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Tom
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| Posted 9/20/2004 10:46 AM (GMT -6) |   | Sorry to say it, Lock, but Sisters has put his/her finger on the trouble with your claim. Given your commitments to deprativty and soteriological determinism, you can offer yourself not a single reason for being confident that your belief in your own salvation is in fact a true one. Others who have said exactly what you've said as evidence for their salvation have in fact shown themselves to be deceived when they latter apostatize. Determinists admit as much. God gives some a false sense of security (to highten his sense of glory). There's no possible way you could know whether or not this is true of you.
Your only advantage is your universalism. If it turns out that you are in fact self-deceived about being saved NOW, you still get to make heaven eventually. But given your belief that human reason is utterly depraved and wholly untrustworthy, your belief in universalism might also be a false one, determined for you by God to draw you along once again. You'd have no way of knowing if our reasoning faculties are as depraved as you believe them to be.
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 9/20/2004 10:56 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by lock
sisters-
As usual you have to twisted my words to make your point.
Except you fail to demonstrate how I have.
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The battle is between the mind and the flesh (Rom. 7:18-25). The bible teaches that as long as we are in flesh, our mind will mind the things of the flesh (Rom. 8:5).
Jesus was born of the flesh, yet didn't set His mind on the things of the flesh. Tempted just like us in the flesh, with the same abilities.
Adam and Eve, before sin entered the world (Romans 5:12), set their mind on their own things, not God's.
Job, born of the flesh, set his mind on the things of God. Job 1:8
Abraham believed God and it was reckoned to him as righteousness. Genesis 15:6
Satan, not even in the flesh ( ), chose to disobey God.
Enoch was pleasing to God and was taken.
If we accept your faulty premise, then using your carnal mind, you can't know ANY truth about God.
You've thrown away any common ground you have to be in communication with God.
Lock's Liar's Dilemma
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Tom
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| Posted 9/20/2004 10:59 AM (GMT -6) | | Lock: We are not able to love in the sense God intends us to love until the flesh is taken away. When the flesh is taken away by God and a person can clearly see the unconditional grace of God, do you really think they would not accept it?
Tom: Absolutely. Adam and Eve didn’t accept it and they had no sinful flesh to blind them.
But the point remains: If our loving God follows necessarily from an event God unconditionally determines, then God unconditionally determines our love. And that, my friend, you cannot make sense of.
Lock: Only when you look at it from a perspective that God is only choosing a small minority and the rest are going to hell.
Tom: Not at all. I actually have in mind those who are saved from their suffering in hell. The same principle applies. Universalism doesn’t “fix” what’s wrong with “determined love” as if such determined love is only problematic if God were to only limit the love of SOME but not all. No, if he determines ALL to love him, then the problem is just multiplied.
Lock: When able to see God's undeserved love without the influence of the flesh, how could a person truly not accept it?
Tom: How did Adam and Eve reject it? Ultimately, Lock, I don’t think sin can be boiled down to ignorance (hello John Dewey and Tom Talbott).
Lock: When you say we have to accept God or not, would not that give us something to boast about?
Tom: Mei Geneto! This is an irrational objection you determinists keep offering. It’s sooo lame bro! Come on. Whatever I possess through freedom of choice gives me grounds for “boasting”? This is so not true.
Lock: I am smarter than that guy over there who heard the evangel of grace but didn't except.
Tom: He might be a lot smarter than you. But he is less willing than you. This doesn’t accrue to your “credit.”
Lock: When you say that God's grace only helps us decide, did that mean that God didn't help the other guy as much?
Tom: No, it means God offered him the same help and was refused. Does this really make NO sense to you?
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 9/20/2004 11:02 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by TGB
Sorry to say it, Lock, but Sisters has put his/her finger on the trouble with your claim. Given your commitments to deprativty and soteriological determinism, you can offer yourself not a single reason for being confident that your belief in your own salvation is in fact a true one. Others who have said exactly what you've said as evidence for their salvation have in fact shown themselves to be deceived when they latter apostatize. Determinists admit as much. God gives some a false sense of security (to highten his sense of glory). There's no possible way you could know whether or not this is true of you.
Your only advantage is your universalism. If it turns out that you are in fact self-deceived about being saved NOW, you still get to make heaven eventually. But given your belief that human reason is utterly depraved and wholly untrustworthy, your belief in universalism might also be a false one, determined for you by God to draw you along once again. You'd have no way of knowing if our reasoning faculties are as depraved as you believe them to be.
Well put, Tom.
Lock has used some faculty of reason (common ground between he and God, Romans 1) to believe scripture and make a profession of faith, crossing the bridge from unbelief to belief, then TURNED AROUND AND BURNED THE BRIDGE..... 
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 9/20/2004 11:08 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by TGB
Lock: When you say we have to accept God or not, would not that give us something to boast about?
Is that what you do on your birthday and Christmas? Boast about how you procured the gifts freely given you?
So ridiculous.....
Or do you humbly and graciously accept the gifts?
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Tom
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| Posted 9/20/2004 12:32 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Lock: When you say we have to accept God or not, would not that give us something to boast about?
Sisters[/ib]: Is that what you do on your birthday and Christmas? Boast about how you procured the gifts freely given you?
Exactly! Too funny.
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JEE
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| Posted 9/20/2004 1:06 PM (GMT -6) | | This weekend at the EEM Conference (Which was GREAT, by the way), Scott Taylor and I had a discussion about this very issue, and he raised basically the same objection that Jeff has raised in this thread. As I was thinking about his objection, a couple of things occurred to me:
1. Knowing about something does not mean one necessarily is morbidly dwelling on it in one's mind; i.e., all of us know our parents have had sex, but at least most of us definitely don't dwell on that. ;)
2. In addition to the verses in which God expresses surprise (and even goes so far as to say "it never entered my mind"), a couple of verses that would seem to support the idea of God being in some way unaware of how bad things could get might be where Paul says of depraved humanity in Romans 1 that they are "inventors of evil things," and in Habakkuk where the prophet says God's "eyes are too pure to look on evil." Perhaps "look on" here refers to contemplation? In any case, if someone INVENTS something evil, that seems to imply it is something completely NEW in character.
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Similitude
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| Posted 9/20/2004 4:16 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
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Tom: Then you need to revise your definition of omniscience from (as I’ve understood you) “God knows the present infallibly but doesn’t have to know future infallibly” to “God doesn’t know the present infallibly” as well, since an “infallible” knowledge of the present would include knowing the present. We’ll probably not agree on this, but there ya go.
Jeff: We do agree. I think it's clear from Hebrews that God observes all of reality at all times. I just don't know that He makes all possible inferences and deductions about the contingencies thereof. So we're in agreement.
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Well, actually we don’t agree. I was suggesting how YOU would have to define omniscience. I don’t agree with this understanding. You want to claim that at any given point in time God knows all reality infallibly, and that this reality does indeed entail what is determinate about the future and what is contingent about the future, but you then want to deny that infallible knowledge of reality entails infallible knowledge of what this reality entails about future contingencies (although you don’t deny that infallible knowledge of reality entails knowledge of what events are determined by that reality; you only limit this entailment (inconsistently in my view) in denying foreknowledge of future ‘contingencies’).
What I was agreeing with, was your assertion that I don't agree with P6?. I didn't realize it at first, but you brought to my attention that my latter arguments contradicted my earlier concession to P6. For if, by "entails," you mean all possible deductions and inferences about future possibilities, I would contend that we can't PROVE that God calculates them all from each and every state of affair. Not saying He necessarily doesn't; just that I don't know how to prove that He does.
For again, the mere possibility of a deduction being made can not assure that the deduction WILL be made. To prove THAT, we have to know something about the mind and nature of God, and we only have creation and scripture to make such inferences.
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Jeff: What establishes the relevancy is God's purpose. God's purposes have certain necessary conditions/means for their implementation.
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OK, let me ask this differently, because the point is still not being address. Assuming that God’s purposes establish the fact of relevancy with respect to “purpose” and “future contingent events,” who or what then—this is the point—tells God about this? Who “informs” God of this fact, this relevancy? See, God doesn’t know the specific future contingent evil E. So though it may be a FACT that E is highly relevant to God’s purposes, God can only know this by a) knowing E and so THEN knowing the fact that E is relevant, or by b) having somebody who does know E and E’s relevancy to God inform God about E. (b) seems to be out of the question. You’re left with (a). But that won't work for you either since it's nonesensical to say God informs himself of what he doesn't know.
I gave a specific example about the N.A. Indians taking over the Middle East. What you repeatedly ignore is that it takes lots of time and planning for the N.A. Indians to do this. So God can providentially intervene in plenty of TIME to prevent this Mid-East takeover. It is precisely this TIME that makes it to where God doesn't have to be OMNI-PREPARED at every instant. If an instance of child abuse led, immediately, to a Mid-East takeover, your point would be easier for me to see. But this is not how reality works. It takes TIME for some things to become relevant, and God can providentially prevent things by SHEER POWER without all this foreknowledge you think He must have. He can simply cause an ocean wave to drown the Indians in the Atlantic before they get to the Middle East. This is small potatoes for this God we believe in.
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Why do think that "knowing" a specific future contingent evil amounts to “contemplating’ that evil? This is where you keep missing it. Give this up, and you'll be fine. I “know” the square root of 144, but I don’t “contemplate” the square root of 144 all the time. I contemplate it when it’s “relevant” to accomplishing some purpose.
I've already agreed with this. I said just like once we experience "green," we know it, the same is true with God. That doesn't mean that you have proved that God knew about child abuse 50 trillion years ago, does it?
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Jeff: (2) If God, as you’re now claiming, only knows particular evils when the occur, then how can he ever take foreknowing them into consideration when it’s providentially advantageous to do so?
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Your (1) didn’t answer this. You claim God doesn’t know SOME specific future continent evils. SOME of these ARE relevant to God’s purposes, in which case God (you agree) must know them before they occur to make providential use of knowing them at all. Above, you only agreed that the fact of relevancy is established by God’s purposes with respect to other contingent events. But that this fact exists doesn’t tell God what the relevancy is. God is still in the dark until he knows contingent evil event E.
My mind is simple, Tom. Take my N.A. Indian take-over example and demonstrate how your view must prevail therein. Then I might see it. The only way I know to argue with your abstractions is by giving concrete examples that seem to contradict the universal-ness of your claim.
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Tom: Tell me, Jeff, how does God avoid ever finding himself in the case where knowing some actual evil is simply knowledge that comes too late in the game to be of any providential help for God? To suggest that God only ever begins to act providentially with regard to a particular evil AFTER that evil is actual (i.e., present) empties the concept of “providential” of all meaning.
Jeff: I have not meant to give that impression. I assume God uses knowledge of the present AND foreknowledge (including foreknowledge of EVIL). What I'm questioning is whether we can prove He foreknows EVERY conceivable evil at all times.
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OK, so apply my question to those unknown future evils that ARE relevant.
