "in time" would be philosophically compatible with the open view. But I would still say that God would only elect if there were none (or too few) that would come to Him otherwise. But I think a case can be made for that point of view - especially from Romans 3.
What sort of freedom would determined/elected people exercise in coming to Christ? Would their salvation consist of and result in a “loving and personal” relationship to God? If so, how would God accomplish this on libertarian grounds? If not, how does the election result in a relationship that is a loving and personal one on the grounds that it was all determined? If God can freely determine/elect and guarantee the love of and personal nature of peoples choices, what reason can you give for God’s choosing NOT to so determine all people? If you grant the compatibilist’s claim that predetermining another’s choice to love and relate personally is a coherent one, then why are you not a compatibilist?
Granted, the future can be partly open AND God can unconditionally determine everybody's choices with regard to salvation provided he left other things open. BUT...it would still be the case that our determined relationship to God would be other than a loving and personal one. If someone is happy with that view, fine.
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I just read your earlier reply to me which provoked this thought. I think your syllogism may very well prove that God CAN know all possible contingencies for this finite creation.
Bad news! The syllogism can’t prove that God’s knowledge of all contingencies is “possible” but not necessarily the case. Sorry. It would take another syllogism arguing that such knowledge is logically possible. This syllogism can only prove (or not prove) what it in fact argues, and what it argues is that at any given point in time God knows all that “will,” “will not,” and “might and might not” occur.
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I'm just not sure it proves that He DOES or even desires to. For example, there are many things that you and I COULD learn or contemplate but do not choose to.
OK, this is entirely different. I know what the prime colors are (red, blue, yellow), but I do NOT hold this truth in conscious contemplation all the time. If this is what you mean then you’ve been using the wrong words to express it, for you would NOT argue that when I’m not consciously contemplating the prime colors it’s then case that I don’t know what the prime colors are. No, I DO know what the prime colors are. And I know what they are even when I’m not consciously contemplating them because contemplating them is relevant to some purpose I have (like mixing colors for a painting I’m doing at the moment). If that’s all your point is, then just say, “God does not equally contemplate every truth with respect to every purpose.” Now that’s something I think I can agree to. But to say “God doesn’t KNOW truth T when T isn’t relevant to him but does know truth T when it is relevant to him” is a different (and incoherent) claim about God.
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I also have difficulty believing that God foreknew all of His own purposes. This would seem to imply they weren't purposes at all, but more like inevitable outworkings of His own nature in a calvinistic sense.
Yeah, I hear ya. Well, so long as creating was a free act God could have abstained from making, all his purposes for the world are contingent too. They depended on his choosing to create, which he was free not to do.
Lots to chew on! Love it. 
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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lock
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2004
Total Posts : 701
| Posted 9/17/2004 8:16 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by TGB
Lock: This scenerio lacks the most important detail. Lock says, "students now that you have come to the realization that you are unable to dunk on the ten foot basket on your own. I will bring in my substitute for you, who I predesignated beforehand to dunk in your place, kids, meet Micheal Jordan."
Tom: Close but no booby prize. What you really say is (my additions in bold): "Students now that I have unconditionally predetermined SOME of you to realize that you are unable to dunk on the ten foot basket on your own, I will bring in my substitute for those of you I've elected, who I predesignated beforehand to dunk in SOME of your places. Unconditionally elected kids, meet Micheal Jordan."
But for the unelected majority of kids in the world, God determined their inability to not dunk, determined that they not realize this, blames them for not realizing this, determined that Jordan NOT dunk in their places, blames them for their not allowing Jordan to dunk for them, and then sends them to hell to roast until they realize that all of this really does make sense and that they really ARE responsible as God says they are, at which time God saves them.
It's in your favor that you refuse to belief that God unconditionaly predetermines some for eternal hell. In the end, everybody makes it. But it doesn't rescue the incompatibility of your viewss. Unconditional predetermination is still incompatible with you belief that God holds people responsible for the sins that send them to corrective temporary torment in hell.
Tom
Tom-
Do you feel that God saved you under the condition that you choose to be saved? If that is the case, then salvation really only exists for those that choose it, right, because those that did not choose it are never saved, but tortured in eternal hell?
His achievement are we, being created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God makes ready beforehand, that we should be walking in them. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 9/17/2004 10:00 AM (GMT -6) | | Lock: Do you feel that God saved you under the condition that you choose to be saved?
Tom: I believe in synergism, yes, as opposed to monergism. So, yes, I believe my standing in relation to God’s salvation is contingent upon my saying “yes” to God.
Lock: If that is the case, then salvation really only exists for those that choose it, right, because those that did not choose it are never saved, but tortured in eternal hell?
Tom: Hmm. How’s that? See, for me the question is “What is salvation?” If it’s just “not going to hell” but rather “getting into heaven” irrespective of relating in love to God then sure, God can guarantee that all will be saved, because getting people into heaven is just about geography. But if salvation is, as I’m inclined to believe, knowing and returning the love of God, i.e., a personal loving relationship with God, then that requires that both parties in the relationship be free to determine themselves with respect to the other party. To the extent that one party determines the other, however, the relationship ceases to be an interpersonal and loving one. It's interesting. For all their complaining about scare tactics, focus on hell, and how salvation isn't "just" escaping hell, etc., universalists reduce salvation down to escaping hell more than anybody I know (at least so far). If salvation really IS more (like they say they believe), really DOES amount to RELATING personally and lovingly to God, then in what do they ground the truth that "Every person without fail will be saved"?
Now, I can be convinced that universalism is true. Who WANTS people to burn, right? I certainly don’t. But I haven’t found an explanation of universalism that shows how God can guarantee that everybody makes a libertarian choice for God (including Tom Talbott). I’ve asked others who are at least somewhat convinced that universalism is true about this. The only explanation I’ve gotten is that God must have originally wired our libertarian free will to expire under certain circumstances (frying your brains out in hell being one of them). So God just draws limits around our libertarian free will and says “I won’t allow you to choose against love forever.” But all this amounts to is an admission that salvation isn’t about love and a personal relationship and so doesn’t require libertarian choice, which I’m not prepared to accept. Talbott just defines sin like Dewey does, as “ignorance.” When we roast for a while God will destroy every illusion, every possible reason we might have for believing there’s anything left “in it” for us to continue saying “no” to God. But besides being a questionable definition of sin, it sill ultimately says God is prepared to objectify us and remove our freedom to get us into heaven.
I just finished Jerry Walls’ book Hell: The Logic of Damnation. And he may have convinced me that omnibenevolence demands that every person have an opportunity to resolve herself with respect to God even if that has to take place after death, though such an arrangement wouldn’t be any more or less of an exposure to the truth than what God knows is enough. Recall that “love does not demand its own way” (which as far as I can tell is precisely what universalism says God ultimately does). I’m prepared to agree that God does everything possible to influence our choice for him short of determining our choice for us. I haven’t yet heard an explanation of universalism that doesn’t in the end reduce to the belief that God does just this, determines our choice for God (or is at least prepared to do if he needs to).
So right now I don’t have any option but to believe that a) God provides salvation for all, b) is prepared to save all, c) does all he possibly can to convince people to resolve themselves in God’s favor, but d) since salvation amounts to loving and personal relationship, will not determine this choice for them.
