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GregBoyd
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Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 10/23/2003 6:42 AM (GMT -6) |   | My article "Neo-Molinism and the Infinite Intelligence of God" just came out in Philosophia Christi. It is followed by a response by David Werther, a philosopher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. I’d like all who want to take the time to read the article and the response voice their feedback on both articles on this thread.
I’ll start.
As a first preliminary word, I am delighted that the neo-Molinist and infinite intelligence argument has finally been responded to. (One author responded to it in the book "Outside the Bounds," but the response was completely beside the point.) Werther engaged it in a philosophically robust way. This is good.
As a second preiminary word, I am myself not altogether happy with my article. I wrote in over a year ago, and I think the discussions on this board over this last year have refined my thinking on might-counterfactuals. The article thus represents a stage in my development – the article coming out in the Pinnock Festschrift is better. It would have been worse except that the editors of Philosophia Christi graciously allowed me to make some last minute corrections and additions. Still, I didn’t develop the relationship between would and might-counterfactuals as fully as I did later on. This is perhaps why Werther misunderstood my argument at points. Here’s my initial feedback to Werther’s response. I’ll make eleven points to eleven specific criticisms he raises.
1. Werther mistakenly thinks that I hold that God only knows "some ‘would counterfactuals.’ (206). Hence he thinks that I think classical molinism is "too broad" (ibid). In point of fact, I believe God knows the truth value of all "would counterfactuals." Its just that I think God knows they some are false (viz. when they contradict true "might-counterfactuals.").
2. Werther thinks I deny bivalence. I can see how he assumed this, since I used to. He attributes to me the belief "that some future-tensed propositions regarding the free actions of libertarian agents lack truth-value" (207). In point of fact, I now hold that all future tensed propositions are either true or false. Its just that I regard "conjoined might-counterfactuals" as future tensed propositions that also have truth value – and they’re not all false.
3. More significantly, Werther points out that I am mistaken in thinking that classical Molinists have not seriously considered might-counterfactuals. He points out that Plantinga and others have wrestled with these (209-210). He also points out that thus far they have adopted Lewis’ view that would- and might- counterfactuals are interdefinable. (He says I "overlooked" this interdefinability, 211). If its true that "x would do y in situation z," its false that "x might not do y in situation z." If its true that "x might do y in situation z," its false that "x would not do y in situation z."
Now, here is where my article is most underdeveloped. For I did not make as explicit as I should have the distinctive nature of might-counterfactuals in the neo-molinist perspective I’m advocating. (It think it comes out better in the Pinnock article). What’s distinctive is the argument that would- and might-counterfactuals are NOT interdefinable. I didn’t "overlook" this point. I argued AGAINST it. And I use "conjoined might-counterfactuals" to make my point. (I was allowed to put in the "conjoined might counterfactuals" terminology at the last minute, but couldn’t develop the argument… hence Werther never engages me on the distinctive nature of "conjoined might counterfactuals." My argument is that if the statement "x might and might not do y in situation z" cannot be reduced to "x would or would not do y in situation z." For if "x might" its false that "x would not" and if "x might not" its false that "x would."
What was never considered by classical molinism, so far as I know, is the possibility that "conjoined might counterfactuals" could be TRUE… Or, to put it differently, that "might-counterfactuals" could be INDEPENDENTY true, and not simply implications of "would counterfactuals."
4. Werther argues that I am mistaken in maintaining "if it is true that agent x might or might not do y in situation z, it is false that agent x would do y in situation z and vice versa." He argues that "if it is true that agent x might or might not do y in situation z, then either it is false that agent x would do –y in situation z or it is false that agent x would do y in situation z."
I think I need Alan’s expertise on this one. But I suspect the problem is that I said "or" instead of "and." Hence again, the necessity of talking about "conjoined" might counterfactuals. For if it is "true that agent x might AND might not do y in situation z," it seems to me to be false BOTH that "agent x WOULD do y or –y in situation z." Alan? (the whole of 210-11 is a bit puzzling to me – and I don’t know how much of it is Werther and how much of it is me. Can you chime in my philosophical astute brother)?
5. Werther argues I’m mistaken in thinking that classical Molinism implies that the actual world is the best possible world, given libertarian freedom. He points out that "there is no reason why a traditional Molinist could not consistently claim that for any possible libertarian world you like, there is one with just one more praiseworthy action." (212).
Well, of course there is always a world that is LOGICALLY POSSIBLE that is better. But I thought I was clear in referring to the feasible worlds God has to chose from in his middle knowledge.
6. Werther criticizes the second advantage I allege neo-Molinism has over classical Molinism: namely, it can explain the might-counterfactual way God speaks about the future in Scripture. (212). But he never discusses Scripture. He moves on to critique my view that God’s might-counterfactual knowledge is not proper "middle knowledge." He argues that God’s knowledge of "might-counterfactuals" should rather be classed as God’s "natural knowledge" – his knowledge of necessary truths (including all logical possibilities).
Now, here we are getting to the rub. For its clear Werther assumes that "might" is simply equivalent to "logically possible." And if we make that assumption, I think he’s right. But if we are speaking of historic or "ontological" possibilities – not merely logical possibilities, then the might-counterfactuals would be in God’s middle knowledge. (The difference is like this: its logically possible I ‘might’ wake up a french fry tomorrow. But its historically impossible… the ‘givens’ of reality rule it out. BUT, I ‘might’ go jogging tomorrow. The ‘givens’ of reality allow for this. And one of the ‘givens’ is my free choice.)
BETWEEN God’s natural knowledge of all logical possibilities and God’s "free" knowledge of contingent facts is his "middle" knowledge of what agents would do, and might do, in particular situations.
THIS is a huge point. As Werther himself points out, classical molinist never included might-counterfactuals in God’s middle knowledge because they assumed they were already covered in God’s natural knowledge. But, as I’ve said, this assumes that "might" = "logically possible’ without remainder. It thereby assumed that the only propositions that express anything more than logical possibilities are "would" counterfactuals. The distinctive thing about the open view – or "neo-Molinism" – is the view that "mights" can express MORE than logical possibility. They express ontological realities.
7. Werther argues that might-counterfactuals don’t entail an open future, for there is no necessity to agents existing. He writes, "the truth of neo-Molinist might-counterfactuals would entail an unsettled future only if from the truth of ‘If agent x were in situation z he might choose y’ it followed that agent x exists." (213). But the assertion of the might-counterfactual can be true even if the agent to whom it applies does not exist.
I can’t quite make sense of Werther’s argument here. How about if I amend the proposition to say, "If agent x exists and were in situation z he might choose y"? Is Werther conceding that if THIS proposition is true it implies an open future? If he wouldn’t concede this, what is the significance of pointing out that agents need not exist for propositions about them to be true? How does this in any way argue against the open view of the future? I must be missing something here.
8. Werner argues that if I am right that might and would counterfactuals are contradictories (viz. if true x might, than false x would not), and if, as he argues, might-counterfactuals are part of God’s necessary knowledge, then "it follows that all would-counterfactuals are necessarily false." (213). And in this case God would have no middle knowledge. Hence he argues that neo-Molinism "constitutes a rejection, and not a modification, of middle knowledge." (215).
This is mistaken on two accounts. A) God’s knowledge of might-counterfactuals IS part of God’s middle knowledge, unless we assume that conjoined might counterfactuals cannot be independently true. B)God’s knowledge of true might-counterfactuals doesn’t falsify all would-counterfactuals. It only falsifies those would counterfactuals that contradict might-counterfactuals.
