Hi Albert-

I was able to download sever interesting articles (pro and con) about Presentism by just typing “presentism” on Google’s search line. I wanted to pass one such paper on to you. I think I found this by typing “defending presentism” on the search line. It’s a paper by Ned Markosian (Western Washington University) entitled “A Defense of Presentism.” A different version of the same paper is found in Dean Zimmerman’s (ed) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1 (2004). It’s an interesting paper. I didn’t know, for example, that one common objection to Presentism is the claim that it’s incompatible with the Special and General theories of Relativity. But that’s easily answerable. Anyhow, check it out if you can.

In the meantime, Alan and Albert, what do you think of this (not a syllogism but perhaps the component of one):

1 Statements have meaning

2 The meaning of a statement is its proposition

3 The truth of a proposition is grounded in the correspondence that obtains between its meaning (language asserting some state of affairs) and reality

4 Temporality (or tense) is an irreducible part of the meaning of propositions positing contingent states of affairs

5 If (4), then no past-tense proposition and present-tense proposition can have the same meaning

6 If (5), then no past-tense proposition and present-tense proposition can posit the same state of affairs

7 If (6), then no past-tense proposition and present-tense proposition can have identical grounds for truth-value (since truth value of a proposition [which is the meaning of a statement asserting some state of affairs] is grounded in the reality of the states of affairs posited; different states of affairs posited, different grounds for truth)

Example: “Socrates is a philosopher” and “Socrates was a philosopher” have different meanings (obviously!). And if the meaning of a statement is the proposition it posits, then these statements posit different propositions. If they posit different propositions, then they cannot be said to share the same grounds (states of affairs) for their truth values.

There’s just no getting around the reality of tense. There’s no meaning (for contingent propositions at least, maybe all propositions) apart from tense. If there’s no meaning apart from tense, then all propositions (positing contingent state of affairs) are tensed. And if propositions of different tense necessarily have different meanings, then they must have different grounds for their truth values. So the past-tense “Socrates was a philosopher” cannot have as its truth-grounds the same state of affairs that grounds “Socrates is a philosopher.” This is not to say the truth value of “Socrates is a philosopher” and the truth value of “Socrates was a philosopher” are not logically related. The former cannot have been true while the latter be false, for example. But this is not to say the grounds of the former (Socrates’ being present and being a philosopher) is the grounds of the latter. On the contrary. If the grounds of the former obtains, then “Socrates is a philosopher” is true and “Socrates was a philosopher” is false. Likewise, it must be the case that if whatever grounds “Socrates was a philosopher” (Socrates’ having been present and having been a philosopher, or whatever else it is) obtains so as to render the claim true, then the truth grounds for the former (“Socrates is a philosopher”) cannot be said to obtain and it is false, in which case the two cannot share identical truth grounds.

Here’s a different way to pose it, Albert. If “Socrates was a philosopher” shares the same truth grounds as “Socrates is a philosopher” then must they not both share the same truth value? It certainly seems so. But they obviously cannot both be true (though they can both be false!)…

--------------------BREAK IN POSTING WHILE TOM CHASES A RABIT DOWN A DIFFERENT PATH-------------------

Oh my. They can both be false but can’t both be true? So they are contrary propositions? No. They can only be properly contrary (on the Square) if they make claims about the same state of affairs, which means the same tense. “S is a philosopher” and “S was a philosopher” must posit different propositions and have different truth grounds or else they’re ability to be both false but not both true would mean they’re properly contrary propositions. Hmm. What’s that tell us Alan? We previously agreed that “was” and “was not” and “is” and “is not” make their propositions contradictory, while “will” and “will not” are contrary. But surely “Socrates is a philosopher” has a present-tense contrary. What would that be, “Socrates is not a philosopher”? Isn’t that it’s contradictory if “is” and “is not” are contradictory? I think there’s something else we’re not figuring in. Can a proposition have more than one contrary, one of its own tense and others in other tenses? Hmmm.

Here are two present-tense props:

The present King of France is bald.

The present King of France is not bald.

