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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 12/5/2003 2:47 PM (GMT -6) |   | Thanks, Ross.
One more thought on applying indeterminacy logic to Molinism. Since libertarian freedom implies that reality is indeterminate w.r.t. the choice until it is made, every conditional of creaturely freedom should be a conditional of the form "might and might not if". But as has been shown, such conditionals are contrary to both "would if" and "would not if" conditionals. Molinism, however, requires that all conditionals of creaturely freedom be expressible in "would if" or "would not if" terms. Molinism is therefore internally inconsistent. It tries to marry the contingency of free will with the certitude of a strict "would" where creature X always freely does action A under conditions C. What indeterminacy logic shows is that the Molinist can't have his cake and eat it too. Either he gives up libertarian freedom, or he gives up meticulous providence.
Adios, amigos.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 12/6/2003 5:17 AM (GMT -6) | | What happens, I wonder, if we transform all our terminology into probability statements.
Zp = 100% x occurs.
Z-p = 100% x not occurs.
Qp= n% (less than 100%, more than 0%) x occurs.
* The probability I'm speaking about is ontic, not epistemic.
* The distinctiveness of the open view is that we affirm that some aspects of the future do not have a 100% or 0% probability of occuring. (In the classical view, EVERYTHING is 100% or 0%).
What this way of talking shows is that
* God's knowledge of "mights" is as determinate as his knowledge of "wills". God possesses exhaustive definite foreknowledge.
* It clarifies the error of thinking that only propositions affirming future determinate states of affairs are true or false, hence clarifies why open theists need not deny bivalence.
* talk of "mights" is simply a shorthand "fuzzy" way of talking about a particular probability short of 100% but more than 0% -- but not essentially different than talk of 100% or 0%.
* We speak of "mights" as though they were different in kind that "will" -- almost as if they were an EXCEPTION. In this way of talking, EVERYTHING is in one sense "on a level playing field." The entire future is a probability function. Its just that some things become 100% and other things 0%.
* This way of talking perhaps clarifies the distinction between epistemic mights and ontoic mights. Epistemically, a thing must have a probability above 0% for it to have 100% probability. In this sense "might" is implied by "will" (on the square). Ontically, however, a thing can't have a probability less that 100% if it is to have a probability of 100%. In this sense "might" falsifies "will."
Other Thoughts:
* I am not certain that libertarian acts possess a specific ontic probability at any moment in time. What would GROUND this specific probability? The freedom of the libertarian will is an indeterminate variable.
Still, it seems an all-knowing being COULD know probabilities where one of the variables is indeterminate -- but its a "fuzzy" probability. It is a probability within limits, but not exhaustively determinate.
This fits with the OV perspective that freedom is always limited.
If this is correct, God would know at T1 that the probability of x occuring, where x is a libertarian free act, is BETWEEN (say) 67% and 74%. Of course, the probability would flucuate with time. Choosing to actualize particular possibilities rather than others "bends" the total probability matrix of one's future. So at T2 God might know x to be BETWEEN 71% and 80%. At T3 Between 74% and 85% etc....
Of course, if this is so, then perhaps we WOULDN'T say that God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge? His knowledge corresponds to reality perfectly, but reality is partly indefinite.
* If God knows that x occuring is between 71% and 79%, what is the truth value of the proposition, "X might occur"? It is true, of course. What is the truth value of the proposition, "X will occur" or "X will not occur." It is false, of course. BUT what is the truth value of "X occuring is 76% probable"?
I suspect its FALSE, even though it fits the probability wave. It's FALSE by between OVERLY-SPECIFIC. Agree?
What think ye all?
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 12/6/2003 11:37 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by GregBoyd
What happens, I wonder, if we transform all our terminology into probability statements.
Zp = 100% x occurs.
Z-p = 100% x not occurs.
Qp= n% (less than 100%, more than 0%) x occurs.
I like the idea. It has already, at least implicitly, played a part in our discussions, but it's nice of you to spell it out more fully. One issue, as you point out, is that this way of cashing things out will be plausible only if we think of "mights" as referring to probability ranges, or perhaps approximate probabilities. Another issue is how to define probabilities. I suspect that the best way to understand probabilities is in terms of propensities.
Doc: God's knowledge of "mights" is as determinate as his knowledge of "wills". God possesses exhaustive definite foreknowledge.
