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robertseakykr
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Date Joined Oct 2006
Total Posts : 15
| Posted 10/15/2006 6:30 AM (GMT -6) |   | | Hi:
Regarding God's knowledge or ignorance of human choice: Suppose God made an exact replica of YOU. Placed this replica in a universe that EXACTLY resembled our own. A simple thought experiment for a being such as GOD.
Would the replica YOU behave EXACTLY as you do?
I'll anticipate your answer- "NO!!" (of course you must answer this way)
My question is this- "In answering no to the above, does this not reduce human choice to something either arbitrary or worse, simply random?"
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
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| Posted 10/15/2006 10:57 AM (GMT -6) | | | Hello, RobertSeakykr! And welcome. I'm not sure what you're asking. But let me take a stab at your question.
I'm not a morning person. So every morning when my alarm clock goes off, my immediate impluse is to turn off the alarm and go back to sleep. But I know inductively that my greatest satisfaction will be attained by getting up and going to work. This inductive knowledge entails knowledge about how the world works and how my sensibilities are affected by different world conditions/circumstances.
So I intentionally think about whatever I need to to generate an impulse that works contra my impulse to go back to sleep. For me, this thinking tends to be on the negative consequences of not getting up. But for some people, thinking of the positive pleasure gained from getting up is more effective. Regardless, I think it takes volitional effort to focus my mind to generate that contrary impulse. But insomuch as it is based upon my inductive knowledge of the world and my own sensibilities, that mind focusing is neither abitrary or random. It is truly intelligent.
Now one could say that the focusing of my mind on the consequences of not getting up is merely a natural event, completely explicable apart from final causes. If this is true, then we might actually be void of free-will. But a few things have to be explained from this philosophical stance:
1) How did we form a concept of free-will if it doesn't exist? IOW, how do we apprehend a mode of causality for which there could be no evidence?
2) If the idea of free-will is a necessary concept in the human mind despite its non-existence, what other necessary beliefs might be false, and how would we know it? And what implications does that have for the rest of our thought?
3) If there is no free-will, doesn't that mean that most folks' moral metaphysics is false? And even if so, could they possibly cease to evaluate morally by that metaphysic? And if not, what does that imply about human epistemological competence?
In short, what many people see as mental acts of free-will seem, at least superficially, to be just that. And if they aren't, we still have some explaining to do. And it's questionable, if there is no free-will, that we are epistemologically competent in the first place.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 10/15/2006 11:03:40 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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robertseakykr
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Date Joined Oct 2006
Total Posts : 15
| Posted 10/15/2006 4:28 PM (GMT -6) | | | Hi jefscott:
Sorry if my rambling is a little cluttered, I'll try to clarify myself. 
I'm not actually trying to argue against freewill, but perhaps my argument has ramifications regarding it.
Here's what I'm stating in a nutshell:
1) Holders of open theism believe God cannot know in advance choices I freely make.
2) From this, I deduce that God cannot obtain forknowledge via modeling the universe as obviously even given EXACT REPRODUCTION it may produce a different outcome. ( eg. I may choose differently in any given freely chosen event)
3) If this is so, I'm not sure how my choices really have any meaning at all. How are they diffent from absolutely arbitrary choices or completely random outcomes?
I'm really just backward engineering an argument I see often here- "How can my choice be free if I'm not free to do otherwise."(Constrained by God's foreknowledge)
I think open theists are noble in trying to elevate our state of being to libertarian abilities but it comes at a cost. True libertarian choice is not really any different than the outcome of a random number generator.
Is it really necesssary to strip God of foreknowledge in order for us to have made a meaningful choice? I believe that in trying to dignify humanity, open theists have actually degraded it. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 10/15/2006 5:15 PM (GMT -6) | | | RobertSeakykr: I think open theists are noble in trying to elevate our state of being to libertarian abilities but it comes at a cost. True libertarian choice is not really any different than the outcome of a random number generator.
Jeff: Sorry for misunderstanding you. I would agree that libertarian free-will has different implications than, say, compatibilistic free-will. And we can call those differences costs. But I'm not sure why those costs have to do with dignity. And the crux of my argument was to show that libertarian free-will is intelligent, not random. It is based, as I see it, on an inductive understanding of the world and the sensibilities.
