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| Posted 6/25/2001 8:53 PM (GMT -6) |   | On a different thread (The Ridiculous Motives of Open Theism) someone asked for a defense of the open view of the future from a strictly philosophical perspective. I thought it might prove fun to oblige. Have at it.
There are, I believe, a number of solid philosophical arguments that support the Open View of the Future. Here is one. It attempts to show that if God possesses exhaustively definite foreknowledge (EDF) we cannot be free and/or morally responsible for what we do.
Let four things be granted:
a) God possesses EDF (Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge;
b) God’s knowledge is infallible, hence unalterable;
c) the past by logical necessity cannot be changed; and
d)) we are not free or morally responsible in relation to what we cannot change.
These four premises seems to entail that agents can be no more free and morally responsible with regard to any future event (including their own future chosen actions) than they are with regard to any past event. For among the totality of things at any given moment in the past which we cannot change is the definiteness of what we shall do in the future—a definiteness found in God’s EDF and included in the totality of determinate truths at any given moment in the past.
To illustrate, let us suppose that God commissioned an angel to catalogue all items which constitute the totality of reality on a particular date: August 15, 1492, for example. This catalogue would contain an exhaustive itemized listing of all definite realities: viz. all things that are "definitely this and definitely not that."
Now, if God possesses EDF, this catalogue would include not only all past and present realities, but the definitieness of all future realities as well, including my future decisions. For if my future decisions are settled in God’s mind from all eternity, they certainly are settled in God’s mind on August 15, 1492 and would thus be contained in the list of all definite realities.
The problem, of course, is that I am not free or morally responsible for any of the facts that constitute the totality of reality on August 15, 1492 (premise "d"). It is past, unalterable, and therefore outside the purview of my self-determin-ing freedom. Yet, assuming God possesses EDF, the entirety of my future is part of this past totality. I can’t change it any more than I change any other past fact. Hence, I can be no more free and morally responsible regarding the future than I am regarding any other past fact.
In short, the EDF doctrine logically undermines morally responsible, self-determining freedom.
To make this point even stronger, con-sider what would happen if God wrote down the contents of his omniscient mind in a book and gave it to the world on August 15, 1492. Now I could actually read what was written five centuries ago about what I shall do in my future. And, note, I cannot alter what I read and avoid what it says. For it is the catalogue of an infallible omniscient mind.
Suppose, for example, I read in this book that on a certain date I shall make a catastrophic immoral decision. What can I do about it? Absolutely nothing. Try as I might to alter this reality, I shall certainly do exactly what the book infallibly predicts. Even my attempt to alter what is predicted about me would be written in the book. Indeed, every thought, emotion and action I entertain as I’m reading this exhaustive book would constitute part of the content I’m reading, for these were from all eternity part of the content of God’s infallible, omniscient mind.
If this is not fatalism, how does it differ? If a fatalist proposed a hypothetical catalogue of all definite realities, how would it differ from the scenario I have just offered?
Someone may argue that this scenario simply demonstrates why God cannot reveal the content of his omniscient mind to us. As long as we don’t know what we shall do, they may argue, we do it freely. This argument fails, however, for the issue of whether or not we are self-determining is an ontological, not an epistemological, issue. The question is over whether we really are or are not free, not over whether we think we are free or not. If all my future actions are in fact unavoidable – for they are as unalterable as my past -- then I am not free, even if God is the only being in the universe who knows it.
On the other hand, if we assume that I do self-determine aspects of my future, it follows that what I shall freely do in the future cannot be catalogued as a definite reality on August 15, 1492. To be sure, the possibility of each of my free actions could certainly have been catalogued, for possibilities are eternal. Whatever happens was always possible. But the definiteness which the acts themselves shall acquire when (or if) they take place could not be eternal.
If I am a genuinely self-determining agent, it seems the only reality my future free decisions can have in God’s mind in 1492, or at any point leading up to my determining them, is the reality of a pos-sibility. This is, I argue, what the term "self-determining" means if it has any self-consistent meaning at all. The omniscient catalogue containing all my future possibilities could be revealed to me and I would remain free. What would be revealed to me is what I might or might not do, but it would still be within my power to decide whether or not I shall do it.
What ya'll think?
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| Posted 6/25/2001 8:56 PM (GMT -6) | | Dr. Boyd,
I agree, but for the sake of argument, let me play devil's advocate. If God could exist outside sequential time, then He can know what we will do because it is happening all at once for Him. In other words, what we see as the future, to Him is occuring in the present. This would allow for us to still make free choices. If God is both inside and outside time "at the same time" , then He can still relate to us on our level, traveling with us sequentially, while remaining outside of time simultaneously.
I don't agree with this theory, but I'd like to hear people's rebuttals to it. Of course, if this is indeed how God is, it will be very hard to understand what it is like to be "outside" of time...but maybe we don't need to know that.
IntentOnTruth
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| Posted 6/25/2001 8:58 PM (GMT -6) | | Intent,
To exist outside of time would mean that he is always in the present, there is no future nor any past. You're correct in saying that existing outside of time would be something very hard for us to understand. Augustine delved into it pretty deeply when he described how the present can really not be measured, for the words we speak become past almost the moment we speak them. Our very thoughts become past thoughts almost instantly. The question is, does God exist outside of time? Often in the old testament he refferred to himself as the "I Am", not "I Was" or "I Will Be". Perhaps that could support the claim that God, in fact, does exist outside of time. This stuff goes way beyond me, so i'm not even going to go into what all this stuff would entail. Let me just say that, in my opinion, the OV certainly does present a greater freedom to everything. Good post Doc, hope you get some nice feedback on this one.
In His Grip,
Matta.k.a - Triskal
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| Posted 6/25/2001 8:59 PM (GMT -6) | | Doc, good argument. I was wondering if you could help me out here. I used a similar argument once with my friend and she shot back an argument that I wasn’t able do undo without confusing the heck out of her and myself. I know her argument doesn’t work because (I think) it doesn’t differentiate between the freedom of present actions and those of past actions that used to be free but are no longer; but every time I try to put the argument into words it gets sloppy. Could you undo it for me in a nice makes sense sort of way?
Her argument went like this:
If your last to points are granted:
-- the past by logical necessity cannot be changed; and
-- we are not free or morally responsible in relation to what we cannot change.
Not only are we not morally responsible for our future actions but we are not morally responsible for our past actions either. But we all realize that we are not free to change, say, the sin I committed seven hours ago. Even though I am not free to change that sin I am still morally responsible for that sin am I not? If not than we live in a morally active present and a morally dead past. Murders can get off the hook in court by pointing out that they committed their murders years ago and hence are not free to change those events and therefore not morally responsible for those events any more. So the future is the same way. We are not free to change the future but we are still morally responsible for the events that we do their in the same way that we are not free to change the past but we are still morally responsible for the events that we did their as well.
So what do I say to this?
Wislawa
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:00 PM (GMT -6) | | An Addict of Philosophical Discussion Responds...
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Damn my eyes. I'm a sucker for philosophical quandaries. I will try to make this short as possible.
a) God possesses EDF (Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge;
b) God’s knowledge is infallible, hence unalterable;
c) the past by logical necessity cannot be changed; and
d)) we are not free or morally responsible in relation to what we cannot change.
