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| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > The raging debate continues here... > Open Theism, Omniscience, and the Nature of the Future | Forum Quick Jump
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 8/3/2005 2:42 AM (GMT -6) |   | OK, HB, I'm finally getting back to you. Sorry for the long delay.
HB: When someone asserts something, they are invariably implictly claiming to know the thing they are asserting. We don't just assert things. ... In ordinary parlance, person X saying that "A is the case" is true, implies that person X also believes that "I know that A is the case" is true. Whereas in logic "A is the case" does not necessarily entail "A is knowable by someone-or-other". Since in ordinary parlance it is implicit that a statement is a claim to knowledge, it is the epistemic sense of "will", not what I call the semantic sense, that predominates. However, it is certainly arguable that if I boldly state, without knowing, that horse X will win the Melbourne Cup, that afterwards, if horse X wins, people would say my original statement was true (and was true when I said it), even if they don't think I knew it, but think I just guessed. So the semantic sense of "will" has some play in ordinary discourse. In any case, the fact that it is very difficult for us to assert things without thinking we know them renders, I think, your argument invalid.
Alan: To my mind assertibility (an epistemic notion) constrains what one can seriously mean (semantics). Since I take a proposition to be an assertoric unit of meaning, these go together. When Ockhamist propose to construe 'will' apart from any causal force, I think they create an illusion of assertoric meaningfulness for this by prospectively imagining some future moment, noting the possibility that at that time reality will have some definite character (say X), suppositionally fixing X as an actuality, and then retrospectively projecting that actuality back into the past. By imaginatively shifting temporal perspectives in this way, the Ockhamist regards X as both merely possible (when considering matters prospectively) and as actual (when considering matters retrospectively). Assuming I've got the phenomenology of this roughly correct, there's an illicit modal shift here. When Ockhamists want to claim that it is now true that X will obtain they adopt a retrospective posture. When they want to claim that X is a future contingent they adopt a prospective posture. This shift is disguised by the fact that one can't consider X from both prospectively and retrospectively at the same time.
As an aside, I don't think it's right to say that when a person asserts something that they are implicitly claiming to "know" the thing they are asserting. I would substitute "reasonably believe" for "know". My reason is that assertions can express varying degrees of confidence in what is asserted. If I think p is somewhat more likely true than not, then I may assert p, not as unqualifiedly true, but as probably true. Knowledge, however, implies unqualified truth. Of course if we construe my claim as "probably p" (packing the qualifier into the proposition) then I think you're right--I am implicitly claiming to know "probably p".
HB: I'll admit that I'm having to give a philosophical definition of "will" (for semantic "will" ) that is at odds with ordinary discourse. But I think that logic demands such a definition, whereas ordinary discourse is not really concerned with being logical. ... In logic, when we say "if X then Y", and X is false, then the whole statement is true. So, for instance, the statement "if my name is Bill then tomorrow the Martians will attack" is true. Try explaining that to someone who uses "if" in ordinary English. I think we just have to be precise about our logical, semantic "will", even though it differs from typical ordinary English usage.
Alan: I disagree with the moral you draw from your example. The material conditional that you describe is, to my mind, not a real conditional, but rather an extensional approximation to a real conditional. Material conditionals are frequently used in logic because they are easy to work with, are adequate for set theoretical matters (as in mathematics), and give us an effective test for invalidity (if you have T-->F then the conditional will be false under any interpretation of the conditional). But outside the abstract realm of sets material conditionals are, I think, quite obviously defective and do not adequately capture the logic of good thinking. Just as material conditionals don't capture the semantics of ordinary conditionals, so neither does Ockhamism capture the semantics of ordinary tensed discourse.
HB: Consider these two propositions:
P1: The proposition that "state of affairs S obtained at time t" is true.
P2: The proposition that "state of affairs S obtains" was true at time t.