Alan: I don't think this follows. All it shows is that God's knowledge of "wills" and "mights" is at any given point in time fully determinate. But that's not fore-knowledge. It's knowledge of all present probability values and/or ranges. As you point out, these probability values/ranges can change over time.
One advantage to cashing things out in terms of probabilities is that we can then use the formal apparatus of the probability calculus. The difficulty is that it is difficult or impossible for us in many situations to make confident probability estimations.
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 12/6/2003 12:14 PM (GMT -6) | | I'm currently reading through Thomas Flint's book "Divine Providence: The Molinist Account". He gives an admirably clear exposition of Molinism, but he makes a logical slip at one point that, I think, reveals a systematic equivocation within the Molinist system.
Here's the relevant passages (from pp. 57-59):
quote:
Suppose we continue to think of T1 as the true creaturely world-type. Suppose we also think of V1 as the creative act of will God as a matter of fact performs given T1. Action V1 obviously makes it true that God would perform V1 if in T1--that is, it makes it true that (T1 --> V1). ... For each galaxy, then, there is one world which God would have freely chosen to be actual had that galaxy been feasible. ... [N]o chosen world is necessarily chosen. For which world is chosen in a particular galaxy is dependent upon which counterfactual of divine freedom is true--that is to say, it is dependent upon what complete creative action God would have performed had the world-type determining that galaxy been true. (emphasis mine)
Some definitions:
A creaturely world-type is a complete set of "would" counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs).
A galaxy is the set of possible worlds consistent with a given creaturely world-type. It is the set of worlds that are feasible given that world-type.
Here's the problem. For Molinism to ground meticulous providence, the term "would" in the CCFs has to mean something very strong. It has to mean "definitely would", such that in every feasible world if creature X is placed in conditions C, then free decision D always results. It is only if "would" has this strong meaning that God's prevolitional knowledge of CCFs, coupled with his decision of which world to actualize, that God could have the absolutely certain and infallible free knowledge that Molinists want. In the above passage, however, we see Flint using "would" in a clearly weaker sense. Thus, he says that Action V1 obviously makes it true that God would perform V1 if in T1--that is, it makes it true that (T1 --> V1). From the perspective of indeterminacy logic, this is not only not obvious but is, to borrow a phrase from philosopher Peter Strawson, "a non sequitur of mind-numbing grossness". For God's volitional action being free, as Flint grants, implies that if T1 is true then God need not perform V1. That is, it is false, strictly speaking, that God "would" perform V1 if T1, and true instead that he "might and might not" perform V1 if T1. The only way for Flint's claim to be true is if "would" means something like "in conditions C, result R in fact happens, but might not have". That is, he needs to use "would" in a sense that is consistent with "might not". On the square, however, "would" and "might not" are contradictories, which means that the strong "would" that Molinists need to ground God's meticulous providence is inconsistent with the weaker "would" that they need to allow for genuine contingency and freedom.
The gist of all this is that Molinism obtains whatever apparent plausibility it has only by systematically equivocating on the sense of the term "would". The stronger "would" makes possible meticulous providence, but rules out the real contingency needed for free choices. The weaker "would" leaves room for free choices, but is inadequate to ground the kind of providence that the Molinist desires.
Make sense?
Well, this is my last post until for a few days. Gotta pack for NY. God bless.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 12/6/2003 7:21 PM (GMT -6) | | Doc-
I think expressing what we’ve been talking about in indeterminacy logic in terms of probabilities helps explain things.
quote:
* God's knowledge of "mights" is as determinate as his knowledge of "wills". God possesses exhaustive definite foreknowledge.
* I am not certain that libertarian acts possess a specific ontic probability at any moment in time. What would GROUND this specific probability? The freedom of the libertarian will is an indeterminate variable.
Still, it seems an all-knowing being COULD know probabilities where one of the variables is indeterminate -- but it’s a "fuzzy" probability. It is a probability within limits, but not exhaustively determinate.
Interesting. My initial thought is, if in fact the “range” is the last ontic frontier (i.e., there really is no specific probability) then fine, that's what God would know. But I don’t see how you can argue this is in fact the case by asking “What would ground this specific probability?” How a libertarian choice will work out is indeterminate, but assigning it a “specific probability” of, say 62%, wouldn’t make it determinate. And the same present-tense reality that grounds a range of, say, 71%-79% would ground a specific probability of, say, 84%. Being a single probability doesn't mean it might not be constantly chaning as well, bending the probability matrix.