Meph:
A-C are granted without reservation. But OOOOH that fourth one! Let's dig into that one. Surely everyone hear notices what is being implied in letter d, right? How about this?
Implication of d: Power to the contrary is ASSUMED.
Y'all saw that, right? See, the lynchpin of the argument is this. If we take d as it stands, this means the power to the contrary (even to the highest metaphysical level) is in FULL effect. And it means that anything that would tacitly contradict "power to the contrary" would be thrown out by definition. Simple logic does the rest: Since my human acts are foreknown by God as certainties, not SOLELY possibilities or "subjunctive conditional truths" (hehe ), I do not have the power to do something other that what God KNOWS I will do, and I cannot change them, therefore I am not free or morally responsible for those acts.
My opinion. The fourth premise sucks. I've hated it since I first saw it. (I've seen this argument before.) Why? It's unfair and WAY too limiting. First of all, it smuggles in the "power to the contrary" idea WITHOUT making it explicit. Oh, yes! Remember that little thing called "power to the contrary that ol' Meph has been disputing from time immemorial? That one. Secondly, there are other ways to give meaning to the intent of the fourth premise that would be COMPATIBLE with theological determinism. For example:
d': Human beings are not free or morally responsible for action or thought that, UNDER THEIR OWN SPHERE OF ABILITY OR POWER, they cannot exhibit agency to change their respective situations.
This, my friends, changes everything! "Power to the contrary" is no longer assumed. Basically, this has the locus of freedom in the ACTIONS (psychical and physical) OF THE AGENT, not in the foreknowledge of any act by any divine being. Oh, yeah! When you work it all out, one sees that events and things that are foreknown by God (in ANY conception of foreknowledge) woud still be considered "free" acts of agents. This is a VALID possibility that goes unrecognized because of the "power to the contrary" assumption within premise d.
Something else. His quote:
To make this point even stronger, con-sider what would happen if God wrote down the contents of his omniscient mind in a book and gave it to the world on August 15, 1492. Now I could actually read what was written five centuries ago about what I shall do in my future. And, note, I cannot alter what I read and avoid what it says. For it is the catalogue of an infallible omniscient mind.
Suppose, for example, I read in this book that on a certain date I shall make a catastrophic immoral decision. What can I do about it? Absolutely nothing. Try as I might to alter this reality, I shall certainly do exactly what the book infallibly predicts. Even my attempt to alter what is predicted about me would be written in the book. Indeed, every thought, emotion and action I entertain as I’m reading this exhaustive book would constitute part of the content I’m reading, for these were from all eternity part of the content of God’s infallible, omniscient mind.
If this is not fatalism, how does it differ? If a fatalist proposed a hypothetical catalogue of all definite realities, how would it differ from the scenario I have just offered?
Meph:
Now all you people who've been here a long time KNOW what I would say to this, right? About how fatalism is distinct from determinism. About how a person's knowledge of their predetermined fate is what contributes to the idea of fatalism. Of COURSE you do. And Doc knows it too. So he goes on to write:
"Someone may argue that this scenario simply demonstrates why God cannot reveal the content of his omniscient mind to us. As long as we don’t know what we shall do, they may argue, we do it freely. This argument fails, however, for the issue of whether or not we are self-determining is an ontological, not an epistemological, issue. The question is over whether we really are or are not free, not over whether we think we are free or not. If all my future actions are in fact unavoidable – for they are as unalterable as my past -- then I am not free, even if God is the only being in the universe who knows it."
Meph:
People, whoever made this is nobody's fool. He knows the deal. But I have some questions. I'm trying to figure out WHY the arguer would use the "If humans could read the book" thing, if he KNOWS that that's the quintessential distinction between fatalism and determinism. He even KNEW what people like me would say in retort. So, why use it? Shock value? Hey, I'm asking. Moving on, though.
"On the other hand, if we assume that I do self-determine aspects of my future, it follows that what I shall freely do in the future cannot be catalogued as a definite reality on August 15, 1492. To be sure, the possibility of each of my free actions could certainly have been catalogued, for possibilities are eternal. Whatever happens was always possible. But the definiteness which the acts themselves shall acquire when (or if) they take place could not be eternal."
Meph:
In the second part of the above and the paragraph directly above, we switch gears. The arguer hones back into the use of the 4th premise. But surely, we all now recognize that ALL of this is based on the "power to the contrary" assumption that was IMPLIED in premise d but NEVER truly explicated! Unfair. This is how I see the argument.
1. Use premise d to show that self-determining freedom is irreconcilable with EDF.
2. Give a "stronger" version of the point by introducing thoughts that NATURALLY LEAD to the idea of fatalism. Easily seen fatalism.
3. Supply and counter the critique that WOULD be coming against the fatalism thing, while at the same time, REAFFIRM what has been claimed about premise d and it's effects.
The rhetorical effect of this is POWERFUL. Am I saying that this is being done intentionally or deceptively? Not at all. I'm just recognizing the rhetorical force of an argument structed in this manner. But the problem still remains. The smuggled assumption in premise d.
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Conclusion
I reject the arguement that Doc presents because there are implications from premises that are NOT made explicit that have heavy bearing on whether the conclusions of the argument are valid or not. Unless one can:
1) formulate the argument where the assumption of "power to the contrary" is LEGITIMATELY recognized
and...
2) show WHY the "power to the contrary" assumption should be accepted in the first place,
this argument doesn't seem to be so sound to me. That's my word.
Hootie Hoo,
Meph
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:01 PM (GMT -6) | | Two responses, first to Wislawa and Doc and then to Mephi-
Wislawa and Doc: Regarding your friend’s objection to Doc’s reasoning on the certainty of an exhaustively foreknown future, I’ve often conjured up the same sort of objection on my own, but was never able to convince myself! I think a little tweaking of Doc’s wording word forestall the objection. Here are my thoughts on a possible response: We are responsible for our past decisions precisely because they were freely made BEFORE becoming fixed in time by our making them. The freedom of past choices is linked to their contingent nature PRIOR to becoming historically fixed by the flow of time. This is why we’re held accountable for them and precisely why we cannot be held accountable for future decisions if they are foreknown by God, for EDF “fixes” our future choices before they’re made just as the flow of history fixes our past choices after they’re made. It might help if you asked your friend whether or not it is possible to hold somebody accountable for not being able to change a past decision. Obviously we don’t hold people accountable for being unable to do this. This is precisely the point. The past is fixed. But EDF renders the future just as fixed. We can no more change it than we can change the past, and hence we can no more be held responsible for “choosing in the present” (one which is exhaustively foreknown by God) than we can be for “changing the past” (what Doc means by not being responsible “for the past”).
Is that close Doc?
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Mephi-
It’s been a while. How ya doing man? “The fourth premise sucks!” Your frankness rocks!
My opinion. The fourth premise sucks. I've hated it since I first saw it. (I've seen this argument before.) Why? It's unfair and WAY too limiting. First of all, it smuggles in the "power to the contrary" idea WITHOUT making it explicit.
It’s unfair? What’s unfair about believing people are responsible for choices they can do something about and not responsible for choices they could do nothing about? Doesn’t the claim that such a notion of justice is unfair undermine all jurisprudence in existence today? Do we live any other way? CAN we live any other way?