9. Werther argues that if might-counterfactuals are true, there can be no would-counterfactuals, for agents can ‘act out of character’ (214). But this simply assumes that agents never become solidified to the extent that their character is in certain respects determinate. Is Werther arguing that it is really possible for (say) him to randomly murder a child tomorrow? Of course it is LOGICALLY possible, but it is not historically possible. WHY? Because his character is solidified against it. So, it’s false that he "might" murder tomorrow, and true that he "would not" murder tomorrow.
10. I argue that neo-Molinism offers roughly the same providential advantages as classical molinism, for in both systems God must chose among non-ideal feasible worlds. Against this, Werther points out that God need not have created, and thus there is a possible world – viz. God sans creation – where there are no non-ideal decisions.(215)
True, but what’s the point? We all agree with this. I thought it was clear I was talking about feasible worlds God considers to actualize which include libertarian free agents.
11. Finally, Werther argues that classical molinism does have an advantage, for in the classical view God knows there are non-ideal decisions he must confront ahead of time, whereas in the neo-Molinist view he isn’t certain of this (215). But this point ignores my infinite intelligence argument. (I was disappointed he never interacted with this, since it constituted half my article). For a God of unlimited intelligence, there is no functional difference between anticipating a possibility or a certainty. He doesn’t have to "spread out" his intelligence to cover the possibilities the way we do.
IN classical molinism, God KNOWS as certain the non-ideal decisions of agents in the world he chooses to actualize. In neo-Molinism, God knows AS THOUGH certain – because of his infinite intelligence – the possible non-ideal chooses of agents in the world (really, set of possible worlds) he will actualize. But there is no providential advantage to the former, except, as I concede, that the God of the former can perhaps utilize resources more efficiently in preparing a response to the future. The God of neo-Molinism discovers the non-ideal choices when they occur, whereas the God of classical Molinism learns of them, so to speak, when they virtually occur in the eternal perspective of his middle knowledge. But, if we grant that God is infinitely intelligent, there is no disadvantage to God regardless of when he learns what non-ideal decisions free agents will, or might, make.
I appreciate Werther’s engaging my article and hope that it furthers the scholarly discussion of these concepts.
What think the rest of ye?
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 10/23/2003 9:24 AM (GMT -6) | | Glad to see a thread on this, Doc. I was meaning to start one after I got my copy of Philosophia Christi about a week ago, but I got sidetracked.
Unfortunately, I don't have the articles in front of me right now, but I can still offer some initial feedback. As you say, Doc, you are not altogether happy with the article. I think that's a good sign. While reading it I noticed several places where your wording was a bit imprecise. Additionally, I don't think you ever defined in the article what you meant by "conjoined might-counterfactual", so I'm not surprised that Werther misunderstood your position.
With respect to your first 5 response comments (I'll comment on the others when I can get the articles before me):
1. Werther thinks you hold that God knows the truth value of only some would-counterfactuals. As you point out, this is incorrect. God knows the truth value of all would-counterfactuals, but in some cases BOTH "would" and "would not" are FALSE and "might AND might not" is true.
2. Werther thinks you deny bivalence. Again, he is mistaken. (It's a shame he didn't contact you directly to make sure he understood your position correctly, though to be fair to him, scholars rarely do so.")
3. Werther thinks you are mistaken in thinking that classical Molinists have not seriously considered might-counterfactuals. He points out that Plantinga and others have wrestled with these (209-210). He also points out that thus far they have adopted Lewis’ view that would- and might- counterfactuals are interdefinable.
In standard logical terms, Lewis is correct: "would" is equivalent to "it is not the case that it might not", and "would not" is equivalent to "it is not the case that it might". These equivalences follow from the contradictory relations on the counterfactual square of opposition. I don't think there's anything to be gained by contesting this.
What Werther (and Lewis et al.) apparently miss, however, is that BOTH "would" and "would not" can be FALSE, whereas BOTH "might" and "might not" can be TRUE. Hence, God could know that it is false BOTH that "x would do y in situation z" and false that "x would not do y in situation z", while knowing that it is true that "x both might and might not do y in situation z". In other words, what traditional logicians have missed is that "might" and "might not" can be CONJOINTLY TRUE, which is equivalent to the claim that "would" and "would not" can be CONJOINTLY FALSE.
4. Werther that "if it is true that agent x might or might not do y in situation z, then either it is false that agent x would do –y in situation z or it is false that agent x would do y in situation z."
The reason why he argues this is because "might OR might not" is a tautology. It's like saying that something is either possible or it's not. As a tautology it cannot be false, hence Werther is correct to claim that you are mistaken in maintaining "if it is true that agent x might or might not do y in situation z, it is false that agent x would do y in situation z and vice versa."
The problem, of course, is that Werther has misunderstood your actual position. While there is one place in your article in which you say "might OR might not", a charitible interpretation of your open theist position would have taken that as a misstep. Werther took it uncritically, overlooking the other places in your article in which you say "might AND might not".
5. Werther argues I’m mistaken in thinking that classical Molinism implies that the actual world is the best possible world, given libertarian freedom. He points out that "there is no reason why a traditional Molinist could not consistently claim that for any possible libertarian world you like, there is one with just one more praiseworthy action." (212).
Werther's response is odd. "Best possible" doesn't just mean "having as many praiseworthy actions as possible", it also means "having as few evil actions as possible". Now it may well be that there is no single possible world that strikes the best balance. Maybe every additional good that God could squeeze into his world would be counterbalanced by an equivalent evil. Still, it does seem that, on classical Molinism, if God creates a libertarian world, then he must create an optimum one, i.e., one in which the balance of good vs. evil is not worse than in any other feasible world that God could create. The problem of evil arises here because it just does not seem that this world is an optimum world, given the degree of providential control that God has in classical Molinism.
Well, that's all I have for now. Are you planning on writing a follow up response for Philosophia Christi, Doc?
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 10/23/2003 10:52 AM (GMT -6) | | Thanks so much for engaging with me Alan.
Alan: While reading it I noticed several places where your wording was a bit imprecise. Additionally, I don't think you ever defined in the article what you meant by "conjoined might-counterfactual", so I'm not surprised that Werther misunderstood your position.
Doc: Agreed. I was at the last minute allowed to replace "might or might not" with "might AND might not" (apparently missed one) and allowed to insert "conjoined might-counterfactuals" in place of simply "might counterfactuals," but I couldn't substantially revise the text at the time that I got, via our discussions, this insight.
Alan: What Werther (and Lewis et al.) apparently miss, however, is that BOTH "would" and "would not" can be FALSE, whereas BOTH "might" and "might not" can be TRUE.
Doc: Exactly. But this proves, does it not, that would and might counterfactuals are NOT "interdefinable."
Alan: In other words, what traditional logicians have missed is that "might" and "might not" can be CONJOINTLY TRUE, which is equivalent to the claim that "would" and "would not" can be CONJOINTLY FALSE.
Doc: And THIS is what I meant to say classical molinist never seriously considered.
Alan: Werther has misunderstood your actual position. While there is one place in your article in which you say "might OR might not", a charitible interpretation of your open theist position would have taken that as a misstep. Werther took it uncritically, overlooking the other places in your article in which you say "might AND might not".
