Tom: In my view, if you opt for insisting on here what you do in Gen. 6, you necessarily get God promising to plant Israel in the land unconditionally, inviting Israel to sin with impunity. That’s where the “regret” reading here would take you.

Jeff: But I thought you had already said previously in this thread that "grieved" in the Jeremiah passage is a different Hebrew word. If so, does it just mean "grieve," or does it mean "regret?"

Tom: No, Jeremiah is the same sort of thing ("nicham") over a past decision of God's. I added Jer. 42.10 to Gen. 6 and 1Sam.1 5 as a THIRD example of God grieving over his own choices.

Tom

Tom:  But more importantly, Jeff, the SAME Genesis 6 language is repeated in 1Sam. 15.11 and Jer. 42.10 and other passages where there is no “radical intervention to save creation from destruction.”

Jeff:  Two questions:  (1) Can't the 1Sam. passage work in the way Doc said?  That God was not regretting selecting a king, per se, but that He was regretting the PARTICULAR selection of Saul because of his disobedience?  Wasn't David clearly CONTRASTED with Saul?  (2)  Is the hebrew word in Jer. 42 that same hebrew word?  I was thinking you had said the word in question only occurred twice.

Tom:  (1) Jeff, the reason Mephi and I are talking about “acceptable risk” is because if God is truly “regretting having created humankind, period” then this entails God’s concluding his having created is now unacceptable to him. He wishes he hadn’t done it. That’s what “regret” means, and as far as I understand “regret” I think it amounts to concluding that the choice you made that got you to this point was an unacceptable risk.

Jeff:  It can also be the author's way of indicating that God's relationship to the world is quite dynamic--that God can see the world as a failed project from the point of view of it's original intent, and YET, still, be able to act, IN TIME, in a manner which will redeem the project, anyway, based on a NEWLY thought out plan.  NEWLY is the keyword, in this take.  It allows for a literal reading AND allows for God ACTING in time to PREVENT an unacceptable scenario--namely, the perpetuation of utter corruption. 

You can ignore the intervention of power until the cows come home, Tom.  But it IS that intervention of power that constitutes the CONTEXT of the whole passage.

Mephi (to Starkman): Think about Genesis as a whole. If you had no prior understanding of Judeo-Christian thought...and just read Genesis ALONE from Chap 1 to the end, would you come away with the idea that God was omniscient? Think about the Sodom and Gommorah story with Abraham's interaction with God and all that. I contend that you could not. What a lot of people are doing with this is reading Genesis in light of the assumption of God's omniscience. This, I genuinely believe, is affecting Tom's reading of this thing.

Tom: Again, I don’t need to, and am not trying to, PROVE that the author of Genesis had a finely tuned doctrine of omniscience in his head. But you, Mephi, seem to take this as warrant for assuming the author had a contrary, finely tuned doctrine of divine ignorance in his head, that he believed God a) operated in fundamental ignorance about the possibilities he himself had created, and b) was too stupid to learn from his own bad judgment.

By all means, Starkman, read it ALL. Read the part about God telling Abraham exactly how long his descendents would be in Egypt and exactly how ripe the sins of the Amorites were and how long it would take to work out the possibilities entailed in their stubbornness. Read the part about God inspiring Jacob to prophesy over his children what sort of future lay in front of them. Yeah, read it all. And when you’re done with that, go back and read the creation narratives and ask yourself—what would somebody believe about God if they also believed he was intelligent enough to imagine the universe in every detail, in all its unfathomable complexity, not to notice it and learn it from some source, but to imagine it from nothing, to create it in his own mind first and then to speak it into existence. Imagine somebody believing God was THAT intelligent, THAT creative, THAT knowledgeable, and then ask yourself if it makes ANY sense to suppose that such a person would also believe God was a nincompoop, an inept strategist, an ignorant contingency planner, a fumbling regretting dunce, and an all around slow learner who while he’s regretting so grievously that he ever created at all, decides to keep the risky deal going! Honestly, I don’t know what to say. I take the biblical authors for thoughtful, intelligent, adroit communicators who knew what they believed and thought about how they could best get their beliefs across, not silly people whose beliefs about God were conflicted and who were so friggin inept as thinkers and writers they couldn’t notice how inconsistent they’re own fundamental beliefs about God were.