Secondly, there are other ways to give meaning to the intent of the fourth premise that would be COMPATIBLE with theological determinism. For example:
D: Human beings are not free or morally responsible for action or thought that, UNDER THEIR OWN SPHERE OF ABILITY OR POWER, they cannot exhibit agency to change their respective situations.
Did you word this “D” correctly? It looks to me like it comes out where libertarian free will comes out. You’re simply saying that we’re not responsible for what we are unable to do anything about? Exactly the point of Doc’s post. So, if only for my sake you may want to reword your “D.” I’m sure it’s MY brain that’s not functioning.
And again, I hate to ask this, but can you give an example from life of a person being justly held accountable for a choice he could not by reason of his nature/constitution possibly avoid? If not, and if libertarian free will is in fact a universal assumption neath all our notions of justice, morality, etc., then on what basis do you reject Doc’s assuming it in his “D”?
Tom
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:02 PM (GMT -6) | | Response To Tom
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Tom,
Great to see you again, bud! I hope everything is going well with your ministry. Let's see if I have some responses to your valid questions.
It’s unfair? What’s unfair about believing people are responsible for choices they can do something about and not responsible for choices they could do nothing about? Doesn’t the claim that such a notion of justice is unfair undermine all jurisprudence in existence today? Do we live any other way? CAN we live any other way?
This is way cool! The best way to preface this is with a quote I saw in the May 21, 2001 issue of Newsweek, in an article called "The Roots of Evil." In it, they were basically talking about Timothy McVeigh, the bomber of Oklahoma City, and the problem of evil. In the last section of the article, they examined many things that they felt contributed to the emergence of gross evil. All of a sudden, this last paragraph virtually comes out of leftfield and it caught my attention...
"The danger of trying to explain evil is that we risk falling into the abyss of predestination: that given these life events, this social surround and this personality type, the evil deed was inevitable. Explanation becomes exculpation, and volition get eclipsed. To understand all should not be to forgive all."
Powerful! Though I feel he botched the true meaning of the word "predestination", he said something profound. Despite all the evidence that would substantiate any type of determinism (even soft determinism), he appeals implicitly to the dogmatic holding of the idea of free will. Why? Because in the writer's mind, there's NO other way to have moral accountability. To him, explaining the evil in causal terms implicitly exonerates any perpetrators. What I like about this quote and idea is that it is characteristic of many people today. There is a GROSS misunderstanding about types of determinism and how they relate to personal responsibility. As such, it is basically just taken as fact dogmatically that there MUST a thing called "free will" because they cannot reconcile determinism with moral culpability.
I only bring all this up, Tom, because the existential nature of your question reverbrates this idea to me. It's basically the main argument of many libertarians. "Can we live without assuming 'free will'?" In my, and other philosophers, opinion, the answer is YES. But the bottom line is that 1) we have never really tried to do so as a society and 2) the level of philosophical sophistication needed to develop the nuances of responsibility within determinism is, frankly, beyond many of the constitueny of our country. This is not to be belittling. It's just the truth. People like me can argue about the distinction between the existential feeling of freedom and the philosophical concept of libertarian free will until we are blue in the face, but to many people , it will just seem artificial, and "going against common sense." The line is "We FEEL that we are free, therefore we are." Naive realism at its finest...and it's a mother to confront. Basically with this part, I just wanted you to understand that the EXISTENTIAL question you pose , though valid, should be distinguished from the philosophical matter at hand.
About the unfair. What I have meant by "unfair" is that Premise D smuggled in an assumption. That's not right in presenting a philosophical argument ALL assumptions that are not completely self-evident are to be spelled out explicitly. That's really why I said "sucks" Remember the trouble that you and I had with Dave Hunt's stuff long time ago? This is an example of EXACTLY the same thing. The assumption of "power to the contrary" should have been spelled out and JUSTIFIED before anyone even thought of putting that Premise D. As I spell out later, "power to the contrary" is NOT as self-evident as many people want to conclude. Hope that's clear.
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Did you word this "D" correctly? It looks to me like it comes out where libertarian free will comes out. You’re simply saying that we’re not responsible for what we are unable to do anything about? Exactly the point of Doc’s post. So, if only for my sake you may want to reword your 'D.' I’m sure it’s MY brain that’s not functioning.
My D':
Human beings are not free or morally responsible for action or thought that, UNDER THEIR OWN SPHERE OF ABILITY OR POWER, they cannot exhibit agency to change their respective situations.
I think you've caught my thing perfectly, Tom. It DOES essentially say what Doc wants it to say, as far as human responsibility goes. It says that human beings are responsible for all thoughts and actions for ONLY those things where they can use their sphere or ability of power to exert agency. Now, what does this affirm? It affirms that agents who possess human agency are responsible. Does my D' hold ANYTHING implication about libertarian free will or "power to the contrary"? Let's see. There exists a book where my decision to do something immoral on June 10, 2001 is seen as something that I will do. God then foreknows my actions, by whatever means. Does this matter a whit to my responsibility for said action on that date, given my D? Heck, no, because with my defintion the locus of concern is on the AGENCY of the agent, not any type of divine knowledge. Because I utilized my agency within my own sphere of ability and power to accomplish the evil deed, I am responsible for it in a meaningful sense. I am responsible for it in the ONLY sense necessary for human beings apply praise and blame among human beings. See what I'm saying?
[Digression: But I think the main issue is NOT human-to-human responsibility. It's responsibility before GOD. In other words, how can God hold us responsible for acts that, due to the implications of EDF, he basically set us UP to do in the first place? Now THAT's the interesting part. And this is why I believe that many theists want to hold to LFW. Not so much for human-to-human responsibility, but to make sure that God's judgment adheres to what WE consider "just" But anyway...]
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Last you say,
And again, I hate to ask this, but can you give an example from life of a person being justly held accountable for a choice he could not by reason of his nature/constitution possibly avoid? If not, and if libertarian free will is in fact a universal assumption neath all our notions of justice, morality, etc., then on what basis do you reject Doc’s assuming it in his "D"?
This goes right back to the existential nature of the question. My contention is that libertarian free will has been assumed more from DOGMATIC reasons that actual solid reasoning. This is the problem with the "example from life" thing that I've kept trying to stress. There are many concepts that cannot be explained by life analogy. A example I've used before is complementarity. By its very nature, complementarity will NEVER have a life example because it it is too counterintuitive. Anything that is counterintuitive will never have a life example that will be pleasing. It's the same with the distinctions I'm trying to make.
Let's go to the judicial system, though. I think that we can see that it is still compatible with human agency within a soft-deterministic framework. In the end analysis, what matters to the judge. 1) Did the person do the act? 2) Was the person reasonably cognizant of the act done? 3) Did the person, of his/her own VOLITION, do the act or was his power of volition FORCED upon him. In other words, did the decision to do the act truly come from the perpetrator. [Note: Number 3 is compatible with my view and human agency!] If you have these things in effect, then you have, IMO, a reasonable basis to assign responsibility.
