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| Open Theism Discussion Board > Public Forums > The raging debate continues here... > Are we failing to to clearly state open theism? | Forum Quick Jump
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Bernie
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Date Joined Jan 2004
Total Posts : 9
| Posted 2/2/2004 7:20 AM (GMT -6) |   | Hi John,
You stated, "I don't see a justification for changing the definitions of words describing moral character (such as "righteous, good, holy, steadfast, etc.") when they are applied to God. God tells us "be holy for I am holy," "the one who practices righteousness is righteous, just as He is righteous;" (1 John 3:7), "love one another as I have loved you," and "be merciful, just as your Father is merciful." (Luke 6:36)
However, if the definitions of these moral characteristics are somehow changed when applied to God, they seem at least to me to lose any and all true meaning."
The difference is not in the nature of the moral quality, but in both quality and quantity. The difference isn't matter/antimatter, it's possession of the quality perfectly or imperfectly. Much of the time when we "practice" righteousness, we do so for imperfect reasons, with selfish, often hidden motivations. Other times we commit flat out sin. This nature in humanity is intermixed with the times actual love and righteousness are practiced. I think this doesn't change the nature of these positive qualities, it just dirties and lessens them in terms of overall content in humanity. The charge, "Be holy for I am holy" is more a decree of what will be rather than an exhortation to DO.
By the way, Albert, I concede that my use of the word "quality" in describing the attribute of contingency was not correct.
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John Earp
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Date Joined Oct 2002
Total Posts : 1715
| Posted 2/2/2004 10:50 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Bernie
The difference is not in the nature of the moral quality, but in both quality and quantity. The difference isn't matter/antimatter, it's possession of the quality perfectly or imperfectly. Much of the time when we "practice" righteousness, we do so for imperfect reasons, with selfish, often hidden motivations.
It seems to me that righteousness is simply not righteousness apart from purity of intention.
quote:
Other times we commit flat out sin.
No disagreement here. My view is that in each and every instance, we have the ability to choose right over wrong (to the degree of our previous enlightment, of course).
quote:
The charge, "Be holy for I am holy" is more a decree of what will be rather than an exhortation to DO.
In context, it sure sounds to me as if Peter is talking about "doing"; "...in all manner of your conduct..." Of course, no good work is possible apart from the influence of the Holy Spirit upon one's heart, mind, and will. No credit can ever accrue for doing what is right.
God bless you in your walk, too.
"The Discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world." Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology.
revivaltheology.net
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/2/2004 1:29 PM (GMT -6) | | Looks like a lot has transpired on this thread over the weekend! I'm jumping back a few posts in this response to Albert.
Albert: Alan writes that "some of God's decisions follow inexorably from his nature, and some don't". Albert replies: Do the things that don't follow from his nature, not count at all in terms of perfection?
Alan: I'm not sure what you mean by "count in terms of perfection". If you are asking whether God's decisions that do not follow from his nature can make him more or less perfect, my answer is no.
Albert: The functionalist account is related to open theism because it is related to the issue of free will. If people have free will, then it seems reasonable to attribute praiseworthyness and perfection to the choices they make, rather than to their nature, since their choices are not determined by their nature. I hope you can see why that is logical. And that leads down the path of functionalism.
Alan: There a false dichotomy here in the assumption that a person's choices have to follow either from their free will or from their nature. Rather, our nature constrains the choices that are effectively open to us even when it doesn't determine those choices. For example, even though I live in Las Vegas and am free to gamble, I have no desire or inclination to do so. My character, such as it is--partly inherited, partly shaped by my experiences, and partly shaped by my own choices--does not present gambling as a live option for me. I am still free to do it, but it would be "out of character" for me. My point is that our choices proceed BOTH from our character AND from our will. Thus both are properly objects of praise and blame. Proberbs 31, for example, praise the "woman of noble character" not just because of the good things she does, but also because those good actions procede from a virtuous character. In short, free-will does NOT presuppose functionalism.
Albert: Alan's criticism that God's nature would be arbitrary on a functionalist account, is really just a criticism of libertarian free-will. If free choices of the will are arbitrary, then yes God's nature would be arbitrary. But that just raises the question of the nature of free-will. If free choices are the subject defining itself within a particular context or world-position (i.e. "existence precedes essence"), then these choices are not arbitrary.
