 |
| 
Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 11/11/2003 10:27 AM (GMT -6) |   | For anyone who might be interested:
The Eastern Regional Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers will meet December 4-6, 2003, on the campus of Asbury College in Wilmore, Kentucky. Those attending will participate in discussions and presentations on the theme, “Open Theism and Its Critics.”
For details: www.asbury.edu/news/press/press_detail.cfm?id=214#schedule
I found out about this too late, or I would have tried to go. The schedule of speakers and topics looks interesting. Sanders and Hasker are participating. Other notables include prominent Molinist, Thomas Flint.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
 |
Laika
Registered Member
Date Joined Mar 2003
Total Posts : 2433
| Posted 11/11/2003 12:29 PM (GMT -6) | | Cool. Here's the abstracts for our .pdf-challenged colleagues:
Eastern Regional Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers
Abstracts (alphabetized by the presenter’s last name)
Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification
Justin Barnard
jbarnard@messiah.edu
It is an axiom of Christian belief that all (and perhaps only) those who are saved will go to heaven. At the same time,
heaven has traditionally been conceived as a place that is essentially perfect, where nothing unholy abides. In this
paper, I argue that once properly clarified based on a standard distinction from a broadly Reformed Protestant theology
between salvation and sanctification, these two basic commitments generate a self-destructive dilemma, one I call the
“Dilemma of Sanctification.” Subsequently, I consider three possible solutions to this philosophical quandary, arguing
that the most promising is a doctrine of purgatory. I close by sketching the model of purgatory I have in mind by
distinguishing it from a traditional model that Reformed Protestants would reject. Ultimately, I aim to show that a
doctrine of purgatory is an essential feature of a complete and coherent Protestant theology.
An Account of Causal Contribution
Thad Botham
tbotham@nd.edu
In the spirit and on the shoulders of Roderick Chisholm, I carve out my own theory of causal contribution. After
advancing the best of Chisholm’s fundamental definitions, I entertain a sequence of unpublished objections each of
which I either meet by mending the account’s defects or undermine by showing how it misfires. The result is my
account. I then show how one armed with my account could respond to a few published objections against an
earlier version of Chisholm’s theory.
Is Aquinas’ NLM Guilty of Methodological Atheism?
Craig Boyd
craig.boyd@greenville.edu
Edward Vacek has argued that the inevitable result of NLM is an approach to Christian ethics that operates under
the rubric of “methodological atheism.” Since it is human nature which determines the content of morality, and
not a divine command, God becomes a superfluous theoretical construct to NLM. If Vacek’s criticism of Aquinas is
correct, then it means that NLM does not seem to be a viable option for a Christian ethicist. However, if Vacek is
wrong, then it appears that NLM remains an attractive position for the Christian. In this paper, I argue that Vacek
is fundamentally mistaken in his interpretation of Aquinas, and that Aquinas’ NLM appeals to God both as a final
cause as well as being the creative ground for the natural creature’s participation in the eternal law.
On George Berkeley as a Christian Apologist
Costica Bradatan
cb277@cornell.edu
This paper is an attempt at considering George Berkeley (1685-1753)’s thought from the standpoint of the
Christian apologetic tradition, and its objective is to show that one of the roots of Berkeley’s thought could be
found precisely in this tradition. Though this is not a paper dedicated to what might be called Berkeley’s theology,
references will nevertheless be made here and there to some of Berkeley’s theological ideas and arguments. The
paper has two large parts: 1) the first part is dedicated to delineating the broader philosophical framework within
which a discussion of Berkeley’s apologetics should to be placed. More specifically, this part will deal with the
special relationship that theism bears, in Berkeley’s system, to his immaterialism; and 2) the second part deals with
Alciphron as an apologetic writing, in an attempt to place this book in the tradition of Christian apologetics. This
part also discusses some of the rhetorical tools resorted to by Berkeley when fighting against free-thinkers, and the
“pragmatism” of Berkeley’s apologetics.
The Dilemma of Divine Simplicity and Divine Freedom
David Bradshaw
dbradsh@uky.edu
One of the most problematic aspects of traditional western theism is the doctrine of divine simplicity. Whether it is
compatible with divine freedom has long been debated, most recently by Stump and Kretzmann (who defend compatibility)
and their critics. A less-noticed but closely related issue is whether it is compatible with the freedom of creatures. I argue
that the western version of the doctrine fails on both counts. However, the Greek Fathers offer a way of understanding
divine simplicity that is equally traditional but far more flexible, in that it posits a fundamental distinction between the
essence of God and the divine activities or operations. I argue that their version can successfully meet the challenge of both
divine and creaturely freedom, and is therefore preferable to its western counterpart.
Is Petitionary Prayer Superfluous?
Isaac Choi
ichoi@nd.edu
I examine several recently proposed solutions to the question of whether petitionary prayer is superfluous, including
arguments offered by Thomas Flint, Eleonore Stump, Michael Murray, and Kurt Meyers. I argue that their reasons, while
they may be useful to varying degrees in understanding petitionary prayer, are ultimately not fully adequate to explain
why an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good God would act differently if petitionary prayers were offered. Then I
offer my own proposal that God may have reasons to not always strive to maximize a creature's good, even in a sinless
world, and that prayer may be a means God has instituted to systematically increase our faith and trust in him.
Open Theism, Divine Sustenance, and Human Freedom
John Churchill
j-churchill@philosophy.tamu.edu
Open theism is a theological position which holds, among other tenets, that God lacks comprehensive knowledge of the
future. While there are many typical criticisms of this position, it is generally conceded that the open view regarding
divine knowledge is completely compatible with human free will. I argue in this paper, however, that once God’s
sustaining activity is properly considered, this apparent compatibility is lost: the open theist has no resources for
explaining how divine sustenance and human freedom, in the libertarian sense, are co-tenable. I then suggest that
Molinism, while not without difficulties, at least possesses an explanatory resource that could potentially harmonize
plausible accounts of both divine sustenance and human freedom.
