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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 11/12/2003 8:57 PM (GMT -6) |   | Well, tried to sleep and the ol brain wouldn't shut off. Thanks alot Meph. So, rather than toss and turn, thought I'd put it to good use.
And I shall, soon as I'm done with this.
It's Time to play (drum roll......)
THE PLAUSIBILITY GAME
Each contestant shall state their answer to the question
How did Jesus know what Peter was going to do?
Each contestant shall then have to answer various objections.
YOU get to decide who wins
THE PLAUSIBILITY GAME
Contestant #1: Jesus knew what Peter would do because everything has been predestined, including Peters denial, from the foundation of the world. (audience applauds)
Questioner A. C.#1, well, you certainly explain the question. But I'm wondering good lady, if everything is predestined, how is Peter morally responsible for the act he did? Or how is Satan really evil for doing what he does?
C#1: Why, that's simple. God predestines evil acts [i[in such a way that he is all holy for predestining them and the actors evil for doing what he predestined them to do. It has to do with primary and second causation. [audience applauds]
Questioner B. Tell me C#1, if all is predestined, how do people end up going to ETERNAL HELL? Doesn't God love everyone?
C#1.. Of course God loves everyone. [applause]. But he doesn't love everyone in the exact same way. You see, he loves some in such a way that they glorify him by going to heaven, and others in such a way that they glorify him by going to eternal hell. [less enthusiastic applause, old lady chokes on a sandwhich]
Questioner C: C#1. But why does the Bible tell us we are free and that things depend on our choices?
C#1: Because we ARE free! And things DO depend on our choices. God didn't make us robots! [laughter] He made us free morally responsible agents. [applause] Its just that he predestined us so that we carry out his designs. So those designs genuinely depend on us doing exactly what he predestined us to do. [wild applause, shouts of "brillant", "hear hear"]
And now for Contestant #2:
Contestant #2: Jesus knew what Peter would do because God eternally foreknows all that shall come to pass, including the free morally responsible acts of agents. [applause]
Questioner A: Now C#2, if God knows our future acts, they are certain before we do them. So how are they free?
C.#2. Oh, that's as old as the hills. God knowing something doesn't determine it. [applause]
Questioner B: Did God just somehow foresee Peter denying him?
C#2. Yes.
Questioner B: And he decided on that basis to tell Peter he'd deny him?
C#2. Of course.
Question B: Did he forsee Peter's repentance after his denials in the same logical moment he foresaw Peter's denials?
C#2. You're boring me.
Questioner B: Well, I'm just wondering. Since Jesus seems to have told Peter about his denials for a purpose -- the purpose being to get him to repent later on -- and since his decision to tell Peter was based on his foreknowledge, do you hold that there's something like TWO tracks of foreknowledge.... first the bare facts, then the facts with God's intervention, based on his foreknowledge of the bare facts?
C#2. Maybe [audience is puzzled]
Questioner B: But then his first track foreknowledge isn't really foreknowledge. It must be a sort of theoretical "run through" sans God's intervention. But then it seems the second track foreknowledge could alter the first track... I mean, what if Jesus' telling Peter he'd deny him three times actually made Peter not do it? When you interfere with history, you alter it. (the ol problem of retroactive causation} [audience is tense]
C#2. God knew he'd still do it. [applause erupts]
Questioner B: Of course. But then that sort of requires a third run through, doesn't it. That is, first God sees Peter would deny him. Second, he foresees him telling Peter this on the basis of his foreknowledge. And third he sees Peter doing it anyway and repenting as a result. of his telling him. {audiene goes "ooohhhhh"]
Moderator: You're hogging the questioning time B. Next Questioner!
Questioner C: C#2, it sounds to me like you should be a Molinist. But then you'd have to accept "would counterfactuals" as an eternal ungrounded surd. [audience barfs]
But my quesiton is biblical. What is one to do with all those passages where God regrets decisions he made, says he thought one thing would happen only to find out a different thing happened, speaks and things of the future in terms of "ifs" and "perhaps" and "maybes", changes his mind, experiences disappointments, tries to do things that don't succeed (like saving everybody), etc....
C#2. [smirking] Anthropomorphism, phenomenological speech, and God simply acting in ways he foreknew he would act. [audience goes nuts, shouting "bravo," hip hip," "splendid"]
And now for Contestant #3.
Contestant #3. Jesus foreknew what Peter would do because Peters present circumstances, including especially Peter's character, rendered it certain. [audience puzzled, two people clap hesitantly]
Questioner A. Now C.#3, if Peter's character was such that he'd deny Christ, why did he repent later?
C#3. This is exactly WHY Jesus gave him the prediction. This wasn't just a crystal ball deal... he had a purpose. To humble Peter, teach him the true meaning of leadership and love, break his false ideas, etc... God knew what Peter's character was, and what it would take to change it.