I’m inclined to think that specific probabilities attach to future contingencies, but I just don’t know probability logic and math enough to engage this. I’m thinking more of quantum mechanics (which I barely understand as well). But I think it’s the case that a particular quantum particle faces a range of possibilities. These possibilities God knows. You’re pushing it further and wondering about the probability of these possible collapsed-states.
quote:
If this is correct, God would know at T1 that the probability of x occuring, where x is a libertarian free act, is BETWEEN (say) 67% and 74%. Of course, the probability would flucuate with time. Choosing to actualize particular possibilities rather than others "bends" the total probability matrix of one's future. So at T2 God might know x to be BETWEEN 71% and 80%. At T3 Between 74% and 85% etc....
Of course, if this is so, then perhaps we WOULDN'T say that God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge? His knowledge corresponds to reality perfectly, but reality is partly indefinite.
I keep getting confused by what "definite" in "Exhaustively definite foreknowledge" means. If "definite" is an attribute of God's knowledge of an unchanging reality, then it means "unchanging" foreknowledge too. But if "definite" is an attribute of God's knowledge of a changing reality, then God's knowledge is constantly changing as it keeps perfect account of a changing world. Could open theists agree that God's knowledge is always "definite" if reality is constantly changing? I think so, because at any given instant reality IS what it is and God's knowledge of reality at that point is perfect and "definit." We want to say that's God's knowledge at any given point in time is "definite" (becasue denying this means it's "indefinite" which sounds like God doesn't know what he should knwo), but we don't want to say that "definite" means unchanging over time. I'm not sure the phrase is that helpful anymore, though I think the way you've explained it in your books and articles makes perfect sense. Our objectors have all the opporunity they require to understand that we DON'T deny "exhaustive foreknowledge." We deny only that that foreknowledge is "definite" in the first sense, that is, that it's "unchanging" foreknowledge.
Back to probability...If the “probability range” is the ultimate “ontic” frontier then that’s the ultimate “definiteness” frontier too. You can’t get any more definite that knowing perfectly what IS. If there IS no specific probability of x’s occurring (if a range of 71%-79% is as far as reality extends), then one could still say God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge at any given point in time but deny that this foreknowledge is unchanging.
quote:
* If God knows that x occuring is between 71% and 79%, what is the truth value of the proposition, "X might occur"? It is true, of course. What is the truth value of the proposition, "X will occur" or "X will not occur." It is false, of course. BUT what is the truth value of "X occuring is 76% probable"? I suspect its FALSE, even though it fits the probability wave. It's FALSE by between OVERLY-SPECIFIC. Agree?
IF in fact the range is the farthest extent of reality, then you’re correct. To claim a specific probability within the range would be to lay claim to a knowledge that extends BEYOND reality, which is self-contradictory. But I still don’t see what it is that makes you think all future contingencies possess only ‘probability ranges’ and cannot possess a specific probability.
quote:
Flint: Suppose we continue to think of T1 as the true creaturely world-type. Suppose we also think of V1 as the creative act of will God as a matter of fact performs given T1. Action V1 obviously makes it true that God would perform V1 if in T1--that is, it makes it true that (T1 --> V1).
I like your response to Flint, Alan. Flint’s comments again convince me that we must distinguish between “THAT event x will or will not occur” and “WHEHTER event x will, will not, or might and might not occur.” I don’t know if I’m using the right words, but I believe this distinction is crucial. By “THAT event x either occurs or not” I mean to describe the either/or of actualization. But by “WHETHER event x occurs or not” I mean the determinacy vs indeterminacy of x's occurring. With "THAT" we have two possibilities (x's occurs and x does not occur). With "WHEHTER" we have THREE possibilities (x will occur, x will not occur, and x might and might not occur). Make sense?
Even if x is a “might and might not” we’re still talking about TWO things, x’s either occurring or not occurring. What “might and might not” happen? Two things: x might occur and x might not occur. Thus “THAT x either will or will not occur” embraces two things while “WHETHER x occurs or not” can be expressed in THREE possible ways (will, will not, or might and might not). Molinists assume that since “THAT” an event is an either/or matter, either it will or will not occur (which seems to be true to me), it logically follows that “WHETHER” that event occurs or not is equally an either/or matter, either “x will occur” or “x will not occur” is true. There are no other options. Thus, Craig will argue there are no true “might and might not” propositions. Why? Because all events either occur or do not occur. There are no events which , once having occurred (or once having not occurred), did not either occur or not occur. This either/or of "THAT an event either occurs or doesn't" is limiting the propositions that express "WHETHER an event ocurs or not." Why have to show why this is illigimate.