Lastly, I just wanna say again that it's NOT about universalism. It's about whether or not God is even conditioned by the world.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/17/2004 3:24 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
I tried reading all of your response, but let's get a bit more focused for the sake of my weak mind.
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If possibilities are real states of affairs that predate actualities, then they exist at each point in time prior to those actualities, and if God infallibly knows reality at any given point in time, then he knows what’s possible for the future at any given point in time.
Knowing "states of affairs" is different than deducing or inferring anything from those "states of affairs." A volitional act is necessary to deduce and infer. Thus, your conclusion is not a necessary one.
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I'm just not sure it proves that He DOES or even desires to. For example, there are many things that you and I COULD learn or contemplate but do not choose to.
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OK, this is entirely different. I know what the prime colors are (red, blue, yellow), but I do NOT hold this truth in conscious contemplation all the time. If this is what you mean then you’ve been using the wrong words to express it, for you would NOT argue that when I’m not consciously contemplating the prime colors it’s then case that I don’t know what the prime colors are. No, I DO know what the prime colors are. And I know what they are even when I’m not consciously contemplating them because contemplating them is relevant to some purpose I have (like mixing colors for a painting I’m doing at the moment). If that’s all your point is, then just say, “God does not equally contemplate every truth with respect to every purpose.” Now that’s something I think I can agree to. But to say “God doesn’t KNOW truth T when T isn’t relevant to him but does know truth T when it is relevant to him” is a different (and incoherent) claim about God.
But God may not even have considered the idea of rape on the first day of creation. How could you prove that He must have? How would He have lost control of the universe if He had not?
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For example, did the actions of North American Indians from 2000 BC to 1000 BC really have any influence on God's providential purposes? I can't see how.
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God’s purposes for whom? If you’re talking about God’s purposes for the North American Indians during that time, then most definitely their actions influence God’s choices. If you’re talking about God’s getting Israel out of Egypt at that same time, then you’re right, the Indians’ actions almost certainly didn’t influence God’s choices.
The actions of North American Indians during that time affected God's future judgement of them. But this only requires the knowledge of current state of affairs, no vast quantity of future possibilities. We have no scriptural evidence that God had any specific purposes for them as He did Israel and their associations.
wjs | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 9/18/2004 2:35 AM (GMT -6) | | Lock: Considering the subject of a loving and personal relationship with God... A person develops this relationship with God after they are saved, right?
Tom: Like Sahid said, it seems to me that the “choice” for God, for salvation, is itself the first step of that experience and is taken in the direction God designed that experience to take us, i.e., towards realizing a more personal and loving experience with God and others. How can our first “choice” for God and for love be a predetermined objectifying of us by God but which launches us on a life-journey which is comprised of second, third, fourth, etc., choices which are of a personal and loving nature?
The whole question of what it means to be a ‘person’ and engage in interpersonal relationships with other ‘persons’ is a really big question. I don’t have all the answers, but it does seem to me that to the extent we determine another party in a relationship we remove something essential to making that relationship a ‘personal’ one. I think salvation from its very beginning and on is all about being ‘persons’ in relationship to the greatest and most personal of all beings, God.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 9/18/2004 3:27 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Jeff: Knowing "states of affairs" is different than deducing or inferring anything from those "states of affairs." A volitional act is necessary to deduce and infer. Thus, your conclusion is not a necessary one.
OK, so you’re denying P6, “Infallible knowledge of a thing entails infallible knowledge of what that thing entails.” Maybe I should say “Infallibly exhaustive knowledge of a thing entails infallible knowledge of all which that thing entails.” But you’d still challenge this. So let’s deal with it. I can’t right now! Gotta run and buy a mouth piece for my son’s French horn before I leave town for a couple days. But would you agree that if P6 is true that the entire argument is sound?
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Jeff: I'm just not sure it proves that He DOES or even desires to. For example, there are many things that you and I COULD learn or contemplate but do not choose to.
Tom: OK, this is entirely different. I know what the prime colors are (red, blue, yellow), but I do NOT hold this truth in conscious contemplation all the time. If this is what you mean then you’ve been using the wrong words to express it, for you would NOT argue that when I’m not consciously contemplating the prime colors it’s then case that I don’t know what the prime colors are. No, I DO know what the prime colors are. And I know what they are even when I’m not consciously contemplating them because contemplating them is relevant to some purpose I have (like mixing colors for a painting I’m doing at the moment). If that’s all your point is, then just say, “God does not equally contemplate every truth with respect to every purpose.” Now that’s something I think I can agree to. But to say “God doesn’t KNOW truth T when T isn’t relevant to him but does know truth T when it is relevant to him” is a different (and incoherent) claim about God.
Jeff: But God may not even have considered the idea of rape on the first day of creation. How could you prove that He must have?
Well, you're not denying that before creation the proposition “Rape might and might not occur in my creation” was true. (It’s the whole logic of the square of oppositions and how it follows logically that if “will” and “will not” are both false then “might and might not” must be true.) Anyhow, since you DO grant that God can choose to know that “Rape might and might not occur in my creation” if he WANTS to, then you must agree that this proposition is true. God’s choosing to know it doesn’t make it true. If that were the case then all God had to do to create a world in which horrible things never happened was simply choose not to contemplate them. But no, your arguments so far seem to suggest that you must agree that “Rape might and might not occur in my creation” was true at all points in time prior the first rape. You just think God can choose to know this truth or not know it. It’s this claim of yours that I’ve tried to show is incoherent. I don’t know what else to do but to repeat myself (sorry): How does the “choice to not know” that rape might and might not occur in creation not entail “knowing” that rape might and might not occur in creation? How does God “pick out” those propositions which describe horrible things (which you DO agree are true—which is the only thing that makes it possible for God to choose to know them as you believe he does if knowing them is relevant to some purpose) without “picking them out”? How does he choose what not to know without knowing what not to know? I think this really does sink you boat, Jeff.
The other thing you do believe in which makes your claim that God doesn’t have to know that horrible sinful things might and might not occur is the whole “relevancy” thing. You believe God can choose to know possibilities IF those possibilities are relevant to some purpose of his, in other words, IF there is some providential warrant in his knowing such possibilities God THEN knows them. But this simply doesn’t work. You’re predicating the “if” to “it’s being the case that knowledge of some possibility is relevant to God’s purposes.” That is, you’re making God’s choice to know some possibility contingent upon that possibility’s being providentially relevant to God. But—and this is my objection—this is circular and ends up being incoherent. Who or what establishes this relevancy for God? Who or what establishes that knowing some possibility is providentially advantageous for God? Who tells God, “Hey God, possibility S is relevant to your purpose in circumstance C” so God can THEN say, “Oh, good. Thanks for telling me. Since that possibility is relevant to the fulfillment of some purpose of mine, I better open up the “range of possibilities” in which possibility S is a member and see exactly what this S is.” See? In your view, 'knowing the relevancy of possibility S' must PRECEDE 'knowing possibility S' since you claim that it’s on the basis of 'knowing that possibility S is relevant' that God THEN chooses to 'know possibility S'. Unless you want to posit a being who is as knowledgeable as God (actually more knowledgeable than God since this being would know more than God at any given point in time) and who does know such things, whose job is to alert God when there is something he has to know, you have to believe that God does his own relevancy estimates. GOD is the one who tells himself that knowledge of possibility S is relevant or not. And he can only tell himself that possibility S is relevant or not if he already knows possibility S.
