Hello,

Divine Simplicity is arrived at by noting the nature of possible beings. I would love to get your thoughts on whether or not this analysis of possible being is cogent. My main questions for Dr. Rhoda are at the bottom of this post.

What are your thoughts on the nature of possible beings. Can one draw legitimate metaphysical conclusions from an analysis of possible beings? If so, what is your account? Is possible being composed? Do you agree with the essence / existence distinction?

I'll repost my initial statements about why there is a real distinction between essence and existence in finite beings. If you have read it, please just skip this section.

----------------------------------

POST FROM THOMISM THREAD
To begin, consider humanity. If a human being ceases to be, humanity does not cease to be. Other people are still human if one human being dies. Humanity is that which is common to all humans. It refers to "what" we are. What we are is also referred to as our essence. When we say, George Bush is a man, we understand that George Bush is real. When we say that Sherlock Homles was a man, we are referring to someone, but to someone that does not exist. It is interesting that even though Sherlock Holmes does not exist, it is still meaningful to talk about him. It is meaningful because Sherlock Holmes does exist, but only as an essence in my mind, whereas George Bush exists in my mind and in reality. George Bush and Sherlock Holmes have the same essence, what is different is their act of existing. Both share a common essence, but one has an act of existence. This is the case with unicorns as well. Unicorns do not exist apart from the mind, but they do exist in the mind. They too are possible beings in that their existence is not impossible. One describes unicorns as a horse with a big horn on its head, etc. We speak of it as a "what", even though it does not have an act of existence apart from my mind.

This is important because, if it is a correct analysis of possible beings, it shows that there is a real distinction between the essence of a thing and a things act of existing. If a thing's essence cannot account for that thing's actual existence, it seems that one needs to conclude that beings are composed of at least two principles: Essence and Existence.

If essence cannot account for my existence, since both real and non-real things have essences, something else must account for my existence. As mentioned above, it seems reasonable to conclude that a being is composed of "Essence" (essentia) and "Existence" (esse). And since essence can't account for my existence, perhaps the other principle of being can account for my existence, namely esse. There are problems however, in trying to account for a things act of existence by appealing to it's own existence.

First, as our first premise points out, the beings of our experience come into existence and pass out of existence. But the beings of our experience are not existence itself. Lots of different things exist, but we always experience existence as "this" thing that exists, or "that" thing that exists. We just don't experience "existence" as such. With this in mind, it is reasonable to conclude that the beings of our experience only "have" existence, they are not existence itself. If they "have" existence, where did they get it from? Something, other than their own essence and existence must account for their being.

-------------------------------------

Matt,

I can tell that I am already in over my head a little in this discussion. But being someone with no real set understanding of a lot of the intricacies of this argument, maybe my questions will help you to clarify what you are trying to get at.

What are your thoughts on the nature of possible beings.

Possible beings are beings that are contingent, not (metaphyisically) necessary*

I differentiate between logical and metaphysical necessity  

Can one draw legitimate metaphysical conclusions from an analysis of possible beings? If so, what is your account? 

Because every contingent being must have a cause, the existence of a possible being requires that there is a necessary being that causally grounds the existence of the possible being.  

Is possible being composed?

Here is where I am not sure what you're asking. What does "composed" mean (in this context)? It does seem that existence is a contingent "property" of possible beings.  

Do you agree with the essence / existence distinction?

I think that the essense of being a man is not the same as the man actually existing, as you have shown with the Sherlock Holmes / George Bush example.

I'm really enjoying the exchange, and hope to learn more from the discussion.

Ross,

I too, am over my head in this discussion. I want to point out again that I am a beginner. I want to discuss this because I want to understand it and be able to articulate it.

You said that you were not sure what I meant when I asked about "composed" being. By composed, I do not mean that a being is composed of different properties, or substances, etc. In the Thomistic view, composition is a composition of metaphysical principles. These principles (i.e. essence, existence, substance, accidents, act, and potency) are not things in themselves. If essence is the principle that makes something be what it is, then it could not itself be something in itself. If essence was a thing in itself, essence would need something to make it what it is and so on.

I would like to talk more about this. Hopefully my internet will be up and running at home today. I am at work, and for some odd reason people keep interrupting me, trying to get me to work. Odd.?

Post Edited (Matt) : 2/16/2005 6:58:56 AM (GMT-6)

Ross,

I wanted to respond to something you said.

