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Tiggers
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 219
| Posted 1/10/2005 3:34 PM (GMT -6) |   |
Alan Rhoda said...
After about a year in the making, here it is.
"open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future" (http://www.alanrhoda.net/papers/opentheism.pdf)
by Alan Rhoda, Greg Boyd, and Thomas Belt
Any constructive feedback appreciated. The sooner the better. I'm going to send this off to a journal at the end of this week.
God bless,
Alan
PS: The hyperlink functionality doesn't seem to be working properly. It keeps inserting the HTML code "<b></b>" in the middle of the URL. Just type the URL in parentheses in your browser. Note: It's a 360 kb PDF file.
Hey Alan,
I'm only now just starting to read this paper and while skimming it...well, is it too lengthy for a journal article, i.e., will they take this paper in it's entirety or will they break it into parts, etc.? Furthermore, just out of curiosity, which journal will be publishing this paper, and will you turn it into a book? Thanks for all your hard work, and on to page 4.
Warmly in Christ,
Tiggers 
“The notion that God uses evils as a means to such higher goods is, … incompatible with the doctrine that he is omnipotent, and therefore does not need to use deplorable means to achieve his ends” (J.L. Mackie). | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 1/10/2005 3:47 PM (GMT -6) | | | Hi Tiggers,
I certainly hope it is not too long for a journal article. If it comes to that, I'll break it into two parts. I hope to get it published in "Faith and Philosophy".
I hope to turn it into a book ... eventually. Though I have several unrelated projects that I have to finish before I can think seriously about that.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2003
Total Posts : 2433
| Posted 1/10/2005 7:07 PM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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JET
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 1/10/2005 9:04 PM (GMT -6) | | | typos...
Footnote, on page 4:
"but the Molinist insists that . . . " (or "but the Molinists insist that” )
Page 9, last line:
“If an event occurs in all causally possible futures or . . .”
great paper btw! Post Edited (JET) : 1/10/2005 8:38:16 PM (GMT-6) | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 1/11/2005 12:52 PM (GMT -6) | |
JET said...
From page 3:
“SFV proponents split, however, over whether there are in fact any future contingents.
Those who accept universal determinism hold that there are none, but others (e.g., Molinists)
believe in future contingency. They maintain that there are several causally possible futures
stemming off from the present in addition to the one that lies on Omega. On their view these
alternate possible futures are ways the future might be, even though it is already settled that they
will not.”
------------------------------------------
This is not a criticism of the paper, but rather a question. Don’t some Molinists use the term “contingent” to mean merely:
(a) “certain to happen, but not causally determined”
as opposed to either:
(b) “causally determined to happen” (which would be the opposite of “contingent” in their minds) or
(c) (as in the above quote) “certain to happen, but might not happen” (which sounds like a strange belief to attribute to even a Molinist).
I’m wondering if (c) implies a reliance on Ockhamist grounds, whereas a pure Molinist would only go so far as (a)
As I understand it, JET, Molinists like Craig understand "contingent" in the ordinary sense to mean simply "neither necessary nor impossible" or "possibly the case and possibly not the case". As such, to say that something is a future contingent implies that it is possible that it not happen. In other words, it "might not" happen.
The crucial move made by Molinists is distinguishing between the three future modalities of necessity, actuality, and possibility. To say, on their view, that something "will" ("would") happen is just to say that it happens in the actual future (in some possible future). It says nothing about whether it happen necessarily or contingently. Hence, it is consistent to say that something "will" happen and that it is contingent. "Will" and "might not" are compatible.
Now I think they're got a strange notion of "actuality" at work here. For starters, it is incompatible with presentism, which says that the only actualities are present actualities--there are no future actualities. At any rate, Craig's recurring criticism of "fatalism" is that it confuses "will" with "must". Craig insists that it can be true that something "will" happen even if it is false that it "must" happen. Hence, "will" is compatible with "might not".
Make sense?