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Jeff: The actions of North American Indians during that time affected God's future judgement of them. But this only requires the knowledge of current state of affairs, no vast quantity of future possibilities.
Possibilities ARE current states of affairs and they exist at every point in time prior to the event they describe. This has to be the case if you want to argue that God chooses not to know them on the basis of their not being relevant to his purposes. This whole ‘foreknowledge based on relevance to purpose’ thing is killing ya.
If God “chooses not to know” (as you affirm), then God “knows what to choose” (which your view denies).
Can’t have ‘em both. 
Gotta run and get that French horn mouthpiece!
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/18/2004 5:12 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
quote:
OK, so you’re denying P6, “Infallible knowledge of a thing entails infallible knowledge of what that thing entails.” Maybe I should say “Infallibly exhaustive knowledge of a thing entails infallible knowledge of all which that thing entails.” But you’d still challenge this. So let’s deal with it. I can’t right now! Gotta run and buy a mouth piece for my son’s French horn before I leave town for a couple days. But would you agree that if P6 is true that the entire argument is sound?
I think that's exactly right. Although theoretically there are implications of states of affairs, it doesn't follow that any mind, including God's, necessarily has to deduce or infer them.
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You just think God can choose to know this truth or not know it. It’s this claim of yours that I’ve tried to show is incoherent. I don’t know what else to do but to repeat myself (sorry): How does the “choice to not know” that rape might and might not occur in creation not entail “knowing” that rape might and might not occur in creation?
You are right again. It may very well be that God doesn't even have the ability to contemplate evil until it occurs. Could you prove otherwise? We can't imagine color until we observe it, so maybe God can't imagine evil until He observes it. This seems quite consistent with my view of God's holiness and the fact that God is only forebearing evil for a finite amount of time.
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That is, you’re making God’s choice to know some possibility contingent upon that possibility’s being providentially relevant to God. But—and this is my objection—this is circular and ends up being incoherent. Who or what establishes this relevancy for God? Who or what establishes that knowing some possibility is providentially advantageous for God? Who tells God, “Hey God, possibility S is relevant to your purpose in circumstance C” so God can THEN say, “Oh, good. Thanks for telling me. Since that possibility is relevant to the fulfillment of some purpose of mine, I better open up the “range of possibilities” in which possibility S is a member and see exactly what this S is.” See? In your view, 'knowing the relevancy of possibility S' must PRECEDE 'knowing possibility S' since you claim that it’s on the basis of 'knowing that possibility S is relevant' that God THEN chooses to 'know possibility S'. Unless you want to posit a being who is as knowledgeable as God (actually more knowledgeable than God since this being would know more than God at any given point in time) and who does know such things, whose job is to alert God when there is something he has to know, you have to believe that God does his own relevancy estimates. GOD is the one who tells himself that knowledge of possibility S is relevant or not. And he can only tell himself that possibility S is relevant or not if he already knows possibility S.
Assume what I conceded above for this reply. You would need to answer my questions about the North American Indians in 1500 bc to play this out. Why would God have had to deduce all possible contingencies from the state of affairs for them to assure the success of His purposes?
As I see it, some knowledge is conceptual (general) and not particular. God can conceptually know what class of behaviors could be possibly relevant to His providence without considering every particular possible case of such behaviors. So all He would need to do is keep an "eye out" on North America for such "present" cases of that class and then respond appropriately.
For example, if the N.A. Indians were to come over and take over the middle east, such a behavior would fall into a class of behaviors that might effect God's providential plans. But He would have plenty of time to prevent such an event without needing to have known, say, all the contingent Indian child abuses that might have occurred up to that point. The child abuses are irrelevant to such providential intervention, for such behaviors do not fall into a conceptual class of behaviors that has any influence on God's plans, necessarily.
In short, I think I'm arguing that conceptual thought eliminates the need to know a mere vat of particular contingencies for certain purposes. I think the same is true for us.
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 9/18/2004 6:44 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: OK, so you’re denying P6, “Infallible knowledge of a thing entails infallible knowledge of what that thing entails.” Maybe I should say “Infallibly exhaustive knowledge of a thing entails infallible knowledge of all which that thing entails.” But you’d still challenge this. So let’s deal with it. I can’t right now! Gotta run and buy a mouth piece for my son’s French horn before I leave town for a couple days. But would you agree that if P6 is true that the entire argument is sound?
Jeff: I think that's exactly right. Although theoretically there are implications of states of affairs, it doesn't follow that any mind, including God's, necessarily has to deduce or infer them.
Then you need to revise your definition of omniscience from (as I’ve understood you) “God knows the present infallibly but doesn’t have to know future infallibly” to “God doesn’t know the present infallibly” as well, since an “infallible” knowledge of the present would include knowing the present. We’ll probably not agree on this, but there ya go.
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You are right again. It may very well be that God doesn't even have the ability to contemplate evil until it occurs. Could you prove otherwise? We can't imagine color until we observe it, so maybe God can't imagine evil until He observes it. This seems quite consistent with my view of God's holiness and the fact that God is only forebearing evil for a finite amount of time.
This really hits the nail on the head so to speak and shows what your real issue is. It’s not foreknowledge at all. Rather, you want to avoid saying God sits around consciously contemplating child abuse, beastiality, and canabalism. This sort of morbid picture of God’s contemplative life (whatever that is) seems incompatible with God’s holiness. That’s your concern.
OK, for the sake of argument I’ll grant you this point. God does not eternally and consciously contemplate such evils. He doesn’t eternally hold in conscious focus such images, as it were. I’ll concede this. If that’s your concern, I share it. But what if I can show you that you can have this without having to deny that “God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods,” or rather, that God knows all possible evils? Would you be interested?
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Tom: That is, you’re making God’s choice to know some possibility contingent upon that possibility’s being providentially relevant to God. But—and this is my objection—this is circular and ends up being incoherent. Who or what establishes this relevancy for God? Who or what establishes that knowing some possibility is providentially advantageous for God? Who tells God, “Hey God, possibility S is relevant to your purpose in circumstance C” so God can THEN say, “Oh, good. Thanks for telling me. Since that possibility is relevant to the fulfillment of some purpose of mine, I better open up the “range of possibilities” in which possibility S is a member and see exactly what this S is.” See? In your view, 'knowing the relevancy of possibility S' must PRECEDE 'knowing possibility S' since you claim that it’s on the basis of 'knowing that possibility S is relevant' that God THEN chooses to 'know possibility S'. Unless you want to posit a being who is as knowledgeable as God (actually more knowledgeable than God since this being would know more than God at any given point in time) and who does know such things, whose job is to alert God when there is something he has to know, you have to believe that God does his own relevancy estimates. GOD is the one who tells himself that knowledge of possibility S is relevant or not. And he can only tell himself that possibility S is relevant or not if he already knows possibility S.
Jeff: Assume what I conceded above for this reply. You would need to answer my questions about the North American Indians in 1500 bc to play this out. Why would God have had to deduce all possible contingencies from the state of affairs for them to assure the success of His purposes?