Bottom line, Tom, libertarian free will need NOT be a universal assumption. The EXISTENTIAL SENSE OF FREEDOM that emerges from self-consciousness is the undeniable and unfalsifiable thing that is universal to all human beings...but this is DISTINCT from the metaphysical concepts that bolster libertarian free will. (Remember this from my Dogmatism thread, way back in the day?) So, though I understand WHY people keep thinking that libertarian free will should be a universal assumption, I think the assumption is a POPULAR one bolstered by a type of common sense/naive realism and it's patently false. It's main support is it's popularity, NOT real cogent argumentation or evidence. The problem is that some people just won't accept the idea, out of hand because to them, it goes against "common sense" or "what we experience everyday" (GRRRRR!!!!!) In my mind, it's JUST like how some people will dogmatically NOT accept the idea of God having temporality, out of hand, without looking at any evidence.
Again, good to see you again, Tom!
Peace,
Meph
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:03 PM (GMT -6) | | Does Timelessness Solve Anything?
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Here’s a brief response to Intent on Truth’s question about divine timelessness.
There are, as I see it, several problems with the timelessness theory:
1) It’s grounding in Scripture is poor at best. Defenders point to Exod. 3:8 where the Lord says "I am that I am." Hebrew scholars generally agree that the meaning of the phrase is more like "I will be whatever I will be." In any case, the entire narrative of the Bible portrays a God who moves with us in sequence. It seems poor hermenuetics to reverse all this, or at least make it a "pen-ultimate" truth on the basis of one questionable verse.
2) I would argue it is impossible to render intelligible the notion that a timeless God is personal. Personal interaction entails sequential experience. How can you attach verbs to God, let alone verbs of response to God as he interacts with us on a personal basis, if God is timeless?
3) The timeless view creates a number of difficult paradoxes. For example, defenders want to assert that God’s experience of the world is timelessly eternal, yet the world is not eternal. God created the world – it began – yet there was no moment BEFORE God created the world.
4) Finally, the postulation of the timeless God does not refute my argument. The problem is that the facticity, the definiteness, the "haeccity" (as the medievals said) of my future acts eternally precede my existence – and therefore exist in 1492 – and I cannot be responsible for facts in the past.
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:06 PM (GMT -6) | | Help for Meph's damned eyes
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Response to Mephi’s Refutation
Here's a brief response to Meph's response to my argument. I’ll respond to it point by point.
Meph: "damn my eyes…"
Doc: well, okay. "your eyes are damned." (ever see The Jerk? One guy says, "damn these cans." So Steve Martin says, "I damn you cans! Guess you had to be there).
Meph. The fourth premise (we are not responsible for what cannot be changed) sucks… Why? It's unfair and WAY too limiting. First of all, it smuggles in the "power to the contrary" idea WITHOUT making it explicit.
Doc: I think saying "we are not responsible for what cannot be changed" is about as explicit as one can get. You clearly disagree with the premise, but I don’t think you can accuse me of smuggling something in.
Meph substitues my fourth premise with an alternative. Human beings are not free or morally responsible for action or thought that, UNDER THEIR OWN SPHERE OF ABILITY OR POWER, they cannot exhibit agency to change their respective situations.
Doc: Maybe it’s the double negative, maybe it’s the ambiguity of the phrases "exhibit" or "agency to change" or "respective situation". But the meaning of this statement remains unclear to me. But I’m wondering, whatever the statement means, does it render an agent responsible for facts that predate their existence? If not, then I don't see how it effects my argument.
Meph responds to a portion of my argument saying, "whoever made this is nobody's fool."
Doc: I have detracts who would certainly disagree with you Meph (check out the Morey thread – on second thought, DON'T). But I’ll take this is a compliment… sort of.
Meph says he’d accept the argument, perhaps, if I
1) formulate the argument where the assumption of "power to the contrary" is LEGITIMATELY recognized
and...
2) show WHY the "power to the contrary" assumption should be accepted in the first place,
Doc: Regarding 1, see above. Regarding 2, see our old thread about looking for an ANALOGY. But most importantly, I’d be interested in Meph showing how his view of freedom answers the problem of being responsible for facts that predate our existence.
Let me personalize this and ask these questions:
* Meph, do you disagree with me that we are not responsible for facts of 1492?
* If so, do you agree that if God possess EDF, the definiteness of all our future actions are facts in 1492?
* If so, how can we be responsible for these facts in 1492, when you’ve alrealdy conceded (if you do concede) that we aren’t responsible for any facts in 1492?
Blessings
Esp. to Meph… and take care of those eyes.
Doc
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:08 PM (GMT -6) | | RE: Help for Meph's damned eyes
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Just read Tom and Meph's exchange. Comments:
1) Tom, you anticipated my responses, as you can see.
2) I don't see anything in Meph's argument so far that has addressed the question of how we can be responsible -- even on his "soft determinist" understanding -- for facts that predate our existence.
3) Mephi, after all of this dialogue I am still baffled by your account of freedom and moral responsibility. You seem to grant that we experience ourselves as having he power of contrary choice and we act as though we had the power of contrary choice, but you then embrace a metaphysical theory that denies it -- calling those who accept it naive realists. I'm wondering, what is the meaning of an idea that not only has no rooting in our actual experience, but which contradicts our actual experience? I happen to accept the dictum that an idea that can make no conceivable difference in action is a meaningless idea. Do you reject this dictum?
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:09 PM (GMT -6) | | Thanks for That Eye Balm, Doc
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Howdy, Doc! Good to hear from you!
Doc: I think saying "we are not responsible for what cannot be changed" is about as explicit as one can get. You clearly disagree with the premise, but I don’t think you can accuse me of smuggling something in.
Meph:
To accept your premise as you apply it in your argument, you would HAVE to presume "power to the contrary", wouldn't you? That seems very clear. Your premises, as it is applied in this argument, would not work without presuming "power to the contrary" But this assumption was never made explicit. Hence, me saying that it was "smuggled" Hopefully, this is not being taken the wrong way. (I have to remember about semantics) When I say "smuggled", I don't mean to say that it was intentionally or deceptively done. I'm just saying that the assumption of "power to the contrary" lay hidden among premise D and it should have been made explicit.
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Doc: Maybe it’s the double negative, maybe it’s the ambiguity of the phrases "exhibit" or "agency to change" or "respective situation". But the meaning of this statement remains unclear to me. But I’m wondering, whatever the statement means, does it render an agent responsible for facts that predate their existence? If not, then I don't see how it effects my argument
Meph:
What the statement does is say that a person is not responsible for any actions that they CANNOT use their wills in conjunction with their sphere of ability or power to change any given situation. The fact that your action is KNOWN to a Being by way of predestination doesn't affect this idea of responsibility. Therefore if my idea is accepted then it doesn't matter if God knows the future. It affects your argument thusly: instead of looking to any notion of foreknowledge or predestination for freedom, we look to the agent's actions and ABILITY to act. What this does is negate the need to presuppose "power to the contrary"...which has a BIG effect on your argument.
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Doc: I have detracts who would certainly disagree with you Meph (check out the Morey thread – on second thought, DON'T). But I’ll take this is a compliment… sort of.
Meph:
It was meant to be a compliment, indeed. It was basically saying that the arguer has some decent knowledge about fatalism as opposed to determinism. Not many people have this and that's good.
