Post Edited (JEE) : 4/13/2005 6:09:52 PM (GMT-5)

Hey John-

John: Theoretically, if God were to sin, with the wages of sin being death, the result would be the death of God and the annihilation of the universe.

Tom: Do you accept the death of God then (on the assumption that God exists of course) as possible? Conceivable? Given your belief that God exists, are you conceding the real possibility that God cease to exist? This entails God’s being a contingent being. Are you OK with that?

John: I think the stickier problem in this discussion is if God can't sin, then rightarianism (might makes right) and determinism would not present a moral problem at all.

Tom: I don’t see this, John, though I understand it’s one of the objections against necessary goodness. As I see it, God’s being necessarily good and so incapable of evil would not mean God could unconditionally determine peoples’ evil choices and send them to hell for it without this constituting a problem, for such a determination would presummably be one of the things a necessarily good God would be incapable of doing. At least it’s not the sort of thing one would expect God as revealed in scripture to do, nor would it be something we could meaningfully claim is true without also sacrificing other things we insist are true (like OUR being morally responsible). So saying God can’t sin doesn’t mean we can attribute just any old act to him without creating problems. Nor does saying God isn’t morally obliged mean we wouldn’t have a basis for objecting to the idea of his doing evil.

But it's interesting that your prefer to problem of conceding the possibility of God's ceasing to exist over the problem of how best to object to the idea of a necessarily good God's unconditionally decreeing evil. I'd much rather deal with the latter.

John: If God says "be holy for I am holy," but He can't help being holy and we can't help being sinful, then we are once again thrown into the quandary of even knowing what "good" and "holy" is.

Tom: Perhaps, but since it's not the case that we can't help being sinful where's the problem.

I'm interested in knowing, John. If God is morally obliged to something or someone, morally responsible to something or someone, some standard, what or who would that be? Godself? And that makes sense of our intuitions? Is my being responsible to no one and nothing other than myself a notion of accountability that would fly in everyday life? So how would it shore up your objection to determinism? Just wondering.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 4/13/2005 6:35:52 PM (GMT-5)

John: Theoretically, if God were to sin, with the wages of sin being death, the result would be the death of God and the annihilation of the universe.

Tom: Do you accept the death of God then (on the assumption that God exists of course) as possible? Conceivable? Given your belief that God exists, are you conceding the real possibility that God cease to exist? This entails God’s being a contingent being. Are you OK with that?

John: When I say "theoretically," that's all I mean. As I have previously tried to make clear on this board, I believe God cannot sin--because He wills not to.

John: I think the stickier problem in this discussion is if God can't sin, then rightarianism (might makes right) and determinism would not present a moral problem at all.

Tom: I don’t see this, John, though I understand it’s one of the objections against necessary goodness. As I see it, God’s being necessarily good and so incapable of evil would not mean God could unconditionally determine peoples’ evil choices and send them to hell for it without this constituting a problem, for such a determination would presummably be one of the things a necessarily good God would be incapable of doing. At least it’s not the sort of thing one would expect God as revealed in scripture to do, nor would it be something we could meaningfully claim is true without also sacrificing other things we insist are true (like OUR being morally responsible). So saying God can’t sin doesn’t mean we can attribute just any old act to him without creating problems. Nor does saying God isn’t morally obliged mean we wouldn’t have a basis for objecting to the idea of his doing evil.

But it's interesting that your prefer to problem of conceding the possibility of God's ceasing to exist over the problem of how best to object to the idea of a necessarily good God's unconditionally decreeing evil. I'd much rather deal with the latter.

John: Did not Abraham say, when bargaining with God over the judgment of Sodom & Gomorrah, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" How can Jesus' words, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect," be even remotely reasonable and a righteous command, if in fact God is a virtually "holy machine" whose righteousness is automatic, while sinfulness is our "default setting?"

John: If God says "be holy for I am holy," but He can't help being holy and we can't help being sinful, then we are once again thrown into the quandary of even knowing what "good" and "holy" is.

Tom: Perhaps, but since it's not the case that we can't help being sinful where's the problem.

