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aquinas
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 36
| Posted 2/12/2004 11:46 AM (GMT -6) |   | Hello,
I am sure that most of you have heard the argument for simplicity from the cosmological argument. (i.e. All finite contingent being is composed of act and potency, contingent being cannot be the cause of it's own existence, therefore there must be a God of pure act with no passive potency to be the ground of being) If you want me to state it more formally, I can do that.
What are your reasons for rejecting this argument? It seems to me that one would have to deny simplicity to accept the proposition "God is in time" or "God changes His mind."
1. Do you reject simplicity? If so, why? Specifically, how do you respond to this version of the cosmological argument?
2. Do you accept the doctrine of simplicity and hold that God is in time? If so, how do you resolve God's simplicity with God being in time?
Thanks.
Matt
If we allow pious feelings to decree what nature should be, we are bound to wrong nature, for how could we find in piety a principle of self-restriction? In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but to be right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God! --Etienne Gilson | | Back to Top | | |
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aquinas
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 36
| Posted 2/13/2004 3:34 PM (GMT -6) | | This is a really important question. If Aquinas's 5 ways are not refuted, or at least rebutted, then open theism is in serious trouble. If God is pure Act, then appeals to "God can't be relational and pure Act" are irrelevant. If He is Pure Act, then He is pure Act even if the implications are that He is NOT relational. (not that I think that simplicity demands this) So if anyone is willing to tackle this, I would love to discuss this. Thanks.
If we allow pious feelings to decree what nature should be, we are bound to wrong nature, for how could we find in piety a principle of self-restriction? In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but to be right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God! --Etienne Gilson | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2001
Total Posts : 10353
| Posted 2/13/2004 8:04 PM (GMT -6) | | State it for me formally borg.
Not many hold too divine simplicity today. And certainly there are many who deny simplicity without being open theists. For example. Craig presents the cosmological argument while denying simplicity.
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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aquinas
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 36
| Posted 2/15/2004 8:56 AM (GMT -6) | | TGB,
I guess it is the case that in evangelical circles there are fewer and fewer people holding to the doctrine of simplicity. My question is whether or not evangelicals ought to hold the doctrine.
Craig uses the kalam form of the cosmological argument. To the best of my knowledge, this argument does not use categories of "act", "potency", "finite contingent being", etc. These are the categories that are used in defending simplicity. They are found in the thomistic form of the cosmological argument. I will outline it for you.
1. Some limited, changing being(s) exist.
2. The present existence of every limited, changing being is caused by another.
3. There cannot be an infinite regress of causes of being.
4. Therefore, there is a first Cause of the present existence of these beings.
5. The first Cause must be infinite, necessary eternal, simple, unchangeable, and one.
Keep in mind that this is an outline. If you want more elaboration on any of these points let me know. I would like to hear your thoughts on the argument. Thanks.
Matt
If we allow pious feelings to decree what nature should be, we are bound to wrong nature, for how could we find in piety a principle of self-restriction? In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but to be right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God! --Etienne Gilson | | Back to Top | | |
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aquinas
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 36
| Posted 2/16/2004 1:28 PM (GMT -6) | | rossfadeinout,
I think the implication of the Thomistic argument is that God is timeless. If God is simple, (without parts or divisions) then God can't be "part" timeless and "part" temporal. This brings up some interesting questions about the incarnation, but they are questions that have been asked for a while now.
My understanding, and I certainly could be wrong, is that Craig holds that there are essential and non-essential properties of God. If God is simple, it would be meaningless to talk about "non-essential" properties or attributes of God. Whatever God is, He is essentially.
I am actually just beginning to seriously study this topic because I am writing a paper on Craig's view of time and foreknowledge. It's fascinating!
Another issue that I am really interested in studying is: "How can God be simple and Triune? I have not heard an understandable answer to this question yet. Perhaps it's because I don't understand Aquinas's view of relations. Or perhaps, it is an incoherent view. Of course I lean toward the former, but we will see.
Matt
If we allow pious feelings to decree what nature should be, we are bound to wrong nature, for how could we find in piety a principle of self-restriction? In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but to be right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God! --Etienne Gilson | | Back to Top | | |
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PhilTheThrill
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2004
Total Posts : 95
| Posted 2/18/2004 8:11 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by aquinas
If God is pure Act, then appeals to "God can't be relational and pure Act" are irrelevant. If He is Pure Act, then He is pure Act even if the implications are that He is NOT relational. (not that I think that simplicity demands this)
Well, I think the Bible would tend to deny God being non-relational. For one, it says "God is love" and love can't really exist in a non-relational sense.