Question B: But how did Jesus know he'd deny him exactly three times? And what about the noisy chicken? [Questioner B is not from a farm]
C#3. God specified the number 3 because threeness is built into the metaphysics of the universe -- that's how you know I'm the TRUE contestant here (#3) -- but even more importantly, because he wanted to (not coincidently) later reiterate 3 times the true meaning of leadership -- its about love (see Jn 21). Getting three people to notice Peter would of course be no problem, since these were pretty public people. God may have had to prevent others from noticing him... which presumably wouldn't be that hard to do. As far as the chicken, they always make noise at sunrise. [neither is Contestant #3] But if God had to poke him, I suspect the sovereign God of the universe was capable of that.
Question #C. But isn't God manipulating people (and a chicken) in doing this? Doesn't this make God a conspirator in Peter's evil?
C#3. God didn't put the character IN Peter or the others (the exeption being the chicken). He just may have steered how they play it out , and he did so for Peter's, and the Church's, own good. He wanted to expose Peter to himself. I don't see that that makes him a conspirator in Peter's evil. He IS guilty of poking the chicken however. [The audience at this point starts to gather green wood for a Servetus style roast]
YOU DECIDE....
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/13/2003 2:15 AM (GMT -6) | | Mephi-
I read the first bit, the definition of “compatibilisitic exploitation” and your example and stopped there. I want to respond first to your question: Is person A in any sense morally responsible for person B’s burning down the building? I don’t want to see what others have said yet. I’d like to see where I fit in just on my own. Cool?
OK, first your definition of “compatibilistic exploitation.” Helseth came up with it but you defined it as: “Compatibilistic exploitation occurs when God uses the self-solidified characteristics of a person for God’s own purposes by way of manipulating the person and/or situational conditions surrounding the person. It’s extremely important to note that the characteristics are solidified by the free willed person and not by God.”
First, I don’t have a problem with this kind of divine action, provided that such action fits, as you say, “God’s own purposes.” And since whether, how, when, and in what sense “God’s purposes” would ever include such ‘compatibilisitc exploitation’ I don’t see how your example solves anything. I mean, yeah, that sort of divine action occurs. What our problem is seems to be understanding what divine PURPOSES cover such choices. Like Doc said, maybe this is all about understanding WHY God chose to create THIS world in the first place.
Secondly, I’m sure your definition is Helseth’s “CE” (‘comp. expl.’) would NOT be welcomed by Helseth himself, since Helseth is a Calvinist (correct me if he affirm libertarian free will). I don’t think he does. So as a compatibilist-determinist, I don’t see how Helseth can attribute to God something unique with CE that is not already true about how God brings about everything that occurs. I like your definition, but I can like it ‘cause I can affirm the libertarian free will that “self-solidification” demands. But Helseth can’t. So I’m wondering, what does Helseth mean by CE?
Lastly, I wouldn’t call what you’ve defined as “exploitation.” If God works compatibilistically, and if he does so for his own purposes, and if those purposes are loving and good, then I wouldn’t call it ‘exploitation.’ I know what ya mean. God does what he can given the circumstances given his good purposes. In a sense this is ‘exploitation’. But since the word has negative connotations, I prefer not to use it. It’s compatibilistic yes. But ‘exploitation’? Not without qualifying so that the negative connotations are gone. No big point.
OK, on to your example.
quote:
An example.
Let’s say that a person is a SELF-SOLIDIFIED pyromaniac who will ALWAYS cause arson if provided with the right opportunity and tools, which to him are the following: a match, a can of gasoline, some newspaper, and an apartment building. ALL of these things have to be in place for him to do the arson. Now, let’s say that I don’t like this certain building and I want it burned to the ground….
Stop there. It all depends on your purposes. Why do you want it burnt to the ground? Why do you need it burnt to the ground? What is it about your loving and good purposes for the neighborhood that require the building be burnt to the ground? I’ll try to suggest why I think this matters.
quote:
I manipulate things such that this pyromaniac will walk down the street that I choose at around the time I choose it. Moreover, I intentionally place a box of matches and a can of gasoline RIGHT IN FRONT of the building that I want him to burn down…that just HAPPENS to have a stack of newspapers in the doorway! As expected, he takes the materials, burns the building and kills a couple of people.
I think that MOST people would say that I am at least guilty of CONSPIRACY to commit arson. AT LEAST! I would be a significant partaker in the share of moral guilt about the evil deed.
It all depends on the context and the factors that you believe make it necessary that this building be burnt down and why this person is the most lovingly efficient way to do it.
If, for example, you know the guy is on his way to burn down a much larger building with far more innocent people in it, and given all the factors you have this one chance to prevent THAT evil, then I’d say you would NOT be guilty for setting up the maniac this way. But if there is no greater evil prevented by your setting up the maniac; you just don’t like the architecture or color of the building and want it out of your sight, then I think you’re guilty.