A Tale of Two Deities
Kelly James Clark
kclark@calvin.edu
In this essay I argue that both classical and open theism offer plausible accounts of the Biblical data; neither has any
special (conclusive or demonstrable) claim to being the best interpretation of Holy writ. I show some of the many
extra-Biblical assumptions that are required to make those judgments and the effect of making such assumptions on
the probability of their interpretation. Each assumption reduces the probability of either view given the biblical
text as data and all of the assumptions together reduce the probability of each to less than .5. Nonetheless both
views could be rationally permissible (if not required by the Biblical data). I end with a plea for peace.
Is the Argument from Gratuitous Evil Neutral Between Moral Theories?
Aaron Cobb
cobbad@slu.edu
One of the most difficult challenges to the belief that an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect God exists is
the certainty with which theists and atheists alike agree that there exist instances of gratuitous evil. The argument
from gratuitous evil (AGE) is predicated upon the existence of these horrendous evils and a virtually uncontested
moral premise. Some theists defend their belief in God by questioning the claim that there are instances of
gratuitous evil while others question the moral premise underwriting the argument. In the following I argue that
this moral premise is not neutral between moral theories and does not necessarily capture the necessary conditions
of morality. The logical space created by my analysis allows room for theists to construct a sophisticated defense of
belief in the existence of God.
Why Machines Deserve Respect, Too
Scott Davison
s.davison@morehead-st.edu
Many years have passed now since Immanuel Kant argued famously that only persons deserve respect. Recently, it
has become commonplace to reject Kant’s claim by insisting that at least some non-human animals deserve respect,
too. In this paper, I argue that once we get clear about the nature of intrinsic value, it is hard to resist the conclusion
that machines are intrinsically valuable, too. This provides a prima facie reason for preserving machines and treating
them with respect, and also suggests that our “throw away” society could use a revival of the art of machine repair.
Four Complaints about The Openness of God
Jeanine Diller Murphy
jdillermurphy@earthlink.net
I raise and explore four complaints about the seminal work of open theism, The Openness of God, which are
complaints about open theism in general, insofar as the book represents the view. I am concerned that open theism
is not carefully formulated; that it is not a genuine alternative to classical theism, as promised; that it should go
further in challenging the view that God is perfect; and that it focuses too much on divine providence and
foreknowledge, to the exclusion of other important relations God bears to us.
Molinism and 4-D Ontology
Alicia Finch
fincham@slu.edu
Those who subscribe to the Molinist theory of divine providence hold that God is both entirely providential (i.e., that
he specifically ordains each detail of life on earth) and that agents engage in acts that are free in the most robust
sense—i.e., they are free in the sense of “free” that only the most ardent libertarian would endorse. It is often assumed
that the second component of the view—
that agents are robustly free—requires a rejection of the 4-dimensionalist ontology, according to which all times are
“equally real” and an enduring agent is composed of “temporal parts” that exist for short periods of time. In this paper,
I will argue that there is no reason for the Molinist to reject a 4-D ontology and that, in fact, if she were to embrace
such an ontology, it would be somewhat helpful to her. That is, I will end with the suggestion that by embracing a 4-D
ontology, the Molinist might be able to take some of the edge off the classic “grounding objection” to Molinism.
Further Misgivings about Open Theism: Hasker’s “Antinomies” Revisited
R. Douglas Geivett
douggeivett@biola.edu
For the past several months, William Hasker and I have been engaged in what we agree has been an enjoyable and
profitable discussion about the comparative merits and deficiencies of molinism and open theism. The substance of our
discussion has been published in the two most recent issues of the journal Philosophia Christi. In the latest installment,
“Counterfactuals and Evil: A Final Reply to Geivett,” Hasker takes a bold new step in his formulation of the
“grounding objection,” suggesting that all statements expressing counterfactuals of human freedom are false, and
necessarily so. He then returns to his original claim that open theism provides a more satisfactory response than
molinism to some aspects of the problem of evil, extending his defense of this thesis. In this paper I offer an initial
response to the more substantive elements in Hasker’s most recent contribution on these topics, and register further
misgivings about open theism at this stage in our discussion. I conclude, as before, that “Hasker’s confidence in the
openness of God proposal outstrips the case that he has so far made on behalf of this theory.”
Taking the Helm: Connections Between Bonhoeffer, Open Theism and Atheism
James Gould
jgould@mchenry.edu
The theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer is robustly Christian and is deeply rooted in classical Christology and
Lutheran orthodoxy. At the same time it embraces the valid atheist concern for human freedom and responsibility.
Finally, it has striking similarities to open theism. In this paper I explore these connections, concluding that open
theism can answer both atheist critics who reject Christianity for weakening humanity and closed theists who
object that open theism is sub-Christian.
A Compatibicalvinist Demonstrative-Goods Defense
Chris Green
cgreen@nd.edu
Many theists claim that theism can best be defended in the face of evil by stressing that God cannot foreordain, and
maybe cannot even foreknow, free acts. But Calvinists who think freedom and determinism (theological or
otherwise) are compatible will probably not want to do that. I suggest, however, that compatibicalvinists are not
without a defense that can do what the free-will defense claims to do. Rather than stressing the value of freedom as
such, they can stress the value of demonstrative or epistemic goods. This move can defang both the argument from
evil and the motivation that problem gives to open theism or Molinism.
A Critique of the Jumping Animals Account of Resurrection
Jeffrey Green
jgreen@nd.edu
Dean Zimmerman has recently proposed an account of resurrection, the “jumping animal” account, which is
compatible with materialism. His proposal is committed to adopting a closest continuer position, a position that
many are reluctant to accept. Hud Hudson modifies Zimmerman’s view so that he avoids endorsing the closest
continuer position. In this paper, I will offer a criticism that is applicable to both versions of the story. First, I will
briefly recall the pictured offered to us by Zimmerman and Hudson. Second, I will argue that this account is merely
an account of time travel and not one of resurrection. Third, I will explain why it is that Zimmerman and Hudson
fail and propose a necessary condition for cases of resurrection. Finally, I will provide an account of resurrection
that is successful.