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Doc: Regarding 1, see above. Regarding 2, see our old thread about looking for an ANALOGY. But most importantly, I’d be interested in Meph showing how his view of freedom answers the problem of being responsible for facts that predate our existence.
Meph:
My #1 still has not been answered. For #2, in my reply to Tom, I talked about this life analogy business and how problematic it is. I will tell you this. I would LOVE to really delve into a discussion about the distinction between the existential sense of freedom that is undeniable and unfalsifiable...and idea of libertarian free will. (Let's keep this in mind for later, Doc. )
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Finally, the questions.
[Interjection (PLEASE READ): Before I get to this part, I just read Doc's second post. I want to make this known for the record again. When I use the term NAIVE REALISM, it is NOT used as an insult or a pejoration. Again, it is NOT an insult. Saying that someone is a naive realist is NOT the same thing as saying that someone is philosophically naive. Naive realism is a legitimate philosophical term. I have had such trouble with this in the past that I really wanted to establish this once again. Whenever I use the term "naive realist" it is not a personal attack or insult. Reader, if you forget EVERYTHING else on this post, please remember this. One more thing. Please, everyone, give ol' Meph the benefit of the doubt BEFORE you take to thinking that I'm insulting, belittling, or anything like that in any of my post. Hopefully, by now, after all this time, my character has shown through on this score to say that I wouldn't do anything like that. Thank you! ]
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Meph, do you disagree with me that we are not responsible for facts of 1492?
Meph:
Of course not. First of all, there is no one alive from that period who can assume responsibility for anything done that year. Second, it is in the past and we can't change it.
If so, do you agree that if God possess EDF, the definiteness of all our future actions are facts in 1492?
Meph:
Yep. Actually the "definiteness" of our future actions would go back further than that.
If so, how can we be responsible for these facts in 1492, when you’ve alrealdy conceded (if you do concede) that we aren’t responsible for any facts in 1492?
Meph:
Alright! Now let's look at what's happened here. First you ask me about responsibility for facts in 1492. Being a temporal being who exists in 2001, I realize that no one alive today could be responsible for ANY ACTION taken in 1492. So as a reasonable person, I say "no" we are not responsible. Those events have LONG AGO taken place in human history and cannot be changed (We don't have any time machine) So far, so good. Next you ask about the implications of EDF. Now, I get a little wary here because I don't necessarily like the way the question is phrased. We seem to be moving from human inability to go back in time...to the subject of God's knowledge of the future. Two different categories. But I make an assumption. I assume that what you MEAN is that if God has EDF then at ANY point in human history, God knows all events that WILL occur from that point onward. His knowledge of these events would be just like what we call "facts" Making that assumption, the question makes sense, and I answer. "Yep, that's right."
But NOW, the question is asked that makes me flip! I am asked this, in my mind:
If you believe that we cannot be responsible for facts that have taken place in 1492, then how can you say that we are responsible for the "facts" that God knows in 1492, using His EDF?
Can you imagine how perplexed I then become? "What the...???" Weren't we just talking about inability to change the past? How in the world are we going to confuse categories like this? We haven't even discussed potential ways HOW EDF takes place. And even if we did do so, we still have a big time problem. The "responsibility" answer for the first question and the "responsibility" answer for the third question don't even lie on the same wavelength. You are using the idea of "facts that predate our existence" EQUIVOCALLY for two entirely different categories.
You can see what I'm saying, right, Doc? This is an unfair question. Moreover, what does this type of question do? It uses the Premise D to the hilt! It uses the category confusion between God's foreknowledge of future events and the inability to change the past of human history and takes the premise D, which primarily deals with changing events, under the presumption of "power to the contrary" And WHAM. Lays it on you. I'm sorry but I'm not buying that. Hopefully, as I've explained my thinking, you can see why.
Check this out. This is from William Lane Craig. DIVINE
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND NEWCOMB'S PARADOX. He deals in some way with what we are talking about. If you understand what he's saying, you will have a pretty good insight that will help explicate my view.
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Doc said:
"Mephi, after all of this dialogue I am still baffled by your account of freedom and moral responsibility. You seem to grant that we experience ourselves as having he power of contrary choice and we act as though we had the power of contrary choice, but you then embrace a metaphysical theory that denies it -- calling those who accept it naive realists. I'm wondering, what is the meaning of an idea that not only has no rooting in our actual experience, but which contradicts our actual experience? I happen to accept the dictum that an idea that can make no conceivable difference in action is a meaningless idea. Do you reject this dictum?"
Meph:
Coupla things. First, I don't think you and I have ever been able to talk fully on why I make the differentiation I make. For then, I would probably be able to show you why I believe that my metaphysical theory does NOT deny the existential sense of freedom. Secondly, I see the realist tendencies of what you write, but on your line of thinking, HOW would you explain complementarity OR alocality. We experience NEITHER of these things and ONLY BECAUSE WE ARE FORCED TO by certain data, do we accept these ideas as viable. According to the criteria that you give, much of quantum theory would seem to be nonsensical, yes?
About your dictum. I might be looney, but you dictum seems to remind me of an possible implication of the Occam's Razor idea. One of the things one doesn't want to posit are ideas that produce a distinction without any real difference. It would be superfluous. Hey, of course, I agree with that dictum. Makes sense. But, dear Doc, the question is is the distinction SUBSTANTIAL enough to warrant us making it? I would say definitely...especially for the subject of openness theology.
Peace out,
Meph
PS: Yo, Doc. What do you think about my "Interesting Idea" ? | | Back to Top | | |
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:10 PM (GMT -6) | | RE: Thanks for That Eye Balm, Doc
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I can delay my writing project (the one I’m a year late on) one more time today. So here’s to ya, Mephi.
1) Mephi says: Your premises, as it is applied in this argument, would not work without presuming "power to the contrary" But this assumption was never made explicit.
Doc: Still not clear about how affirming "power to the contrary" differs from affirming "we cannot be free or morally responsible for what we cannot change." Replace my phrase ‘what we cannot change" with "that for which there is no contrary we can choose." What meaning has changed? No smuggling here Meph.
Mephi : You say your soft determinist view of volition affects my argument, for now "instead of looking to any notion of foreknowledge or predestination for freedom, we look to the agent's actions and ABILITY to act."
Doc: My argument does not look at any notion of foreknowledge or predestination. It looks precisely where you say we should look: at our ability or inability to act! All I’m noting is that we CAN’T ACT to change the past. If God eternally foreknows our acts, the FACT that we shall do x is in the past. Hence we can’t ACT to change that. If you agree that we aren’t responsible for the past, then it seems to follow that you should accept that we aren’t responsible for our "future" acts, for the facticity of these acts IS IN THE PAST – which we cannot change!
Mephi: Whenever I use the term "naive realist" it is not a personal attack or insult.
Doc: No insult was taken. I just think you’re plain wrong in suggesting that believing our experience of libertarian freedom is a good basis for believing in libertarian freedom constitutes being a "niave realist."
Mephi: Meph notes my argument that "If you believe that we cannot be responsible for facts that have taken place in 1492 [which he does], then how can you say that we are responsible for the "facts" that God knows in 1492, using His EDF?"
He responds thus:
Can you imagine how perplexed I then become? "What the...???" Weren't we just talking about inability to change the past? How in the world are we going to confuse categories like this? We haven't even discussed potential ways HOW EDF takes place."