I would say that God's wisdom is so much greater than ours, that He can't possibly be ignorant of a factor that is relevant. And again, His SHEER POWER makes many things that would be factors for us, nothing to Him. Like I said, He can drown the N.A. Indians on their way across the Atlantic, etc.
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Jeff: For example, once I'm dead, why would God consider any longer what possible evils I may have committed had I not died? What would be the point?
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Such possibilities neither exist (you’re dead, so any proposition of the form “Jeff might and might not commit evil E” is necessarily false) nor are they relevant (at least it seems so to me). So I would agree that God knows them in precisely the same manner in which you and I “know” truths which are not relevant.
Your right; I'm probably mixing up the "contemplate" idea with the "knowledge" idea. Let's forget the "comtemplate" idea since we seem to be pretty close on that.
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Tom: How can God act providentially now to prevent particular evils? He can’t in your view because he can’t foreknow them in their specificity (place, time, persons involved, etc.). He only knows “classes of evil behavior.”
Jeff: I didn't say that God ONLY knows classes. I was simply arguing that, in certain cases, conceptual knowledge eliminates the need to know particulars.
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What about cases in which foreknowledge of some particular evil IS required to act providentially? How does God act providentially to avoid particular evils he doesn’t know?
Wisdom, like I said above. It is God's wisdom that allows him to determine which factors are relevant. Don't humans do that? Don't we determine relevant factors to our purposes without being omniscient in the way you mean?
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Tom: So how does God influence Fred to not go through with his intention to abuse his infant daughter? Fred’s not considering committing a class of evil acts.
Jeff: Do we have biblical evidence that God is trying to influence all events all the time? If not, we can only assume that God is trying to influence what He SAYS He's trying to influence.
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Just off the top of my head, I wonder what meaning we are to give to the request “Let your will be done on earth as it is in heaven”
Thy kingdom come, thy will be done... I.e., it is the kingdom where His will SHALL be done, for Christ will rule with a rod of iron. That's my take, as a premillenialist, anyway. In the meanwhile, He hardens whom He will harden, He forbears vessels so He can show His wrath. This could become a drawn out theological debate. Your syllogism does not assume the truth of the bible does it?
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and the claim that “God is love” if these are not true for every human being with respect to every situation, if Christ’s death on the Cross doesn’t demonstrate God’s attitude toward every person and every evil, if it wasn’t the case that God really does care about helping every individual escape their specific bondages to specific sin, that God is there, in the case of every individual struggle with sin, to move the individual away from sinful alienation toward God.
God "gives them over to a reprobate mind." Not all is resisting, some is "turning over." Indeed, God will send them STRONG DELUSION. These verses must be accounted for, too.
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So yes, there is biblical evidence for believing God always and everywhere does all God can do to prevent every specific evil (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) and when such evil cannot (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) be prevented, that God does all he can to minimize the effect of specific evils.
The first of Romans and Corinthians makes the case that God has done things in the past and in creation that make us without excuse. Once we reject those things, God may very well "harden" (not in violation of free-will, obviously) for His own ends, as He did Pharoah.
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Tom: For example, I decided to have children. I knew when my son was born that “David might and might not reject God, become a child abuser, have sex with animals, etc.” Such possibilities existed THEN and I knew them. Did I get morbidly depressed or become unhealthy by contemplating such things? No. Can it even be said that I contemplated them really? I don’t think so. I can know that such specific evils may befall David (which is more than just knowing the classes "Murder," "Beastiality," or "Spiritual rebellion") without consciously contemplating them day and night. There’s nothing morbid about such knowledge of such evil possibilities.
Jeff: What you're saying about yourself is what I think God is probably like. No need to think about all of it all the time to influence your son for the good. Thus, to do so would be a bit morbid.
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No need to “think about it” (i.e., “contemplate it”) all thing time, but there is a need to “know” it. Without the latter (“knowing”) the former (“contemplating” and so making use of when necessary) cannot happen.
There cannot be a NEED for you to know ALL contingencies, for you CANNOT do so. Indeed, you are commanded to be simple unto the evil and wise unto the good; to think on things just, virtuous, etc. And that is the very mind of Christ.
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I think there is overwhelming evidence that God is everywhere working redemptively in every person’s life.
It’s a little frustrating to be asked for specific biblical “proof” for my beliefs, hunches, and assumptions when you offer no biblical proof for your beliefs, hunches, and assumptions. You “suspect” that God doesn’t know all future contingent evils on philosophical grounds (reasoning from what you think is involved in God’s being a “holy” being). You hold to these beliefs on philosophical grounds without specific biblical evidence but discount philosophical arguments and demand specific biblical evidence for anyone who challenges your beliefs. In other words, you’d certainly think I wasn’t debating honestly if dismissed your beliefs simply because you couldn’t prove them by showing that the Bible explicitly teaches them (this is evident in your not having offered explicit biblical evidence for your beliefs but in demanding specific biblical evidence for mine). Not fair.
You didn't read what I said. I specifically said that, FROM WHAT CAN BE KNOWN OF GOD FROM CREATION ALONE, I don't believe that God can be known to be acting providentially to resist all evil. This is my philosophical contention. You are welcome to prove otherwise. If you can't, then the bible is all we have to provide evidence that God is acting providentially the way you contend. I've provided verses that I think show that God is not ALWAYS working towards everyone's good - unless you think sending them STRONG DELUSION is an example of this. But this seems counter-intuitive to me.
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How about what is known about God from Scripture? How about God’s infinite love for every individual human being?
Does God have infinite love for Satan? What about the verse that says the Lord disciplines those He loves? Doesn't that sound exclusive to you? It does to me.
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Jeff: In short, I think I'm arguing that conceptual thought eliminates the need to know a mere vat of particular contingencies for certain purposes. I think the same is true for us.
Tom: The same is not always true for us. We often consider specific, highly defined (person, place, time, act in question, etc.) contingencies.
Jeff: For your syllogism to be valid, it must never be true for us.
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Then you misunderstand my syllogism. I’m claiming that all future possibilities are each, in their specificity, grounded in states of affairs that exist at all points in time prior to the moment such contingencies are actualized (or not) and that the truth-value of propositions expressing these future contingencies are entailed in these such states of affairs. I’m then claiming that at any given point in time infallible knowledge of reality entails infallibly knowing what that reality itself entails. Then I’m claiming that God infallibly knows reality. I conclude that God must know all future contingencies (good and evil ones) if he infallibly knows reality at any given moment in time.
I've already agreed that IF God's intellectual nature is such that He MUST deduce and infer all possibilities from states of affairs, then He MUST be omniscient in the way you claim. I don't think you've proved that He MUST deduce and infer all possibilities. So let's focus in on how you know THAT. I also agree that if God's providential influences are as extensive as you claim, my N.A. Indian story is less relevant to your position. But I've given verses that I think challenge your view of providence. Maybe, we should start with discussing whether you can prove your view of God's providence APART from revelation, and then work from there.
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Fine, then you’re view is only problematic in so far as God is unable to act providentially with respect to preventing specific evils he does not know. Give me an example that demonstrates HOW foreknowledge of classes of evils acts (like foreknowing “murder” as a class of possible evil acts) enables God to act to prevent a specific murder by a specific person on a specific day.
Let's suppose the murderer has to drive to get to the victim on this hypothetical day. God can cause a dog to run in front of the car or a million other acts that might cause the murderer to have a wreck without ever violating anyone's free-will. And that's just causing a wreck. Then again, He might just cause engine trouble, and on and on. These have nothing to do with knowing a myriad of contingencies. They have everything to do with God's wisdom and power.
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And then there’s the issue of his “holiness” which you are concerned about. How is it that God is NOT morbid for knowing the class of evil acts “beatiality” but IS morbid if he knows a specific possible act of beastiality? What sort of holiness is that?
Like you said, having knowledge of something is not the same as consciously contemplating it.
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JEE
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| Posted 9/20/2004 4:33 PM (GMT -6) | | Not sure who posted this, Tom or Jeff, but I wanted to respond:
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And then there’s the issue of his “holiness” which you are concerned about. How is it that God is NOT morbid for knowing the class of evil acts “beatiality” but IS morbid if he knows a specific possible act of beastiality? What sort of holiness is that?
Is a judge's (or a police officer's, or a jury's) moral character somehow tainted by simply knowing about, even contemplating moral evil that others may do, and working to put a STOP to such behavior in criminals?
Consider Jesus Christ during the "days of his flesh," as Hebrews says: Heb. 4:15 says he was tempted in all points like as we, yet without sin. In order to be tempted by Satan, he had to be able to understand mentally what the temptation was, and REJECT it, as He did when he responded with, "It is written..."
It seems to me that this view of God's holiness would require us to say Jesus was a sinner or in some way less than holy while he was being tempted just like we are tempted. James 1 says that temptation is a step removed from sin, not equal to sin. Jesus told the disciples to pray, "Lead us not into temptation." At the point of temptation, we have a choice to make, whether to YIELD our WILL to the temptation or to depend on God's Spirit for strength.
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lock
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| Posted 9/20/2004 5:42 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: No, it means God offered him the same help and was refused. Does this really make NO sense to you?
I do not see it your way, Tom. So much of our life is determined. God determines who are parents are, our nationality, what time period we are born into, whether we are a jew or gentile, etc. You would agree that the Father draws a person to Jesus. Does not God determine when He will draw a person? I do not see that since God determines when He will cut away the flesh, that this means He has determined how you will love Him. My claim that the flesh cannot please God, nor enjoy an allotment in the kingdom of God are biblical.
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If we accept your faulty premise, then using your carnal mind, you can't know ANY truth about God.
You've thrown away any common ground you have to be in communication with God.
Sister here has twisted my post. I did not claim to have a "carnel mind". I said the battle is between the mind and the flesh. The carnel desires are in the flesh. I believe the mind is able to chose what is right, but it must war with the flesh. Our conscience has the law of God written in it. Paul spoke of how he willed to keep the law, but instead did that which he hated. The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.
As for humbly and graciously accepting the gift of grace;
Rom. 8:30, "whom He designates beforehand, these He calls also, and whom He calls, these He justifies also; now whom He justifies, these He glorifies also."
Paul does not break after "whom He calls" and say now, if they accept, then He will justify them.
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Tom
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| Posted 9/20/2004 6:14 PM (GMT -6) | | Jeff-
I appreciate the time you’re investing in this. I’m not sure how much progress we’re gonna make. You seem now to agree that we (and God) can “know” things without consciously “contemplating” them, which fact now entirely does away with your reason for needing to deny that God “knows” specific contingent evils. What’s motivating you to hold on to this now?
I gotta tell ya, without your giving me some further reason for postulating your theory, I don’t see the point.
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Tom: What about cases in which foreknowledge of some particular evil IS required to act providentially? How does God act providentially to avoid particular evils he doesn’t know?