We talked about this a long time ago. Given that these are “is” and “is not” props, must we conclude that they’re contradictory? We seem to have agreed in the paper that “is” and “is not” are contradictory. But that would mean both these propos cannot be false, which in fact they are and which fact suggests they’re contrary. Maybe there’s more to contradictoriness and contrariness than the mere presence of “is” and “is not,” for the above propositions about the King of France attribute in the present contradictory predicates about a subject that is not in fact present. The “not” is more properly conceived as prefacing “bald” and not “is.” So maybe framing the entire debate in terms of “was/was not,” “is/is not,” and “will/not not” is problematic, unless one remembers that the “not” in each case supervenes over what follows (some predicate) and not over the “was” or “is” itself. Maybe saying “is bald” vs “is not-bald” or “is philosopher” vs “is not-philosopher” is where it’s at, so that what makes present-tense propositions contrary or contradictory includes MORE than just the presence of “is” or “is not” (as the props about the King of France show). The subject and not just the predicate goes into determining whether a proposition is contrary or contradictory. Were France to presently have a king ruling, then the two propos “he is bald” and “he is not bald” would be contradictory props (for “bald” and ~“bald” are contradictory factors and all else is equal). One would have to be true and the other false. But for the predicate alone to determine whether or not the entire proposition is contradictory, the subject posited by this present-tense prop must presently obtain (and likewise in past-tense props). Maybe that’s it.

I got off subject a bit. But I thought it interesting that “Socrates was a philosopher” and “Socrates is a philosopher” may both be false but cannot both be true. This just shows how indispensable tense is to the meaning of a proposition. One could not place seemingly similar props of different tense (i.e., props that are identical except for their tense) on the Square and expect to apply the rules of logic throughout. It won’t work. Logically relating props (on the Square) requires that they share TENSE, which just goes to show that different TENSE means different MEANINGS means different PROPS means different GROUNDS for truth-value. “Socrates was a philosopher” cannot have as its grounds for truth Socrates’ actually being present and actually being a philosopher. If that were the grounds, the prop would be false.

Come on Alan.

Tom

Post Edited (Humphrey Bogart) : 2/9/2005 9:19:18 AM (GMT-6)

This is fun.

You owe me big-time Alan!

Humphrey: I agree with your points, I just don't think they affect the argument.

Tom: I’ll try to show how it does (from my point of view at least).

Humphrey: When you say that "no past-tense proposition and present-tense proposition can have identical grounds for truth-value", that is true, but doesn't prove your point. The state-of-affairs that grounds the truth value of a past-tensed proposition was, on my view, a past state-of-affairs, and the state-of-affairs that grounds the truth value of a present-tensed proposition is a present state of affairs.

Tom: OK, I understand your explanation to amount to the claim that “Socrates is a philosopher” and “Socrates was a philosopher” do in fact share the same truth grounds in spite of your claiming they don’t. The state of affairs (SOA) which grounds the former is Socrates’ being present and being a philosopher. Fine. But when you say the truth grounds of the latter is, on your view, a “past SOA,” what, pray tell, would that SOA be if not Socrates’ being present and being a philosopher? Just because you call a “past state of affairs” that which grounds “Socrates was a philosopher” and call a “present state of affairs” that which ground(ed) “Socrates is a philosopher” doesn’t mean the two props have different grounds for their truth value. In other words, from my point of view, what you’re here calling the present tense state of affairs that grounded “Socrates is a philosopher” and the past tense state of affairs which grounds “Socrates was a philosopher” are in fact the same state of affairs. That’s what I’m talking about. If you agree that “Socrates was a philosopher” has as its ontological grounds for truth an SOA other than that SOA which grounds “Socrates is a philosopher,” then you can’t claim that a past tense SOA is what grounds the former, that THAT SOA is in fact what grounded the latter when it was true. If you agree that the two have different grounds for their truth, then the only possible grounds for the truth of “Socrates was a philosopher” is a presently obtaining state of affairs.

Humphrey: Since one is past and the other is present, it is logically impossible for them to be the same state of affairs.