Alan: I strongly disagree. Libertarian free-will is perfectly compatible with an essentialist position, as I have argued above. Your Sartrean notion of free-will is an extreme and implausible version of libertarianism that the open theist need not accept. Furthermore, saying that "free choices are the subject defining itself within a particular context" does not rescue your view of God from the charge of arbitrariness. If the subject (in this case God) is free to define himself within a context however he wants, then that same subject remains free to redefine himself at any time. So that God decides to love sinners on some particular occasion gives us no reason at all for thinking that God will so decide on any other occasion. The functionalist God is not a being that one could reasonably trust, for trust presupposes that God's character constrains his choices and not the other way around.
Albert: Now to the point about essentialism being a hidden God, which Alan also takes up. Let me explain. The Bible asserts in very strong terms that Jesus revealed to us the very nature of God. ... Did his disciples mystically discern an inner divine essence? No. They saw him heal the sick, raise the dead, show compassion, and so forth. The saw his actions (this includes his teaching), and nothing else. They recorded in the Bible his actions and teaching, and nothing else. Now I claim that the divine nature (i.e. love) is comprised of these actions and teachings, as well as God's other actions in history. That IS love, it is not a reflection or outworking of something else which is love. The problem with essentialism is, however much you say that these actions are expressions or whatever of the essence, it is still claimed that the essence is something more than the actions. It is this "more" that is forever hidden in mystery. It is this "more" which Jesus never revealed. For this reason, I don't think essentialists can really claim that Jesus revealed the divine nature to us. Furthermore, since essentialists emphasize the primacy of this "more", it becomes questionable how much we really know about God at all.
Alan: It seems you're willing to grant that essentialism doesn't lead to a completely hidden God, but rather to a God who is partially revealed. So far so good. Yet you find this view implausible, I find that strange since you in effect concede the truth of essentialism when you say that "The Bible asserts in very strong terms that Jesus revealed to us the very nature of God". For on your functionalist view, God has no nature. So Jesus cannot have revealed the nature of God because there's nothing to reveal. Furthermore, your criticisms of essentialism are weak. First, essentialism does not imply that we "mystically discern an inner divine essence." There's nothing mystical about it. Just as the words you are reading right now are physical signs that convey a nonphysical meaning, so Jesus' words and works are "signs" that communicate to us about the nature of God. Similarly, creation as God's handiwork reveals God's nature to us (Rom. 1:20; Ps. 19:1-4). If you find something mystical here, the problem is not essentialism but your nominalism, which guts reality of intrinsic meaning. Second, you say that essentialists cannot claim that Jesus revealed the divine nature to us because he didn't completely reveal it. Why does it have to be all or nothing? If Jesus partially revealed God's divine nature, then it follows that Jesus genuinely revealed God's nature to us, albeit partially. Jesus never claimed to be the complete revelation of God to man. He claimed to be the fullest revelation (so far) of God to man. And when he returns in glory we will get a fuller revelation still.
Regards,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/2/2004 2:05 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by John Earp
It seems to me that when the Scripture says "God is love," it cannot be saying that God is somehow made up of a substance called "love." In addition, when the Bible speaks of us having "perfect love [that] casts out all fear," it cannot mean a love that is a static "thing," but rather a "state of the heart," so to speak, a life in the Spirit and love of God that casts out all fear.
Hi John,
I agree with you that "God is love" does not mean that God is made up of some substance called "love", as though love were a kind of "stuff". Love is, to hazard a definition, a commitment to the true good of another. We say a person "loves" another when they act in such a way as to promote that person's true good, and we say that a person is "loving" when their actions of love procede from a stable disposition of their character. For God to be love is for him to be the paradigm, the exemplar, the ultimate source of love. This means that God is the ultimate lover, that his nature is such that he always seeks to promote the true good of others. This is reflected in the Trinity in the mutual submission of the Persons. Christ desires that the Father be gloried. The Spirit desires that Christ be glorified. The Father shares his glory with the Son and Spirit. The Bible also says that God demonstrates his love in sending his Son. The action demonstrates his love only if it reveals his character, his essence if you will. If functionalism were true, then the action would reveal only that God loved on this occasion, but not that he is loving.
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/2/2004 2:25 PM (GMT -6) | | Bernie: You state: "Where open theists disagree with classical theists is not in the fact of God's omniscience, but in the content of God's omniscience." Statements like this remind me of some of the problems of ambiguity I've run into in the past with OT. The definition of omniscience identifies and affirms the content. To accept the fact leads one logically and automatically to the content...ALL. To say that content is NOT all is to deny the fact, as I see it.