Divine Moral Responsibility
Stephen Kershnar
stephen.kershnar@fredonia.edu
In this essay I argue that if God is maximally great, then he is not morally responsible for avoiding evil. I begin by
arguing that if God is maximally great then he is essentially all-good. My argument rests on a consideration of
divine conativism (i.e., God’s motivation comes solely from his desires). If divine conativism is true, then God
can’t be maximally great since divine conativism makes his motivation depend on external events or chance and
this dependence conflicts with maximum greatness. If divine conativism is false, then God’s essential all-goodness
follows from his being essentially both omnipotent and omniscient. I then note that if God is essentially all-good
then he cannot be motivated to do evil. From this it follows that he does not have the power to choose evil and
hence is not morally responsible for avoiding it.
Universalism for Open Theists
Gordon Knight
gordon-knight@uiowa.edu
Of all traditional theological notions, the belief in eternal damnation must rank as the most troublesome and
controversial. Unlike other theological beliefs that may baffle us as intellectual puzzles, Hell, as traditionally
understood, hits us in the heart as a paradoxical immoral and unloving doctrine. For Christians who share this
repulsion at the concept of damnation, universalism has always been an attractive alternative. In this paper I
consider how one might try to present a case for universalism from within the broad theological tent of open
theism. I argue that while some features of open theism render the traditional doctrine of Hell even more open to
moral challenge than they otherwise would be, the respect for human freedom and the denial of middle knowledge
characteristic of open theism also presents problems for a straightforward necessary universalism. In the end I argue
that the most promising approach for open theists is to adopt a hopeful, contingent version of universalism.
Should We Care About Fine-Tuning?
Jeffrey Koperski
koperski@svsu.edu
There is an ongoing debate over cosmological fine-tuning between those holding that design is the best explanation
and those who favor a multiverse. A small group of critics has recently challenged both sides, charging that their
probabilistic intuitions are unfounded. If they are correct, then a growing literature in both philosophy and physics
lacks a mathematical foundation. In this paper, I show that just such a foundation exists. Cosmologists are now
providing the kinds of measure-theoretic arguments needed to make the case for fine-tuning.
Absence of Evidence and Evidence of Absence
Klaas J. Kraay
kraay@ryerson.ca
I argue that the crucial inference in William Rowe’s well-known arguments from evil is best understood as a move
from a claim concerning the absence of evidence of a satisfactory theodicy (relevant to specified cases of horrific
suffering) either to the claim that no such theodicy exists, or to the claim that God does not exist. I next show that
this move succeeds only if it is reasonable to believe that if there were such a theodicy, we would probably know it. I
concede that there may be limited prima facie support for this claim via the principle of credulity, but I next
consider and reject four more ambitious arguments in favour of this probability-claim. I conclude, then, that the
necessary condition on Rowe’s crucial inference has not been shown to be satisfied.
Occasionalism and the Necessary Connection Argument
Louis Mancha
lmancha@ashland.edu
Defenders of occasionalism are committed to a strong view of providence, whereby God not only creates and conserves
each thing at all times, but is causally active in nature over and above His act(s) of creation and conservation. This
“additional” causal activity drives the occasionalist position that nothing else can operate in nature besides God. In
this paper I analyze one of the main arguments for occasionalism––the Necessary Connection Argument (NCA)––and
show that there are not only good reasons to think that the main premise is false, but that the argument can be turned
against the occasionalist with respect to their supposed commitment to the strong view of providence.
Born of the Virgin Mary
George I. Mavrodes
gimav@umich.edu
Who did Jesus look like? This paper is a speculative exploration of the coherence and relation of three elements:
the doctrine of the virgin birth of Jesus, the creedal claim that Jesus was fully human, and a modern understanding
of human genetics. The first of these elements implies that no sexual intercourse was involved in the conception
and birth of Jesus. The second implies that Jesus had a full genome appropriate for a human being. The third
generates a question about the provenance and content of one half of that genome. I suggest that the physical
representation—that is, the physical chromosomes—of that half of Jesus’ genome may well have been divinely
created at the time of conception. But the informational content of that particular genome must have been
appropriate for a human being. That is, it must have been in large part a match, or maybe a perfect match, for the
partial genome that could have been contributed by some actual male person. I end with the suggestion that there
is a person who would seem to be a rather salient candidate for that role.
What’s Wrong with Homosexual Relationships?
Caleb Miller
cmiller.2@messiah.edu
I argue that homosexual relationships are morally deficient because, lacking a biological connection to procreation,
they tend to be promiscuous, and because mores approving of homosexual relationships tend to undermine the
capacity of human communities to sustain a robust institution of heterosexual marriage.
God, Fine-tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence
Bradley Monton
bmonton@uky.edu
The fundamental constants of the universe seem fine-tuned for life, in that a small change in the fundamental
constants would result in a universe that is not life-permitting. Many theists take this to be evidence for the existence
of an intelligent designer, God, who created the universe and picked the constants to be what they are. I will show
that, when put in the proper probabilistic framework, the fine-tuning argument is not very strong. For some people, it
will lead to an increase of the subjective probability they assign to the proposition that God exists, but for many
others, it will not.
Simple and Free: The Need for Divine Simplicity
Jack Mulder Jr.
mulderjr@purdue.edu
William L. Rowe argues that theism is presented with the following dilemma: Either God's perfection necessitates
the creation of the best possible world, in which case, God’s action is not free, or God fails to create the best
possible world and fails to be unsurpassably perfect. I am persuaded that his argument for the second horn is sound
and that the argument for the first horn would be were it not for Rowe’s holding an unduly narrow conception of
free agency. My focus in this paper is to present an argument according to which, given Rowe's analysis, only
divine simplicity offers hope for rehabilitating the theistic conception of God. Since simplicity can resolve the
dilemma, the battle between Rowe and theists accordingly becomes a stalemate, owing to differing intuitions about
what counts as a free agent.
The God of Abraham, Isaac and (William) James
David Paulsen
david_paulsen@byu.edu
The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob has often been distinguished from “the god of the philosophers.” William
James, American pragmatist, rejected the latter because he found it devoid of significant practical meaning. In this
paper, I set out by clarifying James’s criterion of pragmatic meaning, then sketch his arguments against the god of
the philosophers based thereon, and, finally, show that the God who survives James’s critique seems very much like
the “God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.”