Jeff: Wisdom, like I said above. It is God's wisdom that allows him to determine which factors are relevant. Don't humans do that? Don't we determine relevant factors to our purposes without being omniscient in the way you mean?
Jeff, just saying “wisdom” in answer to my question doesn’t cut it. How is wisdom exercised in determining the relevancy of God’s purposes (which God knows) to other contingent events if God doesn’t know those contingent events? You have to “know” the events first, then wisdom can evaluate their relevancy.
Yes of course we humans exercise wisdom in determining what factors are relevant to our purposes, but not without “knowing” the factors. What you’re claiming regarding God is analogous to our having purposes, and to there being relevant contingent events which we could know if we wanted to but which we in fact choose not to know. Yet, without knowing what these continent events are we are able to establish which are relevant to our purposes and which are not. After establishing which contingencies are relevant, we THEN decide to know what those contingent events actually are. A very strange belief especially now that the reason you gave for believing it no longer exists.
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Jeff: Your syllogism does not assume the truth of the bible does it?
The syllogism doesn’t mention anything along these lines. But neither does it assume that the Bible is not true. Personally I do believe in the truth of the Bible. I wouldn’t come up with an argument that undermined this belief. So nothing about the syllogism is in jeopardy by the Bible’s being true. My goodness. I think we’re talking past each other, reading off of entirely different sheet music. Premillennialism? What happened to our discussion?
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Tom: …and the claim that “God is love” if these are not true for every human being with respect to every situation, if Christ’s death on the Cross doesn’t demonstrate God’s attitude toward every person and every evil, if it wasn’t the case that God really does care about helping every individual escape their specific bondages to specific sin, that God is there, in the case of every individual struggle with sin, to move the individual away from sinful alienation toward God.
Jeff: God "gives them over to a reprobate mind." Not all is resisting, some is "turning over." Indeed, God will send them STRONG DELUSION. These verses must be accounted for, too.
That God loves such people and did all he could to avoid having to harden them or give them over to their delusions does not discount such verses. I’m a little confused about where you think you’re going with this.
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Jeff: The first of Romans and Corinthians makes the case that God has done things in the past and in creation that make us without excuse. Once we reject those things, God may very well "harden" (not in violation of free-will, obviously) for His own ends, as He did Pharoah.
Jeff, I have no idea where you’re going now. How did my suggesting that God’s being “love” means God does what he can to save people from their sin make you think I denied that people are without excuse or that God ever hardens people when that becomes necessary?
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Jeff: What you're saying about yourself is what I think God is probably like. No need to think about all of it all the time to influence your son for the good. Thus, to do so would be a bit morbid.
Tom: No need to “think about it” (i.e., “contemplate it”) all thing time, but there is a need to “know” it. Without the latter (“knowing”) the former (“contemplating” and so making use of when necessary) cannot happen.
Jeff: There cannot be a NEED for you to know ALL contingencies, for you CANNOT do so. Indeed, you are commanded to be simple unto the evil and wise unto the good; to think on things just, virtuous, etc. And that is the very mind of Christ.
It’s was an analogy, Jeff. An analogy arguing that if I hoped to help my son avoid specific evils or gain the victory of specific temptations, I have to know what I’m helping him to avoid. Similarly, God can’t act providentially to avoid specific sins without knowing what specific sins he’s working to avoid. I wasn’t suggesting that “I” had to know all contingencies in the universe to help my son avoid HIS sins. I only need to know my son’s! That’s the point. I’m talking about making providential use of knowing contingent evils so as to avoid THOSE evils. I don’t know what you’re talking about now.
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Jeff: I've provided verses that I think show that God is not ALWAYS working towards everyone's good - unless you think sending them STRONG DELUSION is an example of this.
My claim that God always does what God can do to avoid evil and to save us from our bondages and sins does not mean that the opportunities never run out and that God never judges people or turn people over to our sin. Of course this happens. But when it happens, it’s after God has done all he could to avoid having to make such a decision.
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Tom: How about what is known about God from Scripture? How about God’s infinite love for every individual human being?
Jeff: Does God have infinite love for Satan?
Is Satan an individual human being? Really, Bro, where are you going?
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Jeff: I would say that God's wisdom is so much greater than ours, that He can't possibly be ignorant of a factor that is relevant.
But you haven’t explained how God determines that factors which are unknown to him are irrelevant. They might be relevant. How would he know if he doesn’t know THEM? You cannot know that a factor is either relevant or irrelevant without first knowing the factor. This is so self-evident I can hardly believe you’re arguing the opposite is true.
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Tom: I conclude that God must know all future contingencies (good and evil ones) if he infallibly knows reality at any given moment in time.
Jeff: I've already agreed that IF God's intellectual nature is such that He MUST deduce and infer all possibilities from states of affairs, then He MUST be omniscient in the way you claim. I don't think you've proved that He MUST deduce and infer all possibilities.
Let’s try to take a simple state of affairs, say, “Fred’s now falling from the Empire State building.” OK? We’ll call this state of affairs F (for Falling!). Certain things follow necessarily from F: “Fred will die,” “Fred’s wife will be a widow,” “Fred’s children will be fatherless,” “Fred’s lapsed life insurance won’t pay a dime to the family leaving Fred’s family penniless,” and a thousand other determined and indeterminate events that follow from THIS state of affairs. Would you say that somebody who knew this state of affairs but did NOT know these entailed consequences (and that’s all contingencies are—consequences) possessed “infallible” knowledge of this state of affairs? No. Well, you might, I don’t know. But you shouldn’t. For infallible knowledge of a thing is by definition knowledge (of that thing) greater than which there is not. So knowledge of F may be great. But knowledge of what F entails is a greater knowledge of F. The former cannot be said to be “infallible” (without defining ‘infallible’ to be compatible with fallibility). We can easily point out that knowledge of F’s entailments is a greater knowledge of F than otherwise.
So, argue that God doesn’t know all the consequences of his choice to create if you like, or that at any given point in time God does not know all the consequences entailed by the totality of all states of affairs constituting reality, fine. But don’t call this “infallible” or “perfect” knowledge of present reality. Don’t say God “sees all” if he doesn’t really see all possibilities. For seeing the present and the present’s possible consequences is seeing MORE than seeing the present and NOT seeing the present’s consequences.
I was wondering too. In your view, Jeff, does God “know” (not “contemplate,” just “know”) all the specific PAST evil acts people have committed? Does he know the past infallibly?
John asked about my having said, “And then there’s the issue of his “holiness” which you are concerned about. How is it that God is NOT morbid for knowing the class of evil acts “beatiality” but IS morbid if he knows a specific possible act of beastiality? What sort of holiness is that?” to which you (Jeff) responded with: John, I didn't post that statement - it was Tom. Nor do I agree with Tom's assessment of my view. I totally agree with you and Tom.”
Come on Jeff. You have only in the last couple of posts come around to the distinction between “knowing” and “contemplating.” From the start you agreed that your motivation for doubting whether or not God foreknew all specific contingent evils was that foreknowing them would compromise God’s holiness; it would be a “morbid” thing for God to do. I'm arguing that God's foreknowing specific contingent evils is NOT morbid because (at least) it does not involve contemplating such evils. If you agree, Jeff, then what are we talking about?
I mean, it’s fine to see that you were wrong here, but it seems like you’re now saying you never even considered this. But you did. In fact, you made such a big deal of it I’m now wondering why, without this motivation, you object to God’s foreknowing specific contingent evils so long as such possibilities exist.
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Similitude
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| Posted 9/21/2004 4:40 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
I'm trying, herein, to focus on your claim that your syllogism doesn't assume the truth of the bible and the implications of that claim.
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Jeff: Your syllogism does not assume the truth of the bible does it?
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The syllogism doesn’t mention anything along these lines. But neither does it assume that the Bible is not true.
This is important. Because it means you can't use the bible to argue for God's infinite love for all people and the extensive providence that such a love would imply. So let's keep it that simple. Can you prove, independent of revelation, that God has infinite love for every single person? For if you can't, how do you know God was providentially trying to prevent the sins of N.A. American Indians? How do you know He's not merely a JUST creator who will ultimately judge each person according to their works, forebearing them in the meanwhile?? Or, per Acts, whether He's not just "winking" at our sins until judgement time.
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Jeff, just saying “wisdom” in answer to my question doesn’t cut it. How is wisdom exercised in determining the relevancy of God’s purposes (which God knows) to other contingent events if God doesn’t know those contingent events? You have to “know” the events first, then wisdom can evaluate their relevancy.
If you can't prove without revelation that God is providentially acting to prevent evil all the time in all circumstances, your argument falls flat. Because my N.A. Indian hypothetical would then stand. You have so far only attempted to refute it by assuming that God loves all humans inifinitely - but I don't see how you can know that apart from scripture. Paul seemed AMAZED at God's grace and love as revealed in Christ - he did NOT see it as proveable from philosophy.
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What you’re claiming regarding God is analogous to our having purposes, and to there being relevant contingent events which we could know if we wanted to but which we in fact choose not to know. Yet, without knowing what these continent events are we are able to establish which are relevant to our purposes and which are not. After establishing which contingencies are relevant, we THEN decide to know what those contingent events actually are.
Take again my old example. I've already explained that a conceptual being could KNOW that nothing short of crossing the Atlantic or Pacific could prevent God's purpose IF His only PROVIDENTIAL purpose was related to the Mideast (we're not assuming the Bible is true here). Tom, YOU know this as well as I do, though neither of us knows all the contingencies of the behavior of N.A. Indians. This is not hard. You HAVE to assume God's providential purposes are exceedingly extensive with respect to ALL behavior of ALL persons at ALL time to make your argument work. But you have NOT proved that independent of the Bible. What if God's only providential purposes were with respect to Australia?
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Premillennialism? What happened to our discussion?
I was only making the argument that your choice of scripture was not unequivocal in it's implications. Deductive proofs need virtually unequivocal evidence. And in your case, need unequivocal AND non-biblical theological evidence.
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That God loves such people and did all he could to avoid having to harden them or give them over to their delusions does not discount such verses. I’m a little confused about where you think you’re going with this.
You had said:
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So yes, there is biblical evidence for believing God always and everywhere does all God can do to prevent every specific evil (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) and when such evil cannot (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) be prevented, that God does all he can to minimize the effect of specific evils.
The underlined words are inconsistent with a TIME of hardening. Your syllogism assumes this kind of ABSOLUTE providence, but I don't think you can prove it with the bible, much less with philosophy alone.
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Jeff: The first of Romans and Corinthians makes the case that God has done things in the past and in creation that make us without excuse. Once we reject those things, God may very well "harden" (not in violation of free-will, obviously) for His own ends, as He did Pharoah.
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Jeff, I have no idea where you’re going now. How did my suggesting that God’s being “love” means God does what he can to save people from their sin make you think I denied that people are without excuse or that God ever hardens people when that becomes necessary?