Now it seems to me that you regard P2 as reflecting the fundamental meaning of tense. But you still need to deal with P1, so you make it a kind of corollary of P2, that is true more indirectly in terms of correspondence (because you think it is true by virtue of correspondence with the present consequences of S, rather than with S itself - hence it's indirect). However, I hold that P1 reflects the fundamental meaning of tense, and that P2 is just an imprecise, colloquial way of saying P1. But the important point is this: neither of us is ignoring tense, and neither of us thinks that propositions are "tenseless". It would be far more accurate to say that I think that tense is internal, that is, part of the state of affairs to which the proposition refers, whereas you think it is external, that is, relating to the truth-value of the proposition itself. I would rather characterize the debate as my internally tensed propositions theory versus your externally tensed propositions theory, than as tenseless propositions versus tensed propositions.
Alan: I'm not sure I follow your internal/external distinction. I do think that all truth is truth at a time (namely, the present time--if it's not true now then it's not true). I think this follows from correspondence + presentism.
HB: Existence does not pertain to propositions. Propositions may be true or false, but to assert that a proposition exists or does not exist is a category error. Propositions have no place in ontology. Just as existence does not pertain to propositions, neither does it pertain to truth or falsity. ... Now only things that exist, things that have being, can be temporally or spatially located. Propositions and truth and falsity have no temporal or spatial location. To say that they do, in my opinion, is a category error: it brings an ontological concept across into the domain of semantics where it just don't belong. Saying a proposition is true at time X, if intended literally and not colloquially, is like saying that the sound of the piano is red.
Alan: Here we may just have to part ways, HB. You prefer a more sparse, nominalistic ontology than I am willing to countenance. I think that propositions are part of ontology because I think meaning is real. When I make an assertion that assertion has a meaning and that meaning (which is a proposition) must be real else I wouldn't have made an assertion. Consequently, I don't think truth is a property but a two-term relation between reals: propositions and states of affairs. I don't, however, think the truth relation makes any ontological addition over and above the relata.
HB: When someone says "Caesar crossed the Rubicon", it is plain what they mean.... They mean that back then, there was a dude called Caesar and he crossed the Rubicon. They aren't saying something about now, they're saying something about then.... If you do a survey and ask people, "when you say that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, you're saying something about present states of affairs, aren't you", and see how many people reply in the affirmative. If they don't intend to say anything about present states of affairs, then they aren't saying anything about present states of affairs.
Alan: Again, I beg to differ. When people talk about the past or the future they do implicitly assert something about the present. The reason that is typically not apparent to people is precisely because the significance of the past or future tense is to direct one's attention away from the present. But the reference to the present is still there. If I claim something is past, I mean that it is now past. If I claim something is future, I mean that it is now future.
HB: Suppose I say to you...: "Caesar crossed the Rubicon, but I emphatically, absolutely, do not mean by this that God remembers Caesar crossing the Rubicon or anything else about present states of affairs". My question is, what do you think my statement means? Would you say that I am really unintentionally still saying something about the present, even though I am not intending to and am adamant that I'm not? If so, doesn't that mean that the meaning of statements isn't governed by the author's intentions?
Alan: To your last two questions my answers are "Yes" and "No", respectively. I don't think that all of our intentions are "on the surface", so to speak. I think that in addition to our conscious intentions we also have subconscious intentions. My reason for positing subconscious intentions is that they seem to be necessary to ground the assertibility of many of our claims and make them psychologically plausible. Of course, I don't think you mean to refer to God's memories, whether consciously or subconsciously. What I think you mean, self-consciously or not, is that Caesar has crossed the Rubicon. In other words, you mean that a particular past-tense state of affairs obtains, without thereby committing yourself to any particular account of what the ontological nature of that state of affairs is. An example may make my point clear. When Rutherford dubbed whatever it was that was causing tracks in his cloud chamber "electrons" neither he nor anyone else had any clear idea of what an electron was. Today we understand electrons in terms of quantum physics and such, but there is no reason to think that the average person who can competently speak of electrons is thereby implicitly making quantum physical claims. Rather, they mean something like those tiny things, whatever they are, that "flow" in currents, cause appliances to work, cars to start, lightning, etc.
God bless,
Alan
PS: While I doubt either of us is going to make much headway in convincing the other, HB, I do appreciate the courteous and engaging tone of your arguments.Post Edited (Alan Rhoda) : 8/3/2005 11:13:38 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 8/6/2005 12:31 PM (GMT -6) | | It's official. The paper's been accepted for publication in Faith and Philosophy. Tom received an informal confirmation via email about a week ago. I got the formal letter from Hasker yesterday.