Vagueness and Divine Freedom
Allen Plug
aplug4@naz.edu
Christians hold that God freely performs certain acts. Christians also maintain that God is omnipotent, omniscient,
and perfectly good. But these attributes seem to entail that God necessarily performs the best act. But if God acts
out of necessity then God is not free. In this paper I explore a strategy the Christian could use to avoid this apparent
contradiction. I also defend this strategy from objections that William Rowe and Edward Wierenga have raised
against similar strategies.
Exploring Soft Compatibilism
Scott Ragland
raglandc@slu.edu
Soft Compatibilism says that determinism by natural forces is compatible with freedom and moral responsibility,
but that determinism by superpowerful designers (like God) eliminates freedom. I propose that freedom requires us
to have ultimate control over our actions, and that ultimate control requires our purposes be the most fundamental
intentional explanations of our action. This entails soft compatibilism, because control by other agents would
undermine the explanatory ultimacy of our purposes, but natural determinism would not. I defend the proposal
against some criticisms and then consider some further problems for it.
An Openist Understanding of Divine Risk and Intervention
James D. Rissler
rissler.1@nd.edu
Based on the Openist claim that God’s general purpose in creating was to bring persons into freely loving relationships
with Him, I argue that Openists should not expect God to frequently intervene in the world in a unilateral and
coercive manner. While God’s frequent intervention in this way might allow Him to ensure that specific events occur
soon after His intervention, He could not know the long-term effects of this intervention, and thus would be taking
the risk that His intervention would negatively effect the chances that people would freely choose to love Him. I
suggest that in light of this risk, it is preferable to see God’s project of bringing us into freely loving relationships with
Him primarily in terms of an invitation to do so without any effort to ensure that we do so. This view provides what I
find to be a plausible response to the charge that God risks too much in creating a world in which so much evil is
possible, and in doing so explains why we should not expect God to coercively intervene in the world.
Divine Providence, Simple Foreknowledge, and the ‘Metaphysical Principle’
Michael Robinson
mrobsinso@cumberlandcollege.edu
In this essay, I challenge David P. Hunt’s defense of the utility of simple foreknowledge for divine providence
against the Metaphysical Principle. This principle asserts that circular causal loops are impossible. Hunt agrees
with this principle but maintains that so long as the deity does not use simple foreknowledge in such a way that
causal loops unfold, the Metaphysical Principle in not violated. I argue that Hunt’s position still allows for the
possibility of such causal loops and this itself is a breach of the Metaphysical Principle.
No Best World?--No Problem
William Rued
rued@pitt.edu
William Rowe argues that if for every creatable world there is a better creatable world, then God (a supremely perfect
being) does not exist. He bases his argument on the following principle: If an omniscient being creates a world when
there is a better world that it could have created, then it is possible that there exist a being morally better than it. I
attempt to refute this principle by drawing on Pascal’s doctrine of orders. If the story I tell about the relations of
relative goodness among creatable worlds is coherent, then Rowe’s principle is not a necessary truth, as his argument
requires, and the so-called “problem of no best world” is not a problem for the traditional theist.
Criticisms of Open Theism: Core Concepts and Basic Replies
John Sanders and David Woodruff
jsanders@huntington.edu
In this Paper we seek to show several places where a proper understanding of the core concepts affirmed by open
theists would avoid a great number of erroneous criticisms and make possible a more fruitful discussion of genuine
difficulties that open theism faces. After a brief explanation of some these core concepts we apply them to a series
of criticisms which we have organized according to four basic types.
The Actual World and Open Theism
Walter Schultz
wschultz@bethel.edu
Taking Alvin Plantinga’s metaphysics of modality (PR ) for granted - in particular the idea that a possible world is a
temporally invariant state of affairs - I specify and explore the incompatibilities between PR and Open Theism.
Among the salient “theorems” of PR are:
(1) The actual world is temporally maximal, and
(2) There are true counterfactuals of freedom.
Furthermore, given two entailed (?) emendations of PR , we also have:
(3) Truth is a 1 - 1 onto function whose domain is the collection T of true propositions and whose range is the
collection A of states of affairs constituting the actual world.
From whence it follows that
(4) There are no grounds to take states of affairs to be “truth-makers”.
The upshot of all this, is that if one adopts Plantinga’s metaphysics, the actual world is “closed” in many ways to
Open Theism.
How Libertarianism Entails Open Theism (and Why That’s Okay)
James Sennett
jsennett@lccs.edu
This paper has both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that non-Calvinists have nothing to
fear from open theism. I believe that the resistance to open theism in non-Calvinist traditions is due largely to
several key misunderstandings of the doctrine and its implications. I identify and clear up some of these
misconceptions in the first part of the paper. Such pacification of fears prepares the way for an unagitated hearing
of the positive thesis – that libertarianism in the free will/determinism debate entails an open view of the future
which, coupled with an assumption of the truth of theism, entails open theism. Therefore, the commitment to
libertarianism common to many forms of non-Calvinist Christianity requires a commitment to open theism on pain
of irrationality. I present and defend a formal argument to this conclusion.
Aquinas on Human Freedom and Divine Sovereignty
J. Michael Tilley
jtilley@uky.edu
In this paper, I defend a particular account of human freedom. This account draws heavily from Aquinas’
description of the relationship between God’s providential control and human free choices of the will. It is claimed
that all the important features of human freedom – self-determination, intentionality, spontaneity, and
responsibility – can be maintained without rendering God passive in either his will or his knowledge. God is not
passive in either of these respects because neither his actions nor the content of his knowledge depend on anything
that we may do. Rather both depend entirely on those truths that are logically necessary in addition to those truths
that are the result of God’s free actions.