It comes down to defining the complexity of the situation that makes burning this building down a lesser evil than leaving it not burned down. God’s character defines what’s more or less evil, and assures us that whatever action he chooses to go with is the most loving course of action given his purposes. God’s omniscience is what assures us that whatever action God chooses to go with fully and infallibly accounts for ALL the possible courses of action. Without such knowledge, God could fully and lovingly intend to bring about the most good but still overlook a better way. Without such a character, God could fully and omnisciently account for best way but not choose it. Being maximally loving and maximally knowledgeable, you get the best of both.
More later,
Tom  | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/13/2003 3:15 AM (GMT -6) | | Doc-
Very nice game! Bill Craig might be upset that he didn't get to be a contestant.
You said: "Peter was by his own choices and character development the type of person who WOULD deny Christ under such and such circumstances but would (or would likely?) repent under such and such circumstances."
I'm in agreement with the first WOULD, but the that Peter was sufficiently solidified to make it certain that he WOULD repent? Yeah, maybe likey, as you offered. It all COULD have turned out differently.
Mephi, I see your point in insisting that Calvinisim and the open view are just versions of the greater good argument. But there is an important difference, and I'll tell you what it is (it's in my head, really!), as soon as I have dinner and help the kids with homework.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Laika
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Date Joined Mar 2003
Total Posts : 2433
| Posted 11/13/2003 3:53 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by GregBoyd
Question B: Did he forsee Peter's repentance after his denials in the same logical moment he foresaw Peter's denials?
C#2. You're boring me.
Questioner B: Well, I'm just wondering. Since Jesus seems to have told Peter about his denials for a purpose -- the purpose being to get him to repent later on -- and since his decision to tell Peter was based on his foreknowledge, do you hold that there's something like TWO tracks of foreknowledge.... first the bare facts, then the facts with God's intervention, based on his foreknowledge of the bare facts?
C#2. Maybe [audience is puzzled]
Questioner B: But then his first track foreknowledge isn't really foreknowledge. It must be a sort of theoretical "run through" sans God's intervention. But then it seems the second track foreknowledge could alter the first track... I mean, what if Jesus' telling Peter he'd deny him three times actually made Peter not do it? When you interfere with history, you alter it. (the ol problem of retroactive causation} [audience is tense]
C#2. God knew he'd still do it. [applause erupts]
Questioner B: Of course. But then that sort of requires a third run through, doesn't it. That is, first God sees Peter would deny him. Second, he foresees him telling Peter this on the basis of his foreknowledge. And third he sees Peter doing it anyway and repenting as a result. of his telling him. {audiene goes "ooohhhhh"]
Nice line of interrogation, Questioner B.
quote:
C#2. [smirking] Anthropomorphism, phenomenological speech, and God simply acting in ways he foreknew he would act. [audience goes nuts, shouting "bravo," hip hip," "splendid"]
Dog lying by Questioner #3: "How can it be anthropomorphism when we don't know ANY alternative?" [audience looks puzzled]
C#2. "Huh?"
Dog: "We know anthropomorphism BECAUSE it's contrary to what we usually observe/know about a creature. Because we know [most] dogs don't talk, when Aesop has a dog talking in a fable, we know it's an anthropomorphism. Yet we know NO OTHER alternative for God's emotions other than the thinking, loving, hating, crying, sad, happy, mind-changing God presented in scripture. So, in lieu of any alternative, no emotions attributed to God in scripture are anthropomorphisms."
C#2. "Imagine that, a talking dog."
God help me; I'm arguing with a rhetorical construct. 
inside you the time moves and she don't fade
the ghost in you she don't fade | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 13888
| Posted 11/13/2003 4:27 AM (GMT -6) | | Tom (all emphasis mine):
quote:
Mephi, I see your point in insisting that Calvinisim and the open view are just versions of the greater good argument. But there is an important difference, and I'll tell you what it is (it's in my head, really!), as soon as I have dinner and help the kids with homework.
and…
quote:
It all depends on the context and the factors that you believe make it necessary that this building be burnt down and why this person is the most lovingly efficient way to do it.
If, for example, you know the guy is on his way to burn down a much larger building with far more innocent people in it, and given all the factors you have this one chance to prevent THAT evil, then I’d say you would NOT be guilty for setting up the maniac this way. But if there is no greater evil prevented by your setting up the maniac; you just don’t like the architecture or color of the building and want it out of your sight, then I think you’re guilty.
It comes down to defining the complexity of the situation that makes burning this building down a lesser evil than leaving it not burned down. God’s character defines what’s more or less evil, and assures us that whatever action he chooses to go with is the most loving course of action given his purposes. God’s omniscience is what assures us that whatever action God chooses to go with fully and infallibly accounts for ALL the possible courses of action. Without such knowledge, God could fully and lovingly intend to bring about the most good but still overlook a better way. Without such a character, God could fully and omnisciently account for best way but not choose it. Being maximally loving and maximally knowledgeable, you get the best of both.