John: Peter, Paul, and John all say in one way or another that we are to be imitators of God, and to love as He has loved us. Indeed, love is the fulfilling of the law. And, as love must be chosen to actually be love, then it necessarily must be that God's love is voluntary. This seems to me to exalt God's moral character and real personhood to the highest possible degree.

I'm interested in knowing, John. If God is morally obliged to something or someone, morally responsible to something or someone, some standard, what or who would that be? Godself? 

The everlasting and perpetually true moral law of the universe (love), to which He holds himself responsible. He does not say, "Do as I say but not as I do." 

Blessings,

John

Tom: Hey John, watch me pull a rabbit out of my hat.

John: What, again?!

Tom: Just roll up my sleeve, and presto…

I don’t really understand this. I want to, but I just can’t see what’s really being said. I’m trying to figure out what “cannot” means in “God cannot sin because he wills not to sin.” In my mind, we ‘can’ and ‘cannot’ choose according to what we are ‘able’ or ‘unable’ to choose. So to say “God can’t sin because he chooses not to sin” doesn’t at all help. It just begs the question, ‘Well, can God will to sin?’

Earlier you objected that problems arise if God is thought of as being incapable of sinning. That tells me you think God can sin. But here you say God cannot sin “because he wills not to.” So now my question just becomes, Can God will to sin? To explain the inability to sin by saying God “wills not to” just pushes the question back.

But if this is all ‘theoretical’, then what’s the point? God is theoretically able to sin but actually unable? Or he’s actually able but theoretically unable? I mean, either the theoretical consequences of God’s sinning entail logical impossibilities or not. If they do, then we can’t meaningfully theorize that God can sin, can we? I’m not following what you’re saying by limiting yourself to the “theoretical” that you couldn’t or wouldn’t just flat our say is in fact the case or not.

Help me follow you here John.

I’ve never thought this meant Abraham was holding some standard over God’s head (and certainly not that God would have actually “sinned” had Abraham not held God’s feet to the fire so to speak). It always seemed to me that this statement told us more about Abraham than it did about God. I mean, Abraham is expressing his own belief in God’s faithfulness and character and that gets worked out in his own reasoning as he talks with God. But if Abraham really believed he was holding God to an objective standard and that his doing so actually DID hold God to that standard, then wouldn’t you face the same problem I face? I mean, you admit God can’t sin ‘because he won’t’. How does THAT belief explain Abraham’s comment? It seems that if taken this way, Abraham’s comment proves a bit too much.

Why didn’t Abraham say this same thing a couple of chapters later when God told him to sacrifice Isaac? He should have said something like, “Hold on a minute, God. You can’t ask me to kill Isaac. Shouldn’t you do what’s right?” Instead, Abraham just obeyed. True, he did reason that if Isaac was killed God would raise him from the dead (Heb). But that would suggest just what I’m suggesting, i.e., that Abraham refused to believe God was capable of lying or failing to keep his word. It just wasn’t a possibility Abraham was willing to accept.

I don’t really understand this. I want to, but I just can’t see what’s really being said. I’m trying to figure out what “cannot” means in “God cannot sin because he wills not to sin.” In my mind, we ‘can’ and ‘cannot’ choose according to what we are ‘able’ or ‘unable’ to choose. So to say “God can’t sin because he chooses not to sin” doesn’t at all help. It just begs the question, ‘Well, can God will to sin?’

And I'm trying to see how love can be one thing for God and another for us. If you were to say, "I cannot accept only $500 for this particular antique book," you are saying you "cannot," but the real truth is you WILL (choose) not to. It is a MORAL inability, not a physical inability that you are expressing.

But if this is all ‘theoretical’, then what’s the point?

The point is to distinguish between what one is MORALLY not able to do and what one is PHYSICALLY not able to do. In my paradigm (Moral Gov't Theology), the distinction between the physical/material and the moral/spiritual is paramount and absolutely crucial. 

Blessings,

John

Post Edited (JEE) : 4/15/2005 4:36:17 PM (GMT-5)

Post Edited (TGB) : 4/21/2005 10:36:54 AM (GMT-5)

Let no one say when he is tempted, “I am being tempted by God,” for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one.

Post Edited (jefscott) : 4/23/2005 6:49:09 PM (GMT-5)

John: I really think you guys should just concede the whole thing to the determinists, for your understanding of God's moral "choices" is perfectly automatic and deterministic.