Doc: I really don't think he caught a distinction between these two, for he nowhere comments on my concept of "conjoined might counterfactuals." I'll again own this as my bad, for I didn't adequately develop it. I do in the Pinnock article.
Alan: Werther's response is odd. "Best possible" doesn't just mean "having as many praiseworthy actions as possible", it also means "having as few evil actions as possible"....it does seem that, on classical Molinism, if God creates a libertarian world, then he must create an optimum one, i.e., one in which the balance of good vs. evil is not worse than in any other feasible world that God could create.
Doc: And in this sense, the all -good God must create the BEST POSSIBLE world... not (of course) best LOGICALLY possible, but best FEASIBLY possible. I thought the response was odd as well.
Alan: Are you planning on writing a follow up response for Philosophia Christi, Doc?
Doc: I'd be surprised if the editors would welcome this. They only allowed the first one with the provisio that it came with a philosophical rejoinder. Also, they're very backed up on manuscript requests. BUT, it might be worth a try.
Then again, my philosophically expert friend, why don't YOU submit a rejoinder? hmmmm.... Done with school, time to start publishing!!!
Look forward to the rest of your feedback Alan.
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 10/23/2003 11:27 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Alan: What Werther (and Lewis et al.) apparently miss, however, is that BOTH "would" and "would not" can be FALSE, whereas BOTH "might" and "might not" can be TRUE.
Doc: Exactly. But this proves, does it not, that would and might counterfactuals are NOT "interdefinable."
No, it does not show that they are not interdefinable. What it shows is that "might" is not equivalent to "would", "would not", or "it is not the case that it would". Though "might" here is equivalent to "it is not the case that it would not". Furthermore, and this is the important point, "might AND might not" is not equivalent to "would OR would not". On the contrary, it is precisely because "mights" and "woulds" are interdefinable that when "might" and "might not" are conjointly true that "would" and "would not" must be conjointly false. In other words, "might AND might not" implies that it is NOT the case that "would OR would not".
Doc: Then again, my philosophically expert friend, why don't YOU submit a rejoinder? hmmmm.... Done with school, time to start publishing!!!
Alan: Perhaps I will, Doc. Though my dissertation advisor is supposed to be getting me his feedback on my rough draft any day now. Soon as that happens I'll be busy with revisions for a few weeks. He's already told me that he has no major issues (praise God), so looks like the dissertation defense will happen mid-December.
God bless you, your family, and your work.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Ichabod
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| Posted 10/23/2003 11:38 AM (GMT -6) | | Greg/Alan, I have to ask, after getting a sever headache from reading just a short snippit of your post, why is this important for a Christian to consider? I understand the concepts you are discussing but I believe there is a point at which I lose its relevance.
If you feel my comments do not further this thread just ignore them, i'll understand. I am sure there will be much more relevant responses in the future.  | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 10/23/2003 12:08 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Ichabod
Greg/Alan, I have to ask, ... why is this important for a Christian to consider? I understand the concepts you are discussing but I believe there is a point at which I lose its relevance.
Good question, Ichabod. As you are probably aware, open theism is highly controversial. This controversy is partly theological and partly philosophical. What Greg, myself, and others (notably TGB) have tried to do in this thread and others is to develop a philosophically compelling description of open theism. This means engaging with the arguments pro and con in a careful and precise manner. Is it important for most Christians to consider open theism in this technical manner? No. But if open theism is ever to find broader acceptance in the scholarly community, then the kind of technical discussion that Doc and I are having here is essential. And open theism is unlikely to gain wide acceptance among the laity until the philosophers and theologians who teach our pastors can be persuaded of its merits. So this thread has little direct relevance for most Christians, but potentially significant relevance for communicating open theism to ivory tower academics.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 10/23/2003 7:54 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan: it is precisely because "mights" and "woulds" are interdefinable that when "might" and "might not" are conjointly true that "would" and "would not" must be conjointly false. In other words, "might AND might not" implies that it is NOT the case that "would OR would not".
Doc: So "interdefinable" means "has logical implications for," whether negative or positive? Okay. It makes sense now. Gosh I like you .
Doc: Then again, my philosophically expert friend, why don't YOU submit a rejoinder? hmmmm.... Done with school, time to start publishing!!!
Alan: Perhaps I will, Doc.
Doc: Alan, I think this would be a great launch into your publishing career. Use Werther as a springboard to express some of your insights. I think you'd take this to a new level. Noone else is talking like this, but this is, I am convinced, the most compelling philosophical aspect of openness -- and the most compelling philosophical critique of not only classical Molinism, but the whole classical theistic tradition. And I bet you could do it in a week. Even if Philosophia Christi wouldn't take it, I bet there's plenty of other journals (e.g. Faith and Philosophy) that would.
I hear a growing chant in the background: "Al-an. Al-an. AL-AN. Al-AN. ALAN! ALAN!!ALAN!!!
go for it
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 10/24/2003 2:16 PM (GMT -6) | | OK, Doc, here's my feedback on the rest of your points. To be honest, the more I look over Werther's article, the more he disappoints me. The problem is that he's completely uncritical regarding his own interpretation of your position. A better commentator would have spotted the infelicities in your article and then tried to see if your words could have been interpreted in a way that made your case stronger before knocking it down by pointing over and over again to the same infelicities. From your "might OR might not" language he got this idea in his mind (p. 211) that your proposal requires a rejection of the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals (it doesn't). From this one misinterpretation he derives problem after problem for what he mistakenly takes to be your position.
quote:
6. Werther criticizes the second advantage I allege neo-Molinism has over classical Molinism: namely, it can explain the might-counterfactual way God speaks about the future in Scripture (212). But he never discusses Scripture. He moves on to critique my view that God’s might-counterfactual knowledge is not proper "middle knowledge." He argues that God’s knowledge of "might-counterfactuals" should rather be classed as God’s "natural knowledge" – his knowledge of necessary truths (including all logical possibilities).
The reason he says this, Doc, is because he (mistakenly) takes your position to be that Molinism has overlooked "might OR might not" counterfactuals. Thus he says (top of p. 213): "it seems then that 'If agent x were in situation z he might choose y' is equivalent to 'If one possesses libertarian freedom regarding an action in some set of circumstances then one might OR might not perform that action.'" This last claim, as Werther correctly points out, is necessarily true. That's why he classifies it among God's natural knowledge.
quote:
7. Werther argues that might-counterfactuals don’t entail an open future, for there is no necessity to agents existing. He writes, "the truth of neo-Molinist might-counterfactuals would entail an unsettled future only if from the truth of ‘If agent x were in situation z he might choose y’ it followed that agent x exists" (213). ... I can’t quite make sense of Werther’s argument here. ... How does this in any way argue against the open view of the future? I must be missing something here.
Werther's criticism is puzzling as he doesn't tie it in with your article by means of a quote. My best guess is that he's commenting on your statement: "God would also know what might and might not be. In short, the future in such a world would be partly open." (194) He misses the "and" in "might AND might not", reads it as "might OR might not", and concludes that you hold that this necessarily true might-counterfactual entails an open future. Again, his logic is good, but his interpretation is way off.
quote:
8. Werner argues that if I am right that might and would counterfactuals are contradictories (viz. if true x might, than false x would not), and if, as he argues, might-counterfactuals are part of God’s necessary knowledge, then "it follows that all would-counterfactuals are necessarily false" (213). And in this case God would have no middle knowledge. Hence he argues that neo-Molinism "constitutes a rejection, and not a modification, of middle knowledge" (215).