An Open-Theism Friendly Defense of Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples
From the Kane-Widerker Objection
Kevin Timpe
timpekl@slu.edu
In “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Harry Frankfurt introduced an example that was supposed to
show that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), i.e., the doctrine that alternative possibilities are
necessary for an agent being free or having moral responsibility, is false. A number of incompatibilists, including
Robert Kane and David Widerker, have argued that Frankfurt stories show the falsity of PAP only if they
presuppose the truth of causal determinism, thereby begging the question against the incompatibilist. Recently,
Michael Bergmann has developed a Frankfurt story based on the possibility of middle knowledge that avoids this
objection. In this paper, I develop a Frankfurt story which, like Bergmann’s avoids the incompatibilist’s objection.
Unlike Bergmann’s example, however, the counterexample I develop does not depend on the possibility of middle
knowledge, and is thus compatible with a wider range of options in philosophical theology.
The Prayer of the Molinist
Patrick Toner
pjt5c@virginia.edu
In this paper, I press an objection against Molinism drawn from the work of Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, OP.
The objection, in brief, is that the Church’s great spiritual directors—including those who theoretically accept
Molinism—tend to direct souls to pray as though the Molinist account of grace were false. This suggests (though it
does not prove) that Molinism is false. In the course of presenting this objection, I show that Thomas Flint’s
discussion of this “Power of Prayer” objection is inadequate. However, in the paper’s second section, I argue that
because the notion of physical premotion, which is central to Garrigou-Lagrange’s own account of Providence,
implicitly denies the reality of secondary causation, his theory is not adequate either. I suggest (after arguing that
Congruism is not merely a species of Molinism), that Congruism avoids both problems and so is preferable to either
Thomism or Molinism.
The Narrow and Wide Roads to Open Theism
Dale Tuggy
tuggy@fredonia.edu
Open theists agree that God lacks what is normally called comprehensive foreknowledge, but why believe this?
Open theists, as exemplified by William Hasker and Gregory Boyd, answer in two ways, which I call the narrow and
wide roads to open theism, respectively. Here I argue that (1) the narrow road faces a serious difficulty about
omniscience which doesn’t arise for the wide road, (2) the wide road is well-motivated and appealing given certain
philosophical assumptions, and (3) criticisms of the wide road by William Lane Craig are uniformly questionbegging.
Hartshorne’s Panentheism and the Open View of God
Donald Wayne Viney
rviney@cox.net
The shared content of Charles Hartshorne’s dipolar theism and open theism is God’s openness to creaturely
influence. Open theists join Hartshorne in rejecting the idea of God as an immutable, impassible, and timeless
absolute. Open theists do not, as a rule, follow Hartshorne’s idea that the world is, after a fashion, the body of God.
According to Hartshorne, the world-soul analogy for God is the account that best preserves God’s sympathetic
relation to the creatures while insuring that God remain the radical superior partner in the relationship. The
question raised here is the adequacy of a genuinely open view of God that does not embrace the notion of divine
embodiment in the world. The apparent problems that panentheism pose for open theism may not be
insurmountable, especially if open theists adopt the Thomistic idea that God could have created ex nihilo, a
universe without beginning.
Is Hope Adequate for Religious Faith?
Rico Vitz
ricovitz@yahoo.com
Some philosophers of religion (e.g., Creel, Muyskens, Pojman) defend the thesis that hope is adequate for religious
faith even in the absence of belief. Alexander Pruss offers an argument, which I will call the Moral Commitment
Argument (MCA), that is intended to refute this thesis. In this paper, I will attempt to demonstrate two
points—first, that MCA fails, and second, that the debate about whether hope is adequate for religious faith will
not be fruitful unless we recognize and clarify the ambiguous notion of adequacy.
Newcomb’s Puzzle and Compatibilism/Incompatibilism
about Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom
Jeffrey Yim
jffym@yahoo.com
William Lane Craig believes that a certain modified Newcomb scenario nicely illustrates the compatibility of
divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In this paper, I argue that he is wrong about this. The modified
Newcomb scenario seems to be more of an illustration of incompatibilism about divine foreknowledge and human
freedom. But, for reasons to be discussed, it is not an illustration that incompatibilists will want to use. My overall
conclusion is that the modified Newcomb scenario has no illustrative value.
inside you the time moves and she don't fade
the ghost in you she don't fade | | Back to Top | | |
|
Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 11/11/2003 1:29 PM (GMT -6) | | Thanks, Laika. Several of these look really interesting to me. Most notably:
quote:
A Tale of Two Deities
Kelly James Clark
kclark@calvin.edu
In this essay I argue that both classical and open theism offer plausible accounts of the Biblical data; neither has any special (conclusive or demonstrable) claim to being the best interpretation of Holy writ. I show some of the many extra-Biblical assumptions that are required to make those judgments and the effect of making such assumptions on the probability of their interpretation. Each assumption reduces the probability of either view given the biblical text as data and all of the assumptions together reduce the probability of each to less than .5. Nonetheless both views could be rationally permissible (if not required by the Biblical data). I end with a plea for peace.
Clark is an important Christian philosopher, and it is nice to see him take a mediating position in the OT debate.
quote:
The Actual World and Open Theism
Walter Schultz
wschultz@bethel.edu
Taking Alvin Plantinga’s metaphysics of modality (PR ) for granted - in particular the idea that a possible world is a temporally invariant state of affairs - I specify and explore the incompatibilities between PR and Open Theism. Among the salient “theorems” of PR are:
(1) The actual world is temporally maximal, and
(2) There are true counterfactuals of freedom.
Furthermore, given two entailed (?) emendations of PR , we also have:
(3) Truth is a 1 - 1 onto function whose domain is the collection T of true propositions and whose range is the collection A of states of affairs constituting the actual world.
From whence it follows that
(4) There are no grounds to take states of affairs to be “truth-makers”.
The upshot of all this, is that if one adopts Plantinga’s metaphysics, the actual world is “closed” in many ways to Open Theism.