Ross,

I have another question for you. What reason do you have to think that God's love, beauty, triunity, justice, etc. are necessary. From what we have talked about, it would seem that we agree that God's existence is necessary because we have to have some ground for the existence of contingent or dependent being. But what is your reason for thinking that God's justice, love, beauty, etc. are necessary properties of God?

Matt

Post Edited (Matt) : 2/17/2005 7:56:09 PM (GMT-6)

Matt,

Have you got your internet up and running at home yet?

It seems that we are both in over our head here. I think that our main difficulty here is that you do not understand what I mean by some of the terms that I use, and I don't understand some of the terms that you are using. But I'm going to jump in here and see if we can get some clarification.

In response, I'm not really sure what metaphysical system I have. I haven't read anything about this issue except introductory readings. I would agree with you that existence is not a common property that a thing has, like redness or weight. So don't assume that I have a differening view of "existence"; I'm not sure what I think myself.

First off, we both agree that God is necessary, right? If so, you can't really say that "it is merely the case that God does not have contingent properties." If God is necessary, then the way that He exists is necessary, right? On your view, you cannot say that "God just happens to be simple (uncomposed)." This gets us to the point of my defining two of the terms that I am using-- necessary and contingent. I'm not great at definitions, but the way I am using necessary and contingent is pretty standard (and isn't metaphysically loaded).

Necessary-- not able to be different than what it is

Contingent-- able to be different than what it is

So when we talk about God's necessary existence, I take it to mean that God could not NOT EXIST. And to say that God is necessarily love, I am saying that it is metaphysically impossible for God not to be love. And to say that God is necessarily omnipotent, I am saying that it is impossible for God not to be all powerful.

You say "I certainly agree that God was free with regard to his creating or not creating, but I am not sure how this implies that God has contingent properties." On my definition of contingent, do you see why I say that God's creating the world was a contingent aspect of who He is? God was free to create or not to create, so there either could have been a creation or there could have not been a creation. Therefore, God is contingently creator (it was the case that He could have not created, and still have been essentially God).

I hope that makes my use of necessary/contingent more clear.

Blessings, Ross

Ross,

I do have my internet up and running now. Thanks for asking. Right now I am in Boston though.

Matt,

Sorry man, I've been crazy busy here. I would like to look over your posts and try to understand your terms and then we can go from there. I'll try not to jump ahead of the subjects that you want to discuss into areas that we haven't reached yet.

Alan, you still around? Haven't heard from you in a while here....

Peace,

Ross

Ross,

I can't thank you enough for engaging in this conversation! I want to quickly respond to your email, and then move on.

Matt 

---

Man is the feeblest reed in existence, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the universe be armed for his destruction; a noxious vapour, a drop of water is enough to cause his death. But though the universe were to destroy him, man would be more noble than his destroyer.             -Pascal

Ross,

Sorry it has been a while. I have been helping with a high school debate team lately. It is really cool. Unfortunately, there are soooo many kids that have bought into the idea that morals are matters of personal preference. It is sad. Their philosophy is lived out. There are tons of behavior issues there. Anyways, I'll move on.

Since you seem to agree with the distinctions I have made it seems we can start drawing some inferences about God. If what I said about finite being is true, namely that it is dependant and composed, and if there is a necessary relationship between composition of being and dependancy, then it would seem to be the case that God could not be composed. If He was composed of act and potency, essence and existence, substance and accidents, then he would be dependant.

As was mentioned earlier in the beings of our experience, a being only has being, rather than "being" being. You granted this point. We are both in agreement about God's existence being necessary. However, we disagree on whether or not God's necessary existence implies simplicity. As I understand you, you do not think there is any necessary connection between God's necessity and God's other attributes. Am I correct about that?

If it is the case that these metaphysical principles are the principles that really account for a beings ability to change, (they are really in the thing), and if we say that God's essence is existence; an implication is made about His whole being. It implies something about the way He "be's". For example, if God's existence and His essence are really distinct, then He is really dependant. Therefore, since God is the cause of all dependant being and not the result of any extrinsic cause, God's essence is His existence. God "be's" in such a way that His essence is to exist. This is a radically different mode of existence.

Quick Definition

Post Edited (Matt) : 3/6/2005 8:44:23 AM (GMT-6)

Ross and Dr. Rhoda,

Matt

---

Man is the feeblest reed in existence, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the universe be armed for his destruction; a noxious vapour, a drop of water is enough to cause his death. But though the universe were to destroy him, man would be more noble than his destroyer.             -Pascal