Again, Werther's logic is good, but based on the mistaken assumption that on neo-molinism might-counterfactuals are necessary truths, which is based on his faulty (though consistent) reading of you as saying "might OR might not".
quote:
9. Werther argues that if might-counterfactuals are true, there can be no would-counterfactuals, for agents can ‘act out of character’ (214). But this simply assumes that agents never become solidified to the extent that their character is in certain respects determinate. Is Werther arguing that it is really possible for (say) him to randomly murder a child tomorrow? Of course it is LOGICALLY possible, but it is not historically possible. WHY? Because his character is solidified against it. So, it’s false that he "might" murder tomorrow, and true that he "would not" murder tomorrow.
I agree with you, Doc. It also seems to me that Werther overlooks that God's knowledge of "woulds" based on habitus infusis is not based on God's actually willing to create the world a certain way or not, but on God's ability to entertain the possibility of creating the world a certain way. Thus, prior to creation God says to Himself, "If I were to create such-and-such an arrangement, then such-and-such would result." Hence, God's knowledge of woulds based on habitus infusis is not, as Werther claims, merely part of God's "free" knowledge.
Your answers to points (10) and (11) are, in my opinion, right on the money.
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Total Posts : 397
| Posted 10/25/2003 11:15 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Doc:
7. Werther argues that might-counterfactuals don’t entail an open future, for there is no necessity to agents existing. He writes, "the truth of neo-Molinist might-counterfactuals would entail an unsettled future only if from the truth of ‘If agent x were in situation z he might choose y’ it followed that agent x exists." (213). But the assertion of the might-counterfactual can be true even if the agent to whom it applies does not exist.
A Molinist could easily grant that it may be true that “If agent x were in situation z he might and might not choose y”. Obviously, however, a Molinist could simply deny that any such agent x exists. Hence, the truth of the conjoined might counterfactual does not entail an open future.
quote:
Doc:
How about if I amend the proposition to say, "If agent x exists and were in situation z he might choose y"? Is Werther conceding that if THIS proposition is true it implies an open future? If he wouldn’t concede this, what is the significance of pointing out that agents need not exist for propositions about them to be true? How does this in any way argue against the open view of the future? I must be missing something here.
A classical Molinist need not deny the logical possibility of conjoined might counterfactuals. Rather, a Molinist could simply say that, for any METAPHYSICALLY possible free agent x in any metaphysically possible circumstance z, x either WOULD or WOULD NOT do y. Thus, to say, “If x exists”, would simply beg the question of whether it is metaphysically possible that x could exist. It may be logically possible that such an agent x exists (hence the truth of the assertion that IF x were in situation z he might and might not choose y”). However, it could be metaphysically impossible that any such agent x exists (e.g., if Molinism is true).
Does this possibly explain the significance of pointing out that agents need not exist for propositions about them to be true?
JET | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 10/28/2003 12:38 PM (GMT -6) | | JET: A Molinist could easily grant that it may be true that “If agent x were in situation z he might and might not choose y”. Obviously, however, a Molinist could simply deny that any such agent x exists. Hence, the truth of the conjoined might counterfactual does not entail an open future.
Doc: Its true that the truth of a conjoined might counterfactual does not entail an open future in the actual world. But my point was that a true conjoined might counterfactual entails an open future in the world in which it is true.
JET: A classical Molinist need not deny the logical possibility of conjoined might counterfactuals. Rather, a Molinist could simply say that, for any METAPHYSICALLY possible free agent x in any metaphysically possible circumstance z, x either WOULD or WOULD NOT do y. Thus, to say, “If x exists”, would simply beg the question of whether it is metaphysically possible that x could exist.
Doc: Not sure what the cash value is between the distinction between "logically possible" and "metaphysically possible." Now, Molinists typically distinguish between logically possible worlds and feasible possible worlds -- viz. worlds that are viable candidates for actualization. Perhaps this is what you mean. And this is a possible position, to be sure. But if this is a route a classical Molinist would want to take, then....
a) they would have to provide some defensive as to their view that every feasible world falsified conjoined might counterfactuals... good luck, and
b) they would be granting that God's omniscience does not rule out an open future by definition. Indeed, they would be granting that God's omniscience necessarily includes knowledge of an open future for all possible worlds in which conjoined might-counterfactuals are true. This concession pulls the rug out from the primary philosophical objection to the open view; namely, that omniscience by definition includes exhaustive definite foreknowledge of all future free acts.
Doc
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geebob
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| Posted 10/28/2003 3:58 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Now, here is where my article is most underdeveloped. For I did not make as explicit as I should have the distinctive nature of might-counterfactuals in the neo-molinist perspective I’m advocating. (It think it comes out better in the Pinnock article). What’s distinctive is the argument that would- and might-counterfactuals are NOT interdefinable. I didn’t "overlook" this point. I argued AGAINST it. And I use "conjoined might-counterfactuals" to make my point. (I was allowed to put in the "conjoined might counterfactuals" terminology at the last minute, but couldn’t develop the argument… hence Werther never engages me on the distinctive nature of "conjoined might counterfactuals." My argument is that if the statement "x might and might not do y in situation z" cannot be reduced to "x would or would not do y in situation z." For if "x might" its false that "x would not" and if "x might not" its false that "x would."
What was never considered by classical molinism, so far as I know, is the possibility that "conjoined might counterfactuals" could be TRUE… Or, to put it differently, that "might-counterfactuals" could be INDEPENDENTY true, and not simply implications of "would counterfactuals."
He is right that mights and woulds are interdefinable. The conjoined might can indeed be reduced woulds. But that doesn't help the molinist. Consider the following. I'll use Lewis's symbolism here.
[]-> represents "...then it would have been the case that...," and <>->represents "...then it might've been the case that..."
[(y<>->z)&(y<>->~z)] <-> [~(y[]->z)& ~(y[]->~z)]
So the affimration of the conjoined might is equivalent to the conjoined denials of both woulds.
quote:
But he never discusses Scripture. He moves on to critique my view that God’s might-counterfactual knowledge is not proper "middle knowledge." He argues that God’s knowledge of "might-counterfactuals" should rather be classed as God’s "natural knowledge" – his knowledge of necessary truths (including all logical possibilities).
I would have to agree with this. I geuss it's because I don't understand why middle knowledge should arise at all. Honestly, For the consistent libertarian, all the true and might counterfactuals become true after God makes his decision to create. That is what the molinist considers the third moment. I don't see any point in positing what the molinist calls the second logical moment. Actually, I'm kind of considering that might and would counterfactuals can fluctuate as people are born and characters develope.
quote:
For its clear Werther assumes that "might" is simply equivalent to "logically possible." And if we make that assumption, I think he’s right.
which is an absurd notion. Mights represent something that is true in at least some of the closest possible world's (when there is no one that is closest but several and they are all equally close). That's the only way to make sense of them when we can reasonably put them in the square of opposition.
And of course would's represent all something that is true in all of the closests possible worlds.
I will gladly pay you teusday for a hamburger today.
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Tom
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| Posted 10/28/2003 11:51 PM (GMT -6) | | Doc, nice article.
Let me say first that if Doc and I are twins, then Doc, Alan, and I are triplets. I jotted down some responses to your article and to Werther’s response then got on line to see what had been posted on it and noticed that both of you said exactly what I was going to say. There are just a few things I’ll offer, but Doc and Alan both said pretty much everything there is to say, certainly enough to consider whether or not Alan ought to be admitted into the brotherhood of eternally kindred spirits (making us a trinity!).