Tom: Right. So why are you then attempting to ground the truth value of “Socrates was a philosopher” is the same past tense (relative to the proposition) SOA that grounded “Socrates is a philosopher” when it was true?

Humphrey: But I think that you and Alan have abandoned the correspondence theory of truth. You only think that a statement is true because it corresponds with the state of affairs it describes, if it is a present-tensed statement. If it is a past- or future- tensed statement, then you think it is true or false for other reasons, not because it corresponds with the state of affairs it describes. That is where I think you are going wrong.

Tom: Well, actually not. Alan and I agree that past- present- and future- tense statements are true of false if the proposition they posit obtains when the statement is asserted. What we’re saying is that what propositions “posit” they posit when they’re asserted regardless of whether the refer to the past, present, or future.

All the correspondence theory of truth claims (I think) is that a statement is true iff the proposition it posits obtains, that is, if it’s MEANING obtains. And the meaning of the past tense “Socrates was a philosopher” requires that something now obtain, that is, there must be some reality, something to which the statement points which can serve as grounds for its truth claim. It’s correspondence to REALITY that this theory of truth requires, right? Well, in what sense doe the past obtain, or exist, or in what sense is it “real’? You have to show in what sense the past is REAL apart from any consideration or reference to the present if you want to justify that claim that what grounds past-tense propositions is past-tense SOAs (viz., SOAs that once obtained but do not now obtain) and not present-tense SOAs (SOAs that presently obtain). From my point of view, past-tense SOAs are what grounded present-tense propositions positing those SOAs when those SOAs were actual. They can’t ground past-tense propositions ‘about those events’ when those events do not obtain. Something else that obtains presently must ground these past-tense props.

Humphrey: Tom said: ”If ‘Socrates was a philosopher’ shares the same truth grounds as “Socrates is a philosopher” then must they not both share the same truth value.” But they don't share the same truth grounds. Neither you nor I think that.

Tom: I don’t think they share the same grounds for truth, but it seems to me that your view entails that they do share the same grounds. See my opening comment above.

Humphrey: "Socrates was a philospher" is true if *in the past* the state of affairs of Socrates being a philosopher obtained. "Socrates is a philosopher" is true if *in the present* that state of affairs obtains. But these two are not the same truth grounds!

Tom: To me this looks like both “Socrates is a philosopher” and “Socrates was a philosopher” share the same truth grounds. I put in bold italics what suggests this to me about your view. True, you’re standing in what was the present beside the grounding SOA and pointing to it and in the other you’re standing in what is now the present and pointing to it. But you’re pointing to the same SOA. If you’re not, then you shouldn’t have any trouble with what Alan and I are saying, for all we’re saying is that the past-tense “Socrates was a philosopher” has as its grounds for truth some state of affairs OTHER than the past state of affairs that grounded “Socrates is a philosopher” when that proposition was presently true. What SOA could Alan and I be pointing to? Only some presently obtaining SOA. There is no other option.

Humphrey: Tom said: ”We previously agreed that ‘was’ and ‘was not’ and ‘is’ and ‘is not’ make their propositions contradictory, while ‘will’ and ‘will not’ are contrary.” But this is what I am now disputing. I am saying that "will" and "will not" are contradictories. But that doesn't entail a settled future, because the grounds for the truth of either "will" or "will not" is *what happens in the future, at the time in question*.

Tom: Two things about the future. I’m assuming you agree that future objects do not exist in the present. So, in what sense can non-existent objects, and non-actual states of affairs, serve as grounds for the correspondence that is supposed to account for truth at all? Secondly, if “will not” is the contradictory of “will,” what are the contraries of these propositions?

Humphrey: Let me put it this way. I previously stated, I think correctly, that propositions do not "exist". They can be true or false, but they don't "exist".

Tom: This is very strange. Just what “is” true if that which is claimed to be true (the proposition) does not exist? To what are you attributing truth in this case?

Humphrey: Neither do they have temporal or spatial location. You can't say "the proposition that 2+2=4 is in Australia".