I disagree with some, however, that see most of what people do as regulated by libertarian free-will. I think much of what we do (indeed, most) is acting on automatic or habit, more or less. And these habits were formed by previous libertarian free-will choices for the most part. Hence they have an intelligence to them also.
One other thing. Some argue that God has foreknowledge even though we can't understand how He could do so if we are truly free. In that sense, there is virtually the same cost, epistemologically speaking. Because even then, we are considered to be unable to coherently comprehend how the two are logically compatible. And even then, I don't see how dignity is a cost.
Post Edited (jefscott) : 10/15/2006 5:18:09 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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robertseakykr
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Date Joined Oct 2006
Total Posts : 15
| Posted 10/15/2006 9:28 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi Jeff:
Jeff: "Some argue that God has foreknowledge even though we can't understand how He could do so if we are truly free. In that sense, there is virtually the same cost, epistemologically speaking. Because even then, we are considered to be unable to coherently comprehend how the two are logically compatible. And even then, I don't see how dignity is a cost."
We may be still talk past each other a little bit. Pehaps an example:
You are faced with a situation where your are required to make a decision. This decision is one you are TRULY FREE to make. No compatibalistic, automatic or habitual choice in this instance. A truly free, morally accountable choice. You choose "A".
God could not foreknow "A" as this would negate any other possible choice and demolish moral accountability (according to the open view).
God is very powerful. He creates an alternate universe. Exactly like our own. Would the alt-you choose as you did, given all the same circumstances? The open theist must argue no, as an affirmative answer opens up one possible route to foreknowledge for God.
So here's the problem: "you" when placed repeatedly in the very same morally responsible situation, with the very same cicumstances may choose "not A". Or B or C or D or....
Please explain how this decision retains any moral weight when it really is no different than a completely random outcome? Dignity?- maybe a bad word choice on my part. How about "humanity". | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 10/15/2006 9:45 PM (GMT -6) | | |
Robert: Please explain how this decision retains any moral weight when it really is no different than a completely random outcome?
Jeff: There is nothing random about it. If two identical (clones) 10-year old Jeff's were placed in identical parallel universes, their thoughts and actions would probably be very similar for the first few years, at least. If there would be any divergence, that divergence would grow with time as the effects of choices (the Jeff's and those in their worlds) affected the habits and sensibilities of the two, etc.
A random flip of a coin is just the opposite. The results of subsequent flips will show no pattern analogous to the two Jeff's. Why? Because there is no intelligence involved as there is in the two Jeff's. It's just chance.
The very reason why the world is predictable even given the free-will choices is because humans are similar enough in sensibilities and intellect to result in relatively predictable behavior. But over the course of generations we see the divergence of sensibilities more clearly as the environment changes more significantly for developing humans. Subsequent generations have more disparate environments than do identical twins in a given generation.
I really think most folks attribute way more to free-will than is actually the case. Most people act off of habit and the path of least resistance most of the time. This assures a significantly high level of predictability in human behavior--way more predictable than purely random effects.
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robertseakykr
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Date Joined Oct 2006
Total Posts : 15
| Posted 10/16/2006 11:40 AM (GMT -6) | | Hi Jeff:
What I'm trying to demonstrate is that the OV argument about God's foreknowledge and moral resposibility being incompatible is itself meaningless.
Please consider that in ANY PARTICULAR TRUE FREE-WILL DECISION, if you have a choice of options A, B, C, or D, you COULD possibly choose any of them. The very fact that IN A REPEAT OF THIS VERY SAME SITUATION YOU MAY CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY makes the very ACT itself meaningless. You have become simply a random number generator. If you then say "In the same situation 10 year old Jeff would always choose A", 10 year old Jeff has now become PREDICTABLE, which gives God an avenue to foreknowledge that the original OV argument was meant to discredit.
I really can't say it any plainer than this- The open view is interesting but in reality it offers little more in making true free-will choices meaningful or even intelligible. | | Back to Top | | |
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JET
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Date Joined Jun 2002
Total Posts : 397
| Posted 10/16/2006 2:57 PM (GMT -6) | | First, I'm not sure it would be logically possible for God to create an "exact replica" of a truly libertarian agent. The idea of LFW is tied to the idea of personhood. There is something (beyond DNA) that makes a LFW agent a "self", a "person". It is metaphysical. (LFW is incompatible with naturalism.) The fact that an agent is created in such a way as to have LFW by definition precludes the possibility of creating an "exact replica".