Personally, I’d love to have a chance to say something to Christian philosophers about this stuff. I’d approach things a little differently. But, hey, I’m just a B.A. plebe! So this site is as far as my writing is gonna get. Alan, YOU da man! Carry us on your shoulders triplet bro!
However, if I WERE to write something up I’d come at some of this differently. I’d start with three preliminary definitions:
1. I’d first concede Bill Craig’s definition of omniscience: “God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods.” This is omniscience in the strongest sense of the word (though I can’t think of a ‘weak’ definition of ‘omniscience’) and it’s the definition nobody seems to believe an open theist can consistently affirm. So I’d start by making this clear. We embrace the strongest definition of omniscience there is out there. Let readers go into the article with that much clean. Then they’ll be spending their energy relating other claims to this fundamental belief and not wondering whether or not we affirm this fundamental belief.
2. I’d also begin by affirming the universality of bivalence from the outset. Don’t let them guess. Say it as forthrightly as possible. All propositions are either true or false, including will’s, would’s, and might’s (the three future tense propositions we’re working with).
3. I’d then define “might.” This is the missing foundational piece. Most of the confusion in Werther’s response is not just that “conjoined might-counterfactuals” were not clearly defined, it was that “might” itself was not clearly defined. Apart from conjoined might-counterfactuals, what does little old “might” mean. Unless you first establish what you mean by “might” it won’t help to say what you think “conjoined mights” mean.
[Digression: In defining “might” I think we’ll reveal what seems to me to be a difference between Alan on the one hand and Doc and I on the other (or maybe between Alan and Doc on the one hand and just me on the other—not sure! ) regarding “might” and the traditional square. In talking to Hasker about this I noticed that he claimed that (on the square) “might” means more than merely “logically possible that” but LESS than what I (and Doc I think) am arguing it means (which is something like “actualizable in this world”). Hasker seemed to suggest that you ONLY get this strongest sense of “might” in the case of “might” and “might not” both being true. I at least am defining “might” in such a way that the only true “mights” are conjoined might and might not’s. Though the square allows for subcontraries (“might” and “might not” in the case of counterfactuals) to be one true and the other false, I don’t see that this is possible if “might” consistently carries one meaning, i.e., the stronger sense of “might” as “actualizable in this world.” In other words, I don’t think the “and” in “might and might not” changes the meaning of “might” to something different, something stronger, than “might” when, as is claimed presumably possible, “might” is true and “might not” is false. If we deny this and suggest that “might” when true means something consistent with “might not” being false (or visa versa) and then also want to argue that THIS meaning of “might” carries a unique claim only by virtue of being conjoined to “might not” we’re in deep doo doo. “Might” defined so as to permit “might” to be true and “might not” to be false (or visa versa—which the traditional square allows [and that’s part of the problem with the square]) cannot be the meaning of “might” in conjoined “might and might not.” I sure hope somebody else sees this besides me. We can get into this later if you want to, but I’m going to argue that the only true “might’s” are the “might’s” of true “might and might not’s” and the only false “might’s” are the “might’s” of false “might and might not’s.” This challenges the traditional square, yes. See, no logician wants to admit various meanings for “will” or “would” on the square. Everyone wants to insist the these have to carry the same meaning wherever they appear on the square and however they combine (or not). “Will” means “will.” Period. “Would” means “would.” Period. The square isn’t even a helpful tool if these words don’t carry one consistent meaning throughout. But introduce “might” and suddenly everybody starts talking about multiple meanings of “might” floating around the square: the weaker “might” of “logically possible that” (as the subcontrary of a true “would” for example), the stronger “might” of conjoined “might and might not,” and then, thirdly, the middle of the road “might” where “x might do y in z” is true and “x might not do y in z” is false (which the square permits!). We got into this a bit driving out to the Mall with Modes, Electra, and Mephi last weekend and talked with Doc a bit at dinner about it (crazy discussion because live Jazz music was playing in the background!), but it needs a separate thread. Is there a weaker “might” meaning merely “logically possible that”? Let’s assume that there is for the time being. The problem is in this case “might” cannot falsify “would not” (which it must according to the square) and “might not” cannot falsify “would” (which is must). Disallow this weaker sense of “might” admission onto the square (better yet, call it something else) and all we’re left with on the square is the strongest sense of “might” as in “might and might not” (which ought to be the case). What about the middle of the road “might” that permits a true “might” and a false “might not”? I have no idea what this “might” means. Honestly I don’t. I don’t think it exists, which is why we must abandon the square and embrace a triangle of counterfactuals.]
4. I’d lay this out on the square with a graphic. The square isn’t totally void of utility! The standard square proves the logical possibility of open theism. I’d then move on to suggest why “might” rightly understood requires that we abandon the square and adopt the triangle for expressing counterfactual truth claims, and I’d present that graphic as well. Get the stuff published and let folks SEE it!
Moving on, then…
I’d like to explore Doc’s use of “fact,” “factual” “facticity” and “matter of fact” in the article. I’d like to do this because I don’t think future tense “might’s” are “counter”-factual at all. They in fact (no pun intended!) lay claim to truth, period. They’re facts (or not) about the future. Future tense propositions by definition cannot be “counter-factual” (if “factual” means “actual”) because there’s no fact, no actuality that they “counter.” Now, if you say, “would have” or “might have,” THEN you have a “counter”-factual: “Had Tom brought two boxes of Cohibas to St. Paul instead of just one (there’s the actual fact), Doc would have smoked them all and Tom might have been allowed to smoke just one!” That’s a claim counter to fact (and don’t I know it! ). But to lay claim via a future tense proposition to what “might” occur is, assuming bivalence, either true or false based on FACT, that fact being the present state of reality or actuality. The possibility is a matter of fact even though the states of affairs they describe are not. Besides, if we want to say possibilities are ‘ontological’ then we can’t call them counter-factual, for this amounts to calling them counter-ontological (the ontology of the present state of reality I mean), the opposite of what you want to claim. Thus, it is a “matter of fact” that “x might and might not do y in z” is true or false. Facticity is an attribute of ALL propositions. It’s what makes bivalence universally true. Now, if by “factual” Doc only means “actual” in the real world then OK, “would’s” and “might’s” are counter-factual. But I submit that this not the normal way of using “fact” and it undermines our claim that possibilities are ‘ontologically’ real. How can they be ‘ontologically real’ if facticity is not an attribute they posses? What makes them ontologically real if not fact?
Also, I just picked up David Lewis’s Counterfactuals and would like to see just what is meant be “interdefinable.” If all that’s meant is “has logical implications for one another” then that’s cool. But given Werther’s comments, he seems to think (and he might be right) that Lewis uses “interdefinable” to mean “interchangeable” or “having the SAME truth value.” Surely he doesn’t want to claim that “would” and “might not” have the same truth value. This is to kick the square into kingdom come! On the square these are contradictories.
What’s more, Werther was really weak here. It seems he brought Lewis into the discussion at this point to deny that “would’s” and “might’s” are contradictory. He just quotes Lewis and then moves on. Very weak. I know Lewis is (was) a big-shot, a genius. But in all the reading on modal logic I did online, I didn’t find one explanation of the modal operator for “possibility” (the diamond shape operator) that suggest anything more than “logically possible” was meant. Nobody, Lewis included I think, even countenances the implications which conjoined might’s have for the meaning of “might” across the square nor the impossibility of a logical possibility negating a would-counterfactual. They take the square and assume it adequately accounts for all possible truth-claims. It does not.