Tom: Well, you picked a necessary state of affairs (2+2=4), and necessary states are timelessly true. We’ve been focusing on contingent states of affairs (which by definition do obtain at some times and not at others). But in a sense you’re right. I wouldn’t say propositions have physicality as such. But since propositions don’t exist apart from the statements that express them, and statements are asserted in time and space, why can’t it be true that it’s true in Australia that 2+2=4? The meaning of 2+2=4, which is the proposition, obtains in Australia. It’s “in” Australia, if you will. What is true at all is true everywhere when it’s true, and false everywhere when it’s false.

Humphrey: Neither does it have any temporal location. It just is either true or false. The very idea that something can be "true now" or "false now" is incoherent…

Tom: For being incoherent, believing that propositions are either “now true” or “now false” makes a lot of sense. And for being coherent, your claim doesn’t really communicate much to me. But don’t mind me, Albert. I’m hard-headed. I’m just wondering, if propositions are never true or false “now,” then what account can you give of their correspondence to reality? Must propositions correspond or not to states of affairs they posit?

Humphrey: "It can presently be known that S will obtain" is the CONTRARY of "It can presently be known that S will not obtain".

Tom: I thought you said “will” and “will not” are contradictories. But in any case, here you plant temporality, or tense, smack in the heart of your account of propositional truth. But this contradicts your claim immediately above that it’s incoherent to claim a proposition is “now true” or “now false.” If propositions cannot “now” be either true or false, then what does it mean to claim that we can “presently know (i.e., presently know it’s true) that S will obtain”?

Humphrey: "It can presently be know that S might obtain" is the SUBCONTRARY of "It can presently be known that S might not obtain" and so forth around the square. By doing this, the correspondence theory of truth is saved and the problem of God being able to change the past is solved.

Tom: When was God’s being able to change the past a problem? I don’t concede that this ever was a problem with Presentism.

That’s it Alan! It’s way beyond me now.

And thanks Humphrey for hanging in there with me. In truth, I’m now very confused about what it is you believe. You affirm the correspondence theory of truth, affirm that states of affairs either obtain or not, that states of affairs are the grounds for truth, but deny that truth supervenes a tensed reality (in saying propositions are never true or false at some particular time), but claim we can “presently” (i.e., “now”) know the truth that S will obtain (among other truths we can “presently” know).

I’m totally lost…and lost “now”!

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 2/9/2005 1:41:02 PM (GMT-6)

Alan: Now, you [Humphrey] seem to want to say that the past-tense statement is true at T not primarily because the event's having occurred at T-3 now obtains, but because of the event's occurring at T-3. To that I answer both Yes and No, depending on the type of primacy that's in view. The actual occurring of the event in the past is historically primary. It is because of the occurring of event at T-3 that it is now true that the event occurred at T-3. But the event's having occurred at T-3 is semantically and (given truth as correspondence) ontologically primary. It is because the event has obtained that the past-tense statement is now true.

Tom: This is what I was less aptly trying to get at also. Even for present-tense props positing presently obtaining states of affairs there will be past-tense states of affairs that in a sense are primary to, or ground, the present state of affairs (in the sense that the present wouldn’t be what it IS had the past not been what it WAS). As I said, God’s decision to create the world ultimately grounds all contingent states of affairs, but that decision is not THE truth grounds for propositions about contingent states of affairs not positing God’s having decided to create. This kind of relationship obtains between Socrates’ being present and being a philosopher (when he was alive) on the one hand, and the past-tense “Socrates was a philosopher” on the other. The latter past-tense prop can’t now be true if the former—now non-existent—state of affairs had not obtained. But this doesn’t make the former state of affairs the truth grounds of the latter prop. The former isn’t irrelevant by any means, but it’s not primary in the sense required by the grounding relation. Since the former is non-existent, it can’t be the state of affairs that grounds (present-tense verb) “Socrates was a philosopher.” And if correspondence requires some state of affairs to which props correspond, there has to be some presently obtaining state of affairs that qualifies as THE grounds for “Socrates was a philosopher.” Presentists don’t all agree on just how best to account or describe that state of affairs, but they do agree that the present must be grounding such props.

