M. Carrington-

Not sure if Greg will show up. He hasn't shown up in a long time. He wrote me a few weeks ago and said he tried to get on to make a comment but couldn't remember his password! Would you mind it if others jumped in and tried to answer your question?

Tom

Not sure why you didn't get much discussion on your question so I will humbly add my two cents.

I would say process theism (at least as you describe it) in this regard is clearly not maintaining what the open view would.

Yes, in general, God is not happy with suffering/evil, and yes, he would probably work along side our free will to stop that suffering/evil. But he clearly puts up with a lot of it. I think it is fair to say that a theme of many open viewer, along with Yancey, Eldredge, and others is that God decrees freedom, and thus allows much evil for what he sees as a higher goal, that of the chance of relationship, the chance at creatures learning, the chance to enter his loving Triune, etc. So yes, evil is evil but chancing an evil outcome may be worth the risk for this higher goal.

In the open view, because the future is partially open, in many cases God cannot foreknow as a certainty that evil is going to occur. And because of his pervasive love, patience and hope, it might be maintain that he has the ultimate "glass half full" type outlook. He is always holding out hope that we will make the right choice, regardless of how remote the possibility. The history of Israel in the old testament is validity to this idea.

But I am no expert. Hope this helps.

M. Carrington: As I understand it both Process theism and Open theism maintain that God is fundamentally opposed to evil. As I understand it the Process view maintains that when God has knowledge of evil about to occur He MUST do ALL THAT HE CAN DO to prevent the evil from occurring. Please correct me if I have mistated the positions taken by either view. Would you agree that God's nature is such that He must try to intervene as Process theism maintains or would you hold to the belief that He has both the freedom to intervene and the freedom to NOT intervene if He sees fit?

Tom: I’ll offer what till now has made the most sense to me as an open theist. The idea that God does all God can do to oppose evil is something both Process and non-Process openness folk can agree to, though each defines how much God is able to do differently. As I understand Process theology, you’re description is a bit off. In Process thought God isn’t “intervening” in the sense we normally think, i.e., “miraculously intervening.” In process thought God “influences” and “persuades.” But he doesn’t do the “stuff” that we commonly think of as miraculous. In openness thought, however, God does do “stuff” (speak to people, intervene miraculously, open the earth up to swallow wicked people, etc.). So God is able to do a bit more in standard openness thought than in process thought.

There are complicated reasons why process folks and openness folk differ in this respect, but there you have it.

I think God does do all God can do to prevent evil. That much doesn’t seem to me to be at all difficult. The difficulty comes in understanding a) whether or not how much God is able to do in opposing evil is ever “conditioned” upon factors other than God’s own goodness and the amount of sheer “muscle” God is able to flex, and b) if how much God is able to do in a given situation is ever conditioned upon factors outside himself, just what those factors are.

about (a), both Process and non-Process openness folk will agree that what God is able to do in opposing evil in some situation IS conditioned upon factors other than God’s own goodness and power, but they’ll disagree on just what those factors are. Process folks I believe will argue that the exercise of God’s power in opposing evil is far MORE conditioned upon factors outside God than non-Process openness folk.

Open theists I think will all agree that when considered within itself, God’s “power” is infinitely great. There’s no evil God can't stop. God’s got the muscle to pretty much crush any sinner, open the ground to swallow evil people, etc. God “can” prevent any and all evil if “can” here means only “possesses the sheer power to execute x, y, and z.” The question is, does God always exercise all the power he possesses in opposing evil? Or is “how much” power God exercises conditioned upon factors other than God’s own goodness and will? This is not to question whether or not God does in fact do all God can to maximize good and minimize evil in the world, it's just to question whether that means God always exercises ALL the sheer brute force he possesses. Both Process and non-Process openness folk agree that there are factors (human free will for example) outside of God’s own character and will that contribute to determining just what "all God is able to do" on a given situation might mean. Just what those factors are is something nobody seems to agree on, though both groups (Process and non-Process openness) agree that such factors at least include angelic and human free will.

Lastly, about whether God “must” do all God can do to prevent evil is a complicated question because it has to do with what sort of freedom God possesses. Is God capable or free to do evil but simply chooses not to? Or is God metaphysically incapable of doing evil? And if the latter, does that mean God “must” do good in the sense that God is “forced” to keep some standard of goodness outside himself? I think one can make sense of God’s being incapable of doing evil but yet not “forced” to do good. An apple tree is not free to bear pears or watermelons, but this doesn’t mean it’s “forced” to bear apples. It’s free to be what it is, an apple tree. What it IS defines what sort of fruit it bears. So I think saying “God always and only does what is good” means “what and who God IS defines what goodness is,” and God can’t be other than God. But being capable of only doing good (because God IS good) isn’t properly speaking a weakness. We don’t usually say of a general who “cannot lose in battle” that he is “weak” because he cannot lose or that his winning is somehow “forced.”

