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1Heart
Registered Member
Date Joined Feb 2004
Total Posts : 1128
| Posted 12/5/2004 8:31 PM (GMT -6) |   | quote:
Originally posted by AtTheWell
Hi. New here.
Luke 22:31-34
Can anyone help me out on this? Christ seems to have predicted a future free decision of a human being-- ok, fine. I have read some of the literature that attributes this to probability and Peter still having the choice to change the outcome-- which posits this a prophecy not prediction-- that would be OV, right?
It seems to leave out though, the power of suggestion, Christs knowledge of that power, and the obvious decision to use it in this case. Can someone point me to some resources on this. Or if I'm just way OFF, bring me back to the path.
Much appreciated.
It's very late, and my brain is a bit fuzzy, but I'll give it a go. We just had the elder's council over for supper (5 couples). This passage was difficult for me when I first started looking at the open view, and even now I know that there are many here who could answer this question more insightfully.
Jesus knew Peter intimately. He knew what his strengths and weaknesses were. Peter was quick to lop off an ear, when his Lord was threatened. He would be the one who would have the courage to hang out in the crowds, hoping to hear news of His Lord, or even see Him. Most of us would have denied knowing the Lord. We think Peter was weak, but claiming to know Him would probably have meant certain death. We know that he denied Him three times, but couldn't it have been more?
Besides that last question, it helps me to realize that the Father knows each and ever possibility. If that is true, and I believe it is, then He knew each and every encounter that would take place, and knew that Peter would most certainly deny Him.
The future is partly open and partly settled. I have no doubt that Jesus said this to Peter gently. It was not Judas, who was about to betray Him. It was not planned deception. It was the flip side of a strong characteristic in Peter. Peter was courageous, and bold...but the flip side of that was that it took him into enemy territory, and under "fire" the Lord knew that Peter would cave.
Ever notice that there is a flip side to gifts? I have the gift of mercy. The flip side to being sensitive to people's pain, is that you tend to carry some of that pain yourself. But as we recognize our weaknesses, we are able to realize that His grace abounds more and more, and we are transformed through the trials.
I love the passage where Jesus affirms Peter 3 times. He gently puts him back on the front lines - this time a little wiser for the wear. I also noted that He uses Simon, not Peter when he first addresses him. Peter has lost heart by that time. He quit the "ministry" and went back to what was familiar - fishing. Jesus restores him. He does not immediately call him Peter (the rock) because that would be like sprinkling salt in a wound.
I am amazed how gracious He is, how sensitive He is to our weaknesses, how gentle He is with us.
I'm getting carried away here...
God Bless,
I look forward to reading what others have say,
Jo-Anne
"Sometimes all we can do is go back to the character of God, and drop anchor there."
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Spiderman
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Date Joined Dec 2004
Total Posts : 8
| Posted 12/6/2004 9:59 AM (GMT -6) | | ...If that is true, and I believe it is, then He knew each and every encounter that would take place, and knew that Peter would most certainly deny Him...
..under "fire" the Lord knew that Peter would cave...
How did Jesus know the free choice of a free agent? I can grant Open Theism that he might know the high probability of Peter's denial, but Jesus could not know with absolute certainty that Peter would deny even one time until Peter had the opportunity to exercise his free will....let alone a three-fold denial! | | Back to Top | | |
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1Heart
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Date Joined Feb 2004
Total Posts : 1128
| Posted 12/6/2004 4:42 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Spiderman
...If that is true, and I believe it is, then He knew each and every encounter that would take place, and knew that Peter would most certainly deny Him...
..under "fire" the Lord knew that Peter would cave...
How did Jesus know the free choice of a free agent? I can grant Open Theism that he might know the high probability of Peter's denial, but Jesus could not know with absolute certainty that Peter would deny even one time until Peter had the opportunity to exercise his free will....let alone a three-fold denial!
I'm obviously outleagued here, but I would say that he knew the choice that Peter would make, just as He knew the choice that I would make on the amtrack this summer, because He knows us that intimately. I believe that He knows us far more intimately than we can understand, and that He knows each and every possibility, as if it were the only possibility. And...He knows some things because they are part of an overarching plan. Some things are givens. Maybe this was a given. Having said that, without confusing this anymore, Peter had free choice, just as we have free choice. So, how would you answer it? God cannot know it absolutely, if Peter could have chosen otherwise, right?