You’re entirely avoiding the point. The point is: YOU claim that God only chooses to know possible evil event S when knowing possible evil event S is relevant to some purpose of his. That’s your claim, not mine. Now YOU need to explain who or what it is that establishes this relevancy. If it’s God (and it has to be) then how is it that he knows that knowing possibility S is relevant to some purpose of his without knowing what possibility S is?
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Jeff: As I see it, some knowledge is conceptual (general) and not particular. God can conceptually know what class of behaviors could be possibly relevant to His providence without considering every particular possible case of such behaviors.
Two things: (1) What happens to your concern for God’s holiness? God’s knowing “classes of evil behaviors” doesn’t result in a morbid contemplative life for God but his knowing “particular examples of evil behavior” does? How is that the case?
(2) If God, as you’re now claiming, only knows particular evils when the occur, then how can he ever take foreknowing them into consideration when it’s providentially advantageous to do so?
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Jeff: So all He would need to do is keep an "eye out" on North America for such "present" cases of that class and then respond appropriately.
Tell me, Jeff, how does God avoid ever finding himself in the case where knowing some actual evil is simply knowledge that comes too late in the game to be of any providential help for God? To suggest that God only ever begins to act providentially with regard to a particular evil AFTER that evil is actual (i.e., present) empties the concept of “providential” of all meaning. You’ve reduce God to only responding to particular actual evils and never responding to particular possible evils. I’m sure in such cases it’s still the case that God does better than anybody else could possibly do in such cases. But it totally denies that God ever acts to “prevent particular evils” and that, my friend, is a serious claim. How about you showing us this in the Bible (as concerned as you are about a belief having specific biblical warrant)?
How can God act providentially now to prevent particular evils? He can’t in your view because he can’t foreknow them in their specificity (place, time, persons involved, etc.). He only knows “classes of evil behavior.” So how does God influence Fred to not go through with his intention to abuse his infant daughter? Fred’s not considering committing a class of evil acts. He’s considering commiting a particular evil act, abusing his child. Foreknowing the class "child abuse" but not foreknowing any of its members cannot provide a basis upon which God acts to influence Fred not to abuse his daughter. Not only that, but if God only knows particular cases of child abuse WHEN they actualize, how would God even know what temptation Fred is facing? How would God act presently to prevent THIS particular evil if God doesn’t know possible evils in their particularity?
However, once you concede that God contemplates the possibility of Fred’s committing THIS particular evil (as opposed to his committing a class of evil acts), you have to come to terms with how it is God knows this possibility before it actualizes. And once you do that, you can’t avoid the logic of indeterminacy and the conclusion that it was true at all points in time prior to Fred’s abusing his infant daughter that “Fred might and might not abuse his infant daughter.” But conceding this doesn’t mean God sits around eternally “contemplating” this particular evil in some morbid manner.
For example, I decided to have children. I knew when my son was born that “David might and might not reject God, become a child abuser, have sex with animals, etc.” Such possibilities existed THEN and I knew them. Did I get morbidly depressed or become unhealthy by contemplating such things? No. Can it even be said that I contemplated them really? I don’t think so. I can know that such specific evils may befall David (which is more than just knowing the classes "Murder," "Beastiality," or "Spiritual rebellion") without consciously contemplating them day and night. There’s nothing morbid about such knowledge of such evil possibilities.
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Jeff: For example, if the N.A. Indians were to come over and take over the middle east, such a behavior would fall into a class of behaviors that might effect God's providential plans.
But you’ve claimed now that God only knows actual evil. So he wouldn’t know WHAT the Indians were planning on until they got to the Middle East and DID it, until their evil was actual. But then it’s too late to prevent the question in evil.
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Jeff: But He would have plenty of time to prevent such an event without needing to have known, say, all the contingent Indian child abuses that might have occurred up to that point.
Forget the Middle East for now. Did God act to prevent all the contingent Indian instances of child abuse? On what basis?
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Jeff: The child abuses are irrelevant to such providential intervention, for such behaviors do not fall into a conceptual class of behaviors that has any influence on God's plans, necessarily.
The child abuses of Indians may not be relevant to God’s purposes for Israel, but they ARE relevant to God’s purposes for Indians and so relevant to providential acts taken to prevent those child abuses. Does your conception of God’s providential acting include his ever acting to prevent specific evils? How does God accomplish this without foreknowing the possible evils in question?
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Jeff: In short, I think I'm arguing that conceptual thought eliminates the need to know a mere vat of particular contingencies for certain purposes. I think the same is true for us.
The same is not always true for us. We often consider specific, highly defined (person, place, time, act in question, etc.) contingencies. Foreknowledge of “classes of evil acts” cannot provide a basis upon which God (or anybody) acts to prevent some specific evil. I cannot make advantageous use in preventing the specific murder of a specific person in downtown Richmond on a specific day on the basis of foreknowing the class of evil acts known as “Murder” or even the class of evil acts known as “Murder in Richmond” or even the class of evil acts known as "Murder in Richmond on Mondays." I have to know the specific possibilities that DEFINE that specific act I want to prevent if I am to do ALL I can to prevent it.
You’ve gone from arguing that God can choose to foreknow specific evil acts if such acts are relevant to some purpose of his to arguing now in this last post that God can’t do this, i.e., God can’t foreknow specific evils until they occur (Having said “It may very well be that God doesn't even have the ability to contemplate evil until it occurs”). Which is it? In the former you have the problem of being unable to show how relevancy is established for God. In the latter you have the problem of being unable to show a) how a God who cannot foreknow specific evils can act providentially to prevent them, and b) how foreknowledge of “classes of evil behavior” doesn’t result in the same morbid contemplation for God that foreknowledge of specific evils would. If contemplating the class of evil behavior known as “beastiality” is not problematic for God, how is contemplating a specific member of the class problematic? In fact, Jeff, how does God even define the class, how does he know what "beastiality" is, without even being capable of knowing what a beastial act is until a specific act occurs (since a class gets its definiton from its members).
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
Registered Member
Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 9/18/2004 11:12 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
quote:
Then you need to revise your definition of omniscience from (as I’ve understood you) “God knows the present infallibly but doesn’t have to know future infallibly” to “God doesn’t know the present infallibly” as well, since an “infallible” knowledge of the present would include knowing the present. We’ll probably not agree on this, but there ya go.
We do agree. I think it's clear from Hebrews that God observes all of reality at all times. I just don't know that He makes all possible inferences and deductions about the contingencies thereof. So we're in agreement.
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This really hits the nail on the head so to speak and shows what your real issue is. It’s not foreknowledge at all. Rather, you want to avoid saying God sits around consciously contemplating child abuse, beastiality, and canabalism. This sort of morbid picture of God’s contemplative life (whatever that is) seems incompatible with God’s holiness. That’s your concern.
OK, for the sake of argument I’ll grant you this point. God does not eternally and consciously contemplate such evils. He doesn’t eternally hold in conscious focus such images, as it were. I’ll concede this. If that’s your concern, I share it. But what if I can show you that you can have this without having to deny that “God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods,” or rather, that God knows all possible evils? Would you be interested?
Yep.