I just ran across a couple paragraphs in Craig that will show this. I hope to post them later.
Looking forward to a great report next week-end about your NY trip!
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 12/8/2003 6:17 AM (GMT -6) | | Alan: All it shows is that God's knowledge of "wills" and "mights" is at any given point in time fully determinate. But that's not fore-knowledge. It's knowledge of all present probability values and/or ranges. As you point out, these probability values/ranges can change over time.
Doc: Of course the values change moment by moment. But this is as determinate as reality gets, so it seems it makes sense to refer to God’s knowledge as fully determinate. Also, its true that God’s knowledge of "wills" and "mights" is rooted in his present knowledge. But its knowledge of what shall be and what might be, and thus it is fore-knowledge. Seems to me that in the open view, this is the only sort of fore-knowledge that exists. The present alone is real, and so God’s knowledge is knowledge of the present. The "future" is that aspect of the present that delineates what shall be and what might be, so God knows it as such.
Alan: The gist of all this is that Molinism obtains whatever apparent plausibility it has only by systematically equivocating on the sense of the term "would". The stronger "would" makes possible meticulous providence, but rules out the real contingency needed for free choices.
Doc: I think you’re exactly right. We might call this "the fallacy of retroactive necessity." Because agent x DID y in situation z, some think agent x WOULD CERTAINLY do x in situation z – without realizing that we thereby undermine libertarian freedom.
TGB: How a libertarian choice will work out is indeterminate, but assigning it a "specific probability" of, say 62%, wouldn’t make it determinate. And the same present-tense reality that grounds a range of, say, 71%-79% would ground a specific probability of, say, 84%. Being a single probability doesn't mean it might not be constantly changing as well, bending the probability matrix.
Doc: True, a specific probability at T1 doesn’t mean the probability must be the same at T2. But if the will upon which a probability is based is indeterminate, I don’t see how there can be a determinate probability assigned to it, except within limits. I am very fuzzy on this. I don’t think we know what it is to assign a probability to a will. Yet, at the same time, it seems we do something like this all the time. E.g. Tom will probably bring cohibas next time he visits." And I don’t see any reason to interpret "probably" here in a merely epistemological sense. So intuitively it seems wills DO have probabilities, its just difficiult to conceptualize how it specificially applies.
TGB: Could open theists agree that God's knowledge is always "definite" if reality is constantly changing? I think so, because at any given instant reality IS what it is and God's knowledge of reality at that point is perfect and "definite." We want to say that's God's knowledge at any given point in time is "definite" (becasue denying this means it's "indefinite" which sounds like God doesn't know what he should knwo), but we don't want to say that "definite" means unchanging over time.
Doc: Absolutely. "Definite" does not mean "definite for all time." It just means "as definite as reality is." And reality is changing.
TGB: If there IS no specific probability of x’s occurring (if a range of 71%-79% is as far as reality extends), then one could still say God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge at any given point in time but deny that this foreknowledge is unchanging.
Doc: Absolutely. Now, as Alan pointed out, this is really PRESENT knowledge. But in the Open View, all knowledge is present knowledge. What we call "foreknowledge" relates to what we call "the future," and the future is that aspect of the present that delineates what shall and might be. So God’s foreknowledge is that aspect of his present knowledge that concerns what shall and might be.
Blessings
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Magneton
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Total Posts : 132
| Posted 12/9/2003 12:30 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Doc: I am not certain that libertarian acts possess a specific ontic probability at any moment in time. What would GROUND this specific probability? The freedom of the libertarian will is an indeterminate variable.
Still, it seems an all-knowing being COULD know probabilities where one of the variables is indeterminate -- but it’s a "fuzzy" probability. It is a probability within limits, but not exhaustively determinate.
This fits with the OV perspective that freedom is always limited.
If this is correct, God would know at T1 that the probability of x occuring, where x is a libertarian free act, is BETWEEN (say) 67% and 74%. Of course, the probability would flucuate with time. Choosing to actualize particular possibilities rather than others "bends" the total probability matrix of one's future. So at T2 God might know x to be BETWEEN 71% and 80%. At T3 Between 74% and 85% etc....