Tom

Post Edited (Humphrey Bogart) : 2/10/2005 11:44:03 AM (GMT-6)

I feel like I'm muddying the waters!

HB: The grounds for something being true is not just that a particular SOA obtains, but that it obtains *at the particular time at which the proposition asserts it to obtain*.

Tom: I'm slow, but in what sense does the past exist or obtain (present tense verb)? This is what I’m looking for. In what sense does Socrates’ being a philosopher obtain (present tense verb) to ground “Socrates was a philosopher”? Your present tense use of "obtain" is confusing me I think.

HB: If you construe SOA to exclude reference to time, then SOA is incomplete as a grounds for the truth of any proposition. In other words, when you say "Socrates being present and being a philosopher" grounds the truth of the statements, I think you are wrong, you have not completely specified the grounds for their truth.

Tom: Actually I did, or at least meant to. Socrates’ being present either obtains or does not obtain at any time one posits this SOA. I am including tense. I love tense! ;o)

HB: The complete grounds for the truth of the past-tensed version is "Socrates being present and being a philospher IN THE PAST".

Tom: Then when, pray tell, does the SOA Socrates’ being present and being a philosopher in the past obtain? In the past or in the present? See, by fixing “in the past” to the entire italicized SOA, the only time at which this state of affairs can obtain is subsequent to the time Socrates actually lived. So the state of affairs you give (in my view) is equivalent to what Alan and I are calling Socrates’ having been present and having been a philosopher which is precisely what Presentism claims is the grounds of “Socrates was a philosopher.”

Did you mean to write: "The complete grounds for the truth of the past-tense version is 'Socrates' being present and being a philosopher' [end quote] in the past"?

HB: The complete grounds for the truth of the present-tensed version is "Socrates being present and a philosopher IN THE PRESENT". These just ain't the same grounds for truth.

Tom: Then you shouldn’t have any problem agreeing with the presentist claim that the SOA that grounds “Socrates was a philosopher” is not a past-tense non-existent SOA but rather Socrates’ having been a philosopher (which is not a past-tense non-existent SOA at all).

Maybe we’re talking past each other, I'm not sure.

HB: This is required by the correspondence theory of truth. Part of the correspondence in question is TEMPORAL and SPATIAL correspondence, not just local state-of-affairs. It is being asserted that "at time T and spatial location S state-of-affairs X obtains".

Tom: Obtains? That’s a present-tense verb. If you advocated the static theory of time this would make sense I suppose. But if the past doesn’t exist (on the dynamic theory of time), doesn't 'obtain', what sense does it make to say, per your formula here, that “On November 2, 1963 Kennedy IS BEING assassinated”?

HB: The very use of tense implies a TEMPORAL reference is being asserted for the SOA. That is a part of the grounds of truth.

Tom: I thought tense was an indispensable part of the meaning of a proposition too, but in your last post you said it was incoherent to say that a proposition is true or false “now.” Sounded to me like you were tossing tense out as part of meaning, correspondence, or truth grounds.

HB: Part of the problem here is ambiguity about the term "state-of-affairs". If we included temporal location in what we mean by "state-of-affairs", would that help clarify things?

Tom: It’s not only the time at which Kennedy was assassinated (1963) that’s part of the meaning of the proposition, it’s also the time at which the person makes the claim which is part of the meaning.

HB: So Socrates presently being a philosopher is a different state-of-affairs to Socrates was a philosopher, because they occur at different times? This is purely a definitional issue, of how you define "state-of-affairs", it doesn't affect the argument at all. The point is that time of occurrence is part of the *meaning of a proposition*…

Tom: The SOA Socrates’ being present and being a philosopher can only obtain at some ‘present’ moment. That's the only time one can "be." One can't "be" in the past or future. Socrates’ having been present, which above you seem to agree is what grounds “Socrates was a philosopher” cannot obtain at the same time Socrates’ being present and being a philosopher obtained. I think we agree on this. So if Socrates’ having been present grounds “Socrates was a philosopher,” and tense is part of the meaning of this proposition, and Socrates’ having been present cannot obtain when Socrates’ being present and being a philosopher obtained (i.e., in the past), then there's only one temporal location at which to locate the grounding SOA Socrates’ having been present, and that is the present.