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Jeff: Assume what I conceded above for this reply. You would need to answer my questions about the North American Indians in 1500 bc to play this out. Why would God have had to deduce all possible contingencies from the state of affairs for them to assure the success of His purposes?
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You’re entirely avoiding the point. The point is: YOU claim that God only chooses to know possible evil event S when knowing possible evil event S is relevant to some purpose of his. That’s your claim, not mine. Now YOU need to explain who or what it is that establishes this relevancy. If it’s God (and it has to be) then how is it that he knows that knowing possibility S is relevant to some purpose of his without knowing what possibility S is?
What establishes the relevancy is God's purpose. God's purposes have certain necessary conditions/means for their implementation. If God's only purposes at 2000 BC are with respect to Israel, then it doesn't take super-human knowledge to know that child abuse in North America is not a relevant factor as to whether God's purposes for Israel will be successfully implemented. Am I just way off here? This seems clear to me.
Please explain this particular case for me. I.e., explain why God needs to be concerned about much other than the N.A. Indians sailing the ocean to conquer those nations for which there are specific prophecies that must be fulfilled. How could much else of their behavior have anything to do with God's purposes on the other side of the ocean? I just can't see it. Maybe I'm too simple. 
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Jeff: As I see it, some knowledge is conceptual (general) and not particular. God can conceptually know what class of behaviors could be possibly relevant to His providence without considering every particular possible case of such behaviors.
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Two things: (1) What happens to your concern for God’s holiness? God’s knowing “classes of evil behaviors” doesn’t result in a morbid contemplative life for God but his knowing “particular examples of evil behavior” does? How is that the case?
I've never argued that God is ignorant of ALL evil. Some knowledge of that kind is inevitable just from observing the world - and He can only judge righteously if He knows what acts have been committed. Some conceptual knowledge of that kind is also necessary for His strategic and wise responses to the world, Satan, etc. I just don't know how to prove that ALL such knowledge is necessary. Thus, I ask, why would a God who abhors evil contemplate it to no avail.
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(2) If God, as you’re now claiming, only knows particular evils when the occur, then how can he ever take foreknowing them into consideration when it’s providentially advantageous to do so?
See answer to 1) above.
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Jeff: So all He would need to do is keep an "eye out" on North America for such "present" cases of that class and then respond appropriately.
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Tell me, Jeff, how does God avoid ever finding himself in the case where knowing some actual evil is simply knowledge that comes too late in the game to be of any providential help for God? To suggest that God only ever begins to act providentially with regard to a particular evil AFTER that evil is actual (i.e., present) empties the concept of “providential” of all meaning.
I have not meant to give that impression. I assume God uses knowledge of the present AND foreknowledge (including foreknowledge of EVIL). What I'm questioning is whether we can prove He foreknows EVERY conceivable evil at all times. For example, once I'm dead, why would God consider any longer what possible evils I may have committed had I not died? What would be the point?
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You’ve reduce God to only responding to particular actual evils and never responding to particular possible evils.
Nor have I meant to give that impression. You keep arguing that I can't prove that God doesn't need to know of all possible evils that the N.A. Indians may have done. I don't claim that I can prove that. I simply suspect it strongly. But neither do I think you can prove that He MUST know of all possible evils of the N.A. Indians.
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How can God act providentially now to prevent particular evils? He can’t in your view because he can’t foreknow them in their specificity (place, time, persons involved, etc.). He only knows “classes of evil behavior.”
I didn't say that God ONLY knows classes. I was simply arguing that, in certain cases, conceptual knowledge eliminates the need to know particulars.
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So how does God influence Fred to not go through with his intention to abuse his infant daughter? Fred’s not considering committing a class of evil acts.
Do we have biblical evidence that God is trying to influence all events all the time? If not, we can only assume that God is trying to influence what He SAYS He's trying to influence.
But conceding this doesn’t mean God sits around eternally “contemplating” this particular evil in some morbid manner.
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For example, I decided to have children. I knew when my son was born that “David might and might not reject God, become a child abuser, have sex with animals, etc.” Such possibilities existed THEN and I knew them. Did I get morbidly depressed or become unhealthy by contemplating such things? No. Can it even be said that I contemplated them really? I don’t think so. I can know that such specific evils may befall David (which is more than just knowing the classes "Murder," "Beastiality," or "Spiritual rebellion") without consciously contemplating them day and night. There’s nothing morbid about such knowledge of such evil possibilities.
What you're saying about yourself is what I think God is probably like. No need to think about all of it all the time to influence your son for the good. Thus, to do so would be a bit morbid.
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But you’ve claimed now that God only knows actual evil. So he wouldn’t know WHAT the Indians were planning on until they got to the Middle East and DID it, until their evil was actual. But then it’s too late to prevent the question in evil.
The ocean is very wide and a significant amount of planning would be necessary to pull of this Middle East takeover. God has plenty of time.
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Jeff: But He would have plenty of time to prevent such an event without needing to have known, say, all the contingent Indian child abuses that might have occurred up to that point.
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Forget the Middle East for now. Did God act to prevent all the contingent Indian instances of child abuse? On what basis?
I know of know evidence that God is acting to prevent all evil. If you have unequivocal verses, that would go a long way towards changing my thinking. All I know is that God acts providentially sometimes with respect to SOME things. And that He will justly judge all evil.
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Jeff: The child abuses are irrelevant to such providential intervention, for such behaviors do not fall into a conceptual class of behaviors that has any influence on God's plans, necessarily.
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The child abuses of Indians may not be relevant to God’s purposes for Israel, but they ARE relevant to God’s purposes for Indians and so relevant to providential acts taken to prevent those child abuses. Does your conception of God’s providential acting include his ever acting to prevent specific evils?
I don't rule it out, but I need verses. I certainly don't think what can be known of God from creation tells us that.
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Jeff: In short, I think I'm arguing that conceptual thought eliminates the need to know a mere vat of particular contingencies for certain purposes. I think the same is true for us.
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The same is not always true for us. We often consider specific, highly defined (person, place, time, act in question, etc.) contingencies.
For your syllogism to be valid, it must never be true for us.
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You’ve gone from arguing that ... to arguing now in this last post that God can’t do this, i.e., God can’t foreknow specific evils until they occur (Having said “It may very well be that God doesn't even have the ability to contemplate evil until it occurs”).
No; I meant God may not have known of certain evils until their first occurrence. After that, He obviously knows them. Just like after we experience green, we can imagine it, but not before we experience it. Further, God may have made some deductions from that knowledge after His having been exposed to the evil. I'm just arguing against the universality of your syllogism. Your syllogism is a total pass/fail deductive argument. It has no room for exceptions. That's what I can't convince myself of. Yet, at least.
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lock
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2004
Total Posts : 701
| Posted 9/18/2004 3:07 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by TGB
Lock: Considering the subject of a loving and personal relationship with God... A person develops this relationship with God after they are saved, right?
Tom: Like Sahid said, it seems to me that the “choice” for God, for salvation, is itself the first step of that experience and is taken in the direction God designed that experience to take us, i.e., towards realizing a more personal and loving experience with God and others. How can our first “choice” for God and for love be a predetermined objectifying of us by God but which launches us on a life-journey which is comprised of second, third, fourth, etc., choices which are of a personal and loving nature?