Alan: I think you misunderstand me. The definition of omniscience affirms the content only in a general way. It doesn't specify what that content is. It says simply that God knows ALL truths. Both open theists and classical theists accept this. Hence both hold that God is omniscient in the same sense. Where they disagree is on the specific items that fall into the class of "all truths". In other words, both open and classical theists say that God knows ALL truths, but they have different views about what those truths are.
Bernie: Also, you state, "God has always already anticipated the possibility that some choices he makes may not turn out the way he would prefer them to because of our free choices." In Acts 26:16-18, Jesus told Saul/Paul, "..arise, and stand on your feet; for this purpose I have appeared to you, to appoint you a minister and a witness not only to the things which you have seen, but also to the things in which I will appear to you; delivering you from the Jewish people and from the Gentiles, to whom I am sending you, to open their eyes so that they may turn from darkness to light and from the dominion of Satan to God, in order that they may receive forgiveness of sins and an inheritance among those who have been sanctified by faith in Me."
According to open theism, if after two or three months after the Damasus experience Paul would have decided that the going was too rough, exercised his will and told God, "No thanks, God, this is not what I had in mind for a career.", would God, who appointed him a witness to the Gentiles to turn them from darkness to light--having told Paul rather emphatically and clearly what path he was going to take--have told Paul false information and been a liar?
Alan: God's statement to Paul isn't a prediction of what Paul is necessarily going to do, but a charge, an appointment that commissioned Paul to undertake various things in God's name. It's like God's charging Joshua to "be strong and courageous", to trust God's marching orders and lead the people into the promise land. Presumably Paul could have refused, but then we probably wouldn't hear much about him in the New Testament. An open theist could say, however, that God would not let Paul refuse, i.e., that God was commit to using Paul and would take whatever steps necessary to ensure Paul's cooperation. That would probably involve restricting Paul's freedom, but nothing in open theism implies that God can't do that if he wants to. We just do think it's God usual modus operandi.
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Date Joined May 2002
Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/2/2004 3:19 PM (GMT -6) | | That was a quick response, Albert. Thanks for clarifying your position a bit.
Albert replies: There is no false dichotomy. There is a real dichotomy, forced on us by the simple law of non-contradiction. Either there are states of affairs which cause a given choice, or there are not. There is no middle ground. Many people talk about states of affairs "influencing" or "biasing" the will (e.g. Richard Swinburne - in fact he talks about them "causally influencing"), but not one of these people has ever given any precise account of what is the metaphysical status of "influence" or "bias", and how it compares for instance with "causation". Causation is problematic enough metaphysically, without vague notions of "influence". In fact, since causation on the standard view implies necessary connection, you can't have any middle ground between caused and not caused. Either a state of affairs is necessarily connected to an event, or it is not. Our nature does not "constrain" our choices. Rather, it presents the will with the context in which it will act.
Alan: I suspose we may just have to agree to disagree here. I don't buy the either/or that you're insisting on. First, the concept of "influence" can be given a precise formulation in terms of probabilities. For example, in a random poker hand the probability of being dealt a royal flush is very small. Now suppose we influence the outcome by fixing one of the five cards as the Ace of Hearts. Now the probability of being dealt a royal flush is somewhat higher. If we fix more of the cards, or constrain the dealing such that fewer low value cards are dealt, then the probability will be higher still. My point is that these various constraints "influence" the outcome by changing the probabilities, but they do not suffice to necessitate the outcome. To influence something is just to change the probability of its occurrence. Second, I don't accept the idea that causation implies necessitation. I take a broader view of causation. Aristotle identified four types of causes. I suspect there may be more. At any rate, I don't see any reason to restrict the notion to deterministic event-event causation.
Albert replies: God has a nature, but it consists in his actions. In other words, who we are is defined by our actions.
Alan: But a nature that consists solely in his actions isn't really a "nature", at least not in any sense recognizable to an essentialist like myself. I grant that our actions shape who we are, but that is not the same as being "defined" by our actions, for there has to already be something there with definable structure in order to shape it. Perhaps your view is that God starts out as a completely undefined being and then, gradually, by his actions, defines his nature, in such a way that this acquired nature then constrains subsequent actions of his and so on. If that is your view, then only God's first choice would be completely arbitrary. Subsequent choices would be more or less arbitrary depending on how far God has "defined" his nature by his actions. But if that is so, then you face the same problem that you pose for the essentialist. For most of God's actions are hidden from us (do you suppose that everything God has done is recorded in Scripture?), so you too will have a partially hidden God.