Clear as mud?

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 4/9/2005 9:05:43 PM (GMT-5)

Hi Tom.

I think perhaps we roughly agree on things, just use different terms and explanations.

I agree with the open view and agree with you apple tree analogy and agree that God is 100% powerful (sovereign in an Arminian sense), in that he has the ability to unilaterally act. 

On the other hand Arminians (and I assume most open viewers) see that a) God values love and relationships as some of his top priorities, b) love and relationships requires creaturely freedom, c) the ability for true creaturely freedom requires that God voluntarily choose to restrain his power, and d) thus creatures given freedom may choose to do great evil, and e) so God allows much evil, and chooses not to act to stop a lot of evil, and f) therefore God does not "do all he can do" to prevent evil.

This does not have to do with God's character or nature, or imply that his is in anyway pro evil or anything but wholly good. It just means God prioritizes the chance at a loving relationship with his creatures and the required freedom more than doing all he can to keep order and goodness (at least for a while).

What do you think?

I agree Muz.

So with 9/11, God could have prevented it, but to do so he would have had to obstruct the free will of the terrorists (and perhaps angelic beings), thus violating his own desire to allow creaturely freedom. Thus he did not do all that was within his power as an all powerful God.

Post Edited (TGB) : 4/11/2005 6:12:15 PM (GMT-5)

Muz: Can God violate His just nature? Can God violate His own Word? These are internal things.

Tom: Again, the question “Can X violate X’s nature” is nonsensical. I don’t think God can violate his word (lie, or show contempt for his own promises). But agreeing that God can’t sin doesn’t amount to saying that God is obligated not to sin, that he “musn’t” sin (or lie or break his word) in the ethical sense, or that there’s some standard of right and wrong that God submits to and obeys. I know there are those who think God is libertarianly free to do evil. God can lie, lust, and rape; he just chooses not to. My objection to this is simple: If you admit the possibility of God's sinning, then you're obligated to admit the possibility of the consequences of God's sinning. If the consequences are unthinkable, or illogical, or impossible, then so must the antecedant be. So those who claim God can sin but doesn't ought to offer SOME explanation of what the consequences of God's sinning would be and then defend the intelligibility of claiming the consequences are obtainable. Otherwise, it doesn't really make much sense to claim God really "can" sin.

Muz: I understand where you're coming from, but free will is unique in that it doesn't follow natural laws like an apple tree does.

Tom: Free will might not operate off a set of deterministic physical laws, sure (not sure apples trees exclusively do so either, but forget that for now), but that’s not to say LFW doesn’t operate according to, or isn’t governed by, SOME set of metaphysical laws, laws of operation designed by God. LFW is unique in its operation in that it’s unlike deterministic systems in its operating instructions, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t have an operating system.

My point about the apple tree wasn’t based in the natural laws that govern apples trees. I was just pointing out that if a thing, physical or spiritual, has a nature at all, surely among the properties of that nature are included the sorts of things that thing can and cannot do according to its nature. So I don’t even see what meaning there can be in the idea of a thing being or doing that which violates its nature. On the contrary, its nature delimits what it can and cannot be and do. If God can lie, then he must possess a nature capable of lying, in which case his lying is no violation of his nature.

Now, I totally stink when it comes to getting the philosophical lingo down pat. I know some disagree with the very notion of God’s having a nature or essence. I find it helpful to think he does, at least in an analogous sort of way. If we don’t say at least this much, then we can’t really say anything about God, including whether or not God can lie, cheat, or steal.

Muz: There is another free will agent outside of God who is acting independent of God's meticulous control.

Tom: Sure. But how does this help us answer the question of whether or not God is necessarily good, whether or not he loves and is good in fulfillment of some standard of goodness he “must” keep?

Tom

Interesting!