The whole question of what it means to be a ‘person’ and engage in interpersonal relationships with other ‘persons’ is a really big question. I don’t have all the answers, but it does seem to me that to the extent we determine another party in a relationship we remove something essential to making that relationship a ‘personal’ one. I think salvation from its very beginning and on is all about being ‘persons’ in relationship to the greatest and most personal of all beings, God.
Tom
Tom
Consider this: When we are saved, we are to reckon ourselves dead, crucified with Christ. Our flesh, wherein lies the carnel lusts (Rom 7:5) which produce sin, is nailed to the cross with Christ. We are to also consider ourselves to have been resurrected with Christ and are to walk in newness of spirit. My contention is that in order for one to have a personal and loving relationship with God, the flesh must be taken out of the equation. God is commending this love to us, seeing that, while we are still sinners, Christ died for our sakes (Rom. 5:8). The cross of Christ takes the flesh out of the equation preparing the way for us to be reconciled with God. All men will get this chance to have this loving and personal relationship with God, without the influence of the flesh. The elect have the flesh cut away (circimcisied)and are vivified during this era (Romans 8:11), the rest of mankind will be vivified at the consummation of the eons (1 Cor. 15:22-24). I do not believe God chooses to make us love Him when He wants us to, He opens to door for us to love Him by cutting away the flesh, with its sinful desires, openning the door for us to develop that personal and loving relationship with Him being lead by the spirit.
1 John 4:7-21
Dear friends, let us continue to love one another, for love comes from God. Anyone who loves is born of God and knows God. 8 But anyone who does not love does not know God-for God is love.
9 God showed how much he loved us by sending his only Son into the world so that we might have eternal life through him. 10 This is real love. It is not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent his Son as a sacrifice to take away our sins.11 Dear friends, since God loved us that much, we surely ought to love each other. 12 No one has ever seen God. But if we love each other, God lives in us, and his love has been brought to full expression through us.
13 And God has given us his Spirit as proof that we live in him and he in us. 14 Furthermore, we have seen with our own eyes and now testify that the Father sent his Son to be the Savior of the world. 15 All who proclaim that Jesus is the Son of God have God living in them, and they live in God. 16 We know how much God loves us, and we have put our trust in him.
God is love, and all who live in love live in God, and God lives in them. 17 And as we live in God, our love grows more perfect. So we will not be afraid on the day of judgment, but we can face him with confidence because we are like Christ here in this world.
18 Such love has no fear because perfect love expels all fear. If we are afraid, it is for fear of judgment, and this shows that his love has not been perfected in us. 19 We love each other* as a result of his loving us first.
20 If someone says, "I love God," but hates a Christian brother or sister,* that person is a liar; for if we don't love people we can see, how can we love God, whom we have not seen? 21 And God himself has commanded that we must love not only him but our Christian brothers and sisters, too.
His achievement are we, being created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God makes ready beforehand, that we should be walking in them. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 9/20/2004 4:34 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: Then you need to revise your definition of omniscience from (as I’ve understood you) “God knows the present infallibly but doesn’t have to know future infallibly” to “God doesn’t know the present infallibly” as well, since an “infallible” knowledge of the present would include knowing the present. We’ll probably not agree on this, but there ya go.
Jeff: We do agree. I think it's clear from Hebrews that God observes all of reality at all times. I just don't know that He makes all possible inferences and deductions about the contingencies thereof. So we're in agreement.
Well, actually we don’t agree. I was suggesting how YOU would have to define omniscience. I don’t agree with this understanding. You want to claim that at any given point in time God knows all reality infallibly, and that this reality does indeed entail what is determinate about the future and what is contingent about the future, but you then want to deny that infallible knowledge of reality entails infallible knowledge of what this reality entails about future contingencies (although you don’t deny that infallible knowledge of reality entails knowledge of what events are determined by that reality; you only limit this entailment (inconsistently in my view) in denying foreknowledge of future ‘contingencies’).
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Tom: You’re entirely avoiding the point. The point is: YOU claim that God only chooses to know possible evil event S when knowing possible evil event S is relevant to some purpose of his. That’s your claim, not mine. Now YOU need to explain who or what it is that establishes this relevancy. If it’s God (and it has to be) then how is it that he knows that knowing possibility S is relevant to some purpose of his without knowing what possibility S is?
Jeff: What establishes the relevancy is God's purpose. God's purposes have certain necessary conditions/means for their implementation.
OK, let me ask this differently, because the point is still not being address. Assuming that God’s purposes establish the fact of relevancy with respect to “purpose” and “future contingent events,” who or what then—this is the point—tells God about this? Who “informs” God of this fact, this relevancy? See, God doesn’t know the specific future contingent evil E. So though it may be a FACT that E is highly relevant to God’s purposes, God can only know this by a) knowing E and so THEN knowing the fact that E is relevant, or by b) having somebody who does know E and E’s relevancy to God inform God about E. (b) seems to be out of the question. You’re left with (a). But that won't work for you either since it's nonesensical to say God informs himself of what he doesn't know.
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Jeff: I've never argued that God is ignorant of ALL evil. Some knowledge of that kind is inevitable just from observing the world - and He can only judge righteously if He knows what acts have been committed. Some conceptual knowledge of that kind is also necessary for His strategic and wise responses to the world, Satan, etc. I just don't know how to prove that ALL such knowledge is necessary. Thus, I ask, why would a God who abhors evil contemplate it to no avail.
Why do think that "knowing" a specific future contingent evil amounts to “contemplating’ that evil? This is where you keep missing it. Give this up, and you'll be fine. I “know” the square root of 144, but I don’t “contemplate” the square root of 144 all the time. I contemplate it when it’s “relevant” to accomplishing some purpose. This notion you have that since God doesn’t always “contemplate” horrible future contingent evils God must not “know” future contingent evils. But this doesn’t follow at all. You can believe God “knows” such things (in their specificity, like the square root of 144) without having to believe God consciously “contemplates” such things.
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Jeff: (2) If God, as you’re now claiming, only knows particular evils when the occur, then how can he ever take foreknowing them into consideration when it’s providentially advantageous to do so?
Your (1) didn’t answer this. You claim God doesn’t know SOME specific future continent evils. SOME of these ARE relevant to God’s purposes, in which case God (you agree) must know them before they occur to make providential use of knowing them at all. Above, you only agreed that the fact of relevancy is established by God’s purposes with respect to other contingent events. But that this fact exists doesn’t tell God what the relevancy is. God is still in the dark until he knows contingent evil event E.
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Tom: Tell me, Jeff, how does God avoid ever finding himself in the case where knowing some actual evil is simply knowledge that comes too late in the game to be of any providential help for God? To suggest that God only ever begins to act providentially with regard to a particular evil AFTER that evil is actual (i.e., present) empties the concept of “providential” of all meaning.
Jeff: I have not meant to give that impression. I assume God uses knowledge of the present AND foreknowledge (including foreknowledge of EVIL). What I'm questioning is whether we can prove He foreknows EVERY conceivable evil at all times.
OK, so apply my question to those unknown future evils that ARE relevant.
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Jeff: For example, once I'm dead, why would God consider any longer what possible evils I may have committed had I not died? What would be the point?