I WANT EVERYONE TO SEE THIS!
If you don’t get ANYTHING ELSE from this right now, get the point that both Tom AND Doc would agree on…
The warfare worldview theodicy is a VARIATION of the “greater good” argument.
This is EXTREMELY important to get. The principles involved with the “greater good” argument is greatly summed up by Alan…
quote:
With respect to (a) and (b), there is an important ethical principle called the "Principle of Double Effect". What the principle says is that an action that results in some evil can still be morally justified if (i) it is the optimum means to accomplish some greater good, and (ii) it is done for the sake of that greater good. It seems plausible to me to suppose that whenever God exploits the self-solidified characters of his creatures in a manner that results in something evil that these two conditions are fulfilled.
With respect to (c), I think God as the Creator has rights over his creatures that his creatures do not have over each other. While it would almost certainly be wrong for me to, say, direct a homicidal maniac into the path of a little child, I don't think it is necessarily wrong for God to do so.He gave us life, so he has the right to take, even if he does so through the instrumentality of an self-solidified agent. He also gave us freedom, so he has the right to limit or remove it as it suits his purposes.
This is what occurs IN PRINCIPLE in the greater good argument. Look at what Tom says in that longer quote. The assumption is that LESSER EVILS can be used for GREATER GOOD purposes because of how we conceptualize God’s character. Understand this very important principle. Cause I’m going to use it a lot later!
I’m gonna take on Doc’s stuff later…when I have more time. But get THIS part at least.
And yuk it up with your little plausibility game. I’m comin’ strapped when I come. And when I do it, I’m hittin’ hard like a rhino on speed, buddy. Believe that. 
Later,
"I've been converted three times. The first was to traditional Christianity; the second to honesty and the third was to the Love of God and man (humanity) The third was the real conversion. The first two were preliminary."
--Nels Ferre, a theologian speaking of his spiritual journey with the Triune God
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Tom
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| Posted 11/13/2003 6:26 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
The warfare worldview theodicy is a VARIATION of the “greater good” argument.
In a sense, yes. But the "variants" that make it a variation make it an entirely different theodicy. After you finish exhausting yourself with your Rhino Ram, I'll be back to refresh you with the truth! 
Hardi-har-har!
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 11/13/2003 8:28 AM (GMT -6) | | Mephi-
This may have some bugs that need to be worked out, but I hope there’s something to what I say here. When I admit that the open view appeals to a “greater good” to explain the existence of some evils (not all— hey, there’s one difference right there!) I believe I’m saying something fundamentally different “in kind” than what determinists say when they appeal to a “greater good.” Don’t let the shared vocabulary lead you to assume that determinists and open theists share the same theodicy.
Let me try to describe what I think I’m on the road to believing. (Hey, that’s pretty non-committal!)
When a determinist explains innocent suffering or some evil by appealing to a “greater good,” one must factor into this explanation what is behind determinism. I’m talking about the attributes of God’s decree. Jack Cotrell has a great little chapter (can’t remember where) in which he discusses the characteristics of Calvin’s decree. Among other things, it is unconditional and exhaustive. And this needs to be kept in mind when talking about a determinist’s appeal to the “greater good.” That is, the evil in question, the evil we’re trying to explain, is believed to be unconditionally determined by God. Nothing outside of God, no condition, no circumstance, no other evil, no contingent goal or plan, nothing influenced God in determining THAT Zosia’s eyes get poked out, or THAT John Doe goes to hell OK? Perhaps the fact that determinists talk about a “greater good” they admit they don’t understand makes us forget what it is about EVERY evil that determinists do claim to understand, and that is that every evil was unconditionally decreed by God. So, whatever greater good explains evil, in a world where every evil is unconditionally determined by God without reference to anything or anybody outside himself, that greater good can be none other than God-unrelated-to-the-world.
I’m not saying that it’s wrong, or evil, for God to (unconditionally) do something for Godself without reference to anything or anyone outside Godself. That’s not what bothers me. It’s that its EVIL that is unconditionally decreed by God for Godself. You can lick his boots at this point and say it’s all cool and that God can unconditionally, that is, for reasons unconditioned and unrelated to anything outside himself, predetermine that millions go to hell if you want. But if that’s your position, Mephi, then why are you so engrossed in theodicy at all? What are you pursuing? Why would these sorts of questions, or the answers, be of any interest to a theistic bootlicker? Are there some things you won’t, or can’t, bring yourself to lick off God's boots? If there's nothing you won't lick off, then why the interest in theodicy?
I’m getting off the subject. Sorry bro. When I explain some occurrence of evil by appealing to the greater good, I factor in not an unconditional, efficacious, and exhaustive decree that determines every specific evil, but rather an unconditionally predetermined way of relating conditionally and non-efficaciously with creation for the purpose of freely chosen love. So, though I use the same phrase, “greater good,” the variants between the determinist’s understanding of the why and how of creation and my understanding of the why and how of creation are what make the “greater good” arguments we appeal to two different appeals, two different theodicies.