Tom, let's have a toast.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 8/8/2005 7:03 PM (GMT -6) | | |
First, congratulations on the paper!
I have a quick question regarding Section III (A Semantic Argument for the Incompatibility Thesis).
My understanding of the argument:
Given the constraints of rational assertability and charitable interpretation, noone uses the term "will" in a genuinely predictive sense without implying at least some causal force. "Will" is sometimes used to imply maximal causal force (i.e., the rock "will" fall). "Will" is sometimes used to imply relative likelihood. But noone uses the term "will" (in a genuinely predictive sense) in a way that implies zero causal force. In the case of "retroactively predicating truth of successful predictions about future contingents", we can say that such usage of "will" is not genuinely predictive. Colloquially speaking, the only truth that we retroactively attribute to such statements relate to the temporal component of the statement, not causal force.
The underlying debate is about whether the future is epistemically settled or open for God; i.e., if the future is semantically open for God, then the future must also be epistemically open for God (def. of omniscience).
Thus, it seems to me that the question is not how non-omniscient beings use the term "will", but rather how an omniscient being would use the term "will". Given the Ockhamist version of the SFV, it would seem that God could use the term "will" without implying any causal force. Does this mean that Section III begs the question against the Ockhamist version of the SFV? | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/9/2005 1:01 AM (GMT -6) | | |
JET: Thus, it seems to me that the question is not how non-omniscient beings use the term "will", but rather how an omniscient being would use the term "will". Given the Ockhamist version of the SFV, it would seem that God could use the term "will" without implying any causal force. Does this mean that Section III begs the question against the Ockhamist version of the SFV?
Tom: I’ll give my brief answer and then let Alan respond later if he wants. I think he’s out of town for a few days. Somewhere in Alaska? Must be nice!
We’ve tried to develop an approach to the various ways ‘will’ can be employed by both fallible knowers and God, an omniscient knower. The principle of rational assertability applies to God as well as to us. And given the reality of indeterminacy, omniscience itself doesn’t establish assertabilty grounds for the Ockhamist’s ‘will’. That’s the whole point. What grounds would an omniscient knower have for believing at t1 that I ‘will’ (in the Ockhamist sense) do X at t5 (or “Tom does X at t5”)? The various ways we noted one may justifiably assert ‘will’ are not attributable to our ignorance as finite knowers. Though we can be mistaken in our beliefs about the future, we still employ ‘will’ the only way any rational knower could justifiably employ it, including an omniscient knower. The only difference is that God’s employment of ‘will’ always corresponds perfectly to reality (either ‘will’ with maximal causal force or with probable causal force), whereas ours sometimes does not. But God's being omniscient wouldn’t add the Ockhamist’s non-causal ‘will’ to his repertoire. He’d still be working with the same two rationally assertable uses of the term. It’s just that he would never be mistaken in employing them (as we sometimes are).
JET: Given the Ockhamist version of the SFV, it would seem that God could use the term "will" without implying any causal force.
Tom: "Given the Ockhamist's version of the SFV," of course God could employ 'will' without implying any causal force. But why grant their understanding of the SFV? And given the lack of any justifiably assertalbe use of this 'will' in our language we really must see some level of causal force in all uses of 'will', including God's. So of course if their view is "given," then God could speak and behave in ways consistent with that view. But then if our view is "given," then God may speak and behave in ways consistent with our view. We noted this sort of question begging and tried to get beyond it in the paper by arguing why the Piercean use of 'will' is the better choice.
JET: Does this mean that Section III begs the question against the Ockhamist version of the SFV?
Tom: I don't think so. We argued reasons WHY 'will' is and ought to be justifiably assertable, why this excludes the Ockhamist's use of 'will', why the Piercean use of 'will' is the better sense for philosophical inquiry, why language and ontology ought to jive and why this excludes the Okhamist's use of 'will', and why, given the Ockhamist's agreement with the Piercean that genuine indeterminacy exists in the world, she's already on board ontologically-speaking with the Piercean. In other words, there is reason to abandon the Ockhamist's version of the SFV.