Such possibilities neither exist (you’re dead, so any proposition of the form “Jeff might and might not commit evil E” is necessarily false) nor are they relevant (at least it seems so to me). So I would agree that God knows them in precisely the same manner in which you and I “know” truths which are not relevant. I propose to a girl and know “She might accept me” and “She might not accept me” are both true. She accepts me. We get married. “She might not accept is” is now false. “It was true that she might not accept me” is true, and I “know” this. But I don’t go around “contemplating” it. Yes, I know you’re only claiming that God doesn’t know SOME future contingent evils. I’m pointing this out to show you that you have no reason to deny that God “knows” such possibilities on the basis that he doesn’t “contemplate” them. You’re assuming one must “contemplate” (viz., hold in conscious focus) all one “knows.” But this just isn’t true. So what reason is left you for continuing to insist upon this?
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Tom: How can God act providentially now to prevent particular evils? He can’t in your view because he can’t foreknow them in their specificity (place, time, persons involved, etc.). He only knows “classes of evil behavior.”
Jeff: I didn't say that God ONLY knows classes. I was simply arguing that, in certain cases, conceptual knowledge eliminates the need to know particulars.
What about cases in which foreknowledge of some particular evil IS required to act providentially? How does God act providentially to avoid particular evils he doesn’t know?
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Tom: So how does God influence Fred to not go through with his intention to abuse his infant daughter? Fred’s not considering committing a class of evil acts.
Jeff: Do we have biblical evidence that God is trying to influence all events all the time? If not, we can only assume that God is trying to influence what He SAYS He's trying to influence.
Just off the top of my head, I wonder what meaning we are to give to the request “Let your will be done on earth as it is in heaven” and the claim that “God is love” if these are not true for every human being with respect to every situation, if Christ’s death on the Cross doesn’t demonstrate God’s attitude toward every person and every evil, if it wasn’t the case that God really does care about helping every individual escape their specific bondages to specific sin, that God is there, in the case of every individual struggle with sin, to move the individual away from sinful alienation toward God. So yes, there is biblical evidence for believing God always and everywhere does all God can do to prevent every specific evil (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) and when such evil cannot (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) be prevented, that God does all he can to minimize the effect of specific evils.
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Tom: For example, I decided to have children. I knew when my son was born that “David might and might not reject God, become a child abuser, have sex with animals, etc.” Such possibilities existed THEN and I knew them. Did I get morbidly depressed or become unhealthy by contemplating such things? No. Can it even be said that I contemplated them really? I don’t think so. I can know that such specific evils may befall David (which is more than just knowing the classes "Murder," "Beastiality," or "Spiritual rebellion") without consciously contemplating them day and night. There’s nothing morbid about such knowledge of such evil possibilities.
Jeff: What you're saying about yourself is what I think God is probably like. No need to think about all of it all the time to influence your son for the good. Thus, to do so would be a bit morbid.
No need to “think about it” (i.e., “contemplate it”) all thing time, but there is a need to “know” it. Without the latter (“knowing”) the former (“contemplating” and so making use of when necessary) cannot happen.
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I know of know evidence that God is acting to prevent all evil. If you have unequivocal verses, that would go a long way towards changing my thinking. All I know is that God acts providentially sometimes with respect to SOME things. And that He will justly judge all evil.
I think there is overwhelming evidence that God is everywhere working redemptively in every person’s life.
It’s a little frustrating to be asked for specific biblical “proof” for my beliefs, hunches, and assumptions when you offer no biblical proof for your beliefs, hunches, and assumptions. You “suspect” that God doesn’t know all future contingent evils on philosophical grounds (reasoning from what you think is involved in God’s being a “holy” being). You hold to these beliefs on philosophical grounds without specific biblical evidence but discount philosophical arguments and demand specific biblical evidence for anyone who challenges your beliefs. In other words, you’d certainly think I wasn’t debating honestly if dismissed your beliefs simply because you couldn’t prove them by showing that the Bible explicitly teaches them (this is evident in your not having offered explicit biblical evidence for your beliefs but in demanding specific biblical evidence for mine). Not fair.
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Jeff: The child abuses are irrelevant to such providential intervention, for such behaviors do not fall into a conceptual class of behaviors that has any influence on God's plans, necessarily.
Tom: The child abuses of Indians may not be relevant to God’s purposes for Israel, but they ARE relevant to God’s purposes for Indians and so relevant to providential acts taken to prevent those child abuses. Does your conception of God’s providential acting include his ever acting to prevent specific evils?
Jeff: I don't rule it out, but I need verses. I certainly don't think what can be known of God from creation tells us that.
How about what is known about God from Scripture? How about God’s infinite love for every individual human being? How about the Cross? How about God’s loving purpose for every human being entailing God’s actively pursuing every human being in the fulfillment of those purposes?
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Jeff: In short, I think I'm arguing that conceptual thought eliminates the need to know a mere vat of particular contingencies for certain purposes. I think the same is true for us.
Tom: The same is not always true for us. We often consider specific, highly defined (person, place, time, act in question, etc.) contingencies.
Jeff: For your syllogism to be valid, it must never be true for us.
Then you misunderstand my syllogism. I’m claiming that all future possibilities are each, in their specificity, grounded in states of affairs that exist at all points in time prior to the moment such contingencies are actualized (or not) and that the truth-value of propositions expressing these future contingencies are entailed in these such states of affairs. I’m then claiming that at any given point in time infallible knowledge of reality entails infallibly knowing what that reality itself entails. Then I’m claiming that God infallibly knows reality. I conclude that God must know all future contingencies (good and evil ones) if he infallibly knows reality at any given moment in time. My syllogism then, contrary to what you’re claiming, argues that for any specific contingency at all points in time prior to the moment at which time the contingency in question is actualized, there exists a proposition (known by God) expressing this contingency.
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Tom: You’ve gone from arguing that ... to arguing now in this last post that God can’t do this, i.e., God can’t foreknow specific evils until they occur (Having said “It may very well be that God doesn't even have the ability to contemplate evil until it occurs”).
Jeff: No; I meant God may not have known of certain evils until their first occurrence. After that, He obviously knows them. Just like after we experience green, we can imagine it, but not before we experience it.
Fine, then you’re view is only problematic in so far as God is unable to act providentially with respect to preventing specific evils he does not know. Give me an example that demonstrates HOW foreknowledge of classes of evils acts (like foreknowing “murder” as a class of possible evil acts) enables God to act to prevent a specific murder by a specific person on a specific day.
And then there’s the issue of his “holiness” which you are concerned about. How is it that God is NOT morbid for knowing the class of evil acts “beatiality” but IS morbid if he knows a specific possible act of beastiality? What sort of holiness is that?
Peace out!
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Tom
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| Posted 9/20/2004 4:54 AM (GMT -6) | | Lock: I do not believe God chooses to make us love Him when He wants us to, He opens to door for us to love Him by cutting away the flesh, with its sinful desires, openning the door for us to develop that personal and loving relationship with Him being lead by the spirit.
Tom: Unless you agree that after cutting away our flesh we remain libertarianly free to reject God, then you ARE saying God chooses to bring it about that we love him exactly when he wants us to. If our choosing to love him follows inevitably from having our flesh cut away, and God chooses when to cut our flesh away, then God chooses when we love him and when we don’t love him. This whole approach of yours denies libertarian free will and with it any hope of a genuine loving relationship.