Somebody help me! 
Jo-Anne
"Sometimes all we can do is go back to the character of God, and drop anchor there."
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Spiderman
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| Posted 12/10/2004 8:13 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by moon_river_j
Peter had free choice, just as we have free choice. So, how would you answer it? God cannot know it absolutely, if Peter could have chosen otherwise, right?
I'm not an Open Theist, so I don't have a defense for you! So I see the Peter situation as being a problem area for Open Theists.
Personally, I think that Jesus foreknew what Peter would do and on that basis made the prophecy. I do not believe this foreknowledge meant that Peter did not make a free will decision. I think Peter's denial was still free! | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 12/13/2004 7:39 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by TomEwall
1) God can see all possible futures. If all the possibile futures showed that Peter would deny Christ, then Christ could make the prediction with certainty even though Peter had the free choice to not deny Christ.
If all possible futures include Peter's denying Christ, then what sense do you give to the claim that Peter was free not to deny Christ? What was Peter free to do? Free to actualize a future which was not among the all the possible futures? No. If we are to claim Peter was free NOT to deny Christ, then we must claim Peter's doing this was at least A possible future.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Lee Merrill
booted
Date Joined Jun 2001
Total Posts : 723
| Posted 12/13/2004 6:54 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
TGB: If we are to claim Peter was free NOT to deny Christ, then we must claim Peter's doing this was at least A possible future.
I would say that foresight doesn't prevent free will, though, if that is what you are saying...
And let us notice that, as ATW mentioned, Jesus told Peter he would deny him. And Peter tried not to!
And yet he did.
So this is not simply knowing how Peter would choose, this is knowing how Peter would act, when he was trying to choose otherwise!
And we should notice too, that Peter's courage and cowardice had to balance, this is not simply saying Peter would be cowardly, he had to follow right into the high priest's court, and not run off after the first confrontation, etc. Thus I would say this is not a guess...
Not to mention all the people involved! Peter had to be tested, what if they all left him alone? Why didn't they arrest him, one of the people who tried to arrest the disciples was standing right there...
JN 18:26 One of the high priest's servants, a relative of the man whose ear Peter had cut off, challenged him, "Didn't I see you with him in the olive grove?"
And then there were three denials, not two, as Spiderman mentioned, and the rooster crowed twice, not just once! What if Peter remembered Jesus' words, after the first time the rooster crowed? How could Jesus have guessed that he would not remember?
Blessings,
Lee
==================================================
"Even now we seem to have dim glimpses into regions
from which we receive no word to bring away" (George MacDonald) | | Back to Top | | |
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ISF
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Date Joined Dec 2004
Total Posts : 23
| Posted 12/17/2004 8:23 AM (GMT -6) | | AtTheWell,
Hey, also new here.
This is a great passage to highlight why Open Theism fails. I always thought, OV theism was supposed to try to preserve REAL contingency of future choices/events. However, when it comes down to prophecy and contigency - open theists unfortunately have to resort to determinism.
while it is possible that Jesus may be able to predict how Peter would react if asked to deny Jesus, there is no way, except by resorting to determinism to have exactly 3 people question Peter before the cock crowed twice.
other views, such as arminian simple-foreknowledge, or molinism handle this much better, giving Jesus through the Holy Spirit certain knowledge of Peter's free denial.
peace,
jd
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 12/17/2004 8:26 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by ISF
AtTheWell,
Hey, also new here.
This is a great passage to highlight why Open Theism fails. I always thought, OV theism was supposed to try to preserve REAL contingency of future choices/events. However, when it comes down to prophecy and contigency - open theists unfortunately have to resort to determinism.
while it is possible that Jesus may be able to predict how Peter would react if asked to deny Jesus, there is no way, except by resorting to determinism to have exactly 3 people question Peter before the cock crowed twice.
Jesus walked around for 3 1/2 years with Peter by His side, how many people saw Peter with Jesus? Thousands
Many people would be asking Peter about Jesus that night, God only had to poke a rooster after three of them had questioned Peter.
Occam's Razor and all.... 
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ISF
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| Posted 12/17/2004 9:16 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Sisters of Cain
Jesus walked around for 3 1/2 years with Peter by His side, how many people saw Peter with Jesus? Thousands
Many people would be asking Peter about Jesus that night, God only had to poke a rooster after three of them had questioned Peter.