Albert replies: The problem is that the "extra" part that essentialism claims is behind the actions, is in fact completely vacuous. If we strip away all the actions of God, and ask, what is left of his goodness, there is nothing left at all!
Alan: Not so. God's actions are all in the past and present. It is only the essentialism behind the actions that grounds our expectation that God will continue to act in like manner in the future.
Albert replies: Words refer to or point to something outside of themselves which is already known, understood and experienced. Words are meaningless if the definition is not understood in advance. And that is the problem. Jesus' words and works convey nothing about the "nature of God", unless you define that in terms of God's actions as I do.
Alan: It cannot be the case that words, or signs in general, are meaningless if the definition is not understood in advance. If that were so, then learning a new concept would be impossible. Yet we learn new things all the time. Plato raises this issue in the Meno. You are right that words will be meaningless if we do not understand something in advance, but that which we understand need not be a complete understanding of the word.
Albert: As for nominalism, it doesn't strip reality of anything. It just stops people from attributing reality to their own abstractions, which is the source of practically every philosophical error and metaphysical mayhem in human history.
Alan: The problem is not people attributing reality to their abstractions, but their doing so uncritically. Nominalism isn't the solution. Critical realism is. Nominalism is an overreaction against naive realism. If nominalism is true, then nothing has intrinsic meaning, science as we know it is impossible, and global skepticism the logical result.
Enjoying the interaction.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/2/2004 3:35 PM (GMT -6) | | Albert: I have one more question for Alan: If what counts is nature rather than actions, then why is it that when God judges people, it is always the same criterion that he uses: kata ta erga auton - "according to their works" (e.g. II Cor. 11:15, Rev. 20:12-13, and many other passages). Doesn't that prove that moral praiseworthyness lies only in actions?
Alan: Good question. The answer is that one can distinguish but one cannot separate nature and action. It is of the essence of essence to reveal itself in action. The medievals has saying for this "agere sequitur esse" (action follows from being). Thus, a loving nature that never issued in loving actions wouldn't be a loving nature. Our nature, character, and beliefs constitute dispositions to act in various ways depending on the circumstances. When a person's actions are out of sync with their professed beliefs, we call them a "hypocrit" because we understand that if you really believe something then your actions should reflect it. When God judges our actions he is also judging the character that informed those actions. The Bible says that God "judges the thoughts and attitudes of the heart", not just our actions. The "heart" in the Bible refers to the seat of a person's being, their nature and character. Similarly, God commands us to "be holy as I am holy". It doesn't say merely "do holy deeds" but, rather, we are to become a certain kind of person, one for whom holy deeds are second nature.
Blessings,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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John Earp
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Date Joined Oct 2002
Total Posts : 1715
| Posted 2/2/2004 7:26 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by albert
Dear John,
Thanks for your comments! The problem, I think, remains however. No matter how perfect God has been in the past, and what promises he has made, how can we be sure that his future behaviour will be of the same character as his past behaviour? Promises are only any good if we have assurance that in the future they will be kept. Some answer, I think, has to be given to this question.
Dear Albert,
To my mind, we can rest assured of God's faithfulness for the following reasons:
1. He has always been faithful. Past, steady, unchanging behavior is the strongest possible indicator of future behavior, especially so in a personality so perfectly actualized as God. Note, I am not alluding to God's character ever needing development (except of course in the Incarnation); it is my contention that God is the most perfectly loving Being that has ever existed and that ever will, and as such, he is the very definition of actualized goodness.
2. God has promised that he will always be faithful, and he has never lied. (see #1)
3. Having always chosen the good and having always hated evil, His character is as solid as can be. Having always acted in the interest of the highest good of the universe (LOVE), it must rightly be said metaphorically of his very existence that "God is love." He will always choose that which is loving (the highest good of all).
4. God has perfect knowledge of all possible choices, including evil choices present to Him. Due to this fact and his infinite intelligence and infinite wisdom, as James says, "God cannot be tempted with evil." He can see right through any and all evil choices logically possible to Him, but which are in fact not possible to Him MORALLY. I submit that the reason He can't is that he won't.
quote:
Additionally, there is the problem of explaining why God has always been so good. Is it a "happy coincidence"? Could God have been evil, but it just is our good fortune that he's not?