Doc: The beauty of my argument (if I may be so humble) is that it does NOT matter HOW EDF supposedly takes place. If God HAS EDF, the FACTS of what I SHALL choose are IN THE PAST. They are in the same category of "all past facts that are unchangeable." An exhaustive catalogue of all facts on August 15, 1492 would include all my future acts. If you agree I can’t change and am not responsible for any past facts, then you agree I can’t change and am not responsible for any future facts. No slight of hand. No categorical confusion. Just plain logic my boy.
Mephi: You are using the idea of "facts that predate our existence" EQUIVOCALLY for two entirely different categories.
Doc: Does any other reader out there agree with Mephi here? Am I dealing with a blind spot? The category of past facts includes all facts that God knows. Where’s the equivocation? A fact is that which is no longer a possibility; that which is definite over against all possibilities; that which is a definite this as opposed to a that. If you have a better definition, I'll be happy to live with it so long as it is roughly what we generally mean by "facts." What I don't get is where you think I am equivocating on either the definition of "facts" or "past." Spell it out for me.
I appreciate the help.
Blessings
Got to go.
Doc
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:11 PM (GMT -6) | | RE: RE: Thanks for That Eye Balm, Doc
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1) Mephi says: Your premises, as it is applied in this argument, would not work without presuming "power to the contrary" But this assumption was never made explicit.
Doc: Still not clear about how affirming "power to the contrary" differs from affirming "we cannot be free or morally responsible for what we cannot change." Replace my phrase ‘what we cannot change" with "that for which there is no contrary we can choose." What meaning has changed? No smuggling here Meph.
Of course, Mephi ALSO smuggles in "compatibilisitc" freedom in his "d" without explaining it or denfending it in the first place. Does he not?
Tom - a.k.a TGB | | Back to Top | | |
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:13 PM (GMT -6) | | Well, well, now...
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Tom,
Actually, no, I don't smuggle in "compatibilistic" freedom in my D'. If you look carefully at my D' again, I'm sure that you will plainly see that it doesn't assume ANY metaphysical view of freedom...which is what I intended. It just opens the door for compatibilistic freedom WITHOUT presuming it. Thanks for allowing me to highlight that, Tom.
Meph
PS: Doc, I'm crafting a response to your stuff here. I've decided to take some time and put on my Whitehead 3-d shades and see what I see. Stay tuned... | | Back to Top | | |
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:14 PM (GMT -6) | | To make this point even stronger, con-sider what would happen if God wrote down the contents of his omniscient mind in a book and gave it to the world on August 15, 1492. Now I could actually read what was written five centuries ago about what I shall do in my future. And, note, I cannot alter what I read and avoid what it says. For it is the catalogue of an infallible omniscient mind. Suppose, for example, I read in this book that on a certain date I shall make a catastrophic immoral decision. What can I do about it? Absolutely nothing.
Doc-
Would not Christ's prediction to Peter that he would deny him three times before the rooster (I previously typed in "Kock" but with a "C" at the beginning, but it was automatically deleted by CoolBoard! That's funny!) crowed be an example of this? What in the world must Peter have felt when Christ told him, "Look, Peter, you're going to deny me three times before the sun comes up." Following your logic, wouldn't Peter then be excused from responsibility? Or what else can OVers do with this passage?
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:15 PM (GMT -6) | | As Always, Tom is the Friggin Man!
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Tom,
You are truly a genius! How do you continuously DO it!?! Love you, man. You've given a wonderful biblical example through which to show my issue...
We begin at the VERY MOMENT that Jesus is giving the prophecy to Peter. At the time that Jesus made the prophecy to Peter, would it be safe to assume that Jesus knew something about Israel during the time of Isaiah the Prophet? For the sake of argument, let's say that He did. Now, let's place this whole thing in context. From what I understand of Doc's reasoning, we (and probably Jesus) would say that Peter was NOT responsible for some of the gross acts of idolatry and what not committed by Israel at the time of Isaiah. This is simply because Peter did not even exist at that time, thus there is no way that he could be responsible for anything that took place at that time. Moreover, Peter doesn't have the capacity to time travel, therefore he doesn't have the power to CHANGE anything. Because of these two reasons, any reasonable person would say that Peter was not responsible for any act during Isaiah's time of prophetic operation.
Now, AT THE SAME TIME, Jesus knows FOR CERTAIN that Peter WILL deny him a certain number of times before the crows of a rooster. There is no ambiguity in Jesus' speech. This is bonafide foretelling of the future. It's so on point that when Peter HEARS the rooster, he remembers Jesus' words and their accuracy. This is a "fact" (according to Doc's terminology) that Jesus knows TEMPORALLY PRIOR to the event itself.
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Now according to Doc's reasoning and definition of the word "fact", we would basically have to say two things:
1) Peter's relation to past historical events in the time of Isaiah and Peter's relation to predicted future events that he hasn't done yet are placed within the SAME category in the mind of Jesus: that which is no longer possibility. The obvious difference between the two situations is COMPLETELY negated by the definition and use of the word "fact"
2) Because of the above, Peter CANNOT be held responsible for his Jesus-PREDICTED denial of Christ. Peter's willand act was IN NO WISE "free"
Does anyone else have any problems with this? I think this is great, because Tom has provided a biblical scenario with which we can test out Doc's thought and apply it. The situation is hightened because Jesus HIMSELF is the one making the prediction. Now, I don't see but two choices. Either we accept Doc's thought here and unqualifiably say that Peter wasn't responsible in ANY way for his denial of Christ...OR we have to question the validity of Doc's philosophical argument. If anyone sees a third option, please let me know. I'm blind to it.
Just figured I'd heighten things a bit. This'll start us off pretty good. Again, great stuff, Tom.
Blessings,
Meph
PS: I'm seeing a lot of Whitehead in this "fact" stuff, Doc. I trying to find a way to formulate my ideas without seeming incoherent. Tom's thing helped a bit.
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:16 PM (GMT -6) | | Forgot Something
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Oh, something else. This biblical example ALSO gives a good example, I think, a coherent idea of compatibilism. Check it out. Jesus tells Peter that Peter will deny him. What did Peter say right after that? "Heck, no, Lord, I'm never gonna deny you. I put that on my life, big dawg!" Now let's look at what happened. We are given really good ideas in Matthew. He comes upon various people and, probably, for fear of his own life, denies Christ. Notice, we SEE the causative factors in play. Peter being confronted by different people. Peter's unstability. Peter's fear. etc. WHEN THE ROOSTER CROWS, Peter remembers what Jesus said and knew that he'd blown it. Now, HOW did the situation come about. Did God or anyone else FORCE Peter to deny Christ? Was Peter's sense of volition and agency taken away? Heck, no. His denial came out of a product of PETER's own agency. HE was legitimately the one who denied Christ. He wasn't hypnotized or anything like that. It was Peter who did the action.
Now, the question becomes: How in the world could Jesus predict NOT ONLY the free-willed choices of Peter, but also the TIME in which they would have occurred. We cannot deny Jesus' certainty in predicting unless we just want to say he got lucky. We also don't want to say that Peter was completely COERCED by God's direct causative micromanagement for this event to occur, either. With my view, I see no problems. With the open view (as elaborated partially in Doc's argument) I see MAD problems. This is just something else that I thought of.