The issue here bears on the "grounding objection" to Molinism, to which Craig has recently responded by challenging the notion of "truth-makers". I think Craig is wrong, and this paper may indicate what the faulty assumption is. I think it is the shift from "a possible world is a temporally invariant state of affairs" to (1) "the actual world is temporally maximal". The latter doesn't follow from the former unless one assumes what Richard Purtill has called the "atemporality of truth".
quote:
How Libertarianism Entails Open Theism (and Why That’s Okay)
James Sennett
jsennett@lccs.edu
This paper has both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis is that non-Calvinists have nothing to fear from open theism. I believe that the resistance to open theism in non-Calvinist traditions is due largely to several key misunderstandings of the doctrine and its implications. I identify and clear up some of these misconceptions in the first part of the paper. Such pacification of fears prepares the way for an unagitated hearing of the positive thesis – that libertarianism in the free will/determinism debate entails an open view of the future which, coupled with an assumption of the truth of theism, entails open theism. Therefore, the commitment to
libertarianism common to many forms of non-Calvinist Christianity requires a commitment to open theism on pain of irrationality. I present and defend a formal argument to this conclusion.
I have made this very argument a couple of time on this board. It is nice to see another scholar articulate the same point.
Wish I could go to the conference. 
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/11/2003 4:36 PM (GMT -6) | | Yeah, some of those papers look good! How likely is it that an author would email a copy of the paper if requested? Are ETS people NICE people? 
I thought this was funny…
quote:
Open Theism, Divine Sustenance, and Human Freedom
John Churchill
j-churchill@philosophy.tamu.edu
“Open theism is a theological position which holds, among other tenets, that God lacks comprehensive knowledge of the future.”
Makes me just scratch my head in wonder.
Tom  | | Back to Top | | |
|
Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 11/12/2003 6:05 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
How likely is it that an author would email a copy of the paper if requested? Are ETS people NICE people?
I think there's a good chance that you would get copies, Tom. I plan to email a couple of the participants myself. Whether ETS people in general are nice or not, I suppose most of them are, even if they are trying to can Sanders. But this conference is not ETS, its SCP (Society of Christian Philosophers).
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
|
Blood Washed Heretic
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 167
| Posted 11/12/2003 7:04 AM (GMT -6) | | Dr. Sennett, whose paper is "How Libertarianism Entails Open Theism (And Why That's Okay)", is my mentor!!!
In fact, he's officiating my wedding the weekend before this conference. He was the first to open (hehe) my eyes to the possibility that openness is actually a good thing. I'll have to see if I can tag along with him to this, a lot of those papers sound fascinating...
Doc (Sennett, not Boyd) is actually a huge follower of Plantinga (he wrote the article on Plantinga in the Oxford Dictionary), so I wonder what he'll think of the paper declaring modality and open theism inconsistent with each other.
Man, cool cool stuff, now I gotta email the man!
In essentials, unity; In matters of opinion, liberty; In all things, love. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Master of Time and Space
Registered Member
Date Joined Nov 2003
Total Posts : 1
| Posted 11/20/2003 9:58 AM (GMT -6) | | | I don’t know how many here are in the Minneapolis area, but anyone in the region is welcome to come to Walter Schultz’s presentation of his paper, “The Actual World and Open Theism,” at Bethel Seminary on Tuesday, November 25th at 4:30PM. He may have copies of his paper available there, too, but don’t hold me to that. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 11/25/2003 1:08 PM (GMT -6) | | I send out 6 requests for papers, and have gotten 4 replies so far. All, with the possible exception of James Sennett, have specifically requested that their papers NOT be cited, so I can't post or quote from them here, but that doesn't mean that the IDEAS in the papers can't be discussed. In the next few weeks, as my time permits, I plan to pose some of the issues that are raised in the papers I've gotten so far.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
|
Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 11/25/2003 1:18 PM (GMT -6) | | OK, here's the first issue. James Sennett suggests in a footnote that "open theism" is not, perhaps, the best name for the view because "open" doesn't really qualify the kind of theism, but the status of the future. Thus he suggests that a better name might be the "open future" view.
What do the rest of you think?
One thought I had was that the open view is a view on the nature of divine providence. So perhaps another name could be the "open providence" view?
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/25/2003 6:39 PM (GMT -6) | | Laika: I've been trying to get ahold of a csci paper (Fuzzy Logic and Counterfactuals) from one of the authors and have had no success. (E-mailed twice, is three times considered nagging?)
Tom: I didn't see this paper in the list of papers above, though I'd love to get it as well. If you email me his address, Lakia, I'll give him a try too.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/25/2003 6:49 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan: here's the first issue. James Sennett suggests in a footnote that "open theism" is not, perhaps, the best name for the view because "open" doesn't really qualify the kind of theism, but the status of the future. Thus he suggests that a better name might be the "open future" view. What do the rest of you think?
One thought I had was that the open view is a view on the nature of divine providence. So perhaps another name could be the "open providence" view?
Tom: Hi Alan. I think it's too late to affect any sort of official change now. The snow ball is charging down the mountainside. I prefer the "Open View." Not sure relabbeling it after a particular view of providence works because you have people who are equally openness regarding the future but who have very different views of providence. Note our own Mephi as an example. I'd think it ought to be called something that captures what is fundamentally agreed upon by those who hold the view, and while I think all open theists agree that there's a sense in which certain takes on providence are ruled out given the open view, I'm not so certain we all agree on just what IS "the open view of providence" (or whehter there is an "open view" of providence).
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/28/2003 2:30 AM (GMT -6) | | Just finished Dr. James Sennett’s paper “How Libertarianism Entails Open Theism (and Why That's Okay)” to be presented at next week’s SPC meeting in Kentucky. It’s a very nice paper. And though it’s not really fair to discuss it without you all not having a copy, perhaps those of you who have read it would want to discuss it.
I like the way he chose to address the three most common “bugbears” regarding the open view (i.e., that we deny omniscience, that we deny sovereignty, and that we deny assurance). He said some very nice things about sovereignty and divine self-limitation. But what concerned me were his comments about omniscience. For example:
quote:
Open theism is not a doctrine about what God knows; it is a doctrine about what is true. Specifically, it is a doctrine that any claims about free actions performed in the future currently have no truth value, and therefore cannot be known – by God or by anybody else. Of course, there are typically true propositions about the possibility and probability of certain actions being performed, and God, being omniscient, knows all of these.