Lastly, it doesn’t seem that Werther and others who have engaged open theists really understand the distinction between “exhaustive foreknowledge” and “exhaustively definite foreknowledge.” There’s the question of whether “definite” applies to the knowledge of God or to those states of affairs describe by “might’s.” Perhaps it would help others to point out that it’s the latter we mean and not the former. There’s nothing “indefinite” about God’s knowledge of the truth and falsity of any proposition, might-props included. Omniscience + Bivalence = definite “knowledge” of the truth. God’s knowledge is eternally definite (as opposed to not yet settled on the question of the truth value of all propositions), though not “definite” in the sense of unchanging. What “definite” applies to is the states of affairs described in might’s. God’s knowledge of the truth of “x might and might not do y in z” is definite. Whether or not x does y in z is NOT definite. God definitely knows the outcome is indefinite. Maybe this will help a bit.
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Tom
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| Posted 10/29/2003 7:18 AM (GMT -6) | | Geebob: The affirmation of the conjoined might is equivalent to the denial of the disjoined would. It is neither would nor would not.
Tom: It's clear that conjoined "might and might not" falsify both "would" and "would not." That's what is being denied. But what's being affirmed? Is there anything along a positive note you'd like to say about what conjoined "might and might not" affirm? That is, aside from the fact that it falsifies both "would" and "would not," what does the claim that "x might and might not do y in z" affirm about the future? Anything at all other than that it's false both that "x would do y in z" and that "x would not do y in z"? Something concrete about the future of this world is being asserted in the claim that "x might and might not do y in z." What IS that something more do you think?
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 10/29/2003 3:26 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: Let me say first that if Doc and I are twins, then Doc, Alan, and I are triplets.
Alan: It's nice to be counted among such an esteemed fraternity. Thanks for the kudos, Tom.
Tom: 1. I’d first concede Bill Craig’s definition of omniscience: “God knows all truths and believes no falsehoods.” ... I’d also begin by affirming the universality of bivalence from the outset.
Alan: I think this is good advice, Tom. Effectively sets aside a number of common philosophical objections to open theism.
Tom: I’d then define “might.” This is the missing foundational piece. Most of the confusion in Werther’s response is not just that “conjoined might-counterfactuals” were not clearly defined, it was that “might” itself was not clearly defined. Apart from conjoined might-counterfactuals, what does little old “might” mean. Unless you first establish what you mean by “might” it won’t help to say what you think “conjoined mights” mean.
Alan: Good point, Tom. I agree with you here. I think we also need to define "will" and "would". In colloquial speech these do not necessarily imply that matters are entirely settled. OV opponents sometimes exploit this fact in contesting the arguments for theological incomptibilism (i.e., that free will and exhaustive definite foreknowledge cannot both be true). For example, Craig has offered examples like "If my wife were offered a cookie, she would take it" to argue that there do exist true would-counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Now it seems clear to me that this can only be the case if Craig takes "would" to mean something weaker than "completely settled"--something like "is highly probable". Of course, this weak sense of "would" will not give the Molinist what they need to secure God's exhaustive definite foreknowledge. For Molinism to work, the "would" counterfactuals that make up God's middle knowledge and the "will" statements that make up His free knowledge must refer to fully determinate states of affairs. My point is this, because "will" and "would" have not been carefully defined as well, Molinists and other OV opponents can slip around the arguments for theological incompatibilism by equivocating on the terms. Like Craig, they implicitly use the terms in a weaker sense to give their illustrations of how free will is compatible with there being true would counterfactual of creaturely freedom, but then they turn around and use the same terms in a stronger sense when talking about God's providence.
Tom: In defining “might” I think we’ll reveal what seems to me to be a difference between Alan on the one hand and Doc and I on the other (or maybe between Alan and Doc on the one hand and just me on the other—not sure! ) regarding “might” and the traditional square.
Alan: Actually, Tom, after reading your post, I think we are in near full agreement. As I indicated a couple weeks back in some other thread, in the discussion over open theism the relevant sense of "might" is that in the triangle of opposition, which corresponds to the "might AND might not" possibility indicated by the square. The reason is that there are three metaphysically distinct states of affairs that we need to distinguish:
(a) it is determinately NOT the case that p.
(b) it is determinately the case that p.
(c) it is neither determinately the case that p nor determinately not the case that p. (i.e., it is indeterminately the case that p.)
Alternatively, we could express this in the language of probabilities:
(a') Prob(p)=0.
(b') Prob(p)=1.
(c') Prob(p) is between 0 and 1.
The triangle captures the "might of ontological indeterminacy", which can be expressed by either (c) or (c'). This nicely expresses the core claim of open theism, which is that the future is partially ontologically indeterminate.
The "might" on the square is weaker, meaning something like "it is not determinately not the case that p". Thus it needs to be conjoined with its subcontrary to capture the sense of "might" on the triangle. Thus, "it is not determinately not the case that p AND it is not determinately not the case that not p" is equivalent to "it is indeterminately the case that p."
Tom: I’d like to explore Doc’s use of “fact,” “factual” “facticity” and “matter of fact” in the article. I’d like to do this because I don’t think future tense “might’s” are “counter”-factual at all.
Alan: If the usage of "might" were restricted to nonconditional statements (e.g., "Bush might be reelected."), then I might agree with you. But "might" can also occur in the consequent of a conditional, in which case we have a counterfactual just in case the antecendent is false (see the first sentence in this paragraph for an example ).
Tom: But given Werther’s comments, he seems to think ... that Lewis uses “interdefinable” to mean “interchangeable” or “having the SAME truth value.” Surely he doesn’t want to claim that “would” and “might not” have the same truth value.
Alan: No, he would say that "would" and "not might not" have the same truth value.
Tom: Lastly, it doesn’t seem that Werther and others who have engaged open theists really understand the distinction between “exhaustive foreknowledge” and “exhaustively definite foreknowledge.”
Alan: Good point.
Tom: There’s the question of whether “definite” applies to the knowledge of God or to those states of affairs describe by “might’s.” Perhaps it would help others to point out that it’s the latter we mean and not the former. There’s nothing “indefinite” about God’s knowledge of the truth and falsity of any proposition, might-props included. ... God’s knowledge of the truth of “x might and might not do y in z” is definite. Whether or not x does y in z is NOT definite. God definitely knows the outcome is indefinite.
Alan: Another good point, though I would put this slightly differently. The issue is whether "determinate" qualifies God's knowing, or whether it qualifies what God knows.
Thanks, Tom. Your posts are always insightful. With a little formal training you'd make a fine philosopher.
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Tom
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| Posted 10/30/2003 2:43 AM (GMT -6) | | Alan: I think we also need to define "will" and "would".
Tom: Let’s do. You said it best…
Alan: …there are three metaphysically distinct states of affairs that we need to distinguish:
(a) It is determinately the case that NOT p.
(b) It is determinately the case that p.
(c) It is indeterminately the case that p (or neither determinately the case that p nor determinately the case that not p).
Tom: So, (a) = “will” (and “would” counterfactually expressed), (b) = “will not” (and “would not” counterfactually expressed), and (c) = “might and might not.” These cover all three possibilities. I like especially that they’re concise and to the point definitions.