Occam's Razor and all....
sounds like speculation. you never know, Peter could have been hiding during those periods of time in the account and ran into exactly 3 people. In any case, it is still a problem, since there is a certainty to this prophecy. i mean, Peter could have simply walked away and remained silent. but yet He denys three times exactly THAT HE KNOWS HIM, in an exact time frame.
further, without middle knowledge, how does Jesus know with certainty that these others will freely question Peter? shouldnt that be left "open" - unless you resort to determinism?
not to mention that Jesus' certain prophecy is more plausible if Jesus has middle knowledge about Peter's denials.
This may be overstepping the topic at hand - but since God is omniscient, there is no reason to deny Him knowledge of contingent future propositions. The only way God would not know them is if these facts about Peter's future are either uniformly false (and then God would hold a false belief about Peter's denial) or if they have no truth value at all. But if Peter does deny Christ 3 times, then it is true that Peter denied Christ 3 times. And just before Peter denied Christ, it was true that Peter will deny Christ. This is a true proposition, that an omniscient God would know - and Jesus through the Holy Spirit would know.
peace,
jd | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 12/17/2004 11:26 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
further, without middle knowledge, how does Jesus know with certainty that these others will freely question Peter? shouldnt that be left "open" - unless you resort to determinism?
Welcome, ISF! We’ve had some great discussions on Molinism, but I don’t remember that we’ve ever had a committed Molinist involved in any of said discussions. Hope you stick around.
quote:
This may be overstepping the topic at hand - but since God is omniscient, there is no reason to deny Him knowledge of contingent future propositions. The only way God would not know them is if these facts about Peter's future are either uniformly false (and then God would hold a false belief about Peter's denial) or if they have no truth value at all. But if Peter does deny Christ 3 times, then it is true that Peter denied Christ 3 times. And just before Peter denied Christ, it was true that Peter will deny Christ. This is a true proposition, that an omniscient God would know - and Jesus through the Holy Spirit would know.
In our world, in the case of Peter, it was apparently the case at least 12 hours before Peter denied Christ that “Peter will deny Christ”. However, in another possible world, it could have been the case that before Peter denied Christ it was true that Peter “might and might not” deny Christ. In such a possible world, that would be a true proposition that an omniscient God would know, right?
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 12/17/2004 1:01 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by ISF
quote:
Originally posted by Sisters of Cain
Jesus walked around for 3 1/2 years with Peter by His side, how many people saw Peter with Jesus? Thousands
Many people would be asking Peter about Jesus that night, God only had to poke a rooster after three of them had questioned Peter.
Occam's Razor and all....
sounds like speculation. you never know, Peter could have been hiding during those periods of time in the account and ran into exactly 3 people.
Peter was by Jesus' side for 3 1/2 years. That's visibility.
Certainly less speculative than God knowing the future choices of free moral agents.
If the choice is known before the chooser makes it, the chooser didn't make it. The one who knows the definite choice before it's made, is the author of it.
This "prophecy" is certainly repeatable by us and that takes it out of the realm of prescience, imho.
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ISF
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Total Posts : 23
| Posted 12/17/2004 3:00 PM (GMT -6) | | JET,
Thanks, i will try. I am still learning all the little nuances and objections but i do feel that Molina had an ingenious solution to this problem, the objections i have seen are very shallow, and molinism has a very strong account of God's providence.
quote:
However, in another possible world, it could have been the case that before Peter denied Christ it was true that Peter “might and might not” deny Christ. In such a possible world, that would be a true proposition that an omniscient God would know, right?
I suspect that these "might and might not" semantics are really not what they seem. Because since God is omniscient God does not know if something MIGHT be true or false, but knows what is absolutely true or false. Might seems to indicate some kind of probabilistic certainty, and to affirm "might and might not" is to affirm nothing at all. For example, "2+2 = 4" might and might not be true. "2+3 = 4" might and might not be true. In this case, since we have absolute knowledge of the truth of these statements (under customary semantics and definitions of these symbols) we know that the first statement is true (and "might and might not" says nothing concerning the actual truth value of the statement) and the second statement is false.
it is in this way that God knows the truth of future contingent propositions.
concerning possible worlds analysis - there is a near possible world where Peter is in the same situations and in fact does not deny Christ. However, molinists don't deny this, but rather they say that middle knowledge gives God the knowledge that if Peter were to be in those circumstances, he would freely deny Christ. Hence, it is possible that Peter affirms Christ but it just will be the case that he denies Christ freely. molinists say that middle knowledge limits possible worlds to which worlds are feasible (it is only feasible to create a world where in those exact circumstances Peter freely denies Christ).
thanks for the welcome.
peace,
jd | | Back to Top | | |
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ISF
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Date Joined Dec 2004
Total Posts : 23
| Posted 12/17/2004 3:27 PM (GMT -6) | | Sisters of Cain,
quote:
Peter was by Jesus' side for 3 1/2 years. That's visibility.