Meph
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:16 PM (GMT -6) | | A ghost from Christus Victor Past
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Doc says: Mephi, after all of this dialogue I am still baffled by your account of freedom and moral responsibility. You seem to grant that we experience ourselves as having he power of contrary choice and we act as though we had the power of contrary choice, but you then embrace a metaphysical theory that denies it -- calling those who accept it naive realists.
GDG: This reminds me of Mephi and our old friend LL’s conviction that all Scripture is anthropomorphic. They suggested that we ought not confuse how we live our lives with what we believe about ultimate reality. To do so is philosophically (but not personally) naïve (Mephi’s take) and maybe even idolatrous (LL’s take). I hope I’m recalling this correctly…it’s been a while. GDG a.ka - ghost-dog-girl | | Back to Top | | |
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:17 PM (GMT -6) | | RE: A ghost from Christus Victor Past
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Girl, you so crazy! For real, though, what's your take on this topic thus far? What do you think of Doc's argument? See any problems? On a related note, do you feel that Peter's denial of Christ was a "free" act?
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:18 PM (GMT -6) | | RE: RE: A ghost from Christus Victor Past
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Call me crazy , but so far I’m with Tom. I agree with him about your D' and I agree that Doc better deal with Jesus’ prediction of Peter’s denial.
As for my opinion of Peter’s denial (disclaimer: logic is not my strong suit), why couldn’t God have determined Peter’s denial, as long as this denial was consister rather than contrary to Peter’s self-determined character? GDG
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:19 PM (GMT -6) | | Response to GDG
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Now, THAT'S interesting.
With respect to my D', I guess I stick to my guns. My D' does not assume any specific metaphysic regarding human agency. I specifically crafted it that way. Same thing I told Tom.
As far as my problem with open view theists allowing for Peter's EXACT denials to be predetermined by God, I figured it should be obvious. It's a direct denial of libertarian free will, which is the mainstay of the theological worldview. Though I see grave issues with this character-solidification stuff, it's pretty much irrevelant with this situation. We are not talking about any type of general predetermination. We are talking VERY SPECIFIC and CERTAIN prophecy of a future event. A "fact", according to Doc's definition. We are talking about God basically micromanaging Peter such that Jesus's prediction is right on point.
It would then seem that Millard Erickson is on point in his "God the Father Almighty". Page 91-92. In this section, Erickson is talking about a thought from William Hasker, but the intent is germane to this discussion. All emphases mine:
"If I understand Hasker correctly, he seems to be suggesting that, in a situation of extremity, God may use "coercive power" to exercise his "control over us." But is this not the very thing with which the free will theists have charged the classical view: of holding that God coerces, or works irresistably, thus robbing humans of their freedom? If he is actually suggesting this, however, then the difference between this view and the classical view is one of degree, not of kind. Actually, the Calvinist working with a compatibilist view claims that God does not coerce, he simply brings aobut cooperation or obedience, but that expedient is not available to the free will theists, with their incompatibilist view."
My man Millard is right on point here. If open view theist want to say that God literally MICROMANAGED and, in so doing, COERCED Peter to deny Christ before the rooster crowed in exactly the manner predicted by Jesus, then cool. They also have to say that God COERCED Peter into commiting a sin. No way out of that. Was Peter's denial an "extreme" situation that was a necessity? It's even more of a mystery considering that Peter seemed to very GENUINELY not want to betray his Lord. Are we really going to say, from an open view theist standpoint, that God COERCED things such that Peter had NO CHOICE but to sin, even over and against Peter's desire not to do so? Would this not be undermining the very principles of OVT that many find so nice about it?
This situation is a problem, in and of itself. When taken in tandem with Doc's philosophical argument which seems to heavily imply that Peter's act was IN NO WAY a free one, we seem to really have issues. Remember, because Jesus' DEFINITE knowledge of Peter's action temporally preceded the actual event, Peter was not responsible. Let's hope Doc can aid us here.
Meph
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:19 PM (GMT -6) | | Could Peter Have Done Otherwise?
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Good question. My response may be overly brief, but it’s the best I can do at the moment.
I’m a little bit surprised Mephi is so ecstatic over Tom’s question. I have from the start defended the maxim of Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas – and multitudes of others, that choices become habit, habit becomes character and character eventually becomes being. The more defined by habit, character, and being we become, the more predictable our behavior is. (This is phenom- enologically indisputable). Libertarian freedom becomes compatibilistic freedom. But, unlike the compatibilistic freedom of the Calvinist scheme, this we are responsible for this compatibilistic freedom -- even though it renders our choices predictable [to the extent that it governs us] -- because we, not God, choose it, and we could have, and perhaps should have, chosen otherwise.
Now, an omniscient God knows exactly what stage of "solidification" we – and Peter -- are at. Indeed, the omniscient God has from all eternity been perfectly preparing for just this eventuality – the one in which this person he desires to be a future pillar of his church has an cowardice masked by false bravado, leveraged on a machismo view of the messiah, and God needs to break it. (Of course, things could have and should have gone differently, and if they had, God would have been perfectly preparing for thateventuality – for God is a God of limitless intelligence, and thus doesn’t have to "spread out" his intelligence over the various possibilities he eternally evisions. He is as prepared for every possible story-line as he would be if it was the only possible story-line) So God knew and was from all eternity preparing for this, and knew exactly what it would take to break this future pillar of the church. Three humiliating denials (which, owing to his character, Peter is certain to engage in) followed by three poignant probing questions about Peter’s love, followed by a prediction of his future martyrdom (Jn 21).
If Jesus had unconditionally predicted Peter's behavior 500 years before Peter was born, and Peter was yet held responsible for what he did, that may be problematic to my argument. IF God predicted everything Peter was to do 500 years before he did it, that would really be problematic to my argument. (Actually, it wouldn't be problematic to my argument as such, but to my hope of squaring my argument with Scripture). But this isn't what happened. We have a specific prediction about a specific person's behavior over the next 12 hours. It seems to me there is a world of difference between saying that everything about Peter was settled an eternity before he was born, and saying that, because of who Peter had made himself to be, one behavior of his was predictable over the next 12 hours.
Peter denied Christ freely, not in the sense that he could have at that moment done otherwise, ,but in the sense that he could have and should have chosen otherwise, had he freely chosen to develop a different character.
Good stuff people.
Doc
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:20 PM (GMT -6) | | Meph Hollas...
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I ask all readers to read this intently. What I'm basically going to try to say is that Doc's character-development thing may not really do much to help the situation. Here we go.
Doc says:
If Jesus had unconditionally predicted Peter's behavior 500 years before Peter was born, and Peter was yet held responsible for what he did, that may be problematic to my argument. IF God predicted everything Peter was to do 500 years before he did it, that would really be problematic to my argument. (Actually, it wouldn't be problematic to my argument as such, but to my hope of squaring my argument with Scripture). But this isn't what happened. We have a specific prediction about a specific person's behavior over the next 12 hours. It seems to me there is a world of difference between saying that everything about Peter was settled an eternity before he was born, and saying that, because of who Peter had made himself to be, one behavior of his was predictable over the next 12 hours.
