Hi Matt. I'll comment briefly on the argument you posted.

Thank you for your response! I appreciate your clarity of thought. Unfortunately I do not have much time right now, but I would like to discuss the premises that you find fault with. I just want to make sure I understand your criticisms.

a. You agree with.

b. You do not believe that the conclusion "not all being can be possible beings" follows necessarily from the fact that "what comes to exist does so only through what already exists."

c. You grant that this subconclusion follows if a and b are true.

d. Your response to this point is not clear to me. You say there are two ways in which "there could fail to be a "first" cause that Aquinas fails to distinguish." First is option, you say, is ruled out by the metaphysical intuition ex nihilo nihil fit. The second option, namely "there is an infinite regress of causes" is not refuted by Aquinas. So the only point in question here is whether or not there can be an infinite regress of causes, and whether or not Aquinas refuted this.

rossfadeinout,

I remember your posts. Good to hear from you! Again, I wish I had more time to put up defense of the premises of the argument I gave. Perhaps later tonight or tomorrow. I do want to mention that the more I think about this argument in particular and the 5 ways in general, the more they make sense to me. These arguments come from a very different mindset. Trying to think like the medievals is quite a task.

I agree with you that the moral argument is a very good (and often overlooked) argument. It connects with so many people. The Thomistic arguments generally are not arguments that touch the heart. At least no very quickly.

To address your post, you said you were not convinced that the argument shows God's simplicity, His lack of passive potency, or that God's existence and essence are identical. I assume that since you read Geislers Philosophy of Religion, you have some specific objections to the claim that the argument shows God's simplicity. Do you have some reasons for thinking that the argument only argues for God's existence or is it that you don't understand the argument, or that you don't understand how the argument implies God's simplicity?

Simplicity, as I understand it, means "without composition". An absolutely simple being is not composed of physical parts. Nor is He composed metaphysically. This is the distinction between God and angels. According to Aquinas, God is absolutely simple, while angels are simple in a qualified way. The key to this argument is found in the essence / existence distinction. Beings that are composed of act and potency are dependant beings in that they cannot account for their own existence. If this is true, then God could not be composed of act and potency because He would then need something to account for His existence.

I'll try to get started on the argument soon. Talk to you soon. God Bless!!

Matt

Hello again,

Thank you Alan and Ross for your thoughts. I have some time to begin a defense of the argument for contingency. I would like to take is very slowly; defending one or two premises at a time.

Premise a. There are beings that begin to exist and cease to exist. (i.e. possible beings)

You agreed with this premise, but I would like to comment on it. It was agreed that there are possible beings, but there are some implications of this that are not explicitly stated in the first premise. As Alan said, it is an empirical fact that beings begin to exist and cease to exist. People die, plants sprout and then later die and turn back into soil, components of the earth can be refined and turned into cars, planes, food, etc.

For the purposes of this argument, one needs to go beyond the mere fact of possible beings to an analysis of the metaphysical principles involved in this fact. Again, the main question, for the purposes of this premise, is whether or not the fact of possible beings implies contingency. If so, then possible beings need something that can account for their being real.

To begin, consider humanity. If a human being ceases to be, humanity does not cease to be. Other people are still human if one human being dies. Humanity is that which is common to all humans. It refers to "what" we are. What we are is also referred to as our essence. When we say, George Bush is a man, we understand that George Bush is real. When we say that Sherlock Homles was a man, we are referring to someone, but to someone that does not exist. It is interesting that even though Sherlock Holmes does not exist, it is still meaningful to talk about him. It is meaningful because Sherlock Holmes does exist, but only as an essence in my mind, whereas George Bush exists in my mind and in reality. George Bush and Sherlock Holmes have the same essence, what is different is their act of existing. Both share a common essence, but one has an act of existence. This is the case with unicorns as well. Unicorns do not exist apart from the mind, but they do exist in the mind. They too are possible beings in that their existence is not impossible. One describes unicorns as a horse with a big horn on its head, etc. We speak of it as a "what", even though it does not have an act of existence apart from my mind.

This is important because, if it is a correct analysis of possible beings, it shows that there is a real distinction between the essence of a thing and a things act of existing. If a thing's essence cannot account for that thing's actual existence, it seems that one needs to conclude that beings are composed of at least two principles: Essence and Existence.

If essence cannot account for my existence, since both real and non-real things have essences, something else must account for my existence. As mentioned above, it seems reasonable to conclude that a being is composed of "Essence" (essentia) and "Existence" (esse). And since essence can't account for my existence, perhaps the other principle of being can account for my existence, namely esse. There are problems however, in trying to account for a things act of existence by appealing to it's own existence.