But assuming, arguendo, that it would be logically possible for God to create a exact replica of an LFW agent (agent A1) in an identical universe, I'm not sure the open view entails that the replica agent (agent A2) would NOT behave the same in an identical universe. This would not mean, however, that the open view is false. Even if agent A2 would behave the same as A1, this would not entail EDF:
God's knowledge of A1's LFW choice would be conditioned on A1's having actually made the choice (thus precluding EDF). If God then subsequently created agent A2 in an identical universe (and assuming that A2 would behave the same as A1), the predictability of A2's choices would be based not on EDF, but rather on God's knowledge of A1's choice made earlier. If A2 was created first, God's knowledge would be based on A2's choice. If A1 and A2 are created simultaneously in parallel universes, God's knowledge would be based on A1 and A2's simultaneous choices. In any event, God wouldn't have knowledge of the choice until it is made (the first time).
Earl
Post Edited (JET) : 10/16/2006 3:18:46 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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robertseakykr
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Date Joined Oct 2006
Total Posts : 15
| Posted 10/16/2006 8:46 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi Tom:
I hope it OK for me to use everyone's name here, it seems a little forward as I don't know any of you.
First, let me say that I am honored that any of you dialogue with me. I have followed many threads on this board for some time and I'm very impressed with the level of discussion here. Most of it well above me.
My intent isn't to discredit the idea of free-will decisions. Only to put them in proper perspective. Perhaps they truly are akin to random events. I think though, I have shown that morally reponsible free-will decisions are just as troublesome to understand as are morally-reponsible determined decisions. There is really no need to extricate God's knowledge from human choice. It gains you nothing. Nada. By the way, you may be suprised to know I am not a determinist.
You asked me:
"Let me ask you a question though. Describe for me God's choice to create. Was he free to not create? Was his choice to create a contingent choice? Could he have NOT made it, given the eternal sort of being he is? How will you argue the contingent nature of creation if libertarian free will is by defintion incoherent?"
For me, asking if God cannot create is like asking if God cannot love. He MUST create. He's God. This is pure speculation on my part but I feel he has always created, probably innumerable times in ages past. Does God posses libertarian will? My gut tells me no.
I almost feel libertarian will is a flaw we posses, not a virtue. It flows from our imperfection. How would choice be constained by perfection? We cannot know but we all agree (I think) that libertarian choice will be supplanted with something else in Paradise.
Hi Earl:
You said:
"I'm not sure the open view entails that the replica agent (agent A2) would NOT behave the same in an identical universe. This would not mean, however, that the open view is false. Even if agent A2 would behave the same as A1, this would not entail EDF:
God's knowledge of A1's LFW choice would be conditioned on A1's having actually made the choice (thus precluding EDF). If God then subsequently created agent A2 in an identical universe (and assuming that A2 would behave the same as A1), the predictability of A2's choices would be based not on EDF, but rather on God's knowledge of A1's choice made earlier. If A2 was created first, God's knowledge would be based on A2's choice. If A1 and A2 are created simultaneously in parallel universes, God's knowledge would be based on A1 and A2's simultaneous choices. In any event, God wouldn't have knowledge of the choice until it is made (the first time)."
I guess in reply I would say that if you did always behave the same way in an identical situation that you're back to square one. Even though you APPEAR to have alternate choices, it's only an aparition. You really only have one possible choice. The one you always make. Might as well give God back his foreknowledge and be done with it.
By the way, it's not really necessary for God to make an alternate you. That was just an attempt to clarify myself to Jeff. The problem lies simply in the notion of being able to FREELY make choices between alternates. | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 10/19/2006 6:47 PM (GMT -6) | | | Robert: If you then say "In the same situation 10 year old Jeff would always choose A", 10 year old Jeff has now become PREDICTABLE, which gives God an avenue to foreknowledge that the original OV argument was meant to discredit.