HB: Tom said...Well, actually not. Alan and I agree that past- present- and future- tense statements are true of false if the proposition they posit obtains when the statement is asserted. What we’re saying is that what propositions “posit” they posit when they’re asserted regardless of whether the refer to the past, present, or future. All the correspondence theory of truth claims (I think) is that a statement is true iff the proposition it posits obtains, that is, if it’s MEANING obtains.

But part of the meaning is *the temporal location*.

Tom: Yes! And the temporal location of the meaning of “Socrates was a philosopher” is the present, not the past. This meaning, the meaning of THIS proposition, cannot obtain (or be temporally located) in the past when Socrates was actually present and was actually a philosopher, for at that temporal location the meaning of “Socrates was a philosopher” would be false. Why? Because its meaning cannot be said to obtain at that time. “Socrates was a philosopher” can only be true because its meaning, its proposition, is temporally located at the time subsequent to Socrates' actual existence, viz., when the past-tense proposition is asserted.

HB: And I think that what you say entails that you hold to the correspondence theory of truth *only for the present*, not for the past and future.

Tom: I’m an amateur, but as far as I can tell correspondence is a relation, and relations cannot (so far as I understand) obtain between actual and non-actual objects. This point is actually raised (unsuccessfully) by philosophers in objection to Presentism. Since relations can only be said to obtain between actual objects or states of affairs, philosophers object that presentists cannot account for any grounding relation that obtains between the propositions spoken in the present and Socrates so as to make “Socrates was a philosopher” true. I was just reading one criticism of presentism to the effect that presentists can only logically maintain that present-tense propositions are true since that’s the only time “relations” (and so grounding) can be said to obtain. But if what grounds past- and future-tense props obtains now, then the grounding relation does obtain between actualities.

HB: For example, take the statement that "Caesar crossed the Rubicon". Suppose that the only remaining traces of this in the present are (a) God remembers it happening, and (b) and ancient text somewhere that describes it. What you are saying, then is that the truth of p1="Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is grounded in the truth of p2="God remembers Caesar crossing the Rubicon" and p3="there is a manuscript describing Caesar crossing the Rubicon".

Tom: Personally, I think the SOA Caesar’s having crossed the Rubicon actually obtains. I'm less convinced that God's memories actually 'ground' past-tense propositions.

HB: But the problem is that p2 and p3 are patently obviously different states of affairs to Caesar crossing the Rubicon. God remembering Caesar crossing the Rubicon is not the same thing as Caesar crossing the Rubicon. A manuscript is not the same thing either.

Tom: True.

HB: But for the correspondence theory of truth, the thing that grounds the statement must be THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS DESCRIBED ASSERTED IN THE STATEMENT…

Tom: I agree. Where we differ is in what we understand to be the ACTUAL state of affairs posited by a past-tense proposition. I don’t see that the ACTUAL state of affairs posited by “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon. How could it be since this is not an ACTUAL state of affairs when we assert “Caesar crossed the Rubicon”? Some other state of affairs must be grounding this prop.

HB: Whatever is the grounds of truth for a proposition, is the MEANING of the proposition.

Tom: I think not. The meaning of a statement or assertion IS the proposition. I think you earlier pointed this out when you quoted Alan. And propositions have grounds for their truth-values. So how can the meaning of a statement be both the proposition itself and the grounds for the proposition’s truth? That would reduce to a proposition being the grounds for its own truth.

HB: Saying "God remembers Caesar crossing the Rubicon" has a different meaning to "Caesar crossed the Rubicon"; that is intuitively obvious! Same with the manuscript. Since they have different meanings, they can't have the same grounds for truth.

Tom: I’m agreeing. But this doesn’t mean the truth grounds for “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” is not a present state of affairs, say, Caesar’s having crossed the Rubicon.