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Starkman
Registered Member
Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1747
| Posted 1/11/2005 5:25 PM (GMT -6) | | | Well, I read it, and what I liked about it was that I could understand it! I mean, most formal logic and philosophical papers are away over my head. This one managed to use language (and use it in a way) that most anyone could follow, and do so without compromising the structure and academic standard of the paper.
Well done! I'll be interested to see what Craig thinks about it.
Starkman | | Back to Top | | |
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markporter
Fire over Oxford
Date Joined Oct 2003
Total Posts : 263
|  Posted 1/12/2005 6:37 AM (GMT -6) | | Have started on reading it....looks good so far  | | Back to Top | | |
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kingsaint
Registered Member
Date Joined Oct 2003
Total Posts : 80
| Posted 1/12/2005 6:24 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Alan,
Nice job! On first read, I do want to discuss one definition. On page 9 it is stated: "According to the open future view, what we call 'the future' is really a branching tree of causally possible futures..."
My concern is the word "causally". If we were to take seriously Biblical miracles, how would these figure into that definition. I suppose we could pack divine causality into our notion of causality, but that may be a stretch. For the sake of argument, let me posit that certain miracles are contrary to any natural theory in which the word "causality" would make sense. Sure, weird things are possible if certain quantum probabilities or improbabilities obtain. But, I'm assuming that God is not contrained by natural laws, no matter what we can derive from them. Actually, there is a tendency for evangelicals to naturalize miracles and apologize that certain miracles could happen consistent with natural laws. Perhaps most Biblical miracles are weird quantum events, but that is beyond my point.
Also, what is the ontology of these possible futures? Are they in the mind of God? The peeled away analogy seems to imply that they are "real".
Not in relation to the paper, but I know you (Alan) have stated your knowledge of Bohm and his belief that quantum probabilities are only epistemic. If so, how would you go about defending open theism in light of natural theories. Granted, we do not want to marry our theology to any natural theory, but shouldn't we tell some story how LFW works if we do not have recourse to quantum mechanics?
"Nobody who omits doing good works nowadays does so in order not to be tempted to become self-righteous; he omits it because it is easier."
--Philip Merlan, "Toward the Understanding of Kierkegaard" | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 1/12/2005 7:18 PM (GMT -6) | |
kingsaint said...
On first read, I do want to discuss one definition. On page 9 it is stated: "According to the open future view, what we call 'the future' is really a branching tree of causally possible futures..."
My concern is the word "causally". If we were to take seriously Biblical miracles, how would these figure into that definition. I suppose we could pack divine causality into our notion of causality, but that may be a stretch.
Hi kingsaint. Thanks for the feedback.
I do not restrict my understanding of causality to physical causality, so I would include divine causality. By 'causally possible' I simply mean that the present state of things (not just the physical world, but all of reality) does not determine or necessitate its not obtaining. I use the term in distinction from both 'logically possible' and (mere) 'physical possibility'. For example, it is presumably physically impossible for dead men to rise again (it would be a miracle), but it does not seem to be logically impossible (the concept implies no contradiction). It is, however, causally possible for a dead man to rise again if God wills to resurrect him.
kingsaint said...
Also, what is the ontology of these possible futures? Are they in the mind of God? The peeled away analogy seems to imply that they are "real".
Not in relation to the paper, but I know you (Alan) have stated your knowledge of Bohm and his belief that quantum probabilities are only epistemic. If so, how would you go about defending open theism in light of natural theories. Granted, we do not want to marry our theology to any natural theory, but shouldn't we tell some story how LFW works if we do not have recourse to quantum mechanics? I think these causally possible futures are in the mind of God. Seems to me that's entailed by the notion of God's infinite intelligence, as Doc spells it out. But as a presentist I do not think anything exists but what exists now. And by "exists now" I do not mean the relativistic time of Einsteinian special relativity, but, if you will, real time, ontological time, time from a God-eye, non-relativistic perspective. (For a defense of this notion, see William Lane Craig's "Time and Eternity".)