Meph:
Where do I begin? I know! First of all, let's talk about the notion of God's foreknowledge and libertarian free will. I'm fully accepting your view of God's knowledge and LFW here. What this means is that at ANY GIVEN MOMENT, God could never predict with 100% accuracy what WILL happen in the next moment. God could only know all of the possibilities that may or may not become actual in the next moment. To be sure, God could use what knowledge He had about past circumstances to predict what MAY or MAY NOT happen. But God could NEVER predict what WOULD happen the next moment. Given his IIA, he would just be ready for any possibile event that would occur. I'm pretty sure this is correct.
Ok, what does this mean? It means that length of time doesn't matter. 12 years. 12 days. 12 minutes. Heck, 12 SECONDS. It doesn't matter. God could NEVER fully know what future events WOULD occur from any given state in time. Not to be funny, but God doesn't know for a CERTAINTY if I'm going to spill flatulence in the next 2 or 3 mins, let alone what I'm going to do in the next 12 hours. So, let's look at the Peter episode. Jesus basically predicted a SPECIFIC number of times that Peter would deny him within a SPECIFIED timeframe. But let's remember the open worldview and metaphysic. For all Jesus knew, Peter could have been captured and killed after the FIRST denial. Or he could have fallen on some camel dung and broke his neck. Or Peter could have decided to locate himself in places where there was no one to question him. Do you understand where I'm going with this? It would have been one thing for Jesus to have said:
"Peter, at the rate you are going and from what I know of you, you will PROBABLY deny me. Even though, you think you won't, you probably will."
That would be so generalized that your character-development thing would be appropriate. But that's not what happens, now is it? It's very specific. Given the presupposition of open view theism and it's cosmology, the ONLY WAY that Jesus could have given that prophecy with the sense of DEFINITENESS that He does is for God to ensure that it WILL happen. And I don't mean by character-development. Think about it, Doc. YOU were the one who kept telling me that power to the contrary is the ability to transcend ALL types of factors in order for a being to make a choice. In other words, it would NEVER have been certain that Peter WOULD have sinned, even from character development alone. Why? Because LFW, as you have defined it, would make it impossible for us to say that. Hopefully, you see this.
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Next, about the "world of difference" that you speak of from the 12 hours and eternity thing. Let's look at your philosophical argument again. From what I understand, your argument basically says the following:
If any future action by any agent can be said to be known WITH DEFINITENESS by someone previous to the actual occurance of the event, then this constitutes a foreknown "fact" that cannot be changed because of its definiteness. Upon THOSE grounds, the agent would NOT be responsible for the act, nor would the same agent be called "free" because, just like the historical past the foreknown definite "fact" cannot be changed.
This is the essence of your argument, Doc. The length of time between the foreknowledge and the act is NOT IMPORTANT. The only thing that is important is the temporal previousness (is that a word??) of the definite foreknowledge to the event being foreknown. This is crucial to understand. Eternity or 12 hours. It doesn't matter. All that matters is the definiteness of the foreknowledge. So the point is extension, Doc. If we say that, at ANY TIME, that some agent's action was foreknown as DEFINITE before the actual event happened...but AT THE SAME TIME, say that the agent was fully or even PARTIALLY responsible for the event, then the heart of your argument is in serious danger. It seems apparent to me that perhaps, this Peter thing is substantial evidence of one of those times. Jesus predicted Peter's denial as a DEFINITE certainty before it happened. The only way that I can see out of this problem is to say that Jesus' prophecy was probabilistic and NOT definite. And that would have big problems of it's own, now wouldn't it? See, my euphoria over Tom's thing had it's reasons.
Allow me to recap:
1) The character solidification thing doesn't necessarily seem to accomplish the goal of explaining the Peter episode.
2) Time differential is not the important thing in examining the Peter episode with respect to Doc's argument. Only the DEFINITENESS of the foreknown "fact"
3) Given open view theisms worldview, the Peter episode seems to provide some evidence that Doc's argument may have serious problems.
Comments?
Peace out, big baybaaaayyy!
One Love,
Meph
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:22 PM (GMT -6) | | Questions For Doc
Turnabout is fair play, right? You asked me some questions, so...here's some questions for you, Doc. The questions are structured so that "yes" answers lead to the next question and on to other implications. Any "no" answer would stop the process and you could feel free to explain you answer. Hopefully, the way this works out, we we all see a logical progression of thought here. Hopefully, I did a decent job on the questions. LOL
1. When Jesus predicted that Peter WOULD deny him three times before the rooster crowed, was that DEFINITE foreknowledge of the event? Yes or no.
2. If yes to #1, would you consider that foreknowledge of the event a "fact" by your definition used in your philosophical argument? (You define FACT as "that which is no longer a possibility; that which is definite over against all possibilities; that which is a definite this as opposed to a that.")
3. If yes to #2, according to your argument, wouldn't the foreknowledge "fact" above indicate that, by its definiteness, that it was UNCHANGABLE, just like other past events?
4. If yes to #3, doesn't this mean that poor Peter was ultimately not responsible in ANY way for the action that had been definitely predicted by Jesus?
Mephi2K
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| Posted 6/25/2001 9:22 PM (GMT -6) | | Thanks for the Critical Insight
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Responses to Mephi's last two posts:'
About post number 1: Mephi, I argued that character renders behavior predictable, and then you respond to me by saying that open theists deny that God can ever predict behavior. Now, I'm an open theist, and I just told you the cases in which I believe God can predict, with certainty, future behavior. My only point is that we are responsible for the behavior predicted of us only to the extent that it flows from a character we ourselves chose when we could have chosen otherwise. So your whole first post, so far as I can see, missed the point.
Your second post was more on the mark, however. You may have fleshed out a weakness in my argument, at least as I initially stated it on this thread.
I would answer your first question YES. While other open theists see Jesus' prediction as a conditional warning, I'm more inclined to read this as an example of a "word of knowledge" regarding a certain, definite future action.
I would answer your second question YES as well. If Peter's future action was certain, God knew it as FACT, and it was a FACT that Peter would deny Christ three times.
Your third question hits on the weakness as stated. The argument as I stated it initially simply said we cannot change the past and we cannot be responsible for that which we cannot change. You are right to point out that this would entail the denial of the very thing I want to here affirm -- namely, Peter's responsibility.
So I need to modify this point. Even though Peter can't now change the past, and thus can't render it false that, given such and such circumstances he will certainly deny Christ (circumstances that God is going to make sure occur so as to sqeeze out this ugliness from Peter) -- even though this is true, I want to say Peter is yet responsible for his future denials, for he's responsible for the character that renders them certain.
So, I should perhaps revise my argument to read:
We are not responsible for what we cannot, or could not ever have, changed.
With this modification I think the argument still works. Since I cannot and could not ever have changed a fact 500 years ago, I cannot be responsible for it. But I could have changed the character I now have, and thus could have avoided the behavior that may now compatibilistically flow from it -- even if I can't now change it. Hence I'm still responsible for my behavior. (Extreme example: an addict may be unable to refrain from cocaine -- but once could have, so is yet responsible for the fact that they now can't).
Thanks for the refinement Meph. Good feedback.
What do you think?
Doc.
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