Tom
Post Edited (TGB) : 8/10/2005 4:46:56 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 8/18/2005 1:12 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom, JET, HB, and anyone else who's listening,
Yesterday I sent off the final version to F&P. It is available on my website at www.alanrhoda.net/papers/opentheism.pdf. Mostly typos corrections. I did, however, make some substantive modifications at the beginning of section V and in response to the third argument for the contradictoriness of 'will' and 'will not'.
I haven't gotten any indications from Hasker as to when it will come out in print, though I'm guessing the second half of '06. There'll still be one more chance to fix typos and make (very) minor changes when the page proofs come out. So if you see anything I missed, please let me know. Thanks.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/18/2005 9:01 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan-
Glad you’re back in town. Hope you had a nice time. I’m overwhelmed prepping for new courses. New courses, new school for me, new colleagues, new neighborhood, new church, new schools for the kids. I’m totally overwhelmed…
…but never to overwhelmed to obsess on my favorite subject!
I wanted to bring up a point about a bit of the paper you reworked, two paragraphs that follow each other to be specific. The first is the last paragraph on p. 31 and the second is the first paragraph on p. 32. (First is the last, second is the first? Gosh!) Here they are (without footnotes):
One way to accommodate this result is to deny bivalence and say that tenseless propositions about future contingents are neither true nor false. But it makes more sense, we think, to say that both are false. After all, a sufficient condition for the falsity of a disjunction is the falsity of each of its disjuncts. If the truth of a tenseless proposition of the form <S obtains at t> entails the truth of a disjunctively tensed proposition of the form <Either S obtained at t, S is obtaining at t, or S will obtain at t> then, when it comes to future contingents, all of the tensed disjuncts are false (if the incompatibility thesis is correct). Therefore, the whole disjunction is false. Therefore, by modus tollens the tenseless proposition is also false. And if it is possible for both <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> to be false, then they are not contradictories, but contraries, in which case premise (2) of the above argument is false.
Another response, one that may be more in accord with the spirit of the OFV, is to distinguish between two types of future tense—a ‘definite’ future tense expressed by ‘will’ and ‘will not’, and an ‘indefinite’ future tense expressed by ‘might and might not’. A disjunctively tensed analysis of tenseless discourse would then have four disjuncts, not three. Thus, <S does obtain at t> entails <Either S obtained at t, S is obtaining at t, S will obtain at t, or S might and might not obtain at t>. On this analysis, <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> are contradictories, so premise (2) is correct. But now premises (5) and (6) must be rejected. <S will obtain at t> does not follow from the truth of <S does obtain at t>, where t is in the future because the <S might and might not obtain at t> disjunct may be true instead.
Okay, take the first paragraph here. The problem with this paragraph is that it’s incomplete. You start by noting the common denial of bivalence, then follow with “But it makes more sense….” So this paragraph ought to be an explanation of why we object to denying bivalence. So far so good. But all the paragraph does is argue that both the tenseless <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> are false. It never says what then is true, which any reader is gonna want to know if we're arguing bivalence ought NOT be denied. As it stands the paragraph leaves readers hanging, thinking, “OK, so both tenseless props are false. So if this is part of why bivalence ought not to be denied, what then IS true?" At the very least we owe an explanation of what IS true on this view.
Then there's the second paragraph which introduces a new and different response to premise (2) of the argument from a couple of pages back in the paper. I wouldn’t agree this argument is more in accord with the OFV, but that aside, I don’t see how it works as an argument at all. Assuming the truth of the tenseless <S does obtain at t> entails the truth of the four-member disjunct <Either S obtained at t, S is obtaining at t, S will obtain at t, or S might and might not obtain at t>, and assuming S is indeterminate, then the disjunct is true and so is the tenseless <S does obtain at t> true. But here’s the problem. If S is indeterminate, then on this construal the tenseless <S does not obtain at t> is also true, for the four-member disjunct <Either S did not obtain at t, S is not obtaining at t, S will not obtain at t, or S might and might not obtain at t> would be true since it contains the singular “might and might not” which is compatible with both S’s obtaining at t and S’s not obtaining at t. But both tenseless props <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> can’t be true. They’re contradictories...