Muz: However, since God is the one who DEFINES right and wrong, as long as God does what He says is right, then He is doing good…

Tom: You’re assuming ‘what God says’ constitutes some ‘standard’ God has to abide by, which is the problem I think. When you say “as long as God does what he says is right God is doing good,” I think you subjugate God to a standard. So I’d disagree that ‘so long as God does what he says is right God is doing good’. I’d disagree because I don’t think God is good because he ‘does what he says’. I think God ‘does what he says’ because God is good, because God is what and who he is. What God says and does flows out of that, so that the question of God’s being good so long as God does this or that misconstrues divine goodness. True, that God is good comes through to us in his doing what he says. There’s no other way we could learn of or observe his goodness. We’re not God. But God doesn’t “get” his goodness from doing what he says. You seem to think he does, and that’s where we disagree.

Previously Tom: “Free will might not operate off a set of deterministic physical laws, sure (not sure apples trees exclusively do so either, but forget that for now), but that’s not to say LFW doesn’t operate according to, or isn’t governed by, SOME set of metaphysical laws, laws of operation designed by God. LFW is unique in its operation in that it’s unlike deterministic systems in its operating instructions, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t have an operating system.

Muz: But if that system determines what the will must do, then it isn't free.

Tom: True, but then you’re proving my point. You’re arguing that there ARE laws (properties, whatever) that apply to LFW, to determining whether a choice is free or not. So freedom is libertarian not because libertarian choice doesn’t have a set of defining properties we call its “nature,” not because there aren’t any rules or laws that apply. You’ve just argued one such law: if the system we live in causally determines my choices, then my choices aren’t free.

Muz: Sometimes I like to refer to nature and "character". It's not in God's character to lie, etc. That refers more to how God chooses to act, rather than what He is in His being.

Tom: It just pushes the question back one step. It’s still the case that our nature determines what sort of options our characters face. Our nature as humans is such that our moral characters can develop, can become good or bad, and eventually do settle irrevocably into one or the other. God’s nature, I think, is by definition necessarily good. If that’s so, then God’s character follows necessarily and there’s no question of God’s violating his character. WE can violate our characters (not our natures) because our nature is such that moral character is developed. God I don’t think can violate his character because his nature is such that moral character follows necessarily.

Muz: It has to do with whether God does all the He can do to prevent evil.

Tom: Right. So if you believe God’s nature is such that he CAN violate his character (like us) and be other than good (or other than perfectly good), then you could agree that God may not do all he can to prevent evil. My own view of God’s necessary goodness constrains me to believe that God would do all he can to prevent evil. It’s not good to do less than one could do in preventing evil. But hey, that’s just my own intuition of what goodness entails.

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 4/12/2005 4:04:52 PM (GMT-5)

Yo Bryan-

Bryan: also, doesn't this change what constitutes as sin for us as well if he suddenly does something which "used to be" sin and says it's no longer sin, which makes it okay?

Tom: Well, it doesn’t so much change what constitutes sin as it does change what constitutes our understanding of sin (from being limited to the context of a particular prohibition to the very fact that it’s God who commands). I mean, God’s good purposes in a particular Old Testament situation might require a particular prohibition and so constitute a sin for the disobedient. But when the situation changes, the same good purposes of God might not require repealing that prohibition. And that’s a ‘good’ thing to do, right?

Bryan: wouldn't we then look at the bible and say, "well, everything in here is true, except for this verse; God changed that standard for righteousness?"

Tom: Well, if in the verse God proscribes X and then later permits X, I wouldn’t say the first verse isn’t “true.” It is true in its context. It’s true that in a particular context, it’s wrong to do X.

But this is the point, we have to see the God (or rather the fact that it’s God who is the one commanding us) as our standard for righteousness and not any one particular “list” or “command” in its historical context as the unchanging standard. The standard then is, God-in-my-context. He’s the same. Some contexts don’t affect the rightness or wrongness of an act (which is why some things remain wrong in all possible contexts). But some contexts do affect the rightness of an act, don’t you think?

Bryan: if so, why could he NOT change it for us too?  if you say it's becuz he would have to violate his word in order to do that, then he could just make violating his word not a sin and then he'd be able to do anything, including change what constitutes sin for us.

Tom: I just lost ya! But maybe that’s because ‘The Munsters’ in on TV!

Eh, seems to me that we can expect some things that were and are wrong to never change (selfishness, lust, greed, hatred, murder, etc.) because in all possible contexts these things are unlike God. They are in any case a fundamental rejection of goodness and love. But we can also expect some things that were wrong to no longer be wrong (and something that once were OK to now be wrong) because the particular contexts and circumstances that make them wrong no longer exist. In the latter case, it’s ultimately God’s unchanging ‘goodness’ that determines what goodness looks like in a particular context.

Dude, I’m not an ethicist and am just shooting from the hip. What d’ya think?

Peace!

Tom

Muz: So, God isn't subject to Himself and His own declarations?