HB: I'll go through each point for you:

1. Affirm the correspondence theory of truth - yes.

2. Affirm that states of affairs either obtain or not - at any given time, yes.

Tom: I was following you on (2) until you added “at any given time.” Do you mean to say that past states of affairs actually obtain ("obtain" is a present tense verb)? Future states of affairs actually obtain? Or are you agreeing (and as I would say) that the only time at which a state of affairs can be said to “obtain” is now?

HB: 3. Affirm that states of affairs are the grounds for truth - no, states of affairs and the time at which they occur are the grounds for truth.

Tom: Not sure I get what you mean. It sounds like you’d answer my immediately preceding question by saying past states of affairs actually obtain (but I can hardly believe you believe this), or else (if the past does NOT obtain) “Socrates was a philosopher” could have no grounds for its truth in your approach.

HB: 4. Deny that truth supervences a tensed reality - not sure precisely what you are saying. I think that tense is part of the meaning of propositions. Does that mean I deny that truth supervenes a tensed reality? Could I say that you deny that truth supervenes states-of-affairs, because you think that states-of-affairs are part of the meaning of the proposition?

Tom: I don’t think states of affairs are part of the meaning of propositions. I think a statement’s meaning IS its proposition and that states of affairs on the other hand are what GROUND the truth-values of propositions. So I wouldn’t say that the states of affairs, the grounds, are part of the meaning. I think correspondence either obtains or does not obtain between the meaning (i.e., proposition) posited by statements and states of affairs in the real world.

HB: 5. Claim that we can presently know the truth that S will obtain - no, absolutely not. I deny that we can know that S will obtain (except where it relates to the part of the future which is settled, of course).

Tom: Then you agree that we can presently knkow the truth that S will obtain (if S will obtain is true, obviously). What else did you mean when you said “The way to solve the problem is to tack onto each statement the preceding phrase, ‘It can be presently known that S will obtain’”? Now, see, I don't take that on explicitly because the fact is that the only time at which we can know ANYTHING is the present. So what is added to our knowing that "S will obtain" is true by saying we can presently know that "So will obtain" is true? It's superfluous. The only time we can know anyting is presently.

HB: The correspondence theory of truth does not require that a proposition refer to or be grounded in any presently existing states of affairs. Why should it? If a statement asserts something about a presently non-existing state-of-affairs (i.e. the past or the future), then why should it require an existing state-of-affairs to ground it?

Tom: Because the past and future do not exist. And non-existent objects cannot be said to stand in any relation to what does exist. The proposition “Socrates was a philosopher” exists. Socrates doesn’t exist. Correspondence is a relation. Relations obtain only between existent objects or states of affairs. So the non-existent Socrates cannot himself constitute the grounding relation. But Socrates' having existed CAN constitute this grounding relation since it is an existing state of affairs.

Gotta go. I’m tired! I'm probably complicating things the more I talk (sorry if that’s the case Alan).

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 2/11/2005 1:22:19 AM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (TGB) : 2/12/2005 8:04:53 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited (Humphrey Bogart) : 2/12/2005 12:17:06 PM (GMT-6)

Hello guys-

Another interesting article (available online): “Presentism and Truthmaking” by Simon Keller (Boston U). It’s also in Dean Zimmerman (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2004).

Tom

Hey guys, I'm just wondering.  Does the basis of your paper presuppose a particular view of time i.e. linear?  Should not this have been laid out first and then the other stuff (the paper?)  Also, why should one accept this view of time as reasonable?  Thanks.

Page 3: “The Case for a Settled Future. There are four main strategies that can be pursued to argue that the future is settled. First, one can try to show that universal determinism is true. If it is, then there is exactly one causally possible chain of events extending from the present onward, which entails a settled future. Second, one can argue for a static view of time. On such a view, the future is (tenselessly) already there and consequently settled.”

Page 8: “The Case for an Open Future. Of the reasons that exist for thinking the OFV is true there are perhaps four that are of significance. First, one can argue from scripture that God knows the future as partly open, and that, therefore, it really is partly open. Second, one can argue from the stochastic nature of quantum physics that the future is, in some respects, really indeterminate and therefore open. For example, many quantum physicists would say that there is no fact of the matter about what a particle in “superposition” definitely will or will not do, but only facts about what it probably will or will not do.”