Notice your words "WHEN THAT BECOMES NECESSARY." You are here seemingly contradicting your previous words, quoted above, "always and everywhere does all God can do to prevent every specific ." Either God at SOME POINT quits trying to prevent hardness in persons or He NEVER does. What can philosophy prove here?
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It’s was an analogy, Jeff. An analogy arguing that if I hoped to help my son avoid specific evils or gain the victory of specific temptations, I have to know what I’m helping him to avoid. Similarly, God can’t act providentially to avoid specific sins without knowing what specific sins he’s working to avoid. I wasn’t suggesting that “I” had to know all contingencies in the universe to help my son avoid HIS sins. I only need to know my son’s! That’s the point.
That's my point, too, Tom. You can't even know all of the contingencies of your son's life. You couldn't know them all if you tried. You could know a great deal of possible "classes" of actions, but not anything like ALL SPECIFIC contingencies. The quantity of all SPECIFIC contingencies of your son's life would be astronomical.
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My claim that God always does what God can do to avoid evil and to save us from our bondages and sins does not mean that the opportunities never run out and that God never judges people or turn people over to our sin. Of course this happens. But when it happens, it’s after God has done all he could to avoid having to make such a decision.
Again, once you abandon the "always" and "all" and "every" language, you have to prove philosophically the basis of your view of providence. In other words, you can't assume conditions for God's providential loving without philosophical proof. You can't assume your interpretation of scripture about God's providence if your syllogism doesn't assume the truth of the Bible. Prove to me philosophically that God is doing as much as He can at all times for your next door neigbor's highest good.
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Tom: How about what is known about God from Scripture? How about God’s infinite love for every individual human being?
Jeff: Does God have infinite love for Satan?
Is Satan an individual human being? Really, Bro, where are you going?
Your syllogism doesn't assume the truth of the Bible. Thus, if God doesn't love ALL REAL volitional/moral beings with infinite love, how do you prove, philosophically, He loves only corporeal moral beings and a subset of spiritual moral beings with infinite love.
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But you haven’t explained how God determines that factors which are unknown to him are irrelevant. They might be relevant. How would he know if he doesn’t know THEM?
The same way you and I know that the behavior of N.A. Indians has no impact on Mid-East affairs. Of course, you could assume that the butterfly effect will cause physical effects in the MidEast, but God can providentially stop these physical effects as they are about to occur. They don't happen instantaneously. I think God's need to know specific future contingencies increases exponentially as His providential interventions increase. Hence the importance of a philosophical theory of providence to your syllogism. I.e., your syllogism alone can't do all the work.
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So, argue that God doesn’t know all the consequences of his choice to create if you like, or that at any given point in time God does not know all the consequences entailed by the totality of all states of affairs constituting reality, fine. But don’t call this “infallible” or “perfect” knowledge of present reality. Don’t say God “sees all” if he doesn’t really see all possibilities.
I've already conceded twice that I disagree with P6? as you define it. You don't have to beat me over the head about it anymore. 
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For seeing the present and the present’s possible consequences is seeing MORE than seeing the present and NOT seeing the present’s consequences.
Which is why I disagree with your explanation of P6?.
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I was wondering too. In your view, Jeff, does God “know” (not “contemplate,” just “know”) all the specific PAST evil acts people have committed? Does he know the past infallibly?
I think He has to at LEAST know all past human behavior infallibly so He can judge righteously. But now that you've got me thinking, I don't know philosophically, without revelation, that God know's all past subatomic motions in distance galaxies.
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Come on Jeff. You have only in the last couple of posts come around to the distinction between “knowing” and “contemplating.” From the start you agreed that your motivation for doubting whether or not God foreknew all specific contingent evils was that foreknowing them would compromise God’s holiness; it would be a “morbid” thing for God to do. I'm arguing that God's foreknowing specific contingent evils is NOT morbid because (at least) it does not involve contemplating such evils. If you agree, Jeff, then what are we talking about?
Tom, I've conceded all along, because of my biblical beliefs, that God MUST know some specific evil contingencies and some evil classes. It is the absolutism in your syllogism that I can't square with God's holiness. Again, why must God have known about possible rapes a thousand trillion years ago? I don't even know biblically, much less philosophically, that God knew He MIGHT create our universe a thousand trillion years ago. For all I know, He had no thought of it as a certainty or contingency at that time.
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I mean, it’s fine to see that you were wrong here, but it seems like you’re now saying you never even considered this. But you did. In fact, you made such a big deal of it I’m now wondering why, without this motivation, you object to God’s foreknowing specific contingent evils so long as such possibilities exist.
Tom, I don't object to the POSSIBILITY of God being omniscient in the way you explain. I object to the necessity of such a conclusion from your syllogism.
So once again, I've already agreed that IF God's intellectual nature is such that He MUST deduce and infer all possibilities from states of affairs, then He MUST be omniscient in the way you claim. If you BELIEVE that God's intellectual nature, in this respect, is self-evident, then fine. I just don't see how you could know it since WE don't have to deduce and infer from a knowledge of mere states of affairs. We can deduce all kinds of things from present knowledge but simply don't - our intellectual nature doesn't compel us to. So you can't be using analogy to make your conclusion about God's intellect. And it doesn't seem self-evident to me.
AND, even IF God is not compelled to deduce and infer by His intellectual nature, IF God is as providentially active as you claim, it is plausible that God NEEDS to be as omniscient as you claim. But I don't think you can prove either with philosophy alone. Indeed, I don't think you can unequivocally prove either with the bible.
In short, I think you need one more proposition in your syllogism. One about God's intellectual nature or one about God's providential nature. Either of these will complete it I think. But if they're not self-evident, can you prove them philosophically? - THAT'S THE QUESTION.
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Tom
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| Posted 9/22/2004 10:04 AM (GMT -6) | | Too much to respond to in one reply. Plus I’m on the road in NJ, so…
Jeff: …you can't use the bible to argue for God's infinite love for all people and the extensive providence that such a love would imply. So…
Tom: Right. But my syllogism doesn’t assume any argument whatsoever about God’s love. Your denial that infallible knowledge of a state of affairs entails knowledge of what that state of affairs entails led us into an entirely separate argument about whether or not God’s equally loving all people infinitely means God is always at work redemptively in everybody’s life seeking to prevent increasing bondages to sin (since you appeared to concede that such activity WOULD require foreknowledge of what God attempts to prevent). I didn’t introduce the argument from loving providential actions because I thought my argument from “infallible knowledge” required it. It doesn’t I don’t think. I was just trying to provide you with a reason for believing in something you seemed to agree DID require such knowledge.
But if you wish me to make explicit everything that the syllogism assumes, then OK, it assumes that God exists (shall I offer iron-clad arguments for that to you?), that the rules of grammar are what give meaning to English propositions (does that need to be proven), and on and on. So yes, the syllogism assumes that the God of the Bible exists (since it argues something to be true ABOUT God). In that sense, yes, it assumes the truth of the Bible. I meant that the specific argument regarding what follows from possessing infallible knowledge about some state of affairs doesn’t rely upon some specific passage of scripture. It’s the claim that infallible knowledge of F entails knowledge of F’s “relations” and that entailment is such a relation which infallible knowledge of F would necessarily include (if “infallible” is to mean anything) which does not require the Bible.
Jeff: let's keep it that simple. Can you prove, independent of revelation, that God has infinite love for every single person?
Tom: No. But again, you’re chasing rabbits. Are you in doubt that God has infinite love for every single person? Do I NEED to prove this? If you’re a theist and you believe in the truth of the Bible’s claim that “God is love” (and other such texts), then why is this problematic for you? Please offer me a definition of “love” that makes sense of God’s not doing all he can to win each individual. But again, none of this relates directly to my syllogism.
Jeff: If you can't prove without revelation that God is providentially acting to prevent evil all the time in all circumstances, your argument falls flat.
Tom: The only thing that would cause the argument to fail is if any one of the premises fails or if the conclusion does not follow from the premises. That’s just logic, Jeff. The only biblical truths assumed but not specifically argued for are that God in fact exists and that at any given point in time he in fact infallibly knows all reality. It doesn’t need to be the case that God is providentially acting to prevent evil all the time in all circumstances (though you need to offer an understanding of “God is love” in which this ISN’T the case). This argument about providence is something YOU seem to think is required (and which I am happy to discuss with you) for it to be true that “infallible knowledge of reality at any given point in time entails knowledge of what reality entails.” Maybe you should tell me what you think “infallible” means.
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Tom: So yes, there is biblical evidence for believing God always and everywhere does all God can do to prevent every specific evil (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) and when such evil cannot (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) be prevented, that God does all he can to minimize the effect of specific evils.
Jeff: The underlined words are inconsistent with a TIME of hardening.
They are not. God’s hardening unrepentant sinners is perfectly compatible with God’s always doing all God can, in love, to win them. I'll try to say something about this in a sec.
Jeff: Your syllogism assumes this kind of ABSOLUTE providence, but I don't think you can prove it with the bible, much less with philosophy alone.
Tom: You’ve interjected “providence” as an assumption of my syllogism. But the syllogism doesn’t require it. All it requires is that God exist, that God infallibly know reality at any given point in time, and that “infallible knowledge of a thing entail infallible knowledge of that thing’s relations.” You are not dealing with the syllogism.
Jeff: Notice your words "WHEN THAT BECOMES NECESSARY." You are here seemingly contradicting your previous words, quoted above, ‘always’ and ‘everywhere’ does ‘all’ God can do to prevent ‘every specific’ ." Either God at SOME POINT quits trying to prevent hardness in persons or He NEVER does.
Tom: You’re assuming that "always doing all one can to prevent some evil" (say, having to harden someone), means that eventually having to harden a person entails not doing all one can to redeme the situation NOW, or having NOT done all one could do to have done prevented hardening them. This isn’t so. If God hardens, then he hardens because no option is left him. He did what he could to win and redeem the situation but (given a free world) was unsuccessful. What follows as a result does not mitigate the implications which loving, knowledgeable, providence have for God’s foreknowledge (though all this talk of love is entirely beside the point as far as my syllogism is concerned). I’m saying that at any given point in time in a person’s life that God is doing what he can (given all the factors involved) to redeem and rescue that person from sin; if some particular situation in a person’s life is irredeemable or some sin not preventable, then it’s the case that God did all God could (given all the factors involved) to prevent the situation from becoming irredeemable. The point stands (though it's beside the point as far as I'm concerned): With respect to any given evil event, God did all God could do to prevent it even if NOW God finds himself in the situation of having to harden or judge people.
I also argue that “long-distance” foreknowledge of contingent evils provides a far better basis for a far more effective and loving providence than does your belief that God waits until some evil is practically actual and then uses whatever resources are available at THAT point in time (and that this make far better sense of the biblical claims that God is love than otherwise), but I have NOT incorporated THIS argument into my syllogism. I don’t think I need to. I think it’s quite enough to argue that a) if God exists, and b) if God infallibly knows reality at all given points in time, then God knows all future contingent events so long as they are contingent. Infallible knowledge of reality at any given point in time demands it.