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Tom: Now, it doesn’t seem to me that Jeremiah is best understood as believing God actually regretted “having judged” Israel as he in fact did, that God actually wishes he had let Israel go on sinning without consequence. It seems more consistent to read Jeremiah as saying God’s grief over Israel’s suffering (although brought on by God as a just consequence of their sin) is something God does not wish to repeat, that though given the circumstances under which he grieved made grieving unavoidable, God will again do all he can to avoid such judgment, for it truly grieves him. Thus, God grieves having judged, and this grief figures into a new future.

In my view, if you opt for insisting on here what you do in Gen. 6, you necessarily get God promising to plant Israel in the land unconditionally, inviting Israel to sin with impunity. That’s where the “regret” reading here would take you.

Mephi: Nope. I don't think you are taking a possible scenario into account. It is very possible that God doesn't regret judging his people per se, but regrets the EXTENT of devastation that has happened to his people in that judgement. Perhaps things went farther then God really wanted to go, and God regrets that.

Tom: Mephi, God’s the one doing the judging. What is he, and idiot? He can imagine a universe, maintain its existence in every detail through his abiding word to the ends of the galaxies, he can know the Jews will need 400 years in Egypt because the sins of the Amorites are not yet ripe for judgment, but he can’t anticipate what might result a few days down the road from a plague of his own design? I’m speechless. If you think this the author’s beliefs, I’m not sure what else I can say. The author believed God really regretted his own decisions because God wasn’t knowledgeable enough to even foresee three days down the road what possible extent of suffering his own judgment might bring about? And when what God had not enough intelligence to foreknow as even possible occurs, God regrets how far things went. Oops. That’s your opinion of the authors? Mind you, the alternative is NOT absolute inerrancy. Surely there's some middle ground between being absolutely error free and believing God was a fumbling idiot, powerful, ooo yeah, powerful, but not too smart a planner.

I’m speechless bro. Don’t know what else to say. One the one hand, you believe the authors believe God ignorant and inept at pursuing his plans, so you'll either dismiss the authors and hold on to omniscience or join the authors in their beliefs. On the other hand, Jeff believes the same thing about the authors but agrees with them, finding God’s being that inept at anticipating the possible consequences of his choices meaningfully analogous to what we’re like and so a more parsimonious explanation of scripture. So that's what God's like. 

You guys keep working on it.

Nite nite,

Tom

Post Edited (TGB) : 9/6/2005 7:40:32 AM (GMT-5)

All,

This is an interesting dilemma for us OV’ers.  Perhaps it can be resolved by recognizing that there is both an ontological AND epistemological distinction between that which is “actual” and that which is “possible.”  The former is the premise that Open Theism rests on, as I am sure you know.  I don’t think though, in your discussion (I didn’t read it in its entirety), you take into consideration the latter.

Please indulge me here.  This may be a bit convoluted and/or unsound; for I am more of a dilettante in philosophy than I am a philosopher by any means.

If we recognize that there is an epistemological distinction between the actual and the possible we could infer that God was evaluating risk with “incomplete” knowledge—incomplete only insofar as it lacks definiteness.  First, knowledge of the “possible” is different than knowledge of the “actual.”  In the case of the former, whether or not the state of affairs obtains is inherently indeterminate, open; in the case of the latter it is determined, closed.  The two types of knowledge exist on different epistemological planes, where knowledge of the possible exists as inherently incomplete and that of the actual, complete. 

An important corollary to this is that as God moves from past to present to future, He gains in knowledge, that is, He “learns,” for lack of a better word.  The indefiniteness becomes definite, precluding all other states of affairs from obtaining and rendering one real.  Along with this God is learning what it is like for those states of affairs to be definite, to experience them as real.  The actuality, the definiteness, of this new experience is something that He has never felt before.  As such, and as a profoundly personal being, this new knowledge affects His emotions in a way that knowledge of the possible can not.       

Prior to creation God viewed the future as open and saw evil states of affairs of all degress as merely possible.  This, however, despite the gradation, did not grieve him simply because the evil was not definite; it wasn’t yet immutably locked in the space/time continuum.  It can be inferred that He did not know the experience of actual evil.  And likewise, He did not know its affects on His overall disposition.  Certainly, it is one thing to know evil as possible but it is quite another to know it as real.         

On this basis, it seems that your standards for evaluating risk are too high.  You forget, as the future is incomplete so is God's knowledge of it.  How could God perfectly evaluate risk in its entirety in an inherently open future?  I don't think this implies any shortcoming or deficiency in God.  It merely recognizes the divine ontology as it inherently is--all truths of which God knows perfectly.           