Determinism, it seems to me, must explain why evil exists in a world where God always gets what he wants. So one appeals to a “greater good” to explain not evil, but why God “unconditionally” decrees evil. The greater good is a good that (supposedly) explains why God wants and determines the evil in question. And one cannot suggest that the good that’s behind this evil is the good character that’s built in us as a result or that it’s any other good or loving by-product outside of God himself. No. That would make the decreed evil conditional. When you’re talking about the WHY’S, in determinism God decrees it all for reasons unrelated to anything outside of God himself.
On the other hand, the open view, it seems to me, must explain why evil exists in a world where God does NOT always get what he wants. Surely that’s doable. This takes us in a fundamentally different direction than the unconditional greater good that determines evil. Here the greater good is a good that explains, or at least tries to explain, why God would create a world in which evil was possible.
So, both appeal to a greater good to explain evil. But in one case the good determines the evil, or rather, the evil exists as a response to the greater good unconditioned by anything outside of God himself and so unrelated to the world, to us, or to the options—good and evil—that we face. Evil is decreed without reference to the inter-relatedness, the conditions, circumstances, or factors of our lives. In determinism the greater good, whatever it is, calls forth evil and does so unconditionally. Evil is a response to the greater good which determines with reference only to itself that evil should exist.
The open view is not a “variation” of this. God forbid. For there is no good conceivable, or compatible with the suffering God of the Cross, that would “unconditionally” determine evil. So the good we offer as an explanation of some evils (not all) is not a hidden, unrevealed good that relates unconditionally to the world; it is instead openly declared, announced, fleshed out and revealed in Jesus Christ. If or when God should determine to work in compatibilistic ways that involve evil, it is entirely conditioned upon factors outside of God, entirely related to the give-and-take of the open divine-world relationship, and entirely chosen by God as the last course of action. In determinism, however, we are asked to believe that evil is the FIRST and BEST course of action the “greater good” set its sights on and that it sets its sights on the evils it chooses for reasons unconditioned, that is, unrelated to, unaffected by, the world or what might happen in the world. So, a world without Hitler would be a worse world, for Hitler is the first and best choice of God’s “greater good.”
This is the “greater good” of determinism, and what open theists (as I understand it) offers is not a variation of this. In determinism, when we see evil we see God’s greater good working itself out precisely as God decreed it should. When I see evil, I see God’s greater good at war with evil. For example, I have no way of giving meaning to the word “good” when that good is defined as the glory God gets from judging sinners he’s unconditionally predetermined for hell. It is the unconditionality of an exhaustive decree that makes the determinist’s appeal to a “greater good” different than my own. Now, I can give meaning to the words “greater good” when they describe the suffering brought about as a necessary means of preventing a greater evil. It is a greater good to prevent an evil than to not prevent an evil, even if preventing it requires a lesser evil. Point is, the mysteries involved are mysteries of God related to the world, responding to the world, pleading with the world, fighting the evil of the world. This is not the mystery of determinism’s “greater good.” That is a good unconditioned and unrelated to the world, unengaged in war with evil.
Sorry to hash stuff up so badly my eternal twin.
Like I said, Mephi, my ideas have bugs no doubt. My head is over in logic and I’ve probably hacked my way around the issues. But that’s kinda where I am right now.
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JET
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Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 11/13/2003 9:04 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
MephEternal:
And I want to reprint this quote from Helseth for all to read...because it's going to be important.
"Boyd’s comments on character solidification in this quotation are vague. When he says, “solidified to the extent that,” does that mean “irreversibly” established and “permanently” or “unalterably” acquired? Or does he really mean something less than “irreversibly” established and “permanently” or “unalterably” acquired? If “solidified to the extent that” really means something less than really “solid,” then how are we to avoid the conclusion that we are all compatibilistically free, even with regard to those character traits that have yet to be “permanently” fixed or settled? Are not all of our character traits solidified to one extent or another? What, then, does it really mean to say that a character trait is solidified “to the extent that” it serves as a legitimate candidate for compatibilistic exploitation, particularly when that character trait changes when it is manipulated compatibilistically?
Read this. Then REread this. It's important to understand.
I’ve read and re-read this.
First, Helseth asks:
If “solidified to the extent that” really means something less than really “solid,” then how are we to avoid the conclusion that we are all compatibilistically free, even with regard to those character traits that have yet to be “permanently” fixed or settled?
Let’s say Peter has both of the following character traits:
(a) Peter is sometimes cowardly in all types of circumstances.
(b) Peter is always cowardly in certain types of circumstances.
If Peter acts cowardly in (b)-type circumstances, Peter acts compatibilistically. However, Peter can still be free (in a libertarian sense) with respect to circumstances other than type (b) circumstances. Am I missing something?