Tom: Wait a sec, John. YOU believe God’s doing good is just as determined as I do. You and I both agree that the objective probability of God’s doing evil is 0. So you’re in the same both here bro. That you attribute this objective probability to God’s morally choosing good in spite of being able to sin while I attribute this probability to necessary goodness, it doesn’t change the fact that we both believe the probability of God’s doing evil is 0. In fact, you ended up admitting that "God is materially unable to sin." 

So I'm not the only one that's got to iron this out in objecting to determinists. But seriously, though, there's not problem (especially not for me, though pershaps for you a bit) in this regard. Saying God is necessarily, by nature, good doesn't at all allow me to agree with the determinist that God can unconditionally determine the choices of others and send them to hell for those choices. If God’s “doing good” is determinate with regard to his future choices, then that God would not do evil is also determined, in which case I have grounds on which to object to the determinist that God would not, indeed could not, do such a thing. You on the other hand have more of a problem objecting to the determinist, for you agree with him that God is "materially capable" of doing precisely what they attribute to God—unconditionally determining people for hell. You deny God is morally capable of doing this, yes. So you’d have to rely on that. But you still believe God is materially capable of sinning, and that brings up other difficulties (though not for the determinist who doesn't think God's unconditionally determining people for hell is at all an "evil" thing to do).

Again, believing God is necessarily GOOD doesn’t mean God makes up what ‘good’ is arbitrarily as he goes along, one morning inclined to a good of one sort and the next day to a good of a contradictory sort, or that there aren’t things which would violate God's goodness were he to perform them (like unconditionally determining peoples’ choices and then holding them accountable for those choices).

John: Why don't any of you answer this objection? What advantage is there is thinking of God's holiness as automatic?

Tom: That’s easy. It saves us from having to affirm a logical impossibility, namely, that God can cease to exist or that he could turn into Hannibal Lecter or become Lucifer (or whatever you think the consequences of God’s sinning would be). If the necessary consequence of God’s sinning is itself impossible, then God’s sinning is impossible. You do the math.

You seem to agree actually. You want it to be true that God “will not” sin, that the objective probability of God’s sinning is 0, but you want to ground this “will not” in God’s “moral inability to sin” while affirming God’s “material ability to sin.” But John, if the real objective probability of God’s sinning is 0 this would by definition have to include God’s not being materially capable of sinning. It just makes no sense to say the God has the material ability to actualize that which has an objective probability of 0 of obtaining. That much is just plain definition.

I think Starky touched on this too, and that is when I asked “Which of the two (material ability or moral inability) embraces God’s ‘will’?” you answered, “Both.” But honestly Bro, this means God is both capable and incapable of the same thing in the same respect (viz., with regard to the exercise of his will). But to say the will CAN actualize evil choice E entails E’s having a probability of greater than 0 of obtaining, while to say the will CANNOT actualize E entails E’s having a probability of 0 of obtaining. It’s contradictory.

But then you really confuse me, John. In answer to this same question you said: “God cannot (is materially unable) precisely because He will not (morally refuses to).” Now that’s confusing, because all along you’ve been AFFIRMING that God IS materially capable of sinning. His being “materially unable” to sin is what WE’VE been arguing for. But now you admit God IS “materially unable” to sin. Yes, you say he’s materially unable to sin “because he will not sin." (By the way, how would the sheer exercise of his "will" determine him "materially"? Hmm?) So now you’re agreeing God is both materially incapable and morally incapable of sinning? I’m lost again. For the time being I’ll keep assuming you believe “God can sin” (i.e., God is materially capable of sin).

I don’t have all the answers either, but surely it can’t be found along the line of arguing that God is capable of evil, especially when the necessary consequence of what you affirm God is materially capable of is a logically impossible state of affairs (God’s passing out of existence). So for the time being, I’ll hang on to necessary goodness and try to iron out whatever conceptual difficulties that involves (which do NOT include my being unable to object to determinism on the basis that God can’t perform the evil of unconditionally determining peoples’ choices and holding them accountable for those choices; necessary goodness would rule out God’s being capable of such a thing).

Jeff’s last post is excellent too.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 4/24/2005 1:54:37 PM (GMT-5)