Well, I certainly wouldn't use such terms as "happy coincidence," or "good fortune," as those convey to my mind the sense of luck or chance. Moral choices aren't even in the same category as chance. God, by virtue of his libertarian freedom, always chooses the highest good of all as his supreme motive, has never once wavered in that ultimate decision, and, based on the multitudinous promises of the Bible, we may rest totally assured that it is not possible for God to do evil. Scripture, Reason, and Experience all testify to the truth that His love is absolutely steadfast.
Ps. 52:1 Why boastest thou thyself in mischief, O mighty man? the goodness of God endureth continually.
Ps 100:5 For the LORD is good; His lovingkindness is everlasting And His faithfulness to all generations.
Ps 107:1 O give thanks unto the LORD, for he is good: for his mercy endureth for ever.
Ps 111:3 His work is honourable and glorious: and his righteousness endureth for ever.
Please note, I do not deny the fact that God's goodness will endure forever; I totally affirm that fact. What I am speaking to is the reason why God can't be tempted with evil.
If God has not freely chosen to be good, then how can his moral attributes be either praiseworthy or blameworthy? If God can't help but be holy, righteous, and good, then it seems to me that he is some kind of "holy machine," who automatically "chooses" righteousness over evil. And if this scenario is true, then all God's exhortations to Christians to holiness, righteousness, and loving character are rather like a human expecting an ant to talk. Further, if this scenario were true, holiness, when and if it ever occurred in a human being, would demand more praise than that which is ever ascribed to God, for God is only doing what comes "naturally" to Him, while for humans this would be something totally foreign to their nature.
It seems to me that all moral action must by definition be voluntary, or else it cannot be moral at all.
P.S.: Great post, Alan! I agree completely. I think you, I and Albert are actually very close in our definition of God's moral character.
"The Discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world." Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology.
revivaltheology.net
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John Earp
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Date Joined Oct 2002
Total Posts : 1715
| Posted 2/4/2004 2:59 PM (GMT -6) | | Thanks for the link, A Theist! Looks interesting.
Alan and Albert: I'm no doubt completely out of your league, but for what it's worth, it seems to me that "choices when persisted in form habits, habits when persisted in form character, and character determines destiny" pertains to this discussion, at least with respect to humans.
That said, I do think this paradigm has some application to God's character as well, except that as far as we know God has always chosen to be righteous and loving. That being the case, can't we say that his character is completely solidified as good, loving, and true? Using the terminology of habitude, solidified character, etc., seems to me to avoid the problem of "nature" or essentialism.
"The Discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and there is perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world." Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology.
revivaltheology.net
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PotOnWheel
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| Posted 2/5/2004 4:33 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by albert
The problem, I think, remains however. No matter how perfect God has been in the past, and what promises he has made, how can we be sure that his future behaviour will be of the same character as his past behaviour? Promises are only any good if we have assurance that in the future they will be kept. Some answer, I think, has to be given to this question.
Additionally, there is the problem of explaining why God has always been so good. Is it a "happy coincidence"? Could God have been evil, but it just is our good fortune that he's not?
All the best, Albert.
Albert, I remember coming out of deep ignorance while reading Millard Erickson's Christian Theology on the topic of Providence. It was great. But in fact it was also a bit limited. One can consider God's providence and still consider all that is created as something separate (an object) from its very-ness actively being spoken by God. Creation is not a series of plates spinning on sticks (old TV stunt) being kept up by a God who didn't winde clocks and leave. The plates literally have no "being" without God.
Typically, a weakness of "Openness" discussions is that appreciatio of God as creator and Creation as His creation is weak.
You write doubting God.
But the very creation -- a form of god's chosen revelation to us -- speaks of God, to those who's hearts hear, and eyes see. And those not remain ignorant.
I'm not doubting your faith, nor your discipleship. Just your reasoning here.
No way that God's words (logoi) spoken in all this around and in us speaks of any image such as you conjecture in your doubts.
Don't speculate about your notions of God. Instead, receive His revelations.
PoW | | Back to Top | | |
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Tom
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| Posted 2/6/2004 9:29 AM (GMT -6) | | This thread rocks! I'll definitely wanna save it. Excellent. I wouldn't even try to contribute, but I'm enjoying it. Keep it up.
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1Heart
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Date Joined Feb 2004
Total Posts : 1128
| Posted 2/7/2004 10:00 PM (GMT -6) | | [quote]Originally posted by Bernie
Hello,
I'm new here, in fact this is the first thread I read...and am disappointed to see that the original question -- are we failing to clearly state open theism? -- has not been answered.