Regarding Gen 6:6 it seems to me that it is enough for an OV'er to simply say that at that point in time, prior to creation, based on the knowledge at hand, it was worth the risk to create.  This does not ential that after the fact, when creation becomes actual, he would still feel that same way.  Experiencing the abject evil that was for the first time could certainly cause Him to feel regret.  Could it not? 

Best Regards,

Ryan           

Post Edited (jefscott) : 9/6/2005 9:09:31 PM (GMT-5)

Ryan-

You might be on to something, though I’m not sure how best to word it or argue it. I and Jeff both earlier wondered if there’s an experiential dimension to encountering actual evil which adds a unique factor to how God feels about and responds to evil which cannot be known ahead of time. At best, an omniscient God would have something like a probability tolerance ‘range’ defining just what the nature and scope of evil in the world would be consistent with his continuing on. Something like that just might be the case. I don’t know. It doesn’t undermine omniscience—God would still foreknow the details of possible worlds but the closest even God could get (because that’s all the reality there would be) would be only a “range” of possible worlds that would be incompatible with God’s allowing the world to continue.

Unfortunately I don’t see how this fixes the supposed problem, that is, God’s actually regretting “having taken the risk” involved in knowingly creating a world facing the specific range of possibly tolerant worlds. Presumably, if God knows the range, he knows several possible scenarios in which he’d say, “That’s it. No more.” But one is still left wondering how God can rationally regret having created human beings if he foreknew these possibilities, for foreknowing the possibilities would include foreknowing the possibility that he’d be so grieved that he’d wish he hadn’t created at all. True, as you say, he wouldn’t foreknow precisely how much evil it would take—what it would actually feel like—to push him to this level of grief, but he would know the limit existed and would knowingly embrace that in creating, which makes ‘rational’ regret just a difficult to defend.

Given what seem to me to be the authors own beliefs about God’s intellectual and creative abilities, along with other predictions about the future the author describes, including what would be true about the author if he did in fact believe God really regretted having taking the risk involved in creating (all of which I’ve spelled out), I find it inconceivable to imagine the author would actually attribute to God the sort of ignorance and regret some suppose to be the only possible way one can understand these verses. I’ve suggested an understanding that respects the language, that’s literal, that’s contextually sensitive, and that avoids attributing ridiculous beliefs to the author.

Regarding Saul’s kingship, it is argued by Jeff and Mephi that the divine regret spoken of in 1Sam. 15.11 can ONLY make sense if it entails God’s ignorance of the possibility that Saul might disobey God and thus disqualify himself. The idea is that if God appointed Saul knowing Saul’s behaving dishonorably and disqualifying himself was even possible, then there’s no way to rationally regret having appointed Saul. So ‘nicham’ is read in the so-called ‘literal’ fashion and one just supposes God didn’t foreknow this possibility (Jeff) or suppose God foreknew the possibility and conclude that the author falsely attributes to God a real regret of his choice to appoint Saul.

I’ve just finished Fretheim’s article in CBQ on God’s rejection of Saul’s kingship. Interesting. It’s as if he has absolutely no clue about our problem. He never once ponders the theological implications of divine regret for choices of his own. But he does make one delicious comment. He comments on 1Sam. 12.14-15 where God prescribes what will happen in the event people and king are obedient or disobedient, and that on the eve of Saul’s appointment. So one can no longer suppose what one MUST suppose to make sense of real divine regret for having taken the risk involved in appointing Saul, namely, that God was ignorant at the time he appointed Saul king that Saul might behave badly and disqualify himself. That’s no longer an option. God explicitly acknowledges both good and bad alternative futures with respect to the king and describes what would happen in each event. So it’s now quite impossible to suppose that “divine nicham + ki + past divine choice/action” presumes divine ignorance at the time he makes the choice/action of the possible consequences that things might turn out as badly as they later do and which grieve him and cause him to “regret” making the choice/action that entailed the risk in question.

Tom

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Tom:  Of course, this brings up the issue (argued by Mephi and others) that God's omnibenevolent and good PRECISELY BECAUSE he's omniscient. So if one now concedes that God is NOT omniscient, how DOES one argue that God is predictably good?

