Nathan: 1. Thanks for clearing that up. So, it's "Open theists believe that if God foreknew which choices we'd make, those choices wouldn't be free."

Tom: Right (assuming his foreknowing our choices isn’t grounded in a disposition we’ve freely embraced over time).

Nathan: 2. I refer specifically to Isaiah 48:14….In my estimation, Isaiah here must either require divine atemporality ("I am he; I am the first and I am the last." Isaiah 48:12; "From the first announcement I have not spoken in secret; at the time it happens, I am there." Isaiah 48:16; "Before Abraham was born, I am!" John 8:58) or determinism ("I made them known... I acted and they came to pass" Isa. 48:3; "so that you could not say... my wooden image and metal god ordained them." Isa. 48:5), speaking as if each thing coming into view is brought about by his will.

Tom: I’ll go with determinism in this instance. The point is that the text refers to specific events God intends to bring about—“I acted and they came to pass”—and not to every aspect of the future.

Nathan: 4. Just out of curiousity, how does God foreknow what will happen in nature, given the quantum indeterminacy theory?

Tom: He’s certainly able to “intend and act” with regard to the weather, and so predict anything weather pattern he intends to bring about. But where he doesn’t unilaterally determine the weather then he knows future weather patterns in as much as they’re either determined or indeterminate given present states at any given point in time.

Nathan: Second, correct me if I'm wrong (I don't know much about quantum), but there are two other alternatives to libertarian freedom given quantum indeterminacy: (a) stuff could happen outside the will, if cause-effect is not absolutely certain, or (b) cause-effect (heredity and environment) could still determine what we desire.

Tom: I know of two basic schools of interpretation regarding quantum events, one which views indeterminacy as a genuine feature of the real world, as ontological or real, and one which claims indeterminacy is only apparent to us, the truth of the matter being that quantum events are determined by previous states.

Nathan: 5. No, I don't define mysticism that way. Mysticism to Chesterton meant accepting two known truths that, given current data, do not seem to cohere with each other. And doing this because without accepting both truths, nothing else would make sense. I don't think Chesterton and Frankl were necessarily mistaken in their beliefs. But even if they were, the point I am reaching is not ontological but epistemological, about the ethics of belief. I am saying that Open theists set the bar too high when they say compatibilism is not a valid belief: both pagans and naturalists must utilize it, and I argue that without compatibilism, i.e. leaving room for God to be absolutely God, and for humans to make free choices (but less free than God's), there are no real options left.

Tom: Not all pagans and naturalists are compatibilists since not all believe everything in the world is determined. Anyhow, for me it’s a question of meaning: I simply don’t know what’s being said when one claims God unconditionally determines our choices and we are responsible for those choices.

Nathan: 6. I don't know what you're saying here... I agree Chesterton and Frankl didn't knowingly embrace what they knew to be false. As I said above, I'm arguing that compatibilism is the only option. And that Christian compatibilism is the only sound option.

Tom: Frankl embraced real, libertarian, free will because he believed it was real. Now how does this support your argument that compatibilistic freedom is the only option?

Tom