Jeff: I think you misunderstand the epistemology of many an OV'er, Robert. We don't mean to discredit foreknowledge. We just take our conceptual understanding of libertarian free-will to its logical conclusion and see that as requiring open theism. We don't rule out foreknowledge of non-LFW events. Nor do we rule out God's ability to foreknow by virtue of His ability to bring about events. We just say that so far as our minds can comprehend, God could not foreknow a truly free choice.
My question for you, Robert, is "why do you see this kind of attempt to be logically consistent as problematic?" All theists assert and deny attributes of God. Aren't we to be consistent and avoid counter-intuitive ideas in our understanding of God? Or to put it another way, what truth do you think is at stake if God doesn't foreknow all future events? And is that truth intuitive, derived, or what?
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robertseakykr
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Date Joined Oct 2006
Total Posts : 15
| Posted 10/19/2006 9:56 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi Jeff:
Jeff: "My question for you, Robert, is "why do you see this kind of attempt to be logically consistent as problematic?" All theists assert and deny attributes of God. Aren't we to be consistent and avoid counter-intuitive ideas in our understanding of God? Or to put it another way, what truth do you think is at stake if God doesn't foreknow all future events? And is that truth intuitive, derived, or what?"
We all find logical consistency to be admirable in a system, unless it leads to conflicts with our notions of what "ought" to be. I'm sure many OV'ers embraced this line because of dislike of Calvinist thought (described by many as the most logically consistent form of Christianity) on the matter of freedom. It appears to me that the OV movement is predicted on the defence of the philosophic argument I mention above. Correct me if I'm wrong, but did the egg preceed the chicken? The philosophy before the exegesis?
What I attempted to demonstrate above was that this foundational argument is on shaky ground. The attempt to free-up alternate choices for "free" agents really gains you nothing. For these choices to be "real" they have to be possible to actualize. If they could be actualized, a repeat of any given "free" choice could possibly actualize in a different result. Think about that. You're in a choice situation with EXACTLY the same parameters and you choose differently. Kinda steals the meaningful thunder of your decision doesn't it? If this drives you to the more logically consistent: "The "free" agents choice would always actualize the same way", then why jetison the "constraint" of exhaustive foreknowledge when the agents choice is really already constained by necessity of logical consistency?
This philosophical predicate also creates other problems. An example would be Peter's denial of Christ, raised in another thread recently. I've read many creative OV defences of Christ's prophetic knowledge, some even considering that God over-rode Peter's own will compatibalistically OR EVEN UNILATERALLY to fullfill the predition. Wow! That's alot of baggage to carry. Isn't it VERY much simpler to acknowledge God's foreknowledge of Peter's OWN decision to deny Jesus?? I personally would simply apply Occam's razor here. Cut away the unnecessary. | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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Date Joined Jan 2003
Total Posts : 13888
| Posted 10/20/2006 6:59 AM (GMT -6) | | Robert:
Regarding God's knowledge or ignorance of human choice: Suppose God made an exact replica of YOU. Placed this replica in a universe that EXACTLY resembled our own. A simple thought experiment for a being such as GOD.
Would the replica YOU behave EXACTLY as you do?
I'll anticipate your answer- "NO!!" (of course you must answer this way)
My question is this- "In answering no to the above, does this not reduce human choice to something either arbitrary or worse, simply random?"
and...
Here's what I'm stating in a nutshell:
1) Holders of open theism believe God cannot know in advance choices I freely make.
2) From this, I deduce that God cannot obtain forknowledge via modeling the universe as obviously even given EXACT REPRODUCTION it may produce a different outcome. ( eg. I may choose differently in any given freely chosen event)
3) If this is so, I'm not sure how my choices really have any meaning at all. How are they diffent from absolutely arbitrary choices or completely random outcomes?
I'm really just backward engineering an argument I see often here- "How can my choice be free if I'm not free to do otherwise."(Constrained by God's foreknowledge)
I think open theists are noble in trying to elevate our state of being to libertarian abilities but it comes at a cost. True libertarian choice is not really any different than the outcome of a random number generator.
Is it really necesssary to strip God of foreknowledge in order for us to have made a meaningful choice? I believe that in trying to dignify humanity, open theists have actually degraded it.
and...
What I'm trying to demonstrate is that the OV argument about God's foreknowledge and moral resposibility being incompatible is itself meaningless.