I don't have any strong views one way or the other on whether quantum probabilities are merely epistemic. If they are, then quantum mechanics is not going to help one develop a theory of LFW, but that doesn't really bother me b/c I don't think that genuine quantum indeterminacy is either necessary or sufficient for LFW. I think that there are more things in heaven and earth than are countenanced by current physical theory, so I don't feel any particular need to constrain my philosophy or theology to the limitations of physical theory. If I have a strong intuitive argument for LFW and some physical theory implies that LFW doesn't exist, then I say so much the worse for that physical theory.
So in answer to your question, apart from appealing to the current debate over quantum indeterminacy, I wouldn't try to defend open theism by appealing to natural theories. Instead, I would appeal to the phenomenology of decision making, our intuitions regarding moral responsibility, etc., to argue that LFW is correct. All the open theist (as such) needs is that the contingency and incompatibility theses be true. If they are, and an omniscience God exists, then open theism follows. I don't need a detailed theory of how LFW works to make that case.
Regards,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
Registered Member
Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 1/12/2005 7:33 PM (GMT -6) | | | It seems to me that quantum indeterminancy (QI) and libertarian free will (LFW) are separate and distinct categories within the broader category of openness. (I.e., QI deals with physics while LFW deals with metaphysics.) So if QI is not merely epistemic, that would prove that future is open to some degree, but would not prove the existence of LFW. And conversely, if QI is merely epistemic, it would not disprove the existence of LFW (and, thus, would not disprove openness), ... eh? | | Back to Top | | |
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kingsaint
Registered Member
Date Joined Oct 2003
Total Posts : 80
| Posted 1/12/2005 11:19 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Thanks Alan for the response,
I especially appreciate your comment about the limitations of physical theories. I've said this before, but this comes out very clearly in relation to qualia and consciousness. Even someone like David Chalmers is sympathetic to such notions as panpsychism. You are absolutely right, there is more to the universe than has been dreamt up in our physical theories.
JET,
My comment on quantum mechanics is really aimed at apologetics. It helps, no more than that, to be able to tell a story how LFW might work. I have also stated before that there has been talk in the history of quantum theory for a role for consciousness (John von Neumann, Penrose, Eccles, Stapp, etc.). I think it is safe to say that some people are turned away from belief on account of a physical theory, which is too bad, but that is the way it is.
Be without fear in the face of your enemies
Be brave and upright
Speak the truth
Safeguard the helpless
That is your oath
---Godfrey of Ibelin | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 1/13/2005 12:59 PM (GMT -6) | | | Hi Tom,
Thanks for your feedback. I will implement a number of your suggestions. I've converted footnotes to endnotes and fixed some of the spacing issues. The paper's now 49 pages instead of 54.
Regards,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 1/15/2005 8:15 PM (GMT -6) | |
Lee: That's fine, but then maybe the paper should be titled "Is contingency inconsistent with a settled future?" or something similar.
Tom: It’s a defense of several claims which all converge to support the more fundamental claim that open theism is not only plausible, but it’s the only way a person who believes in future contingency can affirm omniscience. So it won’t be of much interest to determinists, except that they can no longer dismiss the open view with “Oh, that just denies omniscience by denying that Gods’ foreknowledge is exhaustive.” It’s clear that open theists CAN affirm omniscience without having to deny bivalence or argue that there are truths that God cannot logically know (ala Bill Hasker). Having shown this much is a huge step.
In political terms, I think it means determinists have no grounds for feeling about open theism any differently than they do about belief in future contingency (see their wide acceptance today of Arminians and Free-will Molinists). What we’ve done in this paper is place belief in the open view on par with belief in future contingency. If one believes there are future contingents (and lots of believers DO without being thought at all outside the maintstream), then there’s no longer reason to feel any different about open theism, for open theism is the most plausible way of accounting for such contingents.
So no, we didn’t prove open theism. We just proved that open theism is inseparable from what many many believers already hold to be the truth about ourselves and the world. And in my view, that’s proving a lot.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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