So: “Infallible knowledge of P entails knowledge of all P’s relations.”
Disprove it.
Jeff:That's my point, too, Tom. You can't even know all of the contingencies of your son's life. You couldn't know them all if you tried. You could know a great deal of possible "classes" of actions, but not anything like ALL SPECIFIC contingencies. The quantity of all SPECIFIC contingencies of your son's life would be astronomical.
Tom: But I’m not God. I’m not claiming to know all of reality at any given point in time. But I am making this claim about God, as you also seem to be doing.
Jeff: You can't assume your interpretation of scripture about God's providence if your syllogism doesn't assume the truth of the Bible. Prove to me philosophically that God is doing as much as He can at all times for your next door neigbor's highest good.
Tom: Once again, my syllogism doesn’t assume a particular view of “love” or “providence.” It only assumes that “infallible knowledge P entails knowledge of all P’s relations” and that “at any given point in time God knows P" (where P is "reality"). Stick to the issue.
Give us YOUR definition of “infallible” that makes “knowledge of P but ignorance of some of P’s relations” and “knowledge of P and knowledge of all P’s relations” BOTH equal examples of "infallible" knowledge of P. THAT is what you need to show. If you concede that infallible knowledge of P entails knowledge of all P’s relations, then you need to either deny that at any given point in time God infallibly knows reality (and all reality’s relations, entailments being by definition among those relations), or concede the argument.
Jeff: Your syllogism doesn't assume the truth of the Bible. Thus, if God doesn't love ALL REAL volitional/moral beings with infinite…
Tom: My syllogism doesn’t need to assume that God loves all real volitional moral beings infinitely. But since you mention it, do you doubt that God possesses such love for all people?
So, Jeff, just this much right now:
P1: Present reality is the sum total of presently obtaining states of affairs.
P2: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately the case that some future states of affairs obtain.
P3: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately that case that some future states of affairs not obtain.
P4: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it indeterminately the case that some future states of affairs obtain.
P5: Thus, at any given point in time, whether a state of affairs “will,” “will not,” or “might and might not” obtain is determined by present reality (from P1 through P4).
Do you grant this much?
I’ll rework the entire thing and try to make it more specific and clear.
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Similitude
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| Posted 9/22/2004 3:02 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
quote:
Jeff: …you can't use the bible to argue for God's infinite love for all people and the extensive providence that such a love would imply. So…
Tom: Right. But my syllogism doesn’t assume any argument whatsoever about God’s love.
This is good clarification. So for now, let's forget about whether God is anything more than the creation's chief architect/engineer and the world's just moral-ruler. No mercy - only justice. That sounds kind of like Romans 1 anyway, doesn't it?
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But if you wish me to make explicit everything that the syllogism assumes, then OK, it assumes that God exists (shall I offer iron-clad arguments for that to you?), that the rules of grammar are what give meaning to English propositions (does that need to be proven), and on and on. So yes, the syllogism assumes that the God of the Bible exists (since it argues something to be true ABOUT God). In that sense, yes, it assumes the truth of the Bible.
This sounds like a contradiction of the above - but I'll assume I don't understand what you're saying and move on. Or do you think that the biblical view of God's love is identical to what can be philosophically proved about God's love?
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I meant that the specific argument regarding what follows from possessing infallible knowledge about some state of affairs doesn’t rely upon some specific passage of scripture. It’s the claim that infallible knowledge of F entails knowledge of F’s “relations” and that entailment is such a relation which infallible knowledge of F would necessarily include (if “infallible” is to mean anything) which does not require the Bible.
I gave two objections to your syllogism. One was the providence argument. The other was your assumption that God MUST deduce and infer from a mere snapshot observation of a state of affair. I contended that since humans don't have to deduce or infer from states of affairs, I can't assume that God does. This latter objection is what I'm using against your particular argument here. For there is a difference in a state of affairs "entailing" relations and a MIND "deducing" those relations. One does not imply the other, else it would imply it for us, which is clearly not true.
So what do you know about the mind of God that proves God MUST deduce relations? In particular, what do you know about the mind of God that proves He HAD TO HAVE known about all contingent rapes billions of trillions of years ago? For doesn't your syllogism assume that He must have? If not, I'm still misunderstanding it.
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Jeff: let's keep it that simple. Can you prove, independent of revelation, that God has infinite love for every single person?
Tom: No. But again, you’re chasing rabbits. Are you in doubt that God has infinite love for every single person? Do I NEED to prove this? If you’re a theist and you believe in the truth of the Bible’s claim that “God is love” (and other such texts), then why is this problematic for you? Please offer me a definition of “love” that makes sense of God’s not doing all he can to win each individual. But again, none of this relates directly to my syllogism.
Then let's save that argument for later. This one is time consuming enough.
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Jeff: If you can't prove without revelation that God is providentially acting to prevent evil all the time in all circumstances, your argument falls flat.
Tom: The only thing that would cause the argument to fail is if any one of the premises fails or if the conclusion does not follow from the premises. That’s just logic, Jeff. The only biblical truths assumed but not specifically argued for are that God in fact exists and that at any given point in time he in fact infallibly knows all reality. It doesn’t need to be the case that God is providentially acting to prevent evil all the time in all circumstances (though you need to offer an understanding of “God is love” in which this ISN’T the case). This argument about providence is something YOU seem to think is required (and which I am happy to discuss with you) for it to be true that “infallible knowledge of reality at any given point in time entails knowledge of what reality entails.” Maybe you should tell me what you think “infallible” means.
I've discussed my second objection to the syllogism above, so let's focus on it if you don't want to deal with the providence argument.
I'm willing to use infallible for purposes of your syllogism in precisely the way you want to define it. As I understand it, you claim that God can only be infallible IF He necessarily deduces and infers ALL contingencies at ALL times. This would imply, I think, that God MUST have known all contingent rapes billions of trillions of years ago. This, I don't know how to prove.
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Tom: So yes, there is biblical evidence for believing God always and everywhere does all God can do to prevent every specific evil (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) and when such evil cannot (given his purposes that we actualize freely chosen love) be prevented, that God does all he can to minimize the effect of specific evils.
Jeff: The underlined words are inconsistent with a TIME of hardening.
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They are not. God’s hardening unrepentant sinners is perfectly compatible with God’s always doing all God can, in love, to win them. I'll try to say something about this in a sec.
So when God is pouring out His wrath on people, is He loving them infinitely? If not, then God isn't ALWAYS loving all humans infinitely. In my way of thinking, punishment that is not discipline is not love. It's merely vengeance with no view of improvement of the subject. Unless universalism is true or humans/angels will always have a chance to repent, such "mere" vengeance is a theologically necessary implication of a just God. Or so it seems to me, at least.
I realize I'm getting off subject, but it's hard not to!
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Tom: You’ve interjected “providence” as an assumption of my syllogism. But the syllogism doesn’t require it. All it requires is that God exist, that God infallibly know reality at any given point in time, and that “infallible knowledge of a thing entail infallible knowledge of that thing’s relations.” You are not dealing with the syllogism.
I addressed this in previous posts and above.
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Jeff: Notice your words "WHEN THAT BECOMES NECESSARY." You are here seemingly contradicting your previous words, quoted above, ‘always’ and ‘everywhere’ does ‘all’ God can do to prevent ‘every specific’ ." Either God at SOME POINT quits trying to prevent hardness in persons or He NEVER does.
Tom: You’re assuming that "always doing all one can to prevent some evil" (say, having to harden someone), means that eventually having to harden a person entails not doing all one can to redeme the situation NOW, or having NOT done all one could do to have done prevented hardening them. This isn’t so. If God hardens, then he hardens because no option is left him. He did what he could to win and redeem the situation but (given a free world) was unsuccessful. What follows as a result does not mitigate the implications which loving, knowledgeable, providence have for God’s foreknowledge (though all this talk of love is entirely beside the point as far as my syllogism is concerned). I’m saying that at any given point in time in a person’s life that God is doing what he can (given all the factors involved) to redeem and rescue that person from sin; if some particular situation in a person’s life is irredeemable or some sin not preventable, then it’s the case that God did all God could (given all the factors involved) to prevent the situation from becoming irredeemable. The point stands (though it's beside the point as far as I'm concerned): With respect to any given evil event, God did all God could do to prevent it even if NOW God finds himself in the situation of having to harden or judge people.
Why would a just God HAVE to harden anyone?
quote:
I also argue that “long-distance” foreknowledge of contingent evils provides a far better basis for a far more effective and loving providence than does your belief that God waits until some evil is practically actual and then uses whatever resources are available at THAT point in time (and that this make far better sense of the biblical claims that God is love than otherwise), but I have NOT incorporated THIS argument into my syllogism. I don’t think I need to. I think it’s quite enough to argue that a) if God exists, and b) if God infallibly knows reality at all given points in time, then God knows all future contingent events so long as they are contingent.
I don't think you've proved b), as I argued above. Not saying you can't, but you haven't yet attempted to explain how you know, philosophically, that God knew about all contingent rapes billions of trillions of years ago.
quote:
So: “Infallible knowledge of P entails knowledge of all P’s relations.”
Disprove it.
This is a truism, because you've defined it to mean that. The question is, IS God infallible per this definition. You haven't proved it, and I don't think it's self-evident. Again, it would imply that God knew of all possible rapes trillions of years ago. Do you think that is self-evident or proveable?
quote:
Jeff:That's my point, too, Tom. You can't even know all of the contingencies of your son's life. You couldn't know them all if you tried. You could know a great deal of possible "classes" of actions, but not anything like ALL SPECIFIC contingencies. The quantity of all SPECIFIC contingencies of your son's life would be astronomical.
Tom: But I’m not God. I’m not claiming to know all of reality at any given point in time. But I am making this claim about God, as you also seem to be doing.
But my argument was always about the degree of foreknowledge required for providence. The more extensive the providence, the greater the need for extensive foreknowledge. But I don't think we can assume much about the degree of providence without the bible. Nor do I think your biblical view of God's providence is as clear as you claim.
quote:
Jeff: You can't assume your interpretation of scripture about God's providence if your syllogism doesn't assume the truth of the Bible. Prove to me philosophically that God is doing as much as He can at all times for your next door neigbor's highest good.
Tom: Once again, my syllogism doesn’t assume a particular view of “love” or “providence.” It only assumes that “infallible knowledge P entails knowledge of all P’s relations” and that “at any given point in time God knows P" (where P is "reality"). Stick to the issue.
I have. You have either ignored or misunderstood my OTHER objection to your syllogism. See above.
quote:
Give us YOUR definition of “infallible” that makes “knowledge of P but ignorance of some of P’s relations” and “knowledge of P and knowledge of all P’s relations” BOTH equal examples of "infallible" knowledge of P. THAT is what you need to show. If you concede that infallible knowledge of P entails knowledge of all P’s relations, then you need to either deny that at any given point in time God infallibly knows reality (and all reality’s relations, entailments being by definition among those relations), or concede the argument.
