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Holiday
Registered Member
Date Joined Nov 2003
Total Posts : 22
| Posted 4/27/2005 10:42 AM (GMT -6) |   | O.K. Greg personally answered this one last time, but I still don't think the answer is clear.
Molonism claims that we libertarianly choose among possible worlds with our essences.
God instntiates the actual world by choosing from among the feasible worlds.
True given the set of circumstances I have I libertarianly choose what I choose, but I can't choose say a different set of circumstances that give rise to my choice in the first place...and... God renders certain (with foreknowledge) the actual world based on some criteria that is a mystery.
This seems especially significant if we considered that in some worlds other than the one that has been actualized I may choose to have a relationship with God and in the actual world I didn't.
Seems to me to be a fancy way of doing Calvinism with libertarian freedom.
to borrow from Tom,
Clear as mud (at least to me)
Holiday | | Back to Top | | |
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Grahaminator
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2005
Total Posts : 70
| Posted 4/27/2005 7:39 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Holiday,
I have written a modest paper on this topic. I have a ton of respect for William Lane Craig, but I honestly don't understand his view. I have tried to critique it based on what he has written, but I have some questions about the view that I don't think are answered by Him. Or if they are, I missed it. (which is entirely possible) If you get a chance to read my paper on it, let me know what you think.
http://www.grahamapologetics.com/articles.htm
You have to scroll down to the "Two Accounts of Divine Foreknowledge: Molinism and a Thomistic Account "
God Bless!
Matt
Man is the feeblest reed in existence, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the universe be armed for his destruction; a noxious vapour, a drop of water is enough to cause his death. But though the universe were to destroy him, man would be more noble than his destroyer. -PascalPost Edited (Matt) : 4/27/2005 7:42:10 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Holiday
Registered Member
Date Joined Nov 2003
Total Posts : 22
| Posted 4/28/2005 2:27 PM (GMT -6) | | Matt,
thanks for letting me read through your paper. I thought it was very good and from what I've read of Craig you articulated his thoughts well.
You pretty much at one point articulated something close to what I'm trying to suggest. Even if our libertarian freedom conditions the feasible worlds, God's mystery criteria conditions or renders certain the actual world.
And yes given the circumstances I have I libertarianly choose what I want in this system, but how is that different than what Paul Helm does with secondary causes and compatible freedom. In Calvinism God renders certain which set of circumstances He ultimately wants even though I choose what I want. The only difference I can see is that in Craig's system I exercised my libertarian freedom in the mind of God before the creation event. And it is at this point that we would posit the grounding objections. I think Molonism fails at this point. If libertarian freedom is defined by the principle of alternate possibilities, than it would seem that for me to be choose libertarianly in the Molonistic system I would have to ontologically be able to choose among possibilities in the now. I just don't see how this is the case. It is only epistemologically true in the temporal now in Molonism. And what good is that?
Also, I don't understand why Craig works so hard to jump through hoops with the logical order of events. Why not go all the way and suggest that they are sequential. He does posit God in binding himself to creation became temporal for the sake of being able to relate to us, so why not go all the way suggest that God's thinking can be sequential as well. He doesn't posit the Thomistic God does he? As Boyd pointed out at the ETS conference three years ago. The Molonistic God learns.
looking forward to your thoughtful response
Holiday | | Back to Top | | |
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Grahaminator
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2005
Total Posts : 70
| Posted 4/29/2005 10:36 PM (GMT -6) | | | Holiday,
Good to hear from you. Thanks for reading my boring and unoriginal paper. I think the main difference between Paul Helm and myself is that I hold to a libertarian view of free will, while I believe he is a compatibilist. On my view, or what I understand the Thomistic view to be, God is the efficient cause of my action and I am the efficient cause of my action. On the Calvinist view, God is the efficient cause of my action while I am the instrumental cause of my action. In other words, I am the instrument of God's action. Now, I don't know that a Calvinist would admit this, but I think it is the consequence of their view.