Tom: Not subject or ‘obligated’ in the ethical sense, no.

Muz: You honestly think that God would violate His own Word?

Tom: Of course not. How could you ask me that? I’ve said several times I believe God is necessarily good. I’m insisting God would not violate his word or character. But saying God would not do so isn’t saying that God is obligated in the ethical sense NOT to do so. And to say God is not obligated in the ethical sense to keep his word isn't to say God is free to not keep his word. I'm saying God is not morally "subject to..." or "obligated to..." anyone or anything, including his own speech-acts. When God keeps his word, or loves, or is good, God isn’t fulfilling some standard which he’s obligated to fulfill. Seems to me that this much is entailed in God's being necessarily good.

Muz: I wasn't speaking of God's nature, but of God being the source of the defintion of good…

Tom: I think God is the source of good, and of our defintion of good, too. Do you have any conviction regarding the relationship between God's 'nature' and God's good actions? That is, do you think God is free (LFW) to lust or hate but chooses consistently not to? Or would you agree that God is incapable of doing such things?

Muz: …and the resultant actions that God takes that meet that definition. Thus, what it means to be good, and what God does aren't limited by some random standard of good, but by God's own declaration.

Tom: But God’s declarations ARE actions. To declare IS to act. So I wouldn't say God's actions can be ‘obligated’ to his declarations. True, all God’s actions are consistently related to one another. God ‘keeps’ his promises. WE can reason our way from the faithfulness God shows to his promises and words to conclude that God is good. But this is different from arguing that God is good ‘because’ he keeps his word. I guess you agree?

Muz: So, unless you're prepared to say that God would and could violate His own Word (in essense, lie), I don't see your objection.

Tom: My only objection is to the idea that God is “subject” to himself or his word. That sort of language ‘obligates’ God and I don’t think God is obligated in the ethical sense. That doesn’t mean I think God is capable of not keeping his word. It just means that God’s keeping his word isn’t done by God in obedience to some obligation God has to keep his word.

Muz: I never said that there weren't any laws regarding libertarian free will. What I said was that LFW isn't governed by NATURAL law, meaning that we can say that in situation X, Y will do Z. Your apple tree falls into this category.

Tom: That wasn’t my point with the apple tree. Whatever.

Muz: Given the proper conditions, an apple tree will produce apples. No free will involved, it's simply following the laws of nature instituted by God. That's not to say that we can't make ANY statements about LFW. We simply cannot make statements would make a decision determined by anything other than the will.

Tom: I’m a libertarian, Muz. So I’m totally with ya on LFW, OK? My analogy about the apple tree was simply this: The notion of “violating one’s nature” is incoherent. No thing X can meaningfully be said to be in violation of X’s nature. The idea is self-contradictory. This applies to material and immaterial things, personal and/or impersonal. It has to do with ‘meaning’.

Muz: 1) You've just subjected God to His character, which you objected to subjecting to God to ANYTHING above.

Tom: Nice try! Not really, Muz. I just want to subject our ideas and language about God to the general rules of logic and meaningfulness. It’s not meaningful to say God (or anything) can violate his nature. But in saying “God cannot violate his nature” I don’t mean by “cannot” to ‘obligate’ God or ‘subject God’ in the ethical sense to not violating his nature. How can we obligate God to not doing what is logically impossible?

Muz: 2) This makes no sense. If the NATURE determines one's character, then how can one violate the character without violating the nature from which it came?

Tom: Depends on one’s nature. One’s nature can be such that moral character can be contingent and so developed over time. Or one’s nature (like God’s I think) can be such that moral character follows necessarily. Not all natures are the same. Divine nature is different than human nature. God can give us a nature such that we are libertarianly free to develop our own moral character and yet himself have a nature such that he is not libertarianly free to develop his moral character. When I say “nature determines character” I’m using ‘determine’ to mean ‘logically determines’ not ‘causally determines choice’. So to say our nature ‘determines’ our character means (assuming we possess LFW) ‘our nature determines that we’re libertarianly free to develop our own moral character’ and not ‘our nature determines which choices we make’.

(You followin' me Bryan?)

Muz: I think we reach much the same conclusion, but by far different paths.

Tom: Maybe. So tell me, Muz, do you think God can, or is free to, sin? And do you think this has anything to do with whether God does all he can, given the factors he has to deal with (our freedom for example), to prevent evil and maximize good? Do you think God does all he can to prevent evil and maximize good in the world?

Blessings,

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 4/13/2005 9:02:49 AM (GMT-5)