Next, Helseth asks:
Are not all of our character traits solidified to one extent or another? What, then, does it really mean to say that a character trait is solidified “to the extent that” it serves as a legitimate candidate for compatibilistic exploitation, particularly when that character trait changes when it is manipulated compatibilistically?
Let’s say Peter has the following character trait:
(c) Peter is always cowardly in certain types of circumstances and always will be cowardly in those types of circumstances.
In this case, God would have to revoke Peter’s freedom in order to bring it about that Peter would act contrary to trait (c).
Now lets say, instead of (c), Peter has the following character trait:
(d) Peter is always cowardly in certain types of circumstances AND this trait is solidified to the extent that it will not change within the next 12 hours AND thereafter Peter might freely (i.e., LFW) repent of such action at some time in the future. [Note: 12 hours is arbitrary, but it makes the point.]
We’re not talking “partial” solidification—that would be a contradiction. Peter is totally solidified, but only to the extent specified, i.e., to the extent that such trait will not change over the next 12 hours. Perhaps without divine intervention, it is possible (or likely) that Peter’s cowardice will become further solidified. At this time, however, Peter is still free to avoid further solidification. If type (d) circumstances obtain within the next 12 hours (with or without divine intervention), Peter is acting compatibilistically. However, Peter’s actions after 12 hours (which may be somewhat predictable, but not 100%), are free in a libertarian sense.
Now let’s say God brings about (d)-type circumstances within 12 hours and Peter compatibilistically acts in accordance with his character. Let’s further assume that this divine activity makes it more likely that Peter (via LFW) repents and avoids further solidification and that Peter does in fact repent. Note that this does NOT involve ANY CHANGE in trait (d). God did not revoke Peter’s freedom. What’s the problem?
EDIT:
Had another thought (after reading Doc's post, below). Lets say Peter has freely acquired character trait (e):
(e) Peter is always cowardly in certain types of circumstances and this trait is solidified to the extent that it will not change EVEN IF God were to reveal this to Peter.
As with character trait (c), above, God would have to revoke Peter’s freedom in order to bring it about that Peter would act contrary to trait (e).
What if, however, Peter has freely acquired character trait (f):
(f) Peter is always cowardly in certain types of circumstances and this trait is solidified to the extent that it will not change UNLESS God were to reveal this to Peter, in which case Peter may repent.
Again, by revealing this to Peter (and thereby influencing Peter to repent), God does not change (f).
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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 11/13/2003 11:20 AM (GMT -6) | | Mephi: And yuk it up with your little plausibility game. I’m comin’ strapped when I come. And when I do it, I’m hittin’ hard like a rhino on speed, buddy. Believe that.
Doc: OH NO. fear, anxiety, shaking in boots, soiling pants in terrorized hopeless spirit, weeping and gnashing of teeth, dread and awe pierce to the bones... The Meph apocalyse has been announced. Whatever shall we do...
But somehow, somewhere, the spirit of Neo comes upon me... I stand and face the dreaded agent smith... extend forth my left hand as I posture, and flick my four fingers beckoning...
BRING IT ON DUDE.
smooch
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 11/13/2003 11:41 AM (GMT -6) | | Note this connection: Peter confessed Jesus as the Son of God, got great kudos for it and a great teaching about the church based on it (Mt 16:16-19). But then the text continues...
Matt. 16:21 ¶ From that time on, Jesus began to show his disciples that he must go to Jerusalem and undergo great suffering at the hands of the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be killed, and on the third day be raised.
Matt. 16:22 And Peter took him aside and began to rebuke him, saying, “God forbid it, Lord! This must never happen to you.”
Matt. 16:23 But he turned and said to Peter, “Get behind me, Satan! You are a stumbling block to me; for you are setting your mind not on divine things but on human things.”
Matt. 16:24 ¶ Then Jesus told his disciples, “If any want to become my followers, let them deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me.
Matt. 16:25 For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will find it.
Peter's triumphalist view of the messiah led him to become Satan to Jesus, a total stumblng block. He wanted to FIGHT. He had the miracle working Jesus by his side. Peter expresses this same false bravado just before Jesus' prediction. (Mt 26:33-34). The stumbling block has got to be transformed into a servant leader whose willing to lay down his life.
Peter learns his lesson. It comes out clearly in the Gospel of John where Jesus askes him three times "do you love me?" and then tells Peter to FEED MY SHEEP. And then Jesus concludes by giving ANOTHER prediction to Peter... and now Peter does not resist. He tells Peter he will die in the same manner Jesus died (Jn 21:18-19). He will die for his sheep -- and THAT is what servant leadership is all about. So Jesus says to Peter "Follow me" -- and THIS TIME Peter knows what it MEANS. (JN 21:22).