I meant he may have been hiding the night he denied Christ and didnt run into thousands of people asking about him.
quote:
Certainly less speculative than God knowing the future choices of free moral agents.
I dont think so. If counterfactuals of creaturely freedom have truth value, and the principle of bivalence holds for such propositions, then there is no reason that God would not know them. Unless, of course, you are denying that God is Omniscient (knows only and all true propositions) or the principle of bivalence fails for CCF's.
Of course, you could deny that God is omniscient in some maximally perfect way, but at least from what I have read, Open Theism threatens to completely remove omniscience from the Divine Nature (for example, that God holds false beliefs and regrets His decisions). So maybe we shouldnt go there just yet.
quote:
If the choice is known before the chooser makes it, the chooser didn't make it. The one who knows the definite choice before it's made, is the author of it.
but why? this seems to be just a lack of philosophical sophistication. For example, you could predict to fair degree of certainty what a good friend would do in certain situations. but does that in any way mean that YOU cause them to make that choice? God's knowledge of these CCF propositions posits no constraint on our freedom whatsoever.
why dont you explain a little more why you think God's knowledge of a future choice causes the person to choose as such.
quote:
This "prophecy" is certainly repeatable by us and that takes it out of the realm of prescience, imho.
this is just plain arrogance, imho, since there is no way that you could know with absolute certainty about a future contingent fact, as God does in prophesy.
peace,
jd | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 12/17/2004 4:44 PM (GMT -6) | | ISF: . . . Peter could have simply walked away and remained silent. but yet He denys three times exactly THAT HE KNOWS HIM, in an exact time frame. . . . further, without middle knowledge, how does Jesus know with certainty that these others will freely question Peter? shouldnt that be left "open" - unless you resort to determinism?
JET: I think the account of Peter's denials is one of the most difficult (but not impossible) texts for the open view. The story doesn't read as though Peter's future is very open. It seems like too much of a coincidence that everything falls into place (if in fact the future is open). On the other hand, perhaps the opposite was true. Perhaps there was actually a high probability that all the things that needed to happen would happen. If so, an omniscient God would know this. Regarding the question of certainty, I think that with a little imagination, one can see that God could guaranty the necessary circumstances (IF necessary) as long as God was willing to do some serious micro-managing of the whole situation. This type of micro-managing may be inconsistent (generally speaking) with the idea of openness. However, we must remember that Peter presents a very unique case. God has big plans for Peter. (Jesus calls Peter the rock on whom he intends to build the church.) So we have good reason to believe that in this case God might be willing to act providentially in ways that are not typical.
ISF: This may be overstepping the topic at hand - but since God is omniscient, there is no reason to deny Him knowledge of contingent future propositions. The only way God would not know them is if these facts about Peter's future are either uniformly false (and then God would hold a false belief about Peter's denial) or if they have no truth value at all.
JET: Technically speaking, propositions are not "contingent". (Rather, all propositions are either True or False). The open view affirms that we can speak of future states of affairs that are contingent and God knows them as such. But any proposition about future contingent states of affairs is either True or False. This is important because it explains how the OV can affirm omniscience in the traditional sense. Specifically, the OV can affirm that God knows infallibly whether a proposition about a future contingent state of affairs is True or False. If future state of affairs X is in fact contingent, then the proposition "X will occur" is false and the proposition "X will not occur" is false. However, the proposition "X might and might not occur" is true.
ISF: But if Peter does deny Christ 3 times, then it is true that Peter denied Christ 3 times.
JET: So far, so good.
ISF: And just before Peter denied Christ, it was true that Peter will deny Christ. This is a true proposition, that an omniscient God would know - and Jesus through the Holy Spirit would know.