I disagree. I think there is one more possibility. Namely, that you can't prove that God is infallible as you define it. Thus, I'm not denying or conceding - I'm DOUBTING. And I've admitted that my PERSONAL reason for DOUBTING it is that a) since we humans don't necessarily deduce relations from observations, it is not a logical necessity that observations of states of affairs lead to deductions/inferences, and b) my view of God's holiness compels me to suspect that He doesn't do so about evil until required for His own purposes (just like us, but to a much greater degree).
quote:
Jeff: Your syllogism doesn't assume the truth of the Bible. Thus, if God doesn't love ALL REAL volitional/moral beings with infinite…
Tom: My syllogism doesn’t need to assume that God loves all real volitional moral beings infinitely. But since you mention it, do you doubt that God possesses such love for all people?
Yes I do doubt it. But let's get through this syllogism debate before we dive off into that.
quote:
So, Jeff, just this much right now:
P1: Present reality is the sum total of presently obtaining states of affairs.
P2: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately the case that some future states of affairs obtain.
P3: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately that case that some future states of affairs not obtain.
P4: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it indeterminately the case that some future states of affairs obtain.
P5: Thus, at any given point in time, whether a state of affairs “will,” “will not,” or “might and might not” obtain is determined by present reality (from P1 through P4).
Do you grant this much?
Unless I'm misunderstanding it, I agree with it. This much seems undeniable.
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Tom
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| Posted 9/23/2004 3:53 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Tom: Right. But my syllogism doesn’t assume any argument whatsoever about God’s love.
Jeff: This is good clarification. So for now, let's forget about whether God is anything more than the creation's chief architect/engineer and the world's just moral-ruler. No mercy - only justice. That sounds kind of like Romans 1 anyway, doesn't it?
Hmmm. You’re a funny guy Jeff. I’m not allowed to bring into the equation (not that I want or need to) God’s “love” while you insist on bringing into the equation God’s “justice.” I cannot for the life of my figure out your reasoning or what importance this whole love vs justice thing has for you. It is entirely beside the point of the syllogism. So, let’s forget about whether God is anything other than what the syllogism argues he is: (1) God exists, and (2) At any given point in time God knows reality infallibly.
Do you or do you not agree with (2).
Jeff: I gave two objections to your syllogism. One was the providence argument. The other was your assumption that God MUST deduce and infer from a mere snapshot observation of a state of affair. I contended that since humans don't have to deduce or infer from states of affairs, I can't assume that God does. This latter objection is what I'm using against your particular argument here. For there is a difference in a state of affairs "entailing" relations and a MIND "deducing" those relations. One does not imply the other, else it would imply it for us, which is clearly not true.
Tom: Your providence argument means absolutely nothing to my syllogism. Nothing. My syllogism doesn’t argue anything about providence. It doesn’t assume or argue that God sucks at providence or that he’s the greatest. All the syllogism assumes with respect to God is that he exists. All it argues with respect to God is that at any given point in time God knows reality infallibly, perfectly. So any possible view ANY person might have about God’s providence would be entirely inconsequential to my syllogism.
Now, your second objection—that since humans can know a state of affairs without having to deduce or infer its relations—says nothing against my argument. We’re not claiming about human beings’ knowledge of reality what we’re claiming about God’s knowledge. All your objection amounts to is arguing that since we’re not omniscient God doesn’t have to be omniscient, or since we don’t deduce all of P’s relations in knowing P, God doesn’t have to. This entirely misses the point. We’re not omniscient. But God is. We’re claiming something about God’s knowledge of P that we’re NOT claiming about our knowledge of P, namely, that God knows P infallibly. We do not. So pointing out what’s consistent with our less than perfect knowledge of P, or of the world, doesn’t tell us what the case is with perfect knowledge of P, or of the world.
Jeff: So what do you know about the mind of God that proves God MUST deduce relations?
Tom: Precisely this (and something I have up until now understood you to be in agreement on, but maybe I’m wrong): that at any given point in time God perfectly and infallibly knows reality. You argue that since our knowledge of some slice of reality doesn’t entail knowledge of all that slice’s relations that God’s knowledge doesn’t have to be. But again, this ignores the CLAIM we’re making (which I thought you agreed upon): God’s knowledge of reality is i-n-f-a-l-l-i-b-l-e. Ours isn’t. So, don’t leave us hanging. Tell us what YOU understand “infallible” to be, in particular, “infallible knowledge.”
Jeff: In particular, what do you know about the mind of God that proves He HAD TO HAVE known about all contingent rapes billions of trillions of years ago? For doesn't your syllogism assume that He must have?
Tom: Not really. It “argues” that. It assumes (a) God possesses infallible knowledge of reality at all given points in time (as I understood you believed was the case) and then argues that if (a) is true THEN (b) God must by definition of “infallible knowledge” of P also know of all P’s relations.
Jeff: I've discussed my second objection to the syllogism above, so let's focus on it if you don't want to deal with the providence argument.
Tom: Already dealt with both. Your argument from providence is inadmissible as evidence against my syllogism. My syllogism regards the logic of “infallible knowledge” and not of “providence.” I don’t care about providence right now. As regards the syllogism God could be lousy at providence. He could also be unloving, prejudice, and mean-spirited. All that matters is that he exist and that at any given point in time he possesses infallible knowledge of reality. That’s it. That’s all I need to argue my case. FOR NOW just forget providence, forget love, forget justice, forget your Indians. Forget too that human beings WHO DO NOT POSSESS INFALLIBLE KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY at any given point in time (your second objection) don’t deduce all that follows necessarily from some present state of affairs, for what a fallible knowledge FAILS to know cannot tell us what an infallible knowledge may also fail to know.
Jeff: I'm willing to use infallible for purposes of your syllogism in precisely the way you want to define it. As I understand it, you claim that God can only be infallible IF He necessarily deduces and infers ALL contingencies at ALL times. This would imply, I think, that God MUST have known all contingent rapes billions of trillions of years ago. This, I don't know how to prove.
Tom: Well, I’m not sure you’re using “infallible” in the sense I am. If you did you’d concede the syllogism right now.
Secondly, I’m not arguing that anything as wide as “God’s BEING infallible.” That’s a much greater argument I’m not taking on here. No. I’m just arguing (and I understand you agreed) that: At any given point in time God infallibly knows the world/reality. That’s it. God could be fallible when it comes to providence, love, morality, whatever…but NOT knowledge. My syllogism is all about knowledge. That’s all.
Just answer this: Does infallible knowledge of P entail knowledge of all P’s relations or not? If yes, then I’ll show you how you already agree completely with my syllogism. If no, then please tell me what YOUR definition of “infallible” is and how “knowledge of P but not knowledge of all P’s relations” qualifies as infallible knowledge of P when there is a greater knowledge of P to be had (viz., knowledge of P and all P’s relations).
Jeff: So when God is pouring out His wrath on people, is He loving them infinitely?
Tom: You don’t believe God loves all people equally and infinitely, so let’s not discuss God’s love. It’s got zero to do with my argument.
Jeff: Why would a just God HAVE to harden anyone?
Tom: Doesn’t matter to my syllogism. Forget it.
quote:
Tom: I think it’s quite enough to argue that a) if God exists, and b) if God infallibly knows reality at all given points in time, then God knows all future contingent events so long as they are contingent.
Jeff: I don't think you've proved b), as I argued above.
Then you DON’T agree that at any given point in time God perfectly, or infallibly knows the world! Finally! After five pages I get a clear denial of it. I’ve understood from the start that you DO believe that God perfectly knows the PRESENT but that you denied that infallible knowledge of the present included knowledge of what the present entailed (i.e., the present’s ‘relations’); the “God sees all” metaphor you referred to. OK, so you DON’T believe God knows the present perfectly. That changes everything.
But your reasons for “doubting” that God knows the present at any given point is time are: “(a) since we humans don't necessarily deduce relations from observations, it is not a logical necessity that observations of states of affairs lead to deductions/inferences, and (b) my view of God's holiness compels me to suspect that He doesn't do so about evil until required for His own purposes (just like us, but to a much greater degree).
Already spoke to (a). If you’re comfortable saying that God is just much more knowledgeable of reality at any given point in time than we are BUT NOT OMNISCIENT, that is, possesses a "fallible” knowledge of the present at any given point in time, then fine. God and humans both possess fallible knowledge of the world. Your (b) is the weakest of all, Jeff. I’m surprised to even see it here again. You said you now agreed with us that one can “know” without “contemplating.” This disarms your (b). There’s no reason to believe that an infallible knowledge of future contingencies would darken the landscape of God’s holiness. God would not be eternally and consciously contemplating or focusing on each individual contingent evil. So I consider (b) out of the discussion. If you grant the distinction between "knowing" and "contemplating" then God's holiness can no longer be a reason for why you doubt that God knows all contingencies. So you're just left with (a): We don't know all contingencies. That's it. And what kind of reason is THAT? We don't know all contingencies so God doesn't know all contingencies?
I’m not much concerned to convince you that God in fact perfectly knows the present at any given point in time. If you DID believe this then I’d be interested in showing you how THIS belief entails exhaustive divine foreknowledge. But since you DON’T believe that God possesses infallible knowledge of the present, then I’m not all that interested. That’s an entirely different argument my syllogism is NOT intended to prove.
Jeff: But my argument was always about the degree of foreknowledge required for providence. The more extensive the providence, the greater the need for extensive foreknowledge. But I don't think we can assume much about the degree of providence without the bible. Nor do I think your biblical view of God's providence is as clear as you claim.
Tom: Though my syllogism says nothing (and can be affected by nothing) with respect to providence, I think you’re take on providence leaves God considerable short-handed. But never mind. It’s not our issue.
quote:
Tom: So, Jeff, just this much right now:
P1: Present reality is the sum total of presently obtaining states of affairs.
P2: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately the case that some future states of affairs obtain.
P3: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately that case that some future states of affairs not obtain.
P4: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it indeterminately the case that some future states of affairs obtain.
P5: Thus, at any given point in time, whether a state of affairs “will,” “will not,” or “might and might not” obtain is determined by present reality (from P1 through P4).
Do you grant this much?
Jeff: Unless I'm misunderstanding it, I agree with it. This much seems undeniable.
Right. You seem to agree with the following point that “Infallible knowledge of P entails knowledge of all P’s relations.” What you deny is that God possesses infallible knowledge of P. But you do this for very very weak reasons (the weakest being your belief that such knowledge would compromise God’s holiness [which we’ve addressed and dismissed], the second being human ability to know something without deducing all entailments. Weak reasons indeed. Why should our ability to know something fallibly (i.e., our imperfect knowledge) imply the same is true of God?
Take care!