Interestingly enough, in this same context, Peter sees the disciple whom the author says was "the one who had reclined next to Jesus at the supper and had said, “Lord, who is it that is going to betray you?” (21:20). Is John intentionally reminding the audience of Peter's betrayal, thus drawing a link between the three "I love yous" and the new prediction with the old prediction and the three denials?
think about it
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 11/13/2003 5:01 PM (GMT -6) | | MephEternal: Sticking with the principle you’ve laid down, is it possible for a person to be “solidified” in such a way that said person WILL ALWAYS do action Y if placed in situation Z for the next 1 to 1.5 seconds?
In other words, does character solidification just deal with the LACK OF CHOICE involved, and not so much with the duration and situation constraints?
JET: I think of character solidification in two different senses.
One sense deals with “lack of choice”. In this sense, character solidification merely refers to the fact that currently the probability of the person acting “out of character” is zero (or practically zero).
The other adds the idea of duration (where solidification implies permanence).
In the case of Peter, I'm thinking of the former.
MephEternal:It really IS the case that character solidification can endure for LITERALLY ONE SECOND, speaking from the PRINCIPLE you are articulating...right?
JET: No. The idea of "character" implies a disposition to act a certain way over time. Character traits develop over time and typically do not change overnight. The same would be true for solidification. The solidified aspects of Peter's character developed over time and would not change overnight (making it possible for Jesus to predict Peter's behavior without divine coersion.)
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SIM
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Date Joined Nov 2002
Total Posts : 90
| Posted 11/27/2003 5:40 PM (GMT -6) | | Meph, this thread is interesting reading (except for those middle internably long "logic" arguments that I frankly just skip).
Your line of logic reminds me of the logic Socrates uses in a book I'm reading by Peter Kreeft, "Socrates Meets Jesus" when he converses with a professor of the course, Science and Religion. Socrates points out that he-Socrates- is a skeptic "if a skeptic is someone who does not know, especially if a skeptic is one who does not even know whether or not he can know. But if a skeptic is someone who thinks he does know when he really doesn't, if a skeptic is someone who thinks he KNOWS that he cannot know, then I am not a skeptic. For such a skepticism is far too dogmatic for me." The professor was closing himself up to the fact that miracles and science are compatible, not because it was logical, but because he didn't WANT it to be true.
What you state brings to bear what I’ve said many times…and what Doc FINALLY admits to: open view theism boils down to being just another version of the “greater good” argument. Both Calvinism AND open view theism would justify the times when God ordains evil by saying it’s part of a greater good that we may OR MAY NOT be able to comprehend. The MAIN difference between open view theism and Calvinism then would be in how often this is the case. Whereas Calvinism would say that it takes place for EVERY instance of evil, open view theism would not. And this is what Doc doesn’t like. Because it leaves room for Calvinism theoretically. Think about it. Look at what JET says about God being able to use even partial solidification for God’s own purposes. Helseth would be right in that there would be a WHOLE BUNCH of stuff in human history that God would be able to control to God’s own ends. And it could theoretically be very well the case that 90-95% of ALL evil events happens just like the Peter thing. No one could philosophically argue otherwise, and it would functionally have the same effect as Calvinism. One could really argue that Zosia WAS a “greater good” thing by using you’re a, b, and c ideas. And Doc would NOT be liking that.
I would say that any moral stance we take in using (Alan's) a, b, and c for open view theism HAS to be taken when applied to Calvinism. If we are going to say that God is completely justified in authoring sin for greater good purposes, then let’s extend the logic to say that this is so even if ALL EVIL falls under this category!
I like that you, Meph, are thinking objectively about this issue without bringing along "wishful" baggage that presupposes limits on God to "make" your argument. And I agree that OT believers tend to refuse to think through their "logic" completely enough to realize that the logical endpoint is God after all.
Meph: I've been reading your posts in recent months and sense that your view of God's nature is changing. How has it?
Psalm 139:4 "Before a word is on my tongue you know it completely, O LORD." | | Back to Top | | |
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Starkman
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Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1747
| Posted 12/8/2003 4:00 AM (GMT -6) | | Hey Sim,
quote:
What you state brings to bear what I’ve said many times…and what Doc FINALLY admits to: open view theism boils down to being just another version of the “greater good” argument.
I disagree. Open Theism is an attempt of interpretation of the reason why love cannot be expressed to another in its most intimate possibilities and capabilities of one's own doing without freedom to choose to do so. That a bi-product, if you will, results in evil when the choice is to not love, and the necessity to deal with that in view of God's omni-goodness (the issue of greater good), does not make the OV another version of the greater good argument. Greater good or no greater good, there cannot be the expression of love in its most superior manner without freedom of choice.
Consider if Adam and Eve and all their decendants never chose the way of the Fall; there'd be no greater good issue, but there'd most certainly still be freedom to choose ... to love.