The question then is whether or not dual efficient causality is contradictory. I don't believe that it is. I am not saying that God is and is not the efficient cause of my action. Nor am I saying that I am and am not the efficient cause of my action. I am saying that both God and I are the efficient cause of my action. God being the primary cause, while I am the secondary cause. (since even my willing is dependant on Him)
It seems to me the main problem for Craig comes in when making the jump from Natural to Middle knowledge. Going from what a creature could do in any given circumstance to what a free creature WOULD do. Craig is aware of the difficulties that this jump entails. He skillfully tries to rebut any possible defeaters to his view. He has responded to everything I said in my paper and much more. Have you read his responses to the grounding objection? He has some articles on it on his virtual office.
One point Craig makes about God's knowledge of the future is that God does not know the world via "seeing" it beforehand. God's middle knowledge seems to be based on his Natural knowledge. Craig says this to secure his position against that charge that God must learn something. So I think Craig would deny Boyd's charge about God learning new facts. According to Craig, God knows all truths, including all true counterfactuals. This is almost axiomatic for Craig. I suppose the logical end of Craigs view is that God learns. Do you have any thoughts on that?
Craig does NOT believe in the Thomistic God. Craig openly denies God's simplicity, which is Aquinas' bedrock doctrine. To deny simplicity is to leave Thomism. There are who think that Craig will eventually become a process theologian. I hope that does not happen!
about your point with Craig jumping through hoops to say that God has logical moments, but not chronological moments; I agree. That's a good point! Any other thoughts on that?
God Bless!
Matt
Man is the feeblest reed in existence, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the universe be armed for his destruction; a noxious vapour, a drop of water is enough to cause his death. But though the universe were to destroy him, man would be more noble than his destroyer. -Pascal | | Back to Top | | |
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Holiday
Registered Member
Date Joined Nov 2003
Total Posts : 22
| Posted 5/2/2005 11:09 AM (GMT -6) | | Matt thanks for taking to answer my questions as well as share thoughts. I hope I can try and answer some that you have, but I'm not as educated as you are on these topics.
First, can you give me a detailed example of what it might look like for both me and God to be efficient causes of something. Maybe you could describe the episode of me riding my bike. What of me causes me to ride and in what way does God cause me to ride the bike?
The Molonism God never learns.....????? That is true, I suppose Craig does posit in the sense that God always posses knowledge of coutnerfactuals He doesn't learn anything new in the sense that no new knowledge could ever enter God's mind. Here is my question though. I've read God and Time four views and Craig seems to imply that God was atemporal before creation and temporal binding Himself to it when He created it. So maybe in this atemporal existence He could arguably have always had counterfactual knowledge. However, doesn't atemporality create all kinds of other problems. I understood atemporality as God existing eternally in every moment (both past, present and future) including His existence in the temporal state He would later subject Himself to. That seems absurd, doesn't it?
I guess I just don't understand the logical moments bit. If God has all this knowledge from all eternity past when did He decide to do something. Apparently never. He couldn't for as soon as He decides to do something His knowledge would change. If this is true does His knowledge co-exist with His being for all eternity and that would also seem to imply that He really didn't make any decisions.
I just don't think it ever makes sense to say that God can never learn. I suppose we could, but then it would be fallacious to explain it because we don't have the mental faculties to comprehend such a thing, in which case it's like saying God is lasdkjfasl;fjsdl;.
I have a question for you. You seem to share some affinities with the Thomistic version of foreknowledge, which I can understand, but what about the rest of the attributes and their relationship to the simple being? Do immutability or impassibility ever bother you? Doesn't the incarnation, death and ressurection really throw a cog in the "simple being" wheel?
Looking forward to your response
Holiday | | Back to Top | | |
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Grahaminator
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2005
Total Posts : 70
| Posted 5/2/2005 4:08 PM (GMT -6) | | Holiday,
Good to hear from you. I am probably not that educated on these issues. I am most certainly a beginner. Thank you for taking the time to discuss this issue. Especially the issue of simplicity. I am currently trying to understand the metaphysics of finite being so that I can better understand the doctrine of simplicity. I love discussing the subject, it forces me to ask good questions.