...Wait a sec. Even on the previous paragraph's construal they're both FALSE, which means they're treated as contraries. Here they're both true which means they're treated as subcontraries. In both cases we need to come up with tenseless contradictory pairs. Using what? Tenseless might? Might not? But what the heck would "might" and "might not" mean tenselessly?
Tom
Post Edited (TGB) : 8/19/2005 8:12:17 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 8/19/2005 2:21 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi Tom,
Yeah, I know what you mean about prepping for courses. The semester here starts on August 29 and I still haven't gotten all of my textbooks yet. Alaska was great, by the way. We had perfect weather all week (85 and sunny in Juneau), great food, and great interaction with other folks who went, as we did, on the Stand to Reason (www.str.org) cruise. J.P. Moreland, W.L. Craig, and Craig Hazen were there. I got to talk some to each of them, but didn't get into any deep discussions with any of them since they were in pretty high demand. Saw some whales (inc. orcas) and bald eagles, but no bears. Gained about 5 pounds too, which I am now assiduously trying to lose.
Anyway, regarding your comments:
But it makes more sense, we think, to say that both are false. After all, a sufficient condition for the falsity of a disjunction is the falsity of each of its disjuncts. If the truth of a tenseless proposition of the form <S obtains at t> entails the truth of a disjunctively tensed proposition of the form <Either S obtained at t, S is obtaining at t, or S will obtain at t> then, when it comes to future contingents, all of the tensed disjuncts are false (if the incompatibility thesis is correct). Therefore, the whole disjunction is false. Therefore, by modus tollens the tenseless proposition is also false. And if it is possible for both <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> to be false, then they are not contradictories, but contraries, in which case premise (2) of the above argument is false.
Tom: The problem with this paragraph is that it’s incomplete. . . . All the paragraph does is argue that both the tenseless <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> are false. It never says what then is true, which any reader is gonna want to know if we're arguing bivalence ought NOT be denied. As it stands the paragraph leaves readers hanging, thinking, “OK, so both tenseless props are false. So if this is part of why bivalence ought not to be denied, what then IS true?" At the very least we owe an explanation of what IS true on this view.
Alan: I concede your point. It would have been nice to elaborate a bit more. The main rationale for not doing so was the length of the paper. Footnote 41, however, does at least point in the direction of an answer, even if it doesn't get all the way there. Thus, the contradictory of <S does obtain at t> is <~P(T) ^ ~N(T) ^ [F(~T) v M(T)]>. Likewise, the contradictory of <S does not obtain at t> is <~P(T) ^ ~N(T) ^ [F(T) v M(T)]>. When both <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> are false, each of their contradictories will be true. When they are combined together we get <~P(T) ^ ~N(T) ^ ~F(T) ^ ~F(~T) ^ M(T)]>. If we recognize that P(T), N(T), F(T), F(~T), and M(T) and all mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, then we can simplify this to just M(T).
Another response, one that may be more in accord with the spirit of the OFV, is to distinguish between two types of future tense—a ‘definite’ future tense expressed by ‘will’ and ‘will not’, and an ‘indefinite’ future tense expressed by ‘might and might not’. A disjunctively tensed analysis of tenseless discourse would then have four disjuncts, not three. Thus, <S does obtain at t> entails <Either S obtained at t, S is obtaining at t, S will obtain at t, or S might and might not obtain at t>. On this analysis, <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> are contradictories, so premise (2) is correct. But now premises (5) and (6) must be rejected. <S will obtain at t> does not follow from the truth of <S does obtain at t>, where t is in the future because the <S might and might not obtain at t> disjunct may be true instead.
Tom: The second paragraph which introduces a new and different response to premise (2) of the argument from a couple of pages back in the paper. I wouldn’t agree this argument is more in accord with the OFV, but that aside, I don’t see how it works as an argument at all. Assuming the truth of the tenseless <S does obtain at t> entails the truth of the four-member disjunct <Either S obtained at t, S is obtaining at t, S will obtain at t, or S might and might not obtain at t>, and assuming S is indeterminate, then the disjunct is true and so is the tenseless <S does obtain at t> true. But here’s the problem. If S is indeterminate, then on this construal the tenseless <S does not obtain at t> is also true, for the four-member disjunct <Either S did not obtain at t, S is not obtaining at t, S will not obtain at t, or S might and might not obtain at t> would be true since it contains the singular “might and might not” which is compatible with both S’s obtaining at t and S’s not obtaining at t. But both tenseless props <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> can’t be true. They’re contradictories...