I'll be forthright. I know only a little about open theism, have discussed it a little with one other fellow on another board, and have read a few posts on a couple others. Frankly, I appear to have come quite independently to conclusions similar to those of Matt Slick (for whose opinions I have average respect)as I understand his views from the link provided. Some months ago when I first ran across the concept of open theism, it seemed to me that there's something about the idea of placing God in an unknowing or "becoming" state that strikes me as wrong. Logically, how Perfection could want or need to "become" anything doesn't make sense. My main agreement with Slick's "letter" (and what I thought when I first heard the concept of open theism) is that this idea HAS to have been produced by an Arminian. [I am a sovereign grace Christian, but not a Calvinist.]
I'm not here to argue -- my interest in debate lies in other areas -- but I'd be interested to know specifically where Mr. Slick's thinking does not properly represent open theism, or where he is wrong in his remarks. Thanks.
God bless you in your walk.
The Esoteric Fundamentalist
[/quote
Hello Bernie,
From what I have "skimmed" so far in this discussion panel - I may be well out of my league. BUT, what is most essential to my being here is my passion for Jesus Christ and my love of theology. I am probably a novice in comparison to the "voices" that are here. I appreciate your expression of being new and newly introduced to open theism. I still consider myself to be new, even after having been introduced to open theism just a little more than two years ago. I have since read every book of Gregory Boyds that I can lay my hands on as well as some others (Clark Pinnock - The Flame of Love and several others that tackle open theism and the questions that it raises for believers). I may be out of sinc here Bernie - so forgive me if I am. Recently I have come to a personal revelation of sorts as a result of my study of open theism. That discovery is that "Choice by choice I affect eternity." It is my own personal quote as well as a "code" to live by, so to speak. I am also keenly aware that all theology needs to be support scripturally first and foremost, then by experience, reason and tradition. I am keenly aware as well that what is of utmost importance is what difference theology makes in the life of each believer. And finally the thing that makes it all come alive...what each of us does with that theology...how we express it, because if we do not express it in love and with the grace that has been shown to us - then we are merely clanging cymbals.
I am (I won't say blissfully) unaware of "Mr Slick's thinking" but am very aware of the Father and increasingly aware of this view which, by the way Bernie, I am embrace. It has radically changed how I see the Father, how I know He sees me, and how I live as a believer. He is still the unchangeable Father in character but He is ever changing in His response to agents whom He has created with libertarian free will. I believe however that that free will is a "time limited" offer if you will and that He will and does intervene to accomplish His purposes.
I hope I can jump in here somewhere Bernie. I'd love to if If I'm not too far out of my league! Anyway - God Bless and I know that the most important thing is to keep abiding in His presence.
Jo-Anne
"Sometimes all we can do is go back to the character of God, and drop anchor there."
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Tom
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| Posted 2/7/2004 11:30 PM (GMT -6) | | Jo-Anne: That discovery is that "Choice by choice I affect eternity." It is my own personal quote as well as a "code" to live by, so to speak.
Tom: Sounds like a biblical code to live by to me. Great choice of words Jo-Anne. Welcome to the board!
Tom | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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Total Posts : 680
| Posted 2/9/2004 12:48 PM (GMT -6) | | Albert -
Great post on mind-brain problem. I heartily agree with you on that issue. Now to address a couple things you said in your last reply to me.
Albert: The probability argument does not really address the question. Saying that my nature raises the probability that I will do something from x% to y%, still tells me nothing about HOW it has this effect.
Alan: My point was that the notion of our nature or character influencing our choices is intelligible. That I didn't say HOW they influence our choices is beside the point.
Albert: An even greater problem is that probability arguments must presuppose randomness of the will i.e. that the will operates on a stochastic basis. However, when I talk about free-will, I most expressly do NOT mean that the will operates randomly!
Alan: I completely agree with you that the will does not operate randomly, but I would argue that randomness isn't a necessary presupposition of probability arguments. What can count as a probability is defined by the axioms of probability theory. The standard axioms are:
(1) The probability of every event is at least zero. (For every event A, P(A) >= 0. There is no such thing as a negative probability.)
(2) The probability of the entire outcome space is one. (P(S) = 1. The chance that something in the outcome space occurs is 100%, because the outcome space contains every possible outcome.)