Now, I agree that open theism is not primarily about what God knows but rather about what is true. The approach we’ve been arguing endlessly on the “indeterminacy logic” thread assumes this is the case. But I wouldn’t agree that “any claims about free actions performed in the future currently have no truth value and therefore cannot be known by God.” Oh my. On the contrary, any future-tense proposition describing a future free choice or event has truth-value and is known by God to be either true or false (and in the case of libertarian choices is by definition false unless we want to continue calling decisions made compatibilistically as a result of a freely chosen forfeiture of libertarian free will “libertarian” [which is fine by me]). No need to rehash what the three possible propositions describing future events are. Point is, either Sennett denies bivalence, or he hasn’t though through the logic of indeterminacy. There’s no need to deny that future-tense propositions describing ANY event, libertarian or not, are bivalent.
Alan and Doc, we gotta get our act together on this indeterminacy logic and GET IT OUT THERE!
What sort of propositions does Sennett argue have no truth value? He explains:
quote:
Not even the most orthodox of theists will suggest that God knows, for example, that 2 + 2 = 7 or that Omaha is the capital of Nebraska. He does not know these claims because they are false. Of course, God knows of these claims that they are false. That is, he knows their denials.
Sounds like he affirms bivalence. So far so good. But wait for the very next sentence:
quote:
But consider the claim that procrastination drinks tea or that colorless green ideas sleep furiously. God does not know these claims or their denials, since neither they nor their denials have any truth value.
One actually could argue that such meaningless propositions DO have a truth value and that they are false. But even if we admit that such meaningless propositions possess no truth value whatsoever, I still think Sennett is wrong, for likens future-tense propositions describing libertarian choices and events to meaningless propositions like “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.” Here the indeterminacy logic we’ve been constructing takes a very different approach than Sennett is arguing to dispelling the misconception that open theists deny omniscience. I claim we don’t dispel the misconception by arguing that future tense propositions describing free acts, like “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously,” posses no truth value and so are not known by God. On the contrary, all future tense propositions (that are grammatically sound and not incoherent babble like “colorless green ideas”) possess truth value and are known by God.
I’d differ with yet another of Sennett’s paragraphs:
quote:
The third bugbear is that open theism denies assurance. That is, if open theism is true, then doctrines like promise/fulfillment and God’s protection of his people are in jeopardy. The idea seems to be that, unless God knows exactly what the future holds, he cannot guarantee that he will be able to deal with the future to bring about his will. But this is a non sequitur of the highest order. An omniscient and omnipotent God need not know actualities in order to guarantee the future; he need know only possibilities.
Maybe I’m nit-picking, but I’d take issue with the last sentence. Claiming that an omniscient and omnipotent God “need not know actualities” but “only [italics mine] possibilities” in order to guarantee the future doesn’t really dispel the misconception Sennett is addressing. First, “actualities” isn’t the right word at all (I don’t think), for “actualities” are by definition present tense, and Sennett is arguing what may be known about the FUTURE in order for a being to be sovereign. My guess is that by “actualities” Sennett means “certainties” (or events the obtaining of which is “determinately the case”). Secondly, it’s not a choice between God knowing—as Sennett says—“only” certainties as opposed to “only” possibilities that constitutes the misconception needing to be dispelled here, but rather whether or not a God who knows possibilities “in addition to” knowing certainties can guarantee that his purposes are ultimately achieved. Sennett only gives us two alternatives: God either knows the future as exhaustively settled (“only actualities) or exhaustively open (“only possibilities”), and he seems to suggest (though I doubt he believes) that open theism argues the latter. But no open theist argues God knows “only” possibilities regarding the future. But there is a third alternative. Partially settled and partially open. Both are true, but only because neither is “exhaustively” the case.
But he did call Doc an “open theist extraordinaire” so I have to agree with him there!
Later,
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
chestertonian
Registered Member
Date Joined Nov 2003
Total Posts : 31
| Posted 11/28/2003 2:59 AM (GMT -6) | | | Am I right in thinking that if free will (in the libertarian sense) is logically incoherent, that would produce difficulties for open theism? | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/28/2003 6:10 AM (GMT -6) | | chestertonian:Am I right in thinking that if free will (in the libertarian sense) is logically incoherent, that would produce difficulties for open theism?
Tom: It would do more than create difficulties for open theism. If you can prove that self-determining free will is logically incoherent, then you will have completely and utterly destroyed open theism, Molinism, and all forms of Arminianism, for all these maintain libertarian free will.
Go for it.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/28/2003 9:37 AM (GMT -6) | | Laika: There is no wrong or right thinking, just the results of physical processes.
Tom: Now that's funny!
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 11/28/2003 12:01 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: I agree that open theism is not primarily about what God knows but rather about what is true. The approach we’ve been arguing endlessly on the “indeterminacy logic” thread assumes this is the case. But I wouldn’t agree that “any claims about free actions performed in the future currently have no truth value and therefore cannot be known by God.” Oh my. On the contrary, any future-tense proposition describing a future free choice or event has a truth-value and is known by God to be either true or false. ... There’s no need to deny that future-tense propositions describing ANY event, libertarian or not, are bivalent.
Alan: I agree with you, Tom. Though I have some new thoughts on this issue sparked by an email conversation I've been having with Dale Tuggy, a Christian philosopher and open theist who is delivering one of the papers at this conference. Dale construes open theism, like Sennett, as the view that propositions about future contingents are neither true nor false. Thus he denies bivalence, but doesn't think that's a problem. When I described in summary fashion our indeterminacy logic, though, his reaction was and probably still is quite skeptical. On his view, if one affirms bivalence, then either "Craig does go to the movies tomorrow" D(c,m,t) or he does not, since D(c,m,t) and not-D(c,m,t) are contradictories. Which means, he argues, that our indeterminacy logic is inconsistent. I pointed out in response that his argument assumes that D(c,not-m,t) is equivalent to not-D(c,m,t). But that is something an indeterminacy logician would deny since not-D(c,m,t) is consistent with both D(c,not-m,t) and "It is indeterminate whether Craig goes to the movies tomorrow."