Alan: Hmmm. You've certainly identified a problem. It's sloppy for me to overlook something like that. I'll drop Hasker a line an see if he'll let me make the adjustment. Thanks for catching the slip.
Tom: ...Wait a sec. Even on the previous paragraph's construal they're both FALSE, which means they're treated as contraries. Here they're both true which means they're treated as subcontraries. In both cases we need to come up with tenseless contradictory pairs. Using what? Tenseless might? Might not? But what the heck would "might" and "might not" mean tenselessly?
Alan: I don't think this is a problem because we don't need a tenseless 'might' or anything like that. The whole point of giving a disjunctively tensed analysis of tenseless statements is to maintain that there are no irreducibly tenseless statements.
Now, let me see about contacting Hasker ...
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 8/19/2005 4:12 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom,
I haven't heard back from Hasker yet, but I went ahead a made the necessary changes and resent the paper to him. Since he's only had it a couple days, I figure there's a good chance that they'll take the corrected paper. I'll keep you posted.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/19/2005 5:07 PM (GMT -6) | | Hey Alan-
Thanks for the reply. Glad you had such a good time. Good luck losing the five pounds!
Alan: Thus, the contradictory of <S does obtain at t> is <~P(T) ^ ~N(T) ^ [F(~T) v M(T)]> [blue inserted by me]. Likewise, the contradictory of <S does not obtain at t> is <~P(T) ^ ~N(T) ^ [F(T) v M(T)]>.
Tom: This helps. Now I see that footnote. I did read it before too (!), but some time ago.
Just to be sure, it looks like you made a typo here. The contradictory you give for <S does obtain at t> seems right on. But look at the blue portion. Your contradictory for <S does NOT obtain at t> simply repeats these (blue) past and present tensed forms.
Shouldn't the contradictory of <S does not obtain at t> be <~P( ~T) ^ ~N( ~T) ^ [F(T) v M(T)]> [note the blue negations] or even the simpler <P(T) ^ N(T) ^ [F(T) v M(T)]>? Tom
Post Edited (TGB) : 8/19/2005 5:13:36 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 8/19/2005 5:17 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: The second paragraph which introduces a new and different response to premise (2) of the argument from a couple of pages back in the paper. I wouldn’t agree this argument is more in accord with the OFV, but that aside, I don’t see how it works as an argument at all. Assuming the truth of the tenseless <S does obtain at t> entails the truth of the four-member disjunct <Either S obtained at t, S is obtaining at t, S will obtain at t, or S might and might not obtain at t>, and assuming S is indeterminate, then the disjunct is true and so is the tenseless <S does obtain at t> true. But here’s the problem. If S is indeterminate, then on this construal the tenseless <S does not obtain at t> is also true, for the four-member disjunct <Either S did not obtain at t, S is not obtaining at t, S will not obtain at t, or S might and might not obtain at t> would be true since it contains the singular “might and might not” which is compatible with both S’s obtaining at t and S’s not obtaining at t. But both tenseless props <S does obtain at t> and <S does not obtain at t> can’t be true. They’re contradictories...
Alan: Hmmm. You've certainly identified a problem. It's sloppy for me to overlook something like that. I'll drop Hasker a line an see if he'll let me make the adjustment. Thanks for catching the slip.
Alan: ...I went ahead a made the necessary changes and resent the paper to him.
Tom: How'd you fix that second paragraph? I'm scratching my head trying to figure it out!
Tom
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 8/19/2005 7:39 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: Just to be sure, it looks like you made a typo here. The contradictory you give for <S does obtain at t> seems right on. But ... shouldn't the contradictory of <S does not obtain at t> be <~P(~T) ^ ~N(~T) ^ [F(T) v M(T)]> or even the simpler <P(T) ^ N(T) ^ [F(T) v M(T)]>?
Alan: Yep. That's a typo. Thanks for catching it.
Tom: How'd you fix that second paragraph? I'm scratching my head trying to figure it out!
Alan: I deleted it. 
Regards,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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