Please consider that in ANY PARTICULAR TRUE FREE-WILL DECISION, if you have a choice of options A, B, C, or D, you COULD possibly choose any of them. The very fact that IN A REPEAT OF THIS VERY SAME SITUATION YOU MAY CHOOSE DIFFERENTLY makes the very ACT itself meaningless. You have become simply a random number generator. If you then say "In the same situation 10 year old Jeff would always choose A", 10 year old Jeff has now become PREDICTABLE, which gives God an avenue to foreknowledge that the original OV argument was meant to discredit.
I really can't say it any plainer than this- The open view is interesting but in reality it offers little more in making true free-will choices meaningful or even intelligible.
My take.
The free choice of sentient/sapient entity A is representative of the utterly unique experiential PERSPECTIVE of entity A. Free choice is always circumscribed by the chooser in some way. And every act of a free entity VALIDATES the relative autonomy that that entity has. In other words, free choices have "meaning" because they fully represent the novelty that comes forth from a locus of relative autonomy...they are an expression of the chooser, in a real sense.
And that, my friend, is what this is ALL about. Genuine distinction from God. THEREIN lies the "meaning" that you seek.
Even though free willed decisions can be arbitrary (if there is a point of indifference where, given a certain range of choices, no choice is "better" or "worse" than any of the others) or random (insofar as, statistically speaking, there is a volitional opportunity where each option in the set of possible choices has equal opportunity of being chosen)...
...none of this translated to free will decisions being meaningless. This would be the case ONLY if free choices were completely "causa sui"...or completely "self-caused"...that is to say, that each free choice is the sufficient and necessary reason for it's own existence. That's non-sensical though. There is SOMETHING that originates, grounds, and circumscribes the choice...and that's the chooser. Which goes back to the experiential perspective thing I talked about earlier. Tom said:
To say that agent S is free with respect to choice P at time t is to say that given the entire history of the world leading up to t, S's not making choice P is consistent with that history.
This is good..and it shows something. The ONE CONSTANT in agent S's "history" is the continously-becoming experiential perspective of agent S. This means that making choice P or not making choice P is a factor of that experiential perspective...and it is NOT self-originated (with respect to the choice itself) or uncaused.
Now...let's look at something.
If theological determinism (via exhaustive definite foreknowledge) were to bear out, there could be NO genuine distinction between God and Creation, with respect to autonomy. All Creation would be a simple extension of God's will. All things that occur would ONLY genuinely represent God's perspective, because there would be no possible locus for ACTUAL non-divine perspective that could be meaningfully seen as "separate" from God.
How does all this work? Check it. Let's say that what God really wanted was a Creation that facilitated mutual, though assymetrical, influence between divine and non-divine reality. In other words, God wanted to have relationship with a non-God entity that was NOT merely an undeviating RECAPITULATION of God's perspective for that entity. If we have some reason of believing that this is what God wanted (like, say, the telos of having interdependent loving relationship with human beings), then we would have reason to say that IF it's possible for God to create Creation where there is relative ontological autonomy, that God would do so.
Open view theists just believe that God has, in fact, done this.
VERY brief rearticulation:
The "meaning" of our free choices is NOT found in their potential reproducibility. That's missing the point. The "meaning" is found in their expressive nature, as they express the utterly unique PERSPECTIVE of a continuously becoming, relatively autonomous entity.
I hope this helps...
"All is full of love." -- Bjork
"God is love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in them." -- 1 John 4:16b
"God is most glorified in us as we are most satisfied in God's love." -- the newest mantra of the Evangelical Universalist :) Post Edited (Namaste) : 10/20/2006 7:32:06 AM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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Similitude
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Date Joined Apr 2004
Total Posts : 4968
| Posted 10/20/2006 9:49 AM (GMT -6) | | | Robert: Correct me if I'm wrong, but did the egg preceed the chicken? The philosophy before the exegesis?
Jeff: I would say that some philosophy necessarily precedes exegesis. But regardless, what to you make of verses like:
1) the one in Cor. 10 where Paul says God doesn't allow us to tempted above what we are able?