JET: This may be true in the case of Peter. (See above.) However, it is not necessarily true in other cases. If agent A does X at T1, it doesn't necessarily follow that prior to T1 it was true that "A will do X". It could be the case that prior to T1 it was true that "A might and might not do X" (in which case it would be false prior to T1 that "A will do X" even though A does in fact do X at T1.
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JET
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| Posted 12/17/2004 5:25 PM (GMT -6) | | ISF: I suspect that these "might and might not" semantics are really not what they seem. Because since God is omniscient God does not know if something MIGHT be true or false, but knows what is absolutely true or false. Might seems to indicate some kind of probabilistic certainty, and to affirm "might and might not" is to affirm nothing at all. For example, "2+2 = 4" might and might not be true. "2+3 = 4" might and might not be true. In this case, since we have absolute knowledge of the truth of these statements (under customary semantics and definitions of these symbols) we know that the first statement is true (and "might and might not" says nothing concerning the actual truth value of the statement) and the second statement is false.
JET: Sometimes the word "might" is used to mean lack of epistemological certainty. However, just to be clear, when we say "might and might not" around here, we are definitely not using the term in this sense. Rather, we are talking about the ontological status of states of affairs. The OV affirms that, for any future state of affairs S, either "S will occur" or "S will not occur" or "S might and might not occur".
ISF: concerning possible worlds analysis - there is a near possible world where Peter is in the same situations and in fact does not deny Christ. However, molinists don't deny this, but rather they say that middle knowledge gives God the knowledge that if Peter were to be in those circumstances, he would freely deny Christ. Hence, it is possible that Peter affirms Christ but it just will be the case that he denies Christ freely. molinists say that middle knowledge limits possible worlds to which worlds are feasible (it is only feasible to create a world where in those exact circumstances Peter freely denies Christ).
JET: I'm not sure I understand you here. I understand Molinism to say God (via middle knowledge) knows which worlds are logically possible, and which of those logically possible worlds are feasible, and then chooses to create the best world that is logically possible and feasible, right?
It seems that Molinists typically use the term possibility to mean "logically possible", whereas OV'ers use the term to mean "historically possible" as well as "logically possible". Some Molinists like Fredesso seem to deny historical possibility. They claim that agent A freely does X as long there is nothing physically or logically preventing A from doing ~X. These Molinist grant that there is no possibility (historically speaking) of A actually doing ~X. Other Molinists, like Craig, want to say that A has it within his power (both logically and historically speaking) to do ~X. But, in addition to middle knowledge, Craig must rely on Okhamist grounds to pull this off (i.e., God's past knowledge of future free acts constitutes "soft facts" and thus God's past knowledge is somehow dependent on the future actions of free agents).
Anyway, that's my current understanding.
JET
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ISF
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| Posted 12/17/2004 6:50 PM (GMT -6) | | JET,
quote:
However, we must remember that Peter presents a very unique case. God has big plans for Peter. (Jesus calls Peter the rock on whom he intends to build the church.) So we have good reason to believe that in this case God might be willing to act providentially in ways that are not typical.
This is true, but to appeal to determinism in order for God to be provident, seems to reduce Open Theism to determinism. There could be eternally-significant events happenning around us every day. Just because Peter is important in the early Church Biblical history doesnt mean His is the only case where God needs to be providentially active.
quote:
Specifically, the OV can affirm that God knows infallibly whether a proposition about a future contingent state of affairs is True or False. If future state of affairs X is in fact contingent, then the proposition "X will occur" is false and the proposition "X will not occur" is false. However, the proposition "X might and might not occur" is true.
first, i obviously was speaking about propositions which deal with future contingent states of affairs, not that the propositions themselves are contingent! the problem with what you are saying is that you are saying that God is not Omniscient - since under your view, God holds false beliefs. God obviously does believe that certain contingent states of affairs "will occur". He does not believe that they "might or might not" occur, since as I was arguing above, this is equivalent to believing nothing concerning the truth value of such propositions. Open theists generally do admit that God often regrets his decisions and changes His mind - Hence, under your view, God believes that some proposition concerning a future contingent state of affairs is true, and then it turns out that it is not the case that He was correct in His belief - so, God held a false belief and He is not omniscient.