(3) If two events are disjoint, the probability that either of the events happens is the sum of the probabilities that each happens.
Nothing in these axioms requires that the chance of any outcome be random. Moreover, the axioms say nothing about how probabilities are to be measured or calculated. All I need is for it to be possible to make probability assignments to the various choice options that we have in a given choice situation in a manner that is consistent with the axioms.
Albert: Secondly, regarding causation, you're of course entitled to deny necessitation as regards causation. But then we're entitled to ask you what you do mean, and to please give us an precise and non-vague account of causation (and if there is more than one type of cause, we need a precise differentiation).
Alan: As I'm sure you well know, it is notoriously difficult to give precise, counterexample-proof explications of nearly any philosophically significant concept. At any rate, to give just one example, there are perfectly respectable counterfactual analyses of causality that do not require necessitation. Thus, we can say that the presence of O2 causally contributes to the existence of fire in that if there had not been any O2 then there would have been no fire.
Alan writes: Perhaps your view is that God starts out as a completely undefined being and then, gradually, by his actions, defines his nature, in such a way that this acquired nature then constrains subsequent actions of his and so on.
Albert replies: What this overlooks is that God, being omniscient and not completely ignorant, starts out with a given meaning structure. I think again you are missing the point of the functionalist account of choice in relation to meaning structure.
Alan: OK, so God starts out with a given meaning structure. What exactly is that? What would the content of this original meaning structure look like? Where does this meaning structure come from if it is not grounded in God's nature?
Alan writes: Not so. God's actions are all in the past and present. It is only the essentialism behind the actions that grounds our expectation that God will continue to act in like manner in the future.
Albert replies: And you still haven't given me any description at all of what this essentialism behind the actions is. You may as well say that God is grebblefink and that his grebblefink lies behind and explains all his actions, and gives us assurance for the future!
Alan: I don't understand your puzzlement. The notion of an 'essence', like the notion of an 'electron', is explanatory. Philosophers didn't just invent the notion to add a word to the language. There was something that seemed to need explaining, namely, how do we account for the specific powers and potencies of a substance, and for its being the numerically selfsame individual over time. Thus, what is it in virtue of which the baby Socrates and the Socrates giving his defense speech before the Athenian jury are the same individual? Or what is it in virtue of which human beings qua human have the specific powers and potencies that they do? What it is to be human, as opposed to, say, a baboon, or a oak tree? In short, the term essence just denotes that, whatever it is, that is required for something to be what it is. The concept allows us to distinguish between attributes that a thing could lose without fundamentally changing into a different individual or a different kind of thing (i.e., accidents), and attributes that a thing couldn't lose without ceasing to be what it is (i.e., it essence). So defined, the concept of an essence is far from vacuous. How does having an essence inform God's actions? Well, it defines the range of actions that are possible for God. Thus God, being good and loving, cannot sin or do evil (Heb 6:18). Now you probably won't agree with this whole picture, but I hope you can see that it is not nonsensical or unmotivated. Most theists and Christians down through history have had no difficulty with the basic concept.
Albert: As for abstract concepts, these come about when we treat some definite aspect of something concrete as if it were indefinite for the purposes of logical manipulation. We engage in "imaginative variation" as Husserl called it, playing with the various features of an object until we come up with a coherent abstraction. But we never imagine or perceive the abstraction as such. We only ever imagine or perceive a particular. Why? Because abstractions can't exist! They are just part of a logical game playing.
Alan: I agree that we can only IMAGINE or perceive a particular, but I disagree that abstractions can't exist. I would make a distinction between imagining and conceiving. They are not the same. What we imagine is particular, but what we conceive is abstract and general. We can conceive of things that we cannot imagine. Case in point: n-dimensional geometry. I can't imagine what, say, the 11-dimensional world of string theory is like, but I can work with the equations, plug in various conditions, and derive testable predictions. And mathematicians can derive theorems about far more complex, and even infinite-dimensional manifolds. My point is that it is important not to confuse concepts, which are abstract and general, with phenomenological objects, which are concrete and particular.
Albert: Meaning is a product of intentionality, which is in turn a product of the subject acting freely.
Alan: If meaning is the product of intentionality, which is a product of the subject acting freely, then the initial free action must be devoid of intentionality or meaning. This seems implausible. You will perhaps respond by pointing to the subject's "meaning structure", but that just pushes the issue back a step. Where did the initial meaning structure come from? If there has always been a meaning structure, then it seems that at least some meaning is not the product of subjects acting freely. If there has not always been a meaning structure, then it seems that the first meaning structure came from an arbitrary and unintentional act of a subject (brute chance, as it were).