2) the one in Ephesians where Paul says that "having done all, we might stand"
3) the one in Rom. that says make no provision for the lust of the flesh
4) the ones about being watchful in prayer.
All these verses imply, to me, that we have the power to do better than many of us actually do. But like the recovering alcoholic that goes into the cocktail party to have just one drink, once you've put yourself in a position that you know will work adversely on your vices/weaknesses, it is much more likely you will succomb. So yes, the odds of repeating our poor performances is likely. But the question is, "did the recovering alcoholic have a greater chance of acting properly before deciding to go and have that one drink?" To me, the answer is clearly yes. So again, I can explain why repeat performances are likely without casting any doubt on the reality of libertarian free-will.
Christ can foreknow about Peter simply by God telling him what Peter would do. But Peter had his own personality weaknesses and lack of knowledge that made his responses to circumstances virtually certain--even to a psychologist. The only providence required, if any, was for God to assure that 3 occasions would be presented before morning. That was probably not particularly difficult given the overall excitement at Christ's arrest. Peter was, after all, seen with Christ many times.
And God doesn't even have to violate free-will to get people to change their behavior. People are on automatic most of the time anyway. All God had to do, more than likely, is tweak the association of ideas in people's mind to get them to "decide" to go where they need to be to fulfill prophecy. If God changed my associations just right right now, I'd probably go in the kitchen and make a cup of coffee never knowing I was being "led" like a horse to water!  I wouldn't think anything of it anymore than I trouble myself over the free-association of my dreams.
What verses do you think imply we have no free-will?
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Tom
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| Posted 10/20/2006 12:19 PM (GMT -6) | | Robert: Do you believe creation is capable of true novelty for God? I mean to say, can it exhibit information that was not latent or implicit in it's(creations) formation?
Tom: Hi Robert. You asked Namaste this Q, but I'll offer a quick comment and wait to see if Namaste agrees.
I don't think we're capable of the sort of ex nihilo novelty that Christians have traditionally attributed to God. I suspect God's being self-existent, the cause and explanation of his own existence, accounts for his unique ability to create ex nihilo.
But we are capable of genuine novelty in terms of transitioning possibility to actuality. Assuming we face possiblities X, Y, and Z, and are in a place to actualize one of these, we create in the sense of determining which of several possible worlds gets actualized. We cannot be the grounds for the purely logical status of possible worlds. God grounds those possibilites, and only he can. But we are the final arbiter, as it were, in the transition from possibity to actuality.
As for information, I'm not sure what you're getting at, but I'll take a stabe at it--
On the one hand, we don't exhibit novel information, information that was not implicit as 'possible' in previous actualities with which we had nothing to do. Whatever we do, say "bringing it about that X," it was at least true before we did X that "Our bringing X about is logically possible." Being contingent creatures, we cannot generate truths that posit logical possibilities. Those are grounded in God.
On the other hand, we do generate novel information in the sense that we're responsible for the truth value of those propositions describing states of affairs brought about through our free choice. Again, assuming I'm responsible for bringing about either of possibilities X, Y, or Z, God grounds the truth of the propositions "X is logically possible," "Y is logically possible," and "Z is logically possible." But I become the creator of one of the following truths: "X is actual," "Y is actual," or "Z is actual." I (not previous information) determine the truth about what I freely do.
So there's a sense in which I cannot generate novel information (e.g., where the logical status of possible worlds is concerned; this is all grounded in God). But there is a sense in which I can generate novel information not entailed by previous realities or truths (e.g., which of several possible worlds gets actualized; there I determine the transition from possible to actual and so create truth-value, or as Namaste describes it, I express my SELF).
Tom
Post Edited (TGB) : 10/20/2006 12:34:53 PM (GMT-5) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 10/20/2006 12:27 PM (GMT -6) | | Exactly, Tom. Much better articulated than I probably would have done. But exactly.
"All is full of love." -- Bjork
"God is love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in them." -- 1 John 4:16b
"God is most glorified in us as we are most satisfied in God's love." -- the newest mantra of the Evangelical Universalist :) | | Back to Top | | |
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One Love
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| Posted 10/20/2006 1:43 PM (GMT -6) | | Just a bit more.
