TGB said: …to say "the past exists" suggests (to me at least) that the events of the past are actually occurring though not at the present moment.

Lee: Yes, why isn't this the case, if the past could be experienced as it occurred, in absolutely every detail?

Tom: Because the events that constitute the past aren't “experienced” per se, that is "in their actuality," they're “remembered.” That is, in remembering the past God doesn't reproduce the events in their actuality. He isn't relating to the actual Caesar or the actual Rubicon. The memory of the past and the actual events themselves are not one and the same thing. This is important because an infallibly knowledgeable God would presumably know the difference between the actual Caesar and the non-actual remembered Caesar. So an infallible memory is just that, a “memory.” It cannot BE the actuality of what is remembered. These have to be known to be distinct by an omniscient God if in fact they ARE distinct. If they’re not in fact distinct, then God has no memories and all his knowledge of the world is knowledge of the actual world (and thus the block universe). But if they are distinct, then God knows they’re distinct. But this is only possible if God differentiates the actual Caesar and the remembered Caesar. I say God makes this distinction because there IS a distinction and because God is omniscient. But for Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon to be “actual” or “real,” Caesar would have to be real and be having his own experience of the event as well. However, in God’s memories only God is actual. That’s the difference.

Also, in Alan's paper, he's not arguing whether presentism itself is true or false.  Presentism is just one of the premises.  If presentism is true and if TM* is true, what would be sufficient to ground truths of the past? 

He has no reason to defend whether presentism is true or false in this paper because he already explained that as an assumed premise in the paper. 

Post Edited (Laika) : 11/27/2005 10:11:42 PM (GMT-6)

Tom: Because the events that constitute the past aren't “experienced” per se, that is "in their actuality," they're “remembered.”

Lee: Well, wouldn't a perfect and complete-in-every-detail remembrance be indistinguishable from an experience of that event?

Tom: No, it wouldn’t be indistinguishable. You’ve got ‘actuality’ on the one hand and then you’ve got a ‘memory’ of the actuality. If they were indistinguishable then God wouldn’t be able to distinguish between the two, in which case he wouldn’t be omniscient. You can’t posit ‘actuality’ and ‘memory’ without distinguishing between the two.

-----------------------------

TGB said...
It cannot BE the actuality of what is remembered.

Lee: Do you mean that time would have to be put back in order for a past event to be real again? But this seems to be assuming that presentism is true, and you can't have your conclusion make your proof here!

Tom: You’re whole argument assumes presentism as well, since you claim God has ‘memories’ of the past. If the past really is as real and actual as the present, then God can’t remember the past. He would BE in the past experiencing it as it happens, in its actuality. If you reject presentism (which I’m not sure you understand if you admit to not knowing the slightest difference between A- and B-theories of time) then you believe the past is as real and actual as the present. If you’re a theist then presumably you also believe God is present and active at all points along the timeline (past, present, and future). But if this is what you believe then God doesn’t access 1963 by having to remember it. He’s just there in 1963 experiencing it and knowing it. No need to remember it. If you want to reject presentism, be my guest. But be consistent. Along with rejecting presentism, stop all your talk about God accessing the past via his memory of it. To attribute ‘memories’ to God is to agree that the past is not actual for God, which is precisely why he ‘remembers’ it.

But regarding your question, I don’t think I’m assuming presentism. What I was assumed in trying to answer your question is just what you assumed in asking it, namely, that God has memories. Assuming God has memories, Lee, we have also to assume that God’s access to and knowledge of the past is had through those memories. And we only have to define what a memory is to know that it cannot BE the actuality of what is remembered. To remember my first kiss is not to reproduce the ‘actual’ girl and kiss right here independent of me. See, if the kiss is experienced by me in its ‘actuality’, then I’m flat out experiencing IT, the real actual IT, the historical IT, and not remembering it at all. And if I’m really remembering it, then it’s not actual. It’s remembered.

---------------------------------

TGB said...
These have to be known to be distinct by an omniscient God if in fact they ARE distinct.

Jeff: I agree that memories are distinct from the present, I don't think I have to require there be no distinction.

Tom: I don’t know what you just said. ‘Memories’ aren’t one and the same thing as the ‘present’ but they aren’t temporally distinct from the present. The only time to have a memory, to ‘remember’ something, is in the present. So I’m not sure what you’re talking about. If you mean by ‘memories’ the past events that are remembered, then yeah, they’re distinct from the present. They are the past. There’s no other way to have a ‘memory’.

If you don’t think that distinction is required, though, would you care to share a single example of the distinction not obtaining? Go ahead. Give me one memory had by any person or by God himself where the ‘memory’ is not distinct from the ‘actual thing remembered’. We won’t have to wait long, ‘cause you won’t find an example.

I don’t know what reason you could have for thinking the distinction between the act of memory and the events remembered would not obtain universally. But ANYWAY, you agree they’re distinct. Well, if you agree they’re distinct, and you agree God is omniscient, then you have to agree God knows they’re distinct, which means God makes the distinction between his memory of the past and the events of the past in their actuality. If he doesn’t make that distinction, then hunny, there AIN’T no distinction.

--------------------------------

Tom: Because an omniscient memory would know the TRUTH about what’s remembered, and on an A-theory of time that means persons and events remembered are NOT actual.

Lee: But is this assuming the conclusion here?

Tom: No, it’s assuming God has ‘memories’ and then arguing for what that must imply. You seem to be assuming that God has memories. Well, does he or doesn’t he? If he does, then have to buy into what that entails.

--------------------------------

TGB said...
You can’t remember what is actual. And what you remember can’t BE actual.

Lee: Well, these would be conclusions! I would need your proof too, in order to convince me.

Tom: They’re not conclusions at all. They’re definitions. And you’re kidding, right? Tell me you’re kidding. The proof is self-evident. It’s IN the definitions of the words “memory” and “actuality.” Sorry I don’t have more time Lee. Look up what a memory is. That’ll help.

-------------------------------

Violin for God said...
... why do you require that the past "really" exist?

Lee: Oh, I don't insist on it! I may yet be convinced it doesn't, only for now, I hold that it does exist, for God.

Tom: How does it exist for God? Does it exist for God ‘through his memory of it’? Or is God by virtue of being transtemporal (or something like that) actually present in 1963 because 1963 is just as objectively real and actual as 500 BD and 2005 AD? If the latter, then stop attributing ‘memories’ to God. If the former, then come to terms with the distinction between the ‘actual Caesar’ and ‘the remembered Caesar’.

-----------------------------------------

Violin for God said...
Also, in Alan's paper, he's not arguing whether presentism itself is true or false.

Lee: Quite correct! I am taking the liberty of going off-topic. Mea culprit...

Tom: Oh brother.

I have yet to see you engage in debate here and ever say to somebody, “You know, you’ve convinced me. You’re right on that and I’ve been wrong. I’ll adjust my views on that.” As long as you’ve been debating here, to have never changed your mind on something says a lot.

Just believe whatever, Lee.

Tom

Tom, I think that was Lee that said that which you attributed to me.  If I said it, I don't REMEMBER!  HA!  :-)

Post Edited (Alan Rhoda) : 12/2/2005 5:25:43 PM (GMT-6)