Jeff:  This is for anyone who will provide me with an answer.  We all agree that future contingencies are inherently indeterminant, due to LFW.  That means that future contingencies are also dependent on who is born, which can be based upon an LFW decision in any run-of-the-mill one-night stand.  Why is this so important?  Because twin studies and other research has provided STRONG evidence that a person's intellectual uniqueness and personal uniqueness (including personality, social style, natural strengths and weaknesses, etc.) are SIGNIFICANTLY influenced by genetics--which comes from WHO your parents are, obviously. 

Sooo..., if God doesn't know in all cases WHO will have sex leading to conception, and, hence, WHO will be born, and with what genetics, then HOW can God plan benevolently with any considerable degree of certainty FOR THE LONG RANGE?  For all such probabilities must be based on a person's TENDENCY to fail or succeed in a given area (and ultimately to tend towards particular kinds of character solidification), and THAT tendency will be based upon genetics.  Hence, a very important BASIS for probabilistic calculations is one's genetics, which is subject to the LFW of one's parents.

Therefore, God can only affect the short range with any considerable degree of certainty.  SO..., HOW can we know that God's omnipotence, omnipresent "eye," and VAST wisdom would not generate an EQUIVALENT effectiveness with respect to the SHORT RANGE?  In other words, what conceivable example could be provided that would prove, "HEY, this case of benevolence MUST have required eternal omniscience!"  Guys, I can't think of one.  

So, can anyone give me a real-world example and articulate HOW you decided omniscience was required in the example?  In short, can ANYONE explain to me how the positing of eternal, attribute-omniscience is anything other than an Anselmian speculation, much like a Calvinist's or Bill Craig's Anselmian speculation that God can foreknow LFW decisions?

Tom says that God MUST have complete self-knowledge, and, therefore, MUST know all contingencies.  The premise is debatable, but the conclusion is unwarranted.  I know ALL kinds of things without knowing ALL implications of those things.  It takes an act of deduction or judgement to know an implication.  But a deduction/judgement is a mental process that occurs in time.  So if we're going to say that God mystically knows logical relationships without judging or deducing, why is Bill Craig wrong for saying that God mystically knows all future LFW decisions without a ground for such knowledge?  Once you play the mysticism card, you have to grant that card to your opponent, don't you?

Post Edited (jefscott) : 9/7/2005 5:37:29 PM (GMT-5)

Keith:  Jeff, your arguments simply do not preclude God being able to at least know enough to know that it could go bad...so badly that He could grief with the emotions that cause one to wish it all never happened.

Jeff:  THANK YOU, KEITH!!!!!  I absolutely agree with your logical analysis.  I'm even willing to allow for the possibility that God merely "repented" as opposed to "regretted."  It just seems to read smoother with the latter.  But maybe God IS saying that He is "repenting" - i.e., merely changing His intention with respect to man and the animals in the sense that He is going to destroy them.  And, then, the reference to having "made man" is done for contrast only, as Tom argued earlier.

Please understand that I have NEVER advocated the view that God was oblivious RIGHT UP to the point where He floods them.  Not at all.  I think He saw it coming WAY before that, even IF my previous arguments are viable.  In the same way that Rom. 9 speaks of God forebearing with the INTENT to show His wrath, God may have foreknown the ultimate leavening of the pre-flood world WAY before it came about.  The proclamation of God's repentance and grief, then, could be made to declare that the BOUNDARY of tolerance had been reached.

But if we claim that God was doing EVERYTHING He could have done to minimize evil before the Flood AND that He was omniscient, then a couple of things seem to follow.  Namely, human government, the supposed imprisonment of angels, and permission to eat meat after the Flood seem to have NOTHING to do with minimizing evil.  For God would have foreknown any benevolent advantage of these BEFORE the Flood.

What is important, though, is the argument that God's benevolent providence in this world MUST require omniscience.  Doc argued that it must be ETERNAL omniscience, if I remember correctly.  I don't see how either could be proved.  I know of nothing occurring in the real world that would bring me to that conclusion.

Post Edited (jefscott) : 9/7/2005 7:40:22 PM (GMT-5)

Tom,

Regarding your last post, I don’t know if you meant to be sarcastic or quasi-serious, but I’d agree with most of what you wrote. I do think, however, that there is a middle ground that stops short of saying "There’s nothing really special about the book" or "Its just a book like any other book". A while ago, MephE post a link to an article by Walter Brueggemann:

http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2104

The view presented here seems very satisfying to me. Did you read this article? He seems to be speaking to the type of thinking expressed in your last post (i.e., granting the "indeterminancy" of the text to a large degree, while affirming some things about scripture nonetheless).

Earl

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