So Dale hasn't refuted indeterminacy logic. But what his objection reveals is that many otherwise sympathetic philosophers are trying to express open theism from within the frame of reference established by what is perhaps the philosophically "orthodox" understanding of these notions, whereas we are trying to express open theism from within a frame of reference that deliberately and explicitly treats indeterminacy as a real ontological possibility. As is often true in physics, one frame of reference can be transformed to the other, provided we are willing to make suitable modifications in our usage of key terms like "truth", "actual world", etc. Shifting from frame of reference to the other, however, requires something like a Gestalt shift.
What I am suggesting is that there are (at least) two ways to cash out open theism. One way is to affirm what Richard Purtill has called the "temporal invariance" of truth values and deny bivalence. Dale and Sennett pursue this approach. Another way is to deny the temporal invariance of truth values and affirm bivalence. You, me, and Doc have been pursuing this approach. In the first case reality is supposed to be fully determinate one way or the other (i.e., for all states of affairs S, either Z(S) or Z~(S)), and we accommodate indeterminacy by positing three truth values (T, F, and I). In the second case reality is supposed to be partly indeterminate (i.e., for all states of affairs S, either Z(S), Z~(S), or Q(S)), and we have only two truth values (T and F). Both of these approaches are, it seems to me, different ways of trying to say the same thing. So the choice of one over the other is more one of convenience than substance. Do we want to talk as if indeterminacy resides in the truth of propositions, or in the nature or reality? I think we would both agree that the latter approach is the one we should adopt because it makes clear, as the former approach does not, that the issues in question are metaphysical and not merely semantic or epistemic.
Tom: One actually could argue that such meaningless propositions DO have a truth value and that they are false. But even if we admit that such meaningless propositions possess no truth value whatsoever, I still think Sennett is wrong, for he likens future-tense propositions describing libertarian choices and events to meaningless propositions like “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.”
Alan: Good point, Tom. Future contingent propositions like "Craig will go to the movies tomorrow" are, I think, obviously meaningful. If so, then Sennett's examples are either irrelevant to the issue of open theism, or misconstrue open theism. My take on statements like "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously" is that they do not express propositions at all and, for that reason, have no truth value.
Tom: Claiming that an omniscient and omnipotent God “need not know actualities” but “only [italics mine] possibilities” in order to guarantee the future doesn’t really dispel the misconception Sennett is addressing. First, “actualities” isn’t the right word at all (I don’t think), for “actualities” are by definition present tense, and Sennett is arguing what may be known about the FUTURE in order for a being to be sovereign. My guess is that by “actualities” Sennett means “certainties” (or events the obtaining of which is “determinately the case”).
Alan: I agree with you, Tom, that "actualities" is, at the very least, an awkward word to use, but it may not be "technically" incorrect. You see, in reading Dale's paper and in my discussions with him, it has come to my attention that many analytic philosophers define a possible world as a not only a maximal state of affairs, but also a temporally maximal state of affairs. (Nota bene: this move presupposes the temporal invariance of truth values.) On this view, all possible worlds contain a complete and fully settled timeline. The "actual world" is then taken to be one of these possible worlds. Now, given this usage, an open theist like Dale has to say that since the future is partly open our world is not an actual world. On this view there is, now, no actual world. Now that sounds like a very bizarre thing to say, but keep in mind the way the terms have been defined and it (kinda) makes sense. Sennett may be using "actualities" in this strange, philosophical jargon sense. If so, then his claim is technically correct, thought not expressed in a manner that anybody but a philosopher trained to think that way would understand. Personally, I think we should just reject the idea that truth values are temporally invariant and with it the idea that possible worlds are temporally maximal.
Tom: Secondly, it’s not a choice between God knowing—as Sennett says—“only” certainties as opposed to “only” possibilities that constitutes the misconception needing to be dispelled here, but rather whether or not a God who knows possibilities “in addition to” knowing certainties can guarantee that his purposes are ultimately achieved. Sennett only gives us two alternatives: God either knows the future as exhaustively settled (“only actualities) or exhaustively open (“only possibilities”), and he seems to suggest (though I doubt he believes) that open theism argues the latter.
Alan: Good stuff, Tom. Though, again, he may be using "actualities" and "possibilities" in that weird manner preferred by some philosophers described above. If so, then you and Sennett may in fact agree, though even then you and I would both contend that the idea could be expressed much more clearly.
Adios,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/29/2003 5:04 AM (GMT -6) | | Alan-
I copied some of your reply and moved it over to the "Logic of Indeterminacy" thread, just to keep things together.
Excellent.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/30/2003 10:17 PM (GMT -6) | | Since I quoted from Dr. Sennett's paper on this forum, he has asked me to include a mention that his paper is a work in process and so not yet a finalized expression of his positions.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
|
chestertonian
Registered Member
Date Joined Nov 2003
Total Posts : 31
| Posted 11/30/2003 10:41 PM (GMT -6) | | Laika:
OK, you got me. I should have said 'would it be a relatively accurate map of external circumstances to...' but that just clunks.
Tom:
I'll try disproving free will later. It's early and I'm all slow and dumb. But then...Watch Out!
:)
Regards,
Adam. | | Back to Top | | |
|
Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 11/30/2003 10:52 PM (GMT -6) | | Adam: Tom, I'll try disproving free will later. It's early and I'm all slow and dumb. But then...Watch Out! :)
Tom: Hey, bring it on when your personal history determines you to do so! Just remember that whether or not anybody agrees with you is already determined by their histories, which were determined by the history of their immediate context, which was determinted by the history of the universe, which was determined (presummably) by the state of reality at t+1 of the big bang, which state was determined by God.
| | Back to Top | | |
| 44 posts in this thread.
Viewing Page : 1 2 |
| Forum Information | Currently it is Monday, November 09, 2026 4:17 PM (GMT -6)
There are a total of 97,718 posts in 6,040 threads.
In the last 3 days there were 0 new threads and 0 reply posts. View Active Threads
|
Forum powered by dotNetBB v2.42EC SP3
dotNetBB © 2000-2026 |
|
|