the problem is, while you are teaching me about propositions being either true or false, it is you who seems to be denying this very basic rule of logic - the principle of bivalence. For any proposition (including counterfactual statements concerning future contingents) each proposition is either true or false. yet, you are arguing that propositions about whether a future contingent state of affairs will occur - is not Either true OR false, but that there is a third choice - "might or might not". I must admit, this is a very strange solution to my mind, since counterfactuals of this type are usually considered either bivalent (and hence God knows which are true), or uniformly false (and hence God holds false beliefs, and scripture contains falsehoods (1 Cor. 2:8)).
well anyway, i am going to look into this a little further - it seems like ad hoc semantics to make open theism viable, but nonetheless.. moving on...
quote:
It could be the case that prior to T1 it was true that "A might and might not do X" (in which case it would be false prior to T1 that "A will do X" even though A does in fact do X at T1.
the more i look at statements like this, the more i find it very strange, and seemingly false. If it is true at time t that "C does X", where C is a person and X is an action/choice, then at t-1 it is true that "C will do X" since both statements express the same fact from different temporal viewpoints. both express the tenseless truth that "C does (tenselessly) X at t". The idea that contingency somehow makes the statement made at t-1 different in truth value from the statement made at t or at t+1 ("C did X") seems false, and sorry to say, ad hoc for open theism.
quote:
Anyway, that's how I currently understand it.
I havent studied Freddosso's view as much, which is what i am currently doing - but I honestly dont see why people feel Craig's use of Ockhamist notions at this part is a problem. I think it was actually Alvin Plantinga who originally argued that route - and it seems to be proper, since Ockhams' soft facts can be thought of in terms of counterfactual dependence on the future. That is, if the creature would have chosen/acted differently, God would have known differently.
i do need to look at the trivalence that you were talking about before for contingents - where did you read that from? Is that from Boyd?
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Sisters of Cain
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| Posted 12/18/2004 3:32 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by ISF
quote:
If the choice is known before the chooser makes it, the chooser didn't make it. The one who knows the definite choice before it's made, is the author of it.
but why? this seems to be just a lack of philosophical sophistication. For example, you could predict to fair degree of certainty what a good friend would do in certain situations. but does that in any way mean that YOU cause them to make that choice? God's knowledge of these CCF propositions posits no constraint on our freedom whatsoever.
That's why I wrote definite choice. The actual choice, not a prediction of a choice. Predictions can fail.
"Philosophical sophisticates" would have noticed the difference. 
Your friend-prediction doesn't scale very well, you certainly couldn't predict accurately what your friend's descendant would do a thousand years from now, could you?
That's why God can know all possibilities, all paths through a decision tree, all counterfactual worlds but not know the actual choice/path/decision made first, without being the author of it.
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JET
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| Posted 12/18/2004 6:32 AM (GMT -6) | | ISF: the problem with what you are saying is that you are saying that God is not Omniscient
JET: We use the exact same definition of omniscience that William Lane Craig uses—that God believes all truths and believes no falsehoods.
ISF: . . . - since under your view, God holds false beliefs.
JET: Under my view, there are such things as true “might and might not” propositions. (This is all that openness means.) IF there are true “might and might not” propositions, then omniscience requires that God knows them as such (i.e., true). If there are true “might and might not propositions”, then God would hold false beliefs only if God doesn’t know any “might and might not” propositions” (as Molinists claim).
ISF: God obviously does believe that certain contingent states of affairs "will occur".
JET: If they are truly contingent, then it is false that they "will occur". Rather, it is true that they "might and might not occur".
ISF: He does not believe that they "might or might not" occur, since as I was arguing above, this is equivalent to believing nothing concerning the truth value of such propositions.
JET: How is it equivalent to believing nothing concerning the truth value of such propositions? Is it logically impossible for the proposition “X might and might not occur” to be true? How so? Do you claim there is no possible world in which a proposition like “X might and might not occur” can be true?
ISF: Open theists generally do admit that God often regrets his decisions and changes His mind – Hence, under your view, God believes that some proposition concerning a future contingent state of affairs is true, and then it turns out that it is not the case that He was correct in His belief - so, God held a false belief and He is not omniscient.
JET: The open view does not hold that divine “regret” follows from an incorrect belief that a future contingent state of affairs is true and then turns out to be false. Rather, God (correctly) believes that a future contingent state of affairs “might and might not” occur, and God desires it to occur, but it doesn’t, hence, divine regret.
ISF: the problem is, while you are teaching me about propositions being either true or false, it is you who seems to be denying this very basic rule of logic - the principle of bivalence.
JET: I affirm bivalence.