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Similitude
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| Posted 9/23/2004 4:20 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
I'm in a hurry and haven't read all of your post, but want to reply to something towards the bottom. You say,
quote:
But your reasons for “doubting” that God knows the present at any given point is time are: “(a) since we humans don't necessarily deduce relations from observations, it is not a logical necessity that observations of states of affairs lead to deductions/inferences, and (b) my view of God's holiness compels me to suspect that He doesn't do so about evil until required for His own purposes (just like us, but to a much greater degree).
Then you later say,
quote:
You seem to agree with the following point that “Infallible knowledge of P entails knowledge of all P’s relations.” What you deny is that God possesses infallible knowledge of P. But you do this for very very weak reasons (the weakest being your belief that such knowledge would compromise God’s holiness [which we’ve addressed and dismissed], the second being human ability to know something without deducing all entailments. Weak reasons indeed. Why should our ability to know something fallibly (i.e., our imperfect knowledge) imply the same is true of God?
What you call my "second" reason here is what was labeled a) above. But your argument against my a) misses the point. It is NOT the fact that our ability to know about relations is fallible that is relevant to my point. It is the fact that the intellectual ACT of deducing is a different KIND of ACT than observing. The former is not compelled or logically necessitated by the latter. Your syllogism assumes that it is. So PLEASE answer this question that I asked before - for this question gets at our real difference. You have to have an answer, for it is an either/or question.
According to your syllogism, God foreknew ALL contingent rapes of our created world trillions of years before our world existed. DO YOU KNOW THIS INTUITIVELY OR CAN YOU PROVE IT? If you refuse to answer this question, I'll assume you give up.
Seriously, Tom, I'm not trying to be a smartalek, here. To me it is neither intuitive or proveable. I don't see how any human being could possibly know with certainty that God's intellectual nature REQUIRES Him to foreknow ALL contingencies conditioned by future volitional acts of Himself and others LONG (trillions of years) before they have any relevance to His current actions.
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Tom
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| Posted 9/24/2004 1:38 AM (GMT -6) | | Jeff: What you call my "second" reason here is what was labeled a) above. But your argument against my a) misses the point. It is NOT the fact that our ability to know about relations is fallible that is relevant to my point. It is the fact that the intellectual ACT of deducing is a different KIND of ACT than observing. The former is not compelled or logically necessitated by the latter.
Tom: It would be if observing P yields “infallible” knowledge of P. But since you deny God’s observation of the world at any given point in time means God “knows” the world ‘infallibly’ at any given point it time, it doesn’t really matter. The syllogism shows that people who believe God knows the present perfectly must logically concede also that at any given point in time God foreknows all future contingencies. You don’t believe God knows the present perfectly, so the syllogism won’t work for you.
Jeff: So PLEASE answer this question that I asked before - for this question gets at our real difference. You have to have an answer, for it is an either/or question. According to your syllogism, God foreknew ALL contingent rapes of our created world trillions of years before our world existed. DO YOU KNOW THIS INTUITIVELY OR CAN YOU PROVE IT? If you refuse to answer this question, I'll assume you give up.
Tom: It follows necessarily from the sort of infallible knowledge I believe God possesses of the world. I’m not trying to prove WHAT God in fact knows or doesn’t. I’m only arguing that if he knows “infallibly” then he “knows all truths and believes no falsehood.” Anything less than this is “fallible” knowledge. If you agreed that at any given point in time God possesses such knowledge of the world, then I’d continue on with the syllogism, but I’m not so interested in debating the very point that God’s knowledge of the world isn’t fallible and imperfect. Really, Jeff, your only reason left for believe this now is your (reworded now) (a): We don’t deduce all there is to know about P from observing P, so neither does God. In other words, incomplete knowledge is logically possible, so it's true of God (or at least a good reason to doubt whehter its true of God). And I’m asking myself, “Our imperfect knowledge is a good reason for believing God’s knowledge is also imperfect?” I’m looking for some OTHER really strong motivation for buying this, but you don’t offer any. You only offer the argument itself: It’s logically possible for US to know fallibly, so it must be for God.
OK.
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Tom
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| Posted 10/3/2004 4:10 AM (GMT -6) | | Let's try it this way.
Let present reality be P. Let F be the future. Let Z be “It is determinately the case that some event occur” and Q be “It is indeterminately the case that some event occur.”
P1: P is the sum total of presently obtaining states of affairs.
P2: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately the case that some future states of affairs obtain: For some of P, if P then Z(F).
P3: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately that case that some future states of affairs not obtain: For some of P, if P then Z(~F).
P4: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it indeterminately the case that some future states of affairs obtain: For some of P, if P then Q(F).
P5: Thus, whether a state of affairs “will,” [Z(F)] “will not,” [Z(~F)] or “might and might not” [Q(F)] obtain is determined by P (from P1 through P4).
P6: Each state of affairs constituting F stands in relation to some state of affairs constituting P (from P1 through P4 where the P determines whether F is determinately the case or indeterminately the case).
P7: Infallible knowledge of P entails, among other things, infallible knowledge of P’s relations.
P8: At any given point in time God has infallible knowledge of P (or God infallibly knows present reality).
P9: At any given point in time, God has infallible knowledge of P’s relations (from P7 and P8).
Conclusion: At any given point in time, God has infallible knowledge of what “will,” “will not,” and “might and might not” obtain.
Jeff, if you believe P7 or P8 is false, that is, if you believe infallible knowledge of P does NOT entail knowledge of all P's relations, or if you believe God does NOT possess infallible knowledge of the present at any given point in time, then the syllogism is unsound.
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Similitude
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| Posted 10/3/2004 12:18 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
quote:
Let present reality be P. Let F be the future. Let Z be “It is determinately the case that some event occur” and Q be “It is indeterminately the case that some event occur.”
P1: P is the sum total of presently obtaining states of affairs.
P2: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately the case that some future states of affairs obtain: For some of P, if P then Z(F).
P3: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it determinately that case that some future states of affairs not obtain: For some of P, if P then Z(~F).
P4: Some presently obtaining states of affairs render it indeterminately the case that some future states of affairs obtain: For some of P, if P then Q(F).
P5: Thus, whether a state of affairs “will,” [Z(F)] “will not,” [Z(~F)] or “might and might not” [Q(F)] obtain is determined by P (from P1 through P4).
P6: Each state of affairs constituting F stands in relation to some state of affairs constituting P (from P1 through P4 where the P determines whether F is determinately the case or indeterminately the case).
P7: Infallible knowledge of P entails, among other things, infallible knowledge of P’s relations.
P8: At any given point in time God has infallible knowledge of P (or God infallibly knows present reality).
P9: At any given point in time, God has infallible knowledge of P’s relations (from P7 and P8).
Conclusion: At any given point in time, God has infallible knowledge of what “will,” “will not,” and “might and might not” obtain.
Jeff, if you believe P7 or P8 is false, that is, if you believe infallible knowledge of P does NOT entail knowledge of all P's relations, or if you believe God does NOT possess infallible knowledge of the present at any given point in time, then the syllogism is unsound.
I don't really have a problem with P7. I don't BELIEVE P8 - not, as you say: Really, Jeff, your only reason left for believe this now is your (reworded now) (a): We don’t deduce all there is to know about P from observing P, so neither does God. My contention has ever been that unless we can know intuitively or prove that God inevitably deduces/infers contingencies from states of affairs, we cannot assert P8 with full confidence.
In your previous post, you had said,
quote:
Jeff: So PLEASE answer this question that I asked before - for this question gets at our real difference. You have to have an answer, for it is an either/or question. According to your syllogism, God foreknew ALL contingent rapes of our created world trillions of years before our world existed. DO YOU KNOW THIS INTUITIVELY OR CAN YOU PROVE IT? If you refuse to answer this question, I'll assume you give up.
Tom: It follows necessarily from the sort of infallible knowledge I believe God possesses of the world. I’m not trying to prove WHAT God in fact knows or doesn’t.
This is where we needed to get to. Because if you can't "prove WHAT God in fact knows or doesn't," then we can continue with our original discussion about election "in time." For your argument against "election in time" was based upon your belief as to "WHAT God in fact knows."
But before we go there, let me say why I think your answer above makes your syllogism unclear. You say that God knew all contingencies of our world trillions of years before it's existence. Then for all practical purposes, you are agreeing with Doc that God has known all contingencies from eternity. But if this is the case, then how is God's knowledge about contingencies ever grounded in any particular state of affair. God's vast knowledge of all future contingencies is simply an eternal attribute of God, ungrounded in any act of thought "in time." But your syllogism leads one to believe (at least me) that God's knowledge is some how grounded in states of affairs. This would seem to imply that God obtains knowledge "in time" by thinking about the relations implied by states of affairs, etc.
Moreover, if this knowledge of God's is eternal, then God can never truly have an original thought - since any thought of God's that occurred "in time" would have been known as a possible thought throughout the eternal past. I have always thought that when scripture spoke of God purposing a thing, that it meant it was an original idea in response to a state of affairs "in time", like purposes tend to be for us.
John had said,
quote:
This weekend at the EEM Conference (Which was GREAT, by the way), Scott Taylor and I had a discussion about this very issue, and he raised basically the same objection that Jeff has raised in this thread.
That being the case, let's call, for sake of brevity, my view the Scott Taylor View, or STV - although I knew nothing of Scott Taylor's view prior to John commenting on it, and his view may differ in the details from mine. In the STV, WHAT God knows about the future can be much less than WHAT God knows per the Doc/TGB view. So in the STV, would you concede the possibility that election "in time" can be consistent with open view theism? If not, why?
I'm game to consider more attacks on the STV later, but let's hash out it's implications for election "in time," first.
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Tom
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| Posted 10/3/2004 2:57 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Jeff: I don't really have a problem with P7. I don't BELIEVE P8
This clears it up for me, then. You agree that infallible knowledge of P entails knowledge of all P’s relations, you just deny that God’s knowledge of the world is at any given point in time infallible. You deny omniscience.
quote:
Jeff: So PLEASE answer this question that I asked before - for this question gets at our real difference. You have to have an answer, for it is an either/or question. According to your syllogism, God foreknew ALL contingent rapes of our created world trillions of years before our world existed. DO YOU KNOW THIS INTUITIVELY OR CAN YOU PROVE IT? If you refuse to answer this question, I'll assume you give up.
Tom: It follows necessarily from the sort of infallible knowledge I believe God possesses of the world. I’m not trying to prove WHAT God in fact knows or doesn’t.
Jeff: This is where we needed to get to. Because if you can't "prove WHAT God in fact knows or doesn't," then we can continue with our original discussion about election "in time." For your argument against "election in time" was based upon your belief as to "WHAT God in fact knows."
Two things. First, when I say I’m not trying to prove WHAT God knows I only mean to say that I cannot show exhaustively which propositions are true and which are false, or what all the future possibilities in fact are. I’m only arguing that whatever those truths are, God knows them even if I do not. So my understanding of omniscience is: God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods. I’m just not trying to prove what those truths and falsehoods are.