Holiday said...
First, can you give me a detailed example of what it might look like for both me and God to be efficient causes of something.
I can't give you an example. There is nothing in the world like it. This causal relationship is unique. The truth of "dual efficient causality" is affirmed even though we cannot have a model of what that would look like. In fact, I think this is why open theists and even Craig have such a difficult time resolving the issue of foreknowledge and free will. They want to see the "how" it can be, when we only know "that" it may be. We make affirmations about God without having models in theology. We affirm ONE Being and THREE Persons without being able to make an accurate model of what that would look like. We have no examples of three persons in one being in our experience. Yet we affirm it of God and suppose that it has meaning.
In our case (dealing with causality) if we can show that two efficient causes is not a contradiction, then it is at least a possible explination.
Holiday said...
Craig seems to imply that God was atemporal before creation and temporal binding Himself to it when He created it.
Yeah. Honestly though, I am not sure why this must be the case. I'll have to pick up Craig again and read through his arguments. I remember some of them off hand, but I'll reserve commenting on them until I have read through them again.
Holiday said...
However, doesn't atemporality create all kinds of other problems. I understood atemporality as God existing eternally in every moment (both past, present and future) including His existence in the temporal state He would later subject Himself to. That seems absurd, doesn't it?
I know Craig and Plantinga argue that God could not be simple and have many attributes. Again, I better re-read them before I comment on that. Concerning God being subject to his own knowledge: This would only be a problem if you think that God becomes temporal. I don't think that God becomes temporal, so I don't think God becomes subject to His own "unchanging" knowledge.
Holiday said...
If God has all this knowledge from all eternity past when did He decide to do something. Apparently never. He couldn't for as soon as He decides to do something His knowledge would change. I am sure that you are aware of this but, the question of "when did He decide", when asked of an atemporal being is a category error. So the conclusion that God never decided (in an absolute sense) does not follow. My position would be that God's decision was an eternal decision. When temporal beings decide to do something, it is very often the case that we change when we make that decision. But that does not mean that an eternal God must change.
A HUGE key to understanding the Thomistic view is understanding Aquinas' doctrine of analogy. It is regularly misrepresented. Aquinas' argues that we must predicate our statements about God analogously. For example, when I say that a man is good, good is predicated finitely of man, but if I say God is good, good if predicated infinitely of Him. If you have never read anything in this topic, I have written a modest paper on that as well. If you read it, I would jump to page 11 and start reading. It is not a terribly well written paper, but it explains the gist of Aquinas' doctrine.
Holiday said...
I have a question for you. You seem to share some affinities with the Thomistic version of foreknowledge, which I can understand, but what about the rest of the attributes and their relationship to the simple being? Do immutability or impassibility ever bother you? Doesn't the incarnation, death and ressurection really throw a cog in the "simple being" wheel?
To the degree that I understand Him, I do hold Aquinas' view of foreknowledge. When you ask about the problem of a simple being having multiple attributes, are you refering to Plantinga's objection to simplicity? Are you refering to a different problem?
Immutability and impassibility has bothered me. I viewed an immovable God as less than personal, a sort of uncaring, unfeeling power. The more I understand these doctrines, the more I realize that immutability does not necessitate the conclusion that God is less than Personal. In fact, our personhood is only analogous to His Personhood. He is the ultimate Person, and we are finite, limited, boring, creatures made in His image. Of course, this needs to be argued for, but I am just giving you more of a personal testimony now. Sorry.
I would love to discuss any one of these issues in more depth with you if you are interested. (i.e. attributes of a simple being, immutability, impassibility, the incarnation, molinism, etc.) By the way, what is your view of divine foreknowledge and free will??
God Bless!
Matt
Man is the feeblest reed in existence, but he is a thinking reed. There is no need that the universe be armed for his destruction; a noxious vapour, a drop of water is enough to cause his death. But though the universe were to destroy him, man would be more noble than his destroyer. -Pascal | | Back to Top | | |
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