Lee: That's fine, but then maybe the paper should be titled "Is contingency inconsistent with a settled future?" or something similar.

Tom: It’s a defense of several claims which all converge to support the more fundamental claim that open theism is not only plausible, but it’s the only way a person who believes in future contingency can affirm omniscience. So it won’t be of much interest to determinists, except that they can no longer dismiss the open view with “Oh, that just denies omniscience by denying that Gods’ foreknowledge is exhaustive.” It’s clear that open theists CAN affirm omniscience without having to deny bivalence or argue that there are truths that God cannot logically know (ala Bill Hasker). Having shown this much is a huge step.

In political terms, I think it means determinists have no grounds for feeling about open theism any differently than they do about belief in future contingency (see their wide acceptance today of Arminians and Free-will Molinists). What we’ve done in this paper is place belief in the open view on par with belief in future contingency. If one believes there are future contingents (and lots of believers DO without being thought at all outside the maintstream), then there’s no longer reason to feel any different about open theism, for open theism is the most plausible way of accounting for such contingents.

So no, we didn’t prove open theism. We just proved that open theism is inseparable from what many many believers already hold to be the truth about ourselves and the world. And in my view, that’s proving a lot.

Tom

Quote:

ABSTRACT: If the future is wholly settled and therefore exhaustively and truly describable in terms of what either will or will not obtain, then open theists, who deny that God knows the future as exhaustive settled, are forced to deny divine omniscience (the thesis that God knows all and only truths). Conversely, if the future is partly open, such that a complete, true description of it must include reference to what might and might not obtain, then divine omniscience entails open theism. Whether the future is settled or open is, therefore, an issue of fundamental importance to the open theism debate. ...

JET:

I thought that whether the future is settled or open IS the open theism debate.

Does the paper mean to suggest that "open theism" and the OFV are two different things? That "open theism" per se is about what God knows or doesn’t know and is not per se about the nature of the future? You’re saying that some open theists (like Hasker) deny the OFV, while other open theists affirm the OFV?

Previously, it seems, we have assumed that all open theists affirm the OFV, but that open theists disagree over whether the OFV entails a denial of omniscience or bivalence or whatever.

Do any open theists really deny the OFV?  The whole openness metaphysic seems to be based on the premise that LFW is incompatible with a settled future regardless of what God knows or doesn't know.

The quoted language sounds like a change at least in semantics for Doc given his frequent protests that "open theism" is about the nature of the future, not about what God does and does not know.

Post Edited (JET) : 1/25/2005 4:05:45 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (JET) : 1/26/2005 9:48:33 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (TGB) : 1/26/2005 11:08:57 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Alan Rhoda) : 1/27/2005 1:59:00 PM (GMT-6)

Alan: (1) OFV: The thesis that the future is ontologically open
(2) Theism: The thesis that God exists
(3) Omniscience: The thesis that if God exists, then He knows all and only truths
(4) Open Perspective Thesis (OPT): The thesis that if God exists, then the future is epistemically open from His perspective

Tom: The thing is that nobody adopts (4) who does not also adopt (1) and (2). There are people who adopt (4) who also adopt (3) and some who adopt (4) who reject (3). But whatever their view on (3), proponents of (4) all agree in affirming (1) and (2). That’s my point. Affirming (1), the OFV, is a must for membership in the set of “open theists.” If there are people who affirm the SFV and also (4), who are they? Do they exist? I don't know of any. So what’s the point in limiting the definition of open theism to the view that the future is “epistemically” open for God when all who call themselves open theists affirm that the future is ontologically open? Open theists account for this by denying (3) (and who are they? I think, Hasker) or affirming (3) (and either affirming or denying bivalence), but they all affirm (1).