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 9/20/2004 6:47 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by lock
Consider this: When we are saved, we are to reckon ourselves dead, crucified with Christ.
At what point can a "totally depraved" man, a "liar from birth", assume he's "saved" and trust himself enough to "reckon" anything?
If I accept the premise that I'm totally corrupt, then I can never "reckon" anything as being true. Any words of other totally corrupt men, any spiritual feeling, all are, by a-priori acceptance, untrustworthy.
Lock's Liar's Dilemma 
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lock
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| Posted 9/20/2004 7:05 AM (GMT -6) | | Sisters-
If you had been following the discussion, I have stood by the scriptural premesis that flesh is unable to please God. Our psuche (soul, heart, conscience, etc) is willing, but the flesh is infirm. Until God cuts the flesh away, through Christ's death, we are unable to please God. Until God takes the flesh out of the way, we will be a slave to sin which has made a home in our flesh. There is no dilemma. You have twisted my words to create a dilemma.
His achievement are we, being created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God makes ready beforehand, that we should be walking in them. | | Back to Top | | |
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 9/20/2004 7:16 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by lock
If you had been following the discussion, I have stood by the scriptural premesis that flesh is unable to please God. Our psuche (soul, heart, conscience, etc) is willing, but the flesh is infirm. Until God cuts the flesh away, through Christ's death, we are unable to please God. Until God takes the flesh out of the way, we will be a slave to sin which has made a home in our flesh. There is no dilemma. You have twisted my words to create a dilemma.
I've actually taken your illogic at it's face value, which is why I've pointed out your unsupportable premise.
I'll accept your premise that your flesh can do nothing towards God and now you prove to me that God has removed your flesh.
Lock's Liar's Dilemma
Genesis 4:7 "If you do well, will not your countenance be lifted up? And if you do not do well, sin is crouching at the door; and its desire is for you, but you must master it." | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 9/20/2004 8:03 AM (GMT -6) | | Sisters: I'll accept your [Lock's] premise that your flesh can do nothing towards God and now you prove to me that God has removed your flesh.
Tom: Now THAT, Lock, is a great question to answer.
But in resopnse to your comments to me, I don't doubt that in our flesh, unaiding by grace, we are unable to please God. I don't view our saying "yes" as a "work" we offer to God in our flesh which then obligates God to save us. But this hardly means we are unable to say "yes" to letting God aid us by his grace (something Scripture universally holds us accountable for).
Oh well. We'll talk about it in heaven.
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 9/20/2004 8:11 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by TGB
But in resopnse to your comments to me, I don't doubt that in our flesh, unaiding by grace, we are unable to please God. I don't view our saying "yes" as a "work" we offer to God in our flesh which then obligates God to save us. But this hardly means we are unable to say "yes" to letting God aid us by his grace (something Scripture universally holds us accountable for).
They have piles of unopened presents scattered around their house because to "accept" the free presents would be a "work". 
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lock
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| Posted 9/20/2004 8:30 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Sisters of Cain
quote:
Originally posted by lock
If you had been following the discussion, I have stood by the scriptural premesis that flesh is unable to please God. Our psuche (soul, heart, conscience, etc) is willing, but the flesh is infirm. Until God cuts the flesh away, through Christ's death, we are unable to please God. Until God takes the flesh out of the way, we will be a slave to sin which has made a home in our flesh. There is no dilemma. You have twisted my words to create a dilemma.
I've actually taken your illogic at it's face value, which is why I've pointed out your unsupportable premise.
I'll accept your premise that your flesh can do nothing towards God and now you prove to me that God has removed your flesh.
Lock's Liar's Dilemma
Genesis 4:7 "If you do well, will not your countenance be lifted up? And if you do not do well, sin is crouching at the door; and its desire is for you, but you must master it."
Cain was a slave to sin (Rom. 6:17), It is impossible to keep the law, in which it was infirm through the flesh (Rom. 8:3). The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak (Matt. 26:41). I believe that Jesus died, was buried, and rose agian from the dead. This is proof my flesh has been cut away. AS with Peter, flesh and blood did not reveal this to me, but God, the Father does(Matt. 16:17).
His achievement are we, being created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God makes ready beforehand, that we should be walking in them. | | Back to Top | | |
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 9/20/2004 8:41 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by lock
Cain was a slave to sin (Rom. 6:17),
God held him responsible for "mastering" the sin that was crouching at the door (a nice illustration of what temptation is). Which shows Cain had the potential to master it. Abel certainly did.
quote:
It is impossible to keep the law, in which it was infirm through the flesh (Rom. 8:3). The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak (Matt. 26:41).
But Jesus kept the whole Law, in the flesh. So it is possible. Having the same potential to keep or break the law as we do, He can be our High Priest.
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I believe that Jesus died, was buried, and rose agian from the dead.
You "believe"? That's your carnal mind boasting in it's vain thoughts that God has arbitrarily selected you. It's impossible for your carnal mind to be relied on whether this is true or not.
You're also relying on the words of carnally minded men.
You could be elected. You could be NOT elected. You could be fooled into thinking you're elected by your carnal mind. You could be elected to fall away from your election. Your carnal mind will never let you know the truth of this.
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lock
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| Posted 9/20/2004 10:35 AM (GMT -6) | | sisters-
As usual you have to twisted my words to make your point. The battle is between the mind and the flesh (Rom. 7:18-25). The bible teaches that as long as we are in flesh, our mind will mind the things of the flesh (Rom. 8:5). When the flesh is taken away by God, and we are walking in the newness of the spirit (not flesh) as if resurrected with Christ (Who became a life-giving spirit)then we are able to recieve the things of God, which are spiritually examined. In our mind, we have the knowledge of good and evil. God's law is in our conscience (mind). The flesh is where sin makes its home. The flesh is the body of death.
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But in resopnse to your comments to me, I don't doubt that in our flesh, unaiding by grace, we are unable to please God. I don't view our saying "yes" as a "work" we offer to God in our flesh which then obligates God to save us. But this hardly means we are unable to say "yes" to letting God aid us by his grace (something Scripture universally holds us accountable for).
Tom-
We are not able to love in the sense God intends us to love until the flesh is taken away. When the flesh is taken away by God and a person can clearly see the unconditional grace of God, do you really think they would not accept it?
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If our choosing to love him follows inevitably from having our flesh cut away, and God chooses when to cut our flesh away, then God chooses when we love him and when we don’t love him. This whole approach of yours denies libertarian free will and with it any hope of a genuine loving relationship.
Only when you look at it from a perspective that God is only choosing a small minority and the rest are going to hell. All will see the things of God uninfluenced by the flesh. The elect see this now and are an example of God's undeserved grace during this current era. The rest will be made alive in Christ at the consummation of the eons. Made alive (or vivified) is resurrection in our spiritual body. When able to see God's undeserved love without the influence of the flesh, how could a person truly not accept it?
quote:
I don't view our saying "yes" as a "work" we offer to God in our flesh which then obligates God to save us.
When you say we have to accept God or not, would not that give us something to boast about?
I am smarter than that guy over there who heard the evangel of grace but didn't except.
When you say that God's grace only helps us decide, did that mean that God didn't help the other guy as much?
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