Page 12: “As for the contingency thesis [i.e., the dynamic view of time, or the belief in future contingency], we will simply register here our conviction that it is correct….”

Your right, Brandon. Our paper assumes the dynamic theory of time. The paper just wasn’t the place to argue the in's and out's of such a view of time. But we do acknowledge it. And we do acknowledge that if the static view of time is correct, then presentism and open theism are false and there are no future contingencies and libertarian free will is an illusion. So for someone who holds to the static view, our paper is a flop. But for those who DO hold to the dynamic view, to genuine indeterminism, what about the logic of the open view? THAT’S where we wanted to stake our claim that the open view is the only way to uphold omniscience.

So do you hold to the static view of time?

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 2/27/2005 9:29:22 AM (GMT-6)

How ya doin bud?  How ya doin?  Ya doin?  To tell you the truth, I'm not to sure what you mean by that.   By a static view of time.  If by that you mean the all seeing "eternal now?"  Then no.  I don't hold to that. That's bullcrap man!  But I was talking about this with someone and to quote them, they said,

Post Edited (BBBCanada) : 2/27/2005 3:43:36 PM (GMT-6)

What format does Clark need?

Tom

I sent it off to him in Word format. We'll see if that works.

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Brandon: I'm not to sure what you mean by that. By a static view of time. If by that you mean the all seeing "eternal now?" Then no. I don't hold to that. That's bullcrap man!

Tom: Yeah, you’ve got two available understandings, the “dynamic” and the “static.” The static view of time is behind the “eternal now” bull you’re talking about! The dynamic view is the view God told me was the right view! (ha ha)

Brandon: Well then they started getting weird on me because they then said: There is a debatable idea held by some Hebrew scholars that God's name, JHWH, is made up of three characters that are the basis for the Hebrew words for "past", "present" and "future."

Tom: Oooooh, that’s it. I mean, how can ya counter THAT! I heard Nixon’s name when written in Hebrew had a numeric value equal to that of the anti-Christ. Really, this is silly. Jehovah is written the three letters, true. And these letters also appear in thousands of other words. So what? I mean, if you’re debating friends who are into this, don’t waste you’re time. Find someone else to debate with!

Brandon: Bet you thought I was going to say "Moe, Larry and Curly"!)

Tom: If your friends had said Moe, Larry, and Curly I might be able to put some stoke into their view!

Brandon’s friends: Does God exist in what has been described as "the eternal now"? Or take that a step further, does God exist through all our _possibilities_ as well as our actualities? Probably not difficult for someone who is infinite.

Tom: Now why should that not be difficult for someone who is infinite? Why does being “infinite” become a blank check for some people to imagine that God does whatever pops into their heads?

Brandon: Has God already worked through all our possible decisions? That would explain much, such as how he knows us better than we know ourselves.

Tom: How stupid is God then? I mean, he has to be atemporal to know us better than we know ourselves? Can’t God know us perfectly and be temporal?

Brandon: See, this person here is then working with a particular understanding of time that is linear i.e. past, present and future or "a linear continuum of instants." But how does God exist through our possibilities? Of course he could exist through our possibilities when they are settled but then they would not be possibilities now would they? It seems he is working more from the SFV as stated at the beginning of your paper. Should I take Alan up on reading Craig's "Time and Eternity" spiel?

Tom: You can’t do better than Craig on that. He’s really good, and explains the different views really well. Then there’s that 4-views book on time also. But go with Craig. I disagreed with a few things, but I really liked him.

Now, I could be wrong, but the “linear” view of time is the “dynamic” view of time. To say time is “linear” is to say that one moment follows another, that subsequence is real, and the arrow of time runs in one direction from past through the present into the unformed future. But all the points of time along the “line” aren’t equally present. That’s more like the static view, which is also called the “block” theory of time. It’s all there, like a “block,” all points equally present. It sounds like your friend holds to the “block” theory.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 3/22/2005 9:27:27 PM (GMT-6)