ISF; For any proposition (including counterfactual statements concerning future contingents) each proposition is either true or false.
JET: I agree.
ISF: yet, you are arguing that propositions about whether a future contingent state of affairs will occur - is not Either true OR false, but that there is a third choice - "might or might not".
JET: That is not what I argue. I argue that propositions about the future include three basic types:
1. “x will occur” (ie, it is determinately the case that x will occur)
2. “x will not occur” (ie, it is determinately the case that x will not occur) and
3. “x might and might not occur” (whether or not x will occur is now contingent)
This is not a denial of bivalence. I affirm that each of these types of propositions are either True or False and that God knows the truth value (either T or F) of each of these types of propositions.
ISF: I must admit, this is a very strange solution to my mind, since counterfactuals of this type are usually considered either bivalent (and hence God knows which are true),
JET: Yes, they are bivalent—either True or False—but, “might and might not” does not describe COUNTER-factuals. Rather, it is actually true (in our actual world) that X might occur and at the same time it is actually true (in our actual world) that X might not occur.
ISF: . . . or uniformly false (and hence God holds false beliefs, and scripture contains falsehoods (1 Cor. 2:8)).
JET: They are not uniformly false. They are either true or false, depending on the current state of reality. If something about the present makes it true that “X will occur”, then it is false that “X might and might not occur”. However, if there is nothing true in the present that makes it determinately the case that “X will occur” or determinately the case that “x will not occur”, then it is true that “x might and might not occur”.
ISF: If it is true at time t that "C does X", where C is a person and X is an action/choice, then at t-1 it is true that "C will do X"
JET: THIS is what we deny. In fact, THIS is the very question that is being debated. We believe that there are cases where at t-1 it is true that “C might and might not do X” and, in those cases, it is FALSE that “C will do X”.
ISF: since both statements express the same fact from different temporal viewpoints. both express the tenseless truth that "C does (tenselessly) X at t".
JET: They don’t express the same fact. “C does X” at t makes a truth claim about the present at time t. However, declaring at t-1 that “C does X at t” makes a truth claim about the present at time t-1 (namely, that given present reality at t-1, it is true that “C will do X at t”). If it is true at t-1 that “C will do X at t”, then God knows said truth. But if it is true at t-1 that “C might or might not do X a t”, then it is FALSE that “C will do X at t”.
ISF: The idea that contingency somehow makes the statement made at t-1 different in truth value from the statement made at t or at t+1 ("C did X") seems false, and sorry to say, ad hoc for open theism.
JET: As shown above, the statements made at t-1 or at t or at t+1 make different truth claims. They each make a truth claim about the state of reality at DIFFERENT POINTS IN TIME.
ISF: i do need to look at the trivalence that you were talking about before for contingents - where did you read that from? Is that from Boyd?
JET: Most of the OV’ers around here affirm bivalence. Boyd definitely does. He’s got a paper addressing this that hopefully will be available soon.
The “trivalence” that you see has nothing to do with the truth value of propositions. Rather, it has to do with the three types of propositions about the future (see above).
I’ll try to find some links to other threads where we’ve gone over the issue of openness and bivalence and also where we’ve discussed Craig’s appeal to tenseless statements.
You really need to talk to our resident openness apologist – TGB. He would make this much more clear than I am.
Great discussion.
JET
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JET
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 12/18/2004 6:53 AM (GMT -6) | | Here's one, ISF, called "Bivalence Again":
http://www.christusvictorministries.org/gbfront/forum/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=3346&whichpage=4
(The first couple of pages deal with Arthur Prior--the "father of modern tense logic. The last couple of pages includes a discussion of Craig's views.) | | Back to Top | | |
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PotOnWheel
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 9890
| Posted 12/18/2004 6:58 AM (GMT -6) | | More interesting, to me, is WHY that scene was put in the Gospel.
Tarazi points to Peter as the best hope of the Pauline churches to gain recognition of the Jerusalem churches after Paul died. Peter is shown acting in ways he'd not be proud of, and that would remind him to look carefully at his upcoming actions, and to recognize -- as in the vision of the sheet and unclean animals -- that the Gospel goes where God sends, regardless of personal danger. Peter had already denied Christ once (OK, three times); and it was to him to decide whether he would do it again.
- http://www.svots.edu/Faculty/Paul-Nadim-Tarazi/Extracts/Introduction-to-Mark.html
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