As we determine the transition from possibility to actuality (and create truth-value), we are, simultaneously, creating SOME level of beautiful experience for God to appreciate...which comes from our unique self-expression. This is because the self-expression of an actual entity occurs via the present synthesis of past experiences and future conceptualizations into a new instance of "becoming" for the entity. This synthesis is a unifying of diverse elements of reality.
This is why God gets SOME level of beautiful experience from ALL sentient, sapient creatures, no matter how much privation they are enduring. The only way that a being can ever cease to provide God with at least SOME beautiful experience would be for the being to ABSOLUTELY cease to exist.
So...
For God to allow annihilationism (via self-destruction of sentient creatures) would be for God to allow the ETERNAL REMOVAL of experiential centers of unique self-expression that contibute to God's overall total experience of beauty.
Now, would a God who wants to maximize beautiful experience via loving sociality in Creation really allow that?
Think about it.
"All is full of love." -- Bjork
"God is love. Whoever lives in love lives in God, and God in them." -- 1 John 4:16b
"God is most glorified in us as we are most satisfied in God's love." -- the newest mantra of the Evangelical Universalist :) | | Back to Top | | |
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Violin for God
Luke, I am your father. --Nooooooooo!!!!!
Date Joined Dec 2004
Total Posts : 690
| Posted 10/20/2006 7:47 PM (GMT -6) | | | Dude! Great thread! I have my thoughts about this, but I don't know if I'll make much sense in articulating it. Here goes...
I was thinking about this whole thing of what "free will" is a while ago. Often I've heard and thought myself that if agent S wouldn't replicate event E perfectly at time T, then it must be a random choice. But then it's like we have only two categories: predictable or random. Why not something like "degrees of divergence" regarding the actions of an agent? Here's what I mean (I think...)
Suppose God replicates another Heather. Now we have exactly identical twins: H1 and H2. Now suppose they reach their first "libertarianly free decision point" (FDP). Suppose they make the same choice and as a result their characters are solidified a bit more in the same direction. Because of the degree of solidification their characters have, when they reach FDP2, FDP3, and FDP4, their decisions remain the same because of the nature of the FDP's. Their characters are still identical. Then they approach FDP5. This decision is about on the 50-50 level. They make different decisions. These decisions affect their future decisions. Their characters are only slightly divergent from each other. This will in turn affect their future decisions. They make the same decisions for FDP6 and FDP7, but again at FDP8 they choose differently. Now they're more divergent from each other. Eventually they get to the point where none of their decisions are the same. Are they random? I don't think so. They've only gone in different directions and are solidifying differently.
So all in all, I think it's best to think of freedom in terms of how solidified the character is and degrees of divergency. Well... that's my current take anyway.
Cheers! 
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robertseakykr
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Date Joined Oct 2006
Total Posts : 15
| Posted 10/20/2006 11:19 PM (GMT -6) | | Namaste:
You wrote: "...free choices have "meaning" because they fully represent the novelty that comes forth from a locus of relative autonomy...they are an expression of the chooser, in a real sense."
and
"The "meaning" of our free choices is NOT found in their potential reproducibility. That's missing the point. The "meaning" is found in their expressive nature, as they express the utterly unique PERSPECTIVE of a continuously becoming, relatively autonomous entity."
I think I get your line of thought but I still stumble on the idea that my free choices may not be reproducible. I just have a sense that in order for me to take ownership(perhaps to damnation) of my actions, I have to KNOW that the choice I made in situation 'A' was wholly mine. I don't know how to "prove" this ownership other than to assume and hope that given another shot at it, I would absolutely repeat the choice exactly. This required repeatability (in my view) demonstrates, to me at least, that apparent constraints on choice, whether they be my "unique perspective" of that instant OR God's foreknowing my future state, are in reality only APPARENT constraints. They can't truely alter what I have ABSOLUTELY embraced on MY own. At the instant of choice, the decision was still MINE, all the options were still equally possible.
I actually intended this thread to be a discussion of the OV argument against God's foreknowledge but I seem to have indicated to all of you that I am trying to disprove free choice. My apologies if that is the case. I am a firm believer in free-willed decision.
My difficulty with OV is the perceived need to dim God's vision in order to maintain moral accountability within choice. I don't see this. Please show me. IF I'm right and our free-choices must be repeatable do you agree that exhaustive foreknowledge is not incompatible with true freedom?