First, as our first premise points out, the beings of our experience come into existence and pass out of existence. But the beings of our experience are not existence itself. Lots of different things exist, but we always experience existence as "this" thing that exists, or "that" thing that exists. We just don't experience "existence" as such. With this in mind, it is reasonable to conclude that the beings of our experience only "have" existence, they are not existence itself. If they "have" existence, where did they get it from? Something, other than their own essence and existence must account for their being.

I have run out of time tonight. I would like to spend a lot of time on this premise, as it is foundational. I would love to hear your thoughts so far.

God Bless!

Matt

Matt,

I'm at work as well so I can't write too much myself. I do accept that God is a necessary being, at least in an existential way (I'm not sure that I can buy the idea that God is logically necessary).

I guess what I don't see is how believing that God is a necessary being commits me to Thomistic metaphysics. Most evangelical philosophers I know accept that God is the necessary being that grounds the existence of all contengent beings.

Looking forward to your thoughts,

Ross

Ross,

I don't know that accepting God as a necessary being commits one to a Thomistic metaphysics. But the notion of a necessary Being within the context of Thomistic metaphysics does have all sorts of implications.

You accepted the idea that Gods existence and essence are the same, which is in agreement with the doctrine of simplicity. If you accept this, then simplicity seems to follow. God's being, which is uncomposed, is simple. To the best of my understanding, a being whose essence and existence are distinct are composed beings. To have an identity of essence and existence would mean a lack of composition, which is to say, simple.

Matt

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Man is the feeblest reed in existence, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the universe be armed for his destruction; a noxious vapour, a drop of water is enough to cause his death. But though the universe were to destroy him, man would be more noble than his destroyer.             -Pascal

Ross,

It sounds like we are in agreement all the way up to c:

a. There are beings that begin to exist and cease to exist. (i.e. possible beings)

b. But not all being can be possible beings, because what comes to exist does so only through what already exists. (nothing cannot cause something).

d. There cannot be an infinite regress of necessary beings each of which has its necessity dependent on another because
1. An infinite regress of dependent causes is impossible.

2. A necessary Being cannot be a dependent being.

e. Therefore, there must be a first Being that is necessary in itself (and not dependent on another for its existence.)

 

If so, is it the notion of simplicity that you disagree with? If so, why? Is it because you don't see how simplicity is arrived at? Do you see how it's arrived at and you just disagree?

 

I am much more of a discussion oriented learner. I am not sure what to address unless I get feedback from people who agree or disagree. No one has responded to my topic "The metaphysics of open theism". Does it just take a while? Is it the topic? God Bless!

 

Matt 

Hey Matt,

I'm in agreement with you in the argument. But in the argument I do not see where you have made any mention of divine simplicity. All we have got is a being whose existence is essential-- a necessary being.Alan summarized the point well when he made his 3rd point. While we are in agreement that God's essense is that he exists, they don't seem to be identical.

But in response to your question, I don't really fully understand 1) what you mean by divine simplicity and 2) how your understanding of divine simplicity makes Open Theism impossible.

I just found this in Geisler's ST vol.2 chap 2 in the section "answering objections to God's pure actuality".

Obj #1 From the Potential to Create

If God has no potentiality, then how did He have the potential to create? He did create, and whatever he did do, he must have had the potential to do.

Answer to Obj #1

God has no passive potency; he has no possibility to be what he is not. But he does have active potency (power to do what he has not done). Hence, the potential to create existed in God's active power to create, just as the potential to move a book preexists in our muscles before we move it.

So perhaps we're not as far apart as you think

Alan and Ross,

Thank you very much for your thoughts!

Matt

Hello,

I have a friend that suggested talking first about the nature of possible being before trying to talk about an argument for God's existence. I'll take his advice. I guess I have been doing that some already, but perhaps it would be better to start with the nature of possible being. So I'll start a thread on that topic.

Matt

I agree with those who say that reducing God to what "nature" dictates is wrong. God is Person, yet uncreated, etc. I won't attempt to REDUCE God in substance, "nature" or "idea" to anything within my grasp, and such caution on my part is realistic and right.

Yet, I loose nothing and gain everything in the motion. God is Person, and 'has revealed Himself unto us.' Bless the Lord.

Besides, a relationship with God in Christ Jesus throught the Spirit is itself realistic, and not a mere idea.

Why have "beliefs" that differ in kind from a true faith-relationship? What sense does that make?

I don't "argue for God's existence"; I know God. Even rocks know God. The problem is sin and denial.

Dr. Rhoda,

I have been reading lately, I may have been wrong about something. I apologize. It looks like Aquinas does classify angels as "necessary", but necessary in a qualified sense. God is necessary in an unqualified sense. I am still trying to understand the differences between God as necessary and angels as necessary. I am thinking about whether or not my point is still valid concerning the necessity of God. Thanks.

Matt