I have the same concerns that Tom has about the “range of probabilities.” To have a range of probabilities, an uncertainty about the degree of uncertainty, seems to be an epistemic rather than purely ontic concept.
Classical probability problems, like the probability of drawing a royal flush in a game of poker, are calculated by enumerating all the possible alternatives, i.e. the complete array of possibilities. In the case of a free-will agent, we obviously don’t know all the possibilities/alternatives that contribute to a decision or action of that agent. The question you are raising is whether the complete array of possibilities even exists.
My gut is telling me that specific probabilities exist for free-will decisions, grounded by an array of neurons and stimuli. To suggest that there is something beyond this array that adds another level of indeterminacy would be to introduce a mind-body dualism. What are the mind/brain researchers saying that would shed light on this?
Magneton
Never be certain of anything. It's a sign of weakness. -- Doctor Who
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rsirkel
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| Posted 12/10/2003 7:25 AM (GMT -6) | | Magneton
quote:
My gut is telling me that specific probabilities exist for free-will decisions, grounded by an array of neurons and stimuli. To suggest that there is something beyond this array that adds another level of indeterminacy would be to introduce a mind-body dualism. What are the mind/brain researchers saying that would shed light on this?
If it is of interest to you, Evan Harris Walker "Physics of Consciousness" has a chapter where he locates in the brain where a quantum like action is occuring. Between the synapes, the firings, and uses math probabilities applying to what he calls the consciousness stream or channel, all the input going on. Then he recognizes free will and assigns it a probability and calls it the will channel. The volumn of the consciousness stream usually overcomes or drowns out the will channel because it has much lower numbers than the consciousness stream. But like quantum theory eventually a man walking into a wall will walk through it, if he has enough time  . I don't have the book at hand so this is from memory but the chapter on free will could be a useful resource. | | Back to Top | | |
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GregBoyd
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| Posted 12/14/2003 9:06 PM (GMT -6) | | Magneton: My gut is telling me that specific probabilities exist for free-will decisions, grounded by an array of neurons and stimuli. To suggest that there is something beyond this array that adds another level of indeterminacy would be to introduce a mind-body dualism. What are the mind/brain researchers saying that would shed light on this?
Doc: Most neuro-scientists these days are determinists. And that's the problem, as I see it, with your gut feeling. Yes there is indeterminacy with our neurological activity, but we don't want to (I think) REDUCE freedom to the indeterminacy of neurons firing. Call this "dualism" if you will, but to refuse to do this is not to escape determinism... its too simply have CAPRICIOUS determinism. I think that FREEDOM requires that we TRANSCEND our neurological activity.
But this "transcendence" generates the ambiguity in applying probability functions to it. For this DOES introduce "another level" of indeterminacy. And, unlike poker hands, it is a probability funciton about which we don't know -- and perhaps cannot even conceive -- of the relevant variables.
BUT, maybe I'm wrong. Let me think here.... thought coming on. hmmm.
We CAN say of a quantum particle that there is a specific probability it will appear HERE in the wave function (bell curve of probable locations). hmmmmmm...... The wave function IS simply the spreading out of all SPECIFIC probabilities. okay . OKAY... So too, if there is a wave function of probable free decisions, there MUST be a specific probability assigned to each decision.
YES.... And as with our free will, we DON'T KNOW, and apparently can't conceive, of "factors" that determine how it ENDS UP landing within the bell curve of possible outcomes. (If we could, it wouldn't be INDETERMINATE and wouldn't be FREE. )
Okay. I'm sold. done. I agree. Got it. Bingo. No problemos. There IS a specific probability for each behavior at any given time. I was looking at the wrong thing -- the unknown ontology rather than the OUTCOME of the ontology. yep .fo sho. silly me.
I should have known better than to disagree with TGB!
Doc
"The responsibility is with the chooser -- God is blameless." Plato, Republic, 10. | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 12/17/2003 8:01 AM (GMT -6) | | Hey all,
I'm back from New York. Successfully defended dissertation and had a good time sightseeing with my wife. Seem to have come down with the flu, though, so I'm gonna keep this real short. Will be interacting more in the next couple days when I'm feeling better.
God bless,
Alan Rhoda, Ph.D. | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 12/17/2003 8:16 AM (GMT -6) | | Doctor Rhoda! Congrats Alan. Great news. Glad you're back.
Rest up. Then ATTACK!
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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