Alan: The triangle captures the "might of ontological indeterminacy", which [is] expressed by…(c)…. This nicely expresses the core claim of open theism, which is that the future is partially ontologically indeterminate.
Tom: This leads into what you say next…
Alan: The "might" on the square is weaker, meaning something like "it is not determinately not the case that p". Thus it needs to be conjoined with its subcontrary to capture the sense of "might" on the triangle. Thus, "it is not determinately not the case that p AND it is not determinately not the case that not p" is equivalent to "it is indeterminately the case that p."
Tom: This is what I question. Let’s see if I can get this out of my head here:
1) If (as your first quote above correctly claims) there are three metaphysically distinct states of affairs, AND…
2) If these metaphysical states of affairs (i.e., reality itself) are what is behind bivalence being universally true (that is, if a proposition is true or false by corresponding to one of THESE three states; again, if these states of affairs are what is behind a proposition’s being true or false), THEN…
3) Which of these three states of affairs makes the supposed “weaker might” true or false, (a), (b), or (c)? Which metaphysical state of affairs makes “It is not determinately not the case that p” (= the weaker “might”) TRUE while also making "It is not determinately not the case that not p" (= the weaker "might not") FALSE, (a), (b), or (c)? See my problem? This is the difficulty I’m having coming up with any propositions to put into the “weaker might” class. It seems to me that if the "weaker" might is a genuine “might” distinct from the “might” of indeterminacy, there must be some (weaker?) state of affairs that is metaphysically distinct from the three you’ve already identified which grounds this "weaker might." This would suggest a fourth distinct metaphysical state of affairs. And what, pray tell, would THAT be?
Tom: I’d like to explore Doc’s use of “fact,” “factual” “facticity” and “matter of fact” in the article. I’d like to do this because I don’t think future tense “might’s” are “counter”-factual at all.
Alan: If the usage of "might" were restricted to nonconditional statements (e.g., "Bush might be reelected."), then I might agree with you. But "might" can also occur in the consequent of a conditional, in which case we have a counterfactual just in case the antecendent is false (see the first sentence in this paragraph for an example).
Tom: I see your point. But your first sentence, as far as I can tell, makes no claim of “fact” to which “I might agree with you” counters which would be why we’d call it ‘counter’-factual, unless your sentence assumes the "facticity" of "the uses of 'might' are not restricted to nonconditional sentences." I think you’re right for past tense conditionals like “Had I done x [the "fact" being I did not do x] you might have done y” where “I might have done y" expresses what was once possible, or if you wish, counterfactual. But “If the uses of ‘might’ were restricted to nonconditional statements” is the point of debate and not an assumed fact which the consequent “counters.” So I still don't see how "might" is ever a counterfactual. You're probably right, though. It'll soak in eventually!
But still, if you're right, it's only true that "might" is sometimes counterfactual, but more importantly it is NEVER counterfactual when it comes to future tense propositions which are the class of props that concern the open view debate. So shouldn't we default to not calling them "counterfactuals" since the future is what we're discussing? If only half the "mights" that exist are counterfactuals, there's just as much reason to NOT call them counterfactuals as there is for calling them counterfactuals. In fact, I wonder if calling ALL "mights" counterfactuals betrays the prejudiced presupposition that the future is exhaustively settled, a matter of "fact" which ALL "might's" by defintion "counter." Hmmm. But then again, ALL "would's" are traditionally called counterfactuals as well, even if the entire proposition in which they appear is future tense, as in "If Tom comes to town next year, he would bring a box of Cohibas." I don't see anything at all counterfactual about this sentence. My point is, it seems to me that there are no future tense counterfactuals. Counterfactualism is not a function of the future tense, which means we ought to find some other default term for "would" and "might" when discussing the future.
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 10/30/2003 9:00 PM (GMT -6) | | Not to cry. It's only a tag. It helped further the discussion. It was a catalyst for clarifying some issues. But, in this transition stage in which we find ourselves, one in which we are continually trying to pour new wine into old wine skins, there comes a time when you've just got to admit that the old skin, even with a "neo" modification, is no longer helpful. I suspect that is the case here.
As is, I suspect, all talk about future tensed counterfactuals.
As is, I suspect, talk of "might" as "logical possibility." (TGB, that was a really good argument forcing the issue of how "might" without "might not" fits into Alan's three ontological categories.)
Doc
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Tom
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| Posted 10/30/2003 10:09 PM (GMT -6) | | Doc: Calling future tensed "mights" and "woulds" counterfactual presupposes that the future is exhaustively FACTUAL. But this is the precise point being denied by us. Or rather, the "factual" includes what agents "might" or "would" do. (Yes, past tensed counterfactuals are indeed counterfactual, but this is irrelevant to our concern).
Tom: Yeah, I just said that. You twin you.
Doc: So I'm wondering, could the open view of "mights" and "woulds" be collapsed into God's "natural knowledge" and "free knowledge"? God's knowledge of what all possible agents "would" and "might" do is his natural knowledge. God's knowledge of what actual agents "would" and "might " to is part of his free knowledge (knowledge of facts). HENCE IT SEEMS THERE'S NO NEED FOR GOD TO HAVE MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE. Aghhhh.... I think I just thought myself out of neo-Molinism. 
Tom: I actually DID think this while reading Werther's response to you. "Middle" knowledge really is only needed if you believe there are not true "might and might not" props. If there are such props, and if GOd knows them all infallibly, that's all GOd would need to work providentially. Actually, I wonder if in the open view all "would's" are entailed by "might's" (the opposite of what most think, eh?). Think about it. God knows that "x would buy a drink in situation z" IF situation z (x's freely becoming an alchoholic and buy a drink on Sept. 15th) actualized. This boils down to a "might" ("X might become an alchoholic and buy a drink in situation z"). It's a possibility that x will become predictable in certain respects.
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Tom
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| Posted 10/31/2003 3:02 AM (GMT -6) | | Help me out here…
On the standard square of opposites, the subcontraries I and O are ‘quantifiers’. They express the relationship between quantities, or parts, of a whole. For example, if “All grass is green” (prop A) is true, the quantifier (I) “Some grass is green” is also true while the quantifier (O) “No grass is green” is false. Here clearly the subcontraries may be one true and the other false. Prop (A) ("All Grass is green") is quantifiable, or it posits a state of affairs that is quantifiable.
The question our discussion has led me to is this: Are ALL states of affairs quantifiable? If yes, then "X will do y in z" is quantifiable, and “might” and "might not" are its quantifiers. "Might" must then mean something that posits genuine contingency (in the strong sense we’ve been talking about) ONLY when conjoined with “might not.” But this single meaning of “might” must also allow “might” to be true and “might not” to be false (if "will" and "would" posit quantifiable states of affairs that is; if they do, then subcontraries “might” and “might not” are the quantifiers).
Alan appears to be saying that "will" and "would" are quantifiable states of affairs and that “might” and “might not” are the quantifiers. You get indeterminacy (that is, “It is indeterminately that case that p”) only when BOTH subcontraries "might" and "might not" are TRUE, but you get something else that's NOT indeterminacy when "might" is true and "might not" is false (or visa versa). What is this something else? Is it "determinately" the case? It appears to be, because a true "might" and a false "might not" are quantifiers of a true "will." That is, they quantify it's being true that "It is determinately the case that p." "Might" in this case quantifies determinacy! It expresses something about, or perhaps a dimension of, it's being true that "It is determinately the case that p."