Second, from the start you have argued that it’s only horrible, grotesque possible EVILS God doesn’t foreknow since knowing these would compromise God’s holiness. But the possible existence of particular persons and their possible good choices (like choosing the love God) aren’t grotesquely evil and don’t compromise the holiness of God. So what reason will you now find for arguing that God doesn’t eternally know them?
quote:
Jeff: But before we go there, let me say why I think your answer above makes your syllogism unclear. You say that God knew all contingencies of our world trillions of years before it's existence. Then for all practical purposes, you are agreeing with Doc that God has known all contingencies from eternity.
Yes. This is my understanding of omniscience: God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods.
quote:
Jeff: But if this is the case, then how is God's knowledge about contingencies ever grounded in any particular state of affair. God's vast knowledge of all future contingencies is simply an eternal attribute of God, ungrounded in any act of thought "in time." But your syllogism leads one to believe (at least me) that God's knowledge is some how grounded in states of affairs. This would seem to imply that God obtains knowledge "in time" by thinking about the relations implied by states of affairs, etc.
Five stars! Excellent question. Assuming that “Tom might and might not be born” was true before creation (which it had to be since I do in fact exist!  ), what pre-creation state of affairs grounded the truth of THIS proposition? Good question. My answer is, the state of affairs that renders this proposition true before creation is God’s own existence and creative abilities. Given God’s existence, and given his ability to create, say, a thousand different worlds, in half of which I exist, it follows that prior to God’s creative decision, “Tom might and might not exist” was true. It was true before creation because God exists and was able to create a world in which my existence was possible.
Do you want to argue that God foreknew nothing about the possibilities of the world before he created it? If not, what states of affairs make ANY proposition describing those worlds true or false? All that exists is God. So, what makes it true or false that “God might and might not create world X” before he creates world X is God’s own existence and creative abilities. What makes it false to claim, for example, “God can create a world in which he does not exist”? What makes this false is God’s own necessary existence. Such a necessary state of affairs makes propositions describing contradictory states of affairs necessarily false.
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Jeff: Moreover, if this knowledge of God's is eternal, then God can never truly have an original thought - since any thought of God's that occurred "in time" would have been known as a possible thought throughout the eternal past.
And this bothers you? Consider this, however, the possibilities God faced pre-creation ARE his own original thoughts. The states of affairs that ground propositions describing the possible worlds God was free to create are states of affairs that obtain in God’s own being prior to creation. They “originate” with God. So it’s not that none of God’s thoughts are original. Rather, ALL his thoughts prior to creation are original.
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Jeff: I have always thought that when scripture spoke of God purposing a thing, that it meant it was an original idea in response to a state of affairs "in time", like purposes tend to be for us.
If all God’s purposes are responses to a world that already exists, then God could have no purpose for deciding to creating the world. Do you want to say this?
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Jeff: That being the case, let's call, for sake of brevity, my view the Scott Taylor View, or STV - although I knew nothing of Scott Taylor's view prior to John commenting on it, and his view may differ in the details from mine. In the STV, WHAT God knows about the future can be much less than WHAT God knows per the Doc/TGB view. So in the STV, would you concede the possibility that election "in time" can be consistent with open view theism? If not, why?
Right now, no. And the reason is, as you have argued from the start, it’s particular EVILS that God chooses not to know because this would be morbid. But election doesn’t fall into this category of evils, so what reason will you now come up with for why God mustn’t (yep, that’s how my spell-checker conjoins “must not”!) be thought of as having known such possibilities before creation?
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Similitude
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| Posted 10/3/2004 4:11 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
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Second, from the start you have argued that it’s only horrible, grotesque possible EVILS God doesn’t foreknow since knowing these would compromise God’s holiness. But the possible existence of particular persons and their possible good choices (like choosing the love God) aren’t grotesquely evil and don’t compromise the holiness of God. So what reason will you now find for arguing that God doesn’t eternally know them?
I'm going to say this one more time. I contend that a) neither you nor I can demonstrate that God HAS to deduce or infer contingencies from states of affairs, and therefore, b) it is conceivable to me that God doesn't know all evil contingencies. What is important to note here is that b) depends upon a). That's what you keep neglecting to recognize about my contention. So until you REFUTE a) or prove God's knowledge of contingencies is an eternal attribute of God, you cannot logically deny me b).
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Jeff: But if this is the case, then how is God's knowledge about contingencies ever grounded in any particular state of affair. God's vast knowledge of all future contingencies is simply an eternal attribute of God, ungrounded in any act of thought "in time." But your syllogism leads one to believe (at least me) that God's knowledge is some how grounded in states of affairs. This would seem to imply that God obtains knowledge "in time" by thinking about the relations implied by states of affairs, etc.
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Five stars! Excellent question. Assuming that “Tom might and might not be born” was true before creation (which it had to be since I do in fact exist! ), what pre-creation state of affairs grounded the truth of THIS proposition? Good question. My answer is, the state of affairs that renders this proposition true before creation is God’s own existence and creative abilities. Given God’s existence, and given his ability to create, say, a thousand different worlds, in half of which I exist, it follows that prior to God’s creative decision, “Tom might and might not exist” was true. It was true before creation because God exists and was able to create a world in which my existence was possible.
The problem with the above is your phrase "it follows." Such a phrase indicates, as I explained, that God deduces "in time" from a temporal state of affair. This cannot be true by your view, for "God's existence and creative abilities" is the only "state of affair" that makes the contingency real. But God's existence and creative abilities are eternal - hence, there is no point in time when this knowledge "comes into existence." It is simply there as an attribute of God, making your phrase "it follows" completely beside the point.
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Do you want to argue that God foreknew nothing about the possibilities of the world before he created it?
No, for the mere fact that God purposed the world implies that He had certain ends in mind for the yet-future creation. Just like humans do when they purpose.
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If not, what states of affairs make ANY proposition describing those worlds true or false? All that exists is God. So, what makes it true or false that “God might and might not create world X” before he creates world X is God’s own existence and creative abilities. What makes it false to claim, for example, “God can create a world in which he does not exist”? What makes this false is God’s own necessary existence. Such a necessary state of affairs makes propositions describing contradictory states of affairs necessarily false.
I've conceded all along that contingencies can be said to "exist" whether or not they are thought of. Though their "existence" is as nebulous as the existence of "time." For neither time nor unconceived contingencies are beings in the true sense of the word. Propositions, on the other hand, are true beings for they are "products" of a mind. But this implies they are "produced" - i.e., they come into existence "in time."
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Jeff: Moreover, if this knowledge of God's is eternal, then God can never truly have an original thought - since any thought of God's that occurred "in time" would have been known as a possible thought throughout the eternal past.
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And this bothers you?
No, but it makes your language like "it follows" and "entails" completely beside the point. For these are verbs that imply God's knowledge of contingencies is coming into existence "in time." But your actual view is that such knowledge is eternal.
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Consider this, however, the possibilities God faced pre-creation ARE his own original thoughts. The states of affairs that ground propositions describing the possible worlds God was free to create are states of affairs that obtain in God’s own being prior to creation. They “originate” with God. So it’s not that none of God’s thoughts are original. Rather, ALL his thoughts prior to creation are original.
Again the problem is that "originate" is a verb that implies a point in time. But your view denies this, for it claims that all God's thoughts were known as at least possibilities from eternity.
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Jeff: I have always thought that when scripture spoke of God purposing a thing, that it meant it was an original idea in response to a state of affairs "in time", like purposes tend to be for us.
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If all God’s purposes are responses to a world that already exists, then God could have no purpose for deciding to creating the world. Do you want to say this?
I have no reason to believe that God was in a completely static condition prior to the creation of our world or it's purposing. God, for example, was loving Christ, and that might, in itself, imply a dynamic relationship that evolved truly new states of affairs - affairs which may have led God to desire to create.
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Jeff: That being the case, let's call, for sake of brevity, my view the Scott Taylor View, or STV - although I knew nothing of Scott Taylor's view prior to John commenting on it, and his view may differ in the details from mine. In the STV, WHAT God knows about the future can be much less than WHAT God knows per the Doc/TGB view. So in the STV, would you concede the possibility that election "in time" can be consistent with open view theism? If not, why?
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Right now, no. And the reason is, as you have argued from the start, it’s particular EVILS that God chooses not to know because this would be morbid. But election doesn’t fall into this category of evils, so what reason will you now come up with for why God mustn’t (yep, that’s how my spell-checker conjoins “must not”!) be thought of as having known such possibilities before creation?
To be specific, I don't see why God MUST have contemplated the Fall before it happened. And therefore, if the world turned out to provide too few souls that would seek Him volitionally, I think it's conceivable that God might have resorted to election to ensure that He and Christ would have a people.
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Tom
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| Posted 10/4/2004 2:44 AM (GMT -6) | | Thanks for all your time Jeff. I appreciate it. For some reason we’re having a really difficult time just getting our point across to each other. Not sure why. Anyhow, what I understand you to be arguing, fundamentally, is that God is not omniscient (i.e., does not know all things, does not know all truths).
Again, I guess if you could provide good reasons for believing this to be the case with God, I’d keep forging ahead with you here. But so far the only reasons you’ve provided for believing God’s knowledge of the world is in fact fallible and incomplete are (1) it would be morbid of God to foreknow evils far ahead of time, and (2) it’s logically possible that God not know all truths (this is your "God doesn't HAVE to infer or deduce all that is entailed by some state of affairs since WE don't always do this"). You still have me confused on (1). When I dismissed (1) by showing it’s possible for God to “foreknow” evils without “contemplating” them, you agreed but then it came up again later in the argument. So I’m not sure if this is still a reason for your believing God does not foreknow evils. So as far as I’m concerned (1) is gone.
Now (2) is interesting because though fallible knowledge is a logically possible state of affairs, so is infallible knowledge a logically possible state of affairs. So you can’t believe that God’s knowledge is fallible and incomplete SIMPLY because you’re free to do so on the basis of such knowledge being logically possible. You must have some other reason for believing God’s knowledge is fallible. If some attribute’s being ‘logically possible’ is justification for believing it to be an attribute of God, then why not attribute infallible knowledge to God? That’s also logically possible. But you clearly prefer one logically possible attribute over another logically possible attribute.
So after five pages here’s what I understand about your position: You believe God’s knowledge of the world is fallible and incomplete, but I have no clue as to WHY you believe this. It can’t be that you believe this in order to avoid God’s being morbid. That argument has been defeated. And it can’t be that you believe this simply because fallible knowledge is logically possible. That’s not in itself a reason for believing in fallible divine knowledge over and against infallible divine knowledge, for both are logically possible.
Of course, I keep attributing this belief to you though you’ve admitted you’re only doubting and haven’t yet settled on a particular view. But I still have no idea why one would believe God’s knowledge of the world is fallible and incomplete. Can you give me some reasons for believing this to be the case, reasons other than “infallible knowledge would be morbid and compromise God’s holiness” and “fallible knowledge is logically possible”?
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