Starkman
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Tom
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Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 12/8/2003 4:44 AM (GMT -6) | | | | |
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SIM
Registered Member
Date Joined Nov 2002
Total Posts : 90
| Posted 12/8/2003 3:35 PM (GMT -6) | | Starkman said: quote:
----------------------------------------------------------------------SIM'S QUOTE (ACTUALLY MEPH'S ORIGINAL QUOTE)----------
What you state brings to bear what I’ve said many times…and what Doc FINALLY admits to: open view theism boils down to being just another version of the “greater good” argument.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Starkman: I disagree. Open Theism is an attempt of interpretation of the reason why love cannot be expressed to another in its most intimate possibilities and capabilities of one's own doing without freedom to choose to do so. That a bi-product, if you will, results in evil when the choice is to not love, and the necessity to deal with that in view of God's omni-goodness (the issue of greater good), does not make the OV another version of the greater good argument.
SIM: But, Starkman, don't you see that I agree with that statement! My belief system allows for us to choose. I certainly believe in free will. What I do not believe in is complete free will. It's kind of like, my parents giving me their car to use as a teenager. They say "You are free to drive within these boundaries". I have real free will. But not "liberatarian" free will. I was communicating to a pastor once, who does believe in "libertarian" free will, that can go against God's permitted will. He limits God up to the time of a person's death, but then believes God's sovereignty "kicks in" or as he describes it, "has the last word." It seems to me his belief turns out to be a "Hope/Cope, Behave Yourself and Grit your Teeth 'til Death" religion. In that belief system, Hope comes from the belief that at some future time, God's sovereignty will kick in and begin to operate. Until then, we've got to cope, grit our teeth, and behave. However, I believe that the Christian life is so much more! A Christian's hope should come from the belief that, whatever happens, moment by moment to us, is the very best thing that can happen, within the limits of God's permitted freedom. That God is continually "redeeming" our choices by potentially empowering our lives.
This entails a tightrope of understanding! God's amazing condescension that allows us to continue to choose.
Greater good or no greater good, there cannot be the expression of love in its most superior manner without freedom of choice.
This does not negate belief in limited free will. This belief that OV'ers have does not absolve God, Omniscient Creator, from creating the possibility of evil. Isn't that the "DRAGON IN THE LIVING ROOM" of open view theism?
Psalm 139:4 "Before a word is on my tongue you know it completely, O LORD." | | Back to Top | | |
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Starkman
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Date Joined Oct 2001
Total Posts : 1747
| Posted 12/9/2003 3:28 AM (GMT -6) | | I'm sorry there, Sim. I didn't mean at all to suggest that you didn't believe in free will at all. (I must have missed something in your post with regard to your thoughts about the "greater good" issue or something. Didn't mean to sugget at all that you didn't believe in free will. And I agree with what you also said in your posts following mine. Most definitely!
Starkman | | Back to Top | | |
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SIM
Registered Member
Date Joined Nov 2002
Total Posts : 90
| Posted 12/9/2003 4:18 AM (GMT -6) | | A RECANT OF MY RESPONSE
Starkman: I disagree. Open Theism is an attempt of interpretation of the reason why love cannot be expressed to another in its most intimate possibilities and capabilities of one's own doing without freedom to choose to do so. That a bi-product, if you will, results in evil when the choice is to not love, and the necessity to deal with that in view of God's omni-goodness (the issue of greater good), does not make the OV another version of the greater good argument.
SIM: But, Starkman, don't you see that I agree with that statement! My belief system allows for us to choose. I certainly believe in free will. What I do not believe in is complete free will. It's kind of like, my parents giving me their car to use as a teenager. They say "You are free to drive within these boundaries". I have real free will. But not "liberatarian" free will.
After rereading Starkman's above quote, I have to recant that I agree. I don't agree that OV is not a "greater good" belief system. Meph's quote, "The warfare worldview theodicy is a VARIATION of the “greater good” argument" is true. I think the difference is that OV'ers see God as reaching in sporadically for greater good. He will limit individual free will "here and there" for His purposes. I see that His "limit" is 100% as far as His permitted will. God's "allowed" acts cannot be judged by us.
It's hard for us humans to take. Why did God punish the Israelites so fiercely for what we see as so "little"? Like the poor prophet in 1 Kings 13:24. He had prophecied God's word to a cruel, murderous king, and just because he made a small detour for food, out of God's spoken command, God orchestrates a lion to kill him. My first response to that is, "How cruel that You would kill Your own prophet, after he had risked his life prophecying Your words to an evil king?" But the more I thought of this, the more I realized two - no three things:
1) God takes disobedience seriously.(No such as thing as a "little" sin.)
2) We are responsible for the "light of truth" God has given us. The more we know, the more we are accountable.
3) This life is not the MAIN EVENT.
I'm mixing up subjects, but it all comes to one point: God is sovereign, and obedience to God is all important, the only thing that is important. As Ecclesiastes says"Everything is meaningless" except for this one thing. In the very last two verses of the book, Solomon finally concludes: "Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man."
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