Albert: And "critical realism" is a contradiction in terms, like "believing scepticism".
Alan: Huh? How do you figure? To be critical is to carefully evaluate something. To be a realist, in the sense in which I use the word, is to hold that reality is intrinsically intelligible and intelligible, at least in part, to us--i.e., that some of the theoretical concepts of our theories do in fact refer. Now how is that a contradiction? To be a critical realist is just to be careful not to posit things as real without good reason. My position would only lead to skepticism if I insisted, as I do not, that "good reasons" had to be conclusive, or amount to a strict proof.
Alan writes: One can distinguish but one cannot separate nature and action. It is of the essence of essence to reveal itself in action. The medievals has saying for this "agere sequitur esse" (action follows from being).
Albert replies: The reason you cannot separate them, is that your notion of essence is completely vacuous, and if you tried to separate them your emperor would be exposed as wearing no clothes. The medieval notion of "being" is another good example of the metaphysical mayhem that results when an abstraction is attributed a reality it does not possess. And as for saying that actions follows from being, if that is true then there is no free-will. Only to the extent that actions do not follow from being (or something that is), can the will be said to be free. That is why Calvinism is the logical end-point for essentialism.
Alan: I think I have sufficiently responded to the idea that essence is a vacuous concept above. As for actions following from being, I don't see how you get from that to determinism. Determinism would follow only if one's essence limiting the range of one's choices in a given situation to only one. That is not what I hold, and as far as I can see it is not a necessary consequence of essentialism.
Alan writes: Our nature, character, and beliefs constitute dispositions to act in various ways depending on the circumstances....The "heart" in the Bible refers to the seat of a person's being, their nature and character.
Albert replies: One of the frustrating things with essentialism, I think, is that it has far too narrow a view of actions and choices. Actions are not just external, they can also be internal. For example, the Bible commands us to "believe in our heart". Clearly, believing in one's heart is therefore a choice or an action....[In the Bible, the "heart"] refers to their basic chosen orientation of life and faith. It refers to the core of their meaning framework. Otherwise, why all the talk about DOING something such as committing adultery "in your heart" e.g. Mt. 5:28, or BELIEVING "with your heart" (Rom. 10:10).
Alan: I don't know why you suppose that either myself, or essentialism as such, supposes that actions cannot be internal. Neither is the case. Thinking can be an action, as when I "think about" or reflect on something, but it can also be a state, as when I "thing that" something is the case. The latter is not properly construed as an action. What we think to be the case, or what we believe, gives rise to dispositions to act. Thus the Bible says, "As a man thinks in his heart, so is he" and "Out of the abundance of a man's heart, the mouth speaks". Clearly, the "heart" refers to one's dispositions and character. The importance on doing the right things in the Bible is twofold: (1) evil actions are wrong in themselves, (2) evil actions corrupt one's character, which leads to more evil actions and ultimately the destruction of the person ("the wages of sin is death").
John writes: Alan, I think you, I and Albert are actually very close in our definition of God's moral character.
Albert replies: Maybe so, but I have just dumped all the unnecessary metaphysical baggage.
Alan: Perhaps, but in my view nominalism throws out the baby with the bathwater.
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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PhilTheThrill
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2004
Total Posts : 95
| Posted 2/18/2004 8:00 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by A_Theist
from CRAM[sic].org
And that prayer really urked me.
I realize I am late to the game here but I just wanted to echo your sentiments. I have an uber-calvinist friend who basically printed CARM's open theism section out, handed it to me, and said "that's why it's heretical".
I was put-off by the unscholarly way the topic was dealt with but I was highly offended by the mean-spirited nature of the prayer of the open theist. First the guy gets OV wrong, then he makes fun of us based on his own misunderstanding of the topic.
quote:
CARM ministries has posted what they call a "Logical Refutation of Open Theism"
Which was neither of those things... 
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PhilTheThrill
Registered Member
Date Joined Jan 2004
Total Posts : 95
| Posted 2/18/2004 8:59 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Originally posted by Laika
quote:
Originally posted by PhilTheThrill
Just a welcome to the new guy.
And a reminder that the new guy always brings doughnuts.
Hope you guys like maple bars because that's all I brought! | | Back to Top | | |
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