Alan: Now, it seems to me that we can all agree that the very minimum that one must affirm to even stand a chance of being an open theist is (2)+(4). Allowing the other options to vary…

Tom: What open theist denies (1)? It’s logically possible to deny (1) and (3) and affirm (4), yes. But is such a view actually affirmed by anyone? Seems to me that anyone who thinks their way through to affirming (4) has also thought their way through to affirm (1). Though it’s logically possible to affirm (4) but deny (1), I couldn’t guess what reasons one would have for thinking (1) is false and (4) is true. And if I met someone who thought this, I wouldn't call them an open theist. I have no doubt that such a person would also not call herself an open theist. I'd call them a theological determinist who happens to deny that God is omniscient. The open view, in my mind, is about ontology. God's epistemic states are a consequence of the real defining issue.

Alan: …there are 4 possible permutations:

(a) (2)+(4)
(b) (2)+(4)+(1)
(c) (2)+(4)+(3)
(d) (2)+(4)+(1)+(3)

I propose calling (a) minimal open theism, and (d) robust open theism. (a) neither affirms nor denies omniscience or the OFV. (d) affirms them both.

Tom: I don’t see the point in calling (a) a category to which some who actually call themselves open theists belong, since there are no open theists who neither affirm nor deny omniscience and the OFV. (a) is an empty set, and will remain empty. Nobody has an opinion on (4) that doesn't have an opinion on (1) and (3).

Alan: (b) is kind of halfway view. If God's open perspective on the future coincides perfectly with the open nature of the future, then (b) entails omniscience and thus reduces to (d). So the only way to keep (b) a distinct position is to suppose that it is possible either for God to have an open perspective on some aspect of the future that is really settled, or for God to have a settled perspective on some aspect of the future that is really open. I wonder if this might be a way to construe Hasker's position.

Tom: Either way, it amounts to denying (3), omniscience. Hasker would argue he escapes this by defining omniscience in such a way as to accommodate for the existence of truths (“will’s” and “will not’s” that describe future contingents) that are logically impossible to know.

But even accounting for Hasker, (b) is precisely what all open theists agree upon (though they all MUST and DO decide on where they stand with respect to (3)), and is precisely how I would define open theism: The combination of (1), (2), and (4). It's with regard to (3) that open theists themselves have disagreements. Some affirm (3) (like us) and others effectively deny it (Hasker). JET’s (and my) point is that what “open theism” cannot boil down to is the affirmation of ONLY (4), which is what you earlier said and what confused JET and me.

Alan: Now, what I was thinking was that if the SFV is true, then the most that a prospective open theist could affirm is (a). Robust open theism would have to go; only minimal open theism would remain an option, but at the cost of denying omniscience. This, I think, is how most of our critics see the situation.

Tom: Which is why THEIR understanding of open theism is unacceptable.

Alan: In their minds, open theism is primarily an epistemic thesis…

Tom: Which is how you earlier defined open theism: “Open theism = the view that the future is epistemically open from God's perspective.” This is why JET was confused.

Alan: The reason they see it this way is because they suppose (often uncritically) the SFV to be true, and as long as they do so, they will be unable to take robust open theism seriously.

Tom: Precisely why (1) is essential to open theism and open theism can’t be boiled down to affirming only (4). I think robust open theism is the ONLY open theism, though affirming (3) seems not to be essential to it. Where open theists disagree among themselves is regarding (3) (and bivalence), not (1), (2), and (4). I think rejecting (3) is a serious mistake and I don’t enjoy being lumped together with those who deny (3), but I don’t think we can avoid that. Maybe that will change in the future. But your (a), minimal open theism, just isn’t a view that anybody holds. And if anyone came along who affirmed (4) but denied (1), they'd be a minimal determinist.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 1/27/2005 10:01:16 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (TGB) : 1/27/2005 10:09:09 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (TGB) : 1/27/2005 3:30:50 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (JET) : 1/27/2005 6:15:38 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (JET) : 1/27/2005 6:55:55 PM (GMT-6)

The abstract as it is:

ABSTRACT: If the future is wholly settled and therefore exhaustively and truly describable in terms of what either will or will not obtain, then open theists, who deny that God knows the future as exhaustive settled, are forced to deny divine omniscience (the thesis that God knows all and only truths). Conversely, if the future is partly open, such that a complete, true description of it must include reference to what might and might not obtain, then divine omniscience entails open theism. Whether the future is settled or open is, therefore, an issue of fundamental importance to the open theism debate. After examining both views of the future, we develop two arguments in support of a central claim of the open future view, show that the view is consistent with bivalence, and respond to several a priori arguments designed to show that the future must be wholly settled.