Where in the Bible would we get the impression that God is purely Act? How does the "no passive potency" argument square with what we know of God's nature from the Bible? | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/19/2004 2:57 PM (GMT -6) | | This seems to be a relevant thread to post this in. It's a link to an online article that discusses Aquinas' Five Ways in what seems to be a fairly even-handed way. The author makes the point, which is evident to anyone who read the first few questions of the Summa Theol. that Aquinas' arguments for the various divine attributes like simplicity, immutability, etc. depend predominantly on his arguments in the Five Ways.
www.quodlibet.net/aqu5ways.shtml | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
Registered Member
Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/19/2004 3:53 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by aquinas
I am sure that most of you have heard the argument for simplicity from the cosmological argument. (i.e. All finite contingent being is composed of act and potency, contingent being cannot be the cause of it's own existence, therefore there must be a God of pure act with no passive potency to be the ground of being) ... This is a really important question. If Aquinas's 5 ways are not refuted, or at least rebutted, then open theism is in serious trouble.
You raise a important issue, Matt. I don't have much time right now to reflect on the issue, so I'll just add my two cents now and hopefully chip in more in a couple days.
As I read Aquinas' Five Ways, I see a couple problems.
In the First Way he makes a distinction between act and potency. He illustrates this with an example of fire heating wood. The fire is actually hot and causes the wood which was merely potentially hot to become actually hot as well. The example is a case of deterministic efficient causation in which something acquire a property it did not previously have from something that already possessed that property. But Aquinas has to have something broader in mind, or he would have to say that God actually possesses every property of creation, including size, age, etc. He wants to extend this act/potency distinction to apply to necessary/contingent being, the esse/essentia distinction, and so on. What's not clear to me is whether the act/potency distinction remains well-defined in all of these different (though, Aquinas would insist, analogically related) domains of application.
Second, contingent beings are such because they own their existence to another. So it seems right to posit a necessarily existing being, i.e., one that does not own its existence to another, as the ultimate ground for the existence of contingent beings. But how does one get from there to the conclusion that this necessary being must be Pure Act? What the argument seems to show is that God cannot exist contingently, but why can't we affirm that and affirm that some things are contingently true of God, such as his being a Creator, or his being conditioned by the choices of free creatures? Aquinas would undoubtedly respond that for God not to be Pure Act would mean that He was composed of act and potency and therefore a contingent being and not the ultimate ground of the being of everything. This doesn't seem obvious to me, for a couple reasons. First, I'm not sure that the act/potency distinction has been given a clear enough meaning to assess the truth of the claim. Second, why would having both essential and accidental properties make a God a contingent being in the sense of depending on another for his existence? As long as his existence does not depend on those accidental properties, I don't see how this would vitiate the Creator/creature distinction that Aquinas is so concerned to uphold.
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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aquinas
Registered Member
Date Joined Jul 2003
Total Posts : 36
| Posted 2/21/2004 5:39 AM (GMT -6) | | Alan,
Thank you for your response. Thank you for the link as well.
You asked, "how does one get from there to the conclusion that this necessary being must be Pure Act?" You responded, "Aquinas would undoubtedly respond that for God not to be Pure Act would mean that He was composed of act and potency and therefore a contingent being and not the ultimate ground of the being of everything." Finally you gave two reasons for why this conclusion is not necessary:
1. Act/Potency distinction is not clear enought to assess the truth of the claim.
2. It's not clear that God having essential and accidental properties necessitates the conclusion that God is contingent.
I just have a couple of questions for now:
1. How do you define "Act" and "Potency?" Do you think this distinction is an informative distinction? Are these metaphysical principles helpful in understanding change/duration, the one/many problem, etc.?
You asked, "but why can't we affirm that [God cannot exist contingently] and affirm that some things are contingently true of God, such as his being a Creator, or his being conditioned by the choices of free creatures?" Would you say that God's being creator, (something that was not necessitated by His being) shows that there are contingent "properties" of God? If so, could you explain what you mean by this? Could you explain your notion of a "property?"
Thank you!
Matt
If we allow pious feelings to decree what nature should be, we are bound to wrong nature, for how could we find in piety a principle of self-restriction? In theology, as in any other science, the main question is not to be pious, but to be right. For there is nothing pious in being wrong about God! --Etienne Gilson | | Back to Top | | |
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