I am questioning whether or not all states of affairs are quantifiable. I wanna submit that "will" and "would" do not posit quantifiable states of affaris (thank you Alan for your three metaphysically distinct states of affairs). What I need to see is which of Alan’s three metaphysically distinct states of affairs he feels accounts for a true “might” and a false “might not.” Which state of affairs permits a quantifying between "determinately the case that” and “indeterminately the case that”? If this is not what a true "might" and a false "might not" amount to, what do they amount to? What metaphysically stands behind a state of affairs which "might" be but which cannot "might not" be?
Part of the problem is understanding "might" and "might not" exclusively as quantifiers, or SUBcontraries (or SUB-anthing), even when they are conjointly true! If what is indeterminately the case is just as real, or metaphysically distinct, a state of affairs as is what is determinately the case (which follows from Alan's three metaphysically distinct states of affairs), then why on earth label "what is indeterminately the case" SUB-anything? When Doc argues conjointly true "might and might not," it is not helpful to allow these to remain in the old wineskins of "quantifiers" or "subcontraries." We need to think far more outside the box than we've been thinking. Maybe there are good ways of expressing propositional truth-value that don't fit the square because there exist states of affairs which the square does not value, or is prejudiced to ignore. Maybe our triangle is the rest of the story. Maybe there is even more outside the triangle. Gosh I wish I had the training to wrap my head around this. For the time being, I'd like to submit simply that not all states of affairs are quantifiable.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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geebob
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 94
| Posted 10/31/2003 4:45 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Calling future tensed "mights" and "woulds" counterfactual presupposes that the future is exhaustively FACTUAL.
I would think that if you properly combine possible worlds ontology with presentism, it would may be the case that all future tense statements would be counterfactual statements.
So each moment that is actualized represents a distinct possible world. So if I may and may not have oatmeal for breakfast tomorrow, then there are at least two different distinct possible worlds which this world may become. And which ever world our world becomes, it was not the case that the world it became was the world we were in, however the world that became encompasses the former possible world.
This also makes it clearer as to why mights and woulds fit on the square of opposition because now we can see that the analysis I've given of mights does not indicate that the mights are not something that necessarily won't end up eventually describing the actually world.
This analysis comes from E. J. Lowe's Survey of Metaphysics:
'If it had been the case p, then it would have been the case that q' is true if and only if q is true in all of the closest possible worlds in which p is true. (p 141)
Lowe goes on to explain that mights are true when q is true in some of the closest possible worlds where p is true.
I would think that when you combine possible worlds with presentism, interestingly, you get something that is very much like a process metaphysic as the world is always becoming a new world. But of course your not commited to any of the baggage of process.
I also think that we should be permitted a little sloppiness here to call any hypothetical notion a counterfactual because when working out these logical issues, we don't have to commit ourselves to which world is the actual world. and of course which would counterfactuals obtains depends upon which possible world happens to be the actual world. So we could speak of the counterfactuals of a world that is counter to the fact. In light of that, I think a further distinguishment should be made beyond counterfactual and factual and that is in terms of relevent and irrelevent counterfactuals. An example of this might be that if William Lane Craig's wife buys the fancy red dress, Craig might wear it to the next philosophy conference, considering what a nice birthday present it would be. But this counterfactual may be relevent for a world in which it is customary for men to wear the dresses, or a world in which Craig and his wife have serious issues to work out, but it is not relevent for our world (as far as I know). I'd think in most of these discussions, it is quite arbitrary what is indeed the actual world and what constitutes relevent and irrelevent, (although generally, folks wouldn't use examples that were so far out).
actually, come to think of it, I think that distinguishment might be made by Lewis in terms of what is called "accessibility," or maybe not, but I thought I'd leave that statement above in my post since I like the example I gave.
quote:
So I'm wondering, could the open view of "mights" and "woulds" be collapsed into God's "natural knowledge" and "free knowledge"? God's knowledge of what all possible agents "would" and "might" do is his natural knowledge. God's knowledge of what actual agents "would" and "might " to is part of his free knowledge (knowledge of facts). HENCE IT SEEMS THERE'S NO NEED FOR GOD TO HAVE MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE.
Aghhhh.... I think I just thought myself out of neo-Molinism.
Well I thought soft molinism might be a more legitmate term but then I learned why middle knowledge was called middle knowledge. Perhaps I should read a more thorough account as what I know is dependent on Craig's essay on the unevangelized, but it seems really baseless. As of now, I think the molinists are streaking in their new clothes.
I don't know why you would consider the counterfactuals of physics as excluded from natural knowledge. Craig says that natural knowledge is of what "could be the case". Well, it seems obvious to me that the counterfactuals of our laws of physics marks out the range of what could be the case for all worlds with our causal laws. Why propose that these facts are different from natural knowledge? (if it crosses anyone's mind that I am calling this natural knowledge because I am using some laws of nature as my example, that's not what I am thinking of at all)
And as I already mentioned, true counterfactuals fluctuate through time and they are not frozen in God's "free knowledge" or his middleknowledge. For example, we could say that if joe passes a bar on his way home, he may or may not stop at the bar to drink his sorrows away. As if he continues to stop at the bar, his character will continue to develope in the wrong way to the point that joe would stop at the bar to drink his sorrows away if he passes it on the way home. And that counterfactual may hold until joe makes some other libertarian free choices that will move that would back into the arena of the might such as joining AA.
I will gladly pay you teusday for a hamburger today.
-Wimpy | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 1818
| Posted 10/31/2003 11:48 AM (GMT -6) | |
GeeBob: I would think that if you properly combine possible worlds ontology with presentism, it would may be the case that all future tense statements would be counterfactual statements.
Doc: Interesting thought, but I don't see how it works. All PRESENT tensed statements that do not correspond to the "facticity" of the present would be counterfactual. But one fact about the present is that there are possible future worlds that may pertain. And so statements about these possible worlds are NOT counterfactual, if indeed the possible future worlds are truly POSSIBLE (in a relevant or "feasible" way).
Geebob: So each moment that is actualized represents a distinct possible world. So if I may and may not have oatmeal for breakfast tomorrow, then there are at least two different distinct possible worlds which this world may become. And which ever world our world becomes, it was not the case that the world it became was the world we were in, however the world that became encompasses the former possible world.
Doc: But it also encompasses the future possible world it will become, as well as each future world it could have become.
Geebob: I think a further distinguishment should be made beyond counterfactual and factual and that is in terms of relevent and irrelevent counterfactuals.
Doc: it sounds like your distinction between "relevant" and "irrelevant" is roughly the same as the standard molinist distinction between "feasible" and "unfeasible."
Doc
ps. To TGB, I don't know if all states of affairs are quantifiable, but you're swaying me to suspect they're not. Clearly, "might" can only be true while "might not" false -- hence "might" a sub-contrary of "will" -- if they ARE. But just as clearly, if we hold that indeterminate states of affairs ARE ontological states of affairs, then you are right in saying "mights" are not SUB anything. And this calls into question the assumption that all states of affairs are quantifiable. You're good dude!
Reality reduces to THREE equally ultimate descriptions. Determinate P, Not determinate P. Indeterminate P. And all possible statements about reality reduce to THREE equally ulimate poles -- the Triangle: Will, Will Not, Might (and Might Not).No SUB contraries here. Just 1, 2, 3.
YOU GOT A GOOD NOSE.
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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