First, the opening “describable in terms of what either will or will not obtain” gives the wrong sense, I think. Placing the “either” after the ‘what” makes both “will” and “will not” apply to each and every future event, whereas what we want to say is that “will” applies to some of the future and “will not” applies to all else. But if the “either” is placed BEFORE the “what,” (that is, “…in terms either of what will or what will not obtain”), then something more precise is said. No?

If Alan is open to suggestions, then here’s what I’d suggest (or something close to it):

The future is either wholly settled and therefore exhaustively describable in terms either of what will or what will not obtain, or it is partly open, in which case a complete description of it must include reference to what might and might not obtain. If the future is wholly settled, then open theists must either abandon open theism or reduce their claim that the future is ontologically open and known by God as such to the claim that it is merely epistemically open, in which case God is not omniscient. However, if the future is partly open, then omniscience entails open theism. The fundamental point of debate is whether the future is wholly settled or partly open and not whether God is omniscient or not. After examining both views of the future, we develop two arguments in support of a central claim of the open future view, show that the view is consistent with bivalence, and respond to several a priori arguments designed to show that the future must be wholly settled.

Molinists like Craig will balk at being entirely left out here, for he’ll point out that he affirms an ontologically open but epistemically closed future for God.

Ah heck, let ‘em read the article. They’ll figure it out.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 1/28/2005 7:37:29 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (JET) : 1/27/2005 9:35:54 PM (GMT-6)

JET: The paper (p. 4) classifies Craig as an "SFV proponent".

Tom: Craig is a weirdo! He affirms the B-theory of time and LFW. He agrees agents really possess power to the contrary. They can do other than they do. They just won’t do other than they do. Craig has an open ontology but a closed epistemology. The language he uses for expressing his ontology of the future doesn’t fit his ontology. He has an indeterministic view of the future but he insists on talking like a determinist. Everything is “will” or “will not” for Craig. In that sense he’s adopts a SFV semantics. But he believes about the ontological status of the future all the things any open theist believes about the future. So Alan must be classifying Craig as a SFV proponent because Craig describes the future entirely in terms of “will” and “will not.”

JET: I think that Craig actually affirms (1). He'd say that, while it is true that agent A could do X, it just so happens that A will do ~X.

Tom: Exactly. So where do you classify him? Open ontology but a closed language. Hmm. He’d argue also that he does agree that divine epistemology agrees with reality. It’s mind-boggling.

JET: Our beef with Craig is the w/r/t the incompatibility thesis. Craig thinks that contingency is compatible with the SFV because (I've said this before) . . . he has a different notion of "contingency" than we do.

Tom: Exactly. But Craig’s only an SFV in that he believes the future is epistemically settled for God. It’s ontologically open (unless I’m missing something big in Craig’s affirmation of B-theory of time and LFW). So the compatability he’d argue for is affirming an open ontology and a closed epistemology/language, not a closed ontology (SFV) and an open epistemology/language. So where do we classify him, OFV or SFV? If these two describes ontologies, then he’s OFV.

Since Molinists really DO try to ride the fence (affirming that God determines all that happens by picking a specific world from all the possible worlds to create), they do and don't fit both SFV and OFV. Let's NOT try to fit Molinists in! 

Hey Alan, how do you think Craig will react to our classifying him as a proponent of the SFV?

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 1/28/2005 7:41:29 AM (GMT-6)