If our choices are not necessarily repeatable, I'll feel doubly worse standing before God thinking that some quantum fluctuation or unfortunate "perspective of the moment" caused me to choose wrongly in a situation and harden my character just enough to be condemned. :(
BTW, your post was very interesting and I'll be pondering it for a while I'm sure. Had to get my dictionary out a couple of times, but I enjoyed the challenge! 
Tom: Thanks for the reply to the question, tell me if I've got this right. OV believes God understands all POSSIBLE future states of creation. We (as co-arbiters of destiny) assist God in bringing about actual states. Close? I'm not used to thinking in the realm of "truth-values". Is that typically how one would discuss these things? It's difficult to say if one can define "bringing about a foreknown possibilty" as novelty for God though. I'm not entirely convinced as yet.
I'll try to find the books you recomended, they sound helpful.
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robertseakykr
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Date Joined Oct 2006
Total Posts : 15
| Posted 10/20/2006 11:38 PM (GMT -6) | | Hi Jeff:
You said: "All God had to do, more than likely, is tweak the association of ideas in people's mind to get them to "decide" to go where they need to be to fulfill prophecy. If God changed my associations just right right now, I'd probably go in the kitchen and make a cup of coffee never knowing I was being "led" like a horse to water!"
Does it not disturb you that God must continually "tweak" his creation in order to keep it flowing in His chosen direction? Indeed, this tweaking must be continual as some OT prophecies spanned hundreds of years, no? I would have to assume that the intervention in creation by God would become frantic as more and more humans came into existence, possibly screwing up the direction of affairs away from God's intent. Wouldn't it be SOOOO much simpler to assume God KNEW what was to be the result of human choice rather than having to play nursemaid with creation? | | Back to Top | | |
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robertseakykr
Registered Member
Date Joined Oct 2006
Total Posts : 15
| Posted 10/20/2006 11:49 PM (GMT -6) | | Violin for God:
Great nick! Do you play? It's encouraging to see I'm not alone in thinking along this line. The difficulty for me arises with the idea that Heather and Heather, if identical and placed in identical situations, COULD diverge. I can't grasp how this should occur. If their constitutions are being solidified equally, what could be the modifier in their behaviors? All I can equate it with is random chance. In your mind could the divergence lead to one being saved, and one damned? | | Back to Top | | |
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Violin for God
Luke, I am your father. --Nooooooooo!!!!!
Date Joined Dec 2004
Total Posts : 690
| Posted 10/21/2006 3:41 AM (GMT -6) | | Robert:
Yes, I play, though unfortunately not nearly as well as I used to... but life certainly goes in different directions than we originally intend. If their constitutions are being solidified equally, what does this mean? It seems that it would seem to suggest determinism then. Suppose if you could repeat events over and over like rewinding the tape and revisiting a Decision Point over and over while keeping tabs of how many times Heather chooses x and how many times Heather chooses y. And say the event is repeated 1000 times. If Heather only chooses x and never chooses y, then perhaps we could say that Heather had no real freedom at that Decision Point; she can only choose x. But if Heather chooses x 50% of the time and y 50% of the time, then it seems that the choice was purely random. However, suppose Heather chose x 90% of the time and y 10% of the time, how "random" would this be? Not very, I'd think. However, the 10% still would indicate the possibility of Heather having a real choice. It's a bit late and I think I'm making this a bit too simplistic - I think there are many, many factors involved in decision making and freedom of the will. But I don't think we could reduce the will down to being just determined or random.
Now could the divergence lead to whether one goes to heaven and another goes to hell? We're talking about free agency, so, yeah, it's a possibility. I believe God honors all people's free decisions. If a person continually chooses against God, eventually their character will become more and more solidified in that direction and they choose to go to hell on their own, IMV. Now the question is, (heh, Namaste is going to love this (hopefully! )... at least I hope this shows I was trying to follow yours and Tom's discussion a little while back!) would God allow the agent's character to be completely solidified against God or would God have designed people such that there would always be a possibility for them to come back to God, i.e. that their character could never be 100% solidified against God? Some people think that's the case, others don't, and others are undecided... but I'm getting off topic. Back to agent duplication and free will....
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