OK, let’s jump in. I don’t know much about this but it the objective nature of indeterminism in the world interests me.

Zach: Some of you probably remember my objection to speaking of indeterministic influence in terms of probability. When I roll a die, I assume the die is not exercising libertarian free will. I can roll again and again and watch the outcomes correspond to the probabilities. But with libertarian free will we cannot repeat a controlled experiment, and if we could, who knows what would happen?

It seems to be that probability language, even when used appropriately in games of chance, is only a shorthand description of determined future events the causal chain of which we are unaware. This is NOT analogous to God's perspective when observing the libertarian free choice of his creation.

Tom: I’m not sure I’m following you. Natural systems (as opposed to human beings who have libertarian free will) are indeterministic nonetheless on some level, say the micro-quantum level, but very deterministic and predictable on the macro-level (we can predict with precision how the planets will line up 500 years from now on a particular day and hour). So even if natural (non-human systems) don’t exercise what we can LFW, they do possess an inherent freedom that operates with limits given the physical laws of the universe.

Close?

So you want to jettison talk of probability from explanations of human free choice. That’s the bottom line?

Two thoughts:

(1) On the one hand, IF probabilities do attach to human free choices, I don’t know how anally precise we ought to expect those probabilities to be. I remember talking to Greg about this last summer. Pointing at a big Oak tree in his back yard on a windy day (from which some leaves were falling), he asked “You mean that for each leaf there is a specific numerical probability that defines the likelihood of that leaf’s getting blown lose from the tree and falling to the ground?” We chatted about it. It just seemed so, so…tight. Too tightly defined. We thought that saying there’s a probability of, say, 51.75% (not 51.75% or 51.76%), that was just pushing it too far.

(2) On the other hand, he admitted that we can’t jettison probability per se from indeterministic events, including human choice. Neither of us could figure out how to deny what seemed to be the plain fact that we ARE influenced in non-determinative ways to make choices, and those influences tend us in probabilistic terms toward being less or more likely to do something. The influences can be almost anything in the context of a particular choice, but the common experience of ‘tending’ more or less to this choice over that choice, was too obvious. To deny probabilistic categories in the realm of human choice was too counter-intuitive. We simply are sometimes very likely to do something while at other times we are very unlikely to do something else, while also being free in such instances. We sometimes refrain from the very like and engage in the very unlikely, but less often than not. So probability seems an appropriate was to describe influence and LFW choice.

Zach: So I have three questions: 1) Am I right so far in saying that probability language misrepresents the meeting of 'influence' and libertarian free will?

Tom: Still not sure HOW you think it misrepresents the ways in which choice is influenced. We are in fact sometimes more likely, other times less likely, to make this or that choice. But that’s just what it means to attribute probabilities to choice.

Zach: (2) What is it we seek to express when we use probability language in this way? Why do we seek to define 'influence' at all? Is it just so that we can use it as a tool to justify belief in universalism? I hope not.

Tom: Where did universalism come from?

I think understanding how our choices are influenced, and to what degree (or probability), can help in several ways. Courts do make allowances in judgments based on the non-determining influences that motivate people. We often appeal to established tendencies in people to predict (more or less) what their behavior will be. That’s helpful to law enforcement personnel trying to catch bad guys, to military forces engaged on battle, to churches doing outreach, to husbands wondering whether they’re wives will respond better to flowers or a hot bath, to advertising companies, insurance companies, etc. They all make use of probabilities.

Zach: (3) If a definition of 'influence' is useful, what are some alternatives to the use of probability language?

Tom: Not exactly following the question.

T

Jeff: I have a different take. First let me say where I think I differ from Tom.

Tom: Always differing, always differing.

Just kidding. Good to hear from you Bro. Hope all is well.

Agree with all you said. Until the debate is resolved by further experiments, I think the BEST experimental evidence we have obligates us to posit indeterminism.

One comment on a possible link between the question of indeterminism in the physical order and LFW. We ARE part of the physical order. If physical determinism is true, Jeff, then our bodies (neurons, etc.) follow those laws as well. How does one posit physical determinism and then argue that our bodies (one part of the physically determined world) are sometimes not subject to those laws?

Z: So in terms of LFW, from God's point of view without any limitation of knowledge of the world as it is, the probability of a choice can only be the reciprocal of the number of options available.

J: That's exactly how I see it.

Tom: OK then, so I do disagree. I was wondering if I was following you.

I think it’s undeniable that we ‘tend’ on occasion to choose this or that. On your views, however, it would be impossible to actually ‘prefer’ one thing over another. Preference would be a vacuous notion, unless you collapse preference into animalistic ‘habit’. But if we really do prefer this over that, (a) preference doesn’t rule out libertarianism, and (b) the reality can’t be expressed in 50/50 probabilities. We really are sometimes more likely to CHOOSE (not out of habit), this or that.

So, tell me again what this has to do with universalism?

Tom

Zach: Quantum theory is a mess that I'd prefer not to worry about. One major criticism of the Copenhagen school of thought is that it attempts to describe indeterminate phenomena with determinate (probabilistic) language.

Tom: Is that what it does? I’m not so sure. It does attribute objective status to the indeterminism which characterizes outcomes. And that’s can’t be objectionable to a proponent of LFW.

Zach: But let's talk about planets. We haven't charted all the asteroids and other stuff out there that might effect the planets in 500 years. So there is a very small margin of error in our calculations of future planet locations. I contend (ignoring QM and LFW for now) that there is a determined location where Saturn's center of gravity will be located in 500 years. But our calculations of this location could be off by a few millimeters because of unknown collisions and gravitational fluctuations.

Tom: Right.

Zach: Here's my point: The future location IS determined, while our prediction of this location can only be made in terms of probabilities. This resort to probabilities is not based on a supposed probabilistic reality (ignoring QM for now), but rather on our limited knowledge.

Tom: But not all probability need be reduced to what you’re describing. Just because our ability to predict with more or less accuracy outcomes which we know to be in themselves determinate says nothing about our ability to predict with more or less accuracy outcomes which we know to be in themselves more or less probable.

Zach: If we had every speck of dust in the solar system mapped, our margin of error would tend very close to zero and the probabilities would tend very close to one. It is limitation of knowledge that requires probability language.

Tom: Are you a believers in physical determinism Zach? If not, then what are you worrying about? True, if we had every speck mapped, our margin of error would tend to zero. But this isn’t the case on the micro level. As far as we know, knowing all the information there is to know about a quantum particle won’t tell you where it’ll be. It’s indeterministic on the level of reality.

Of course, the physical world’s indeterminism doesn’t exactly parallel LFW.

Zach: Take Chaz's shirts for example. Let's say he has two green shirts and one blue shirt. Is the probability of a green shirt 2/3 or 1/2?

Tom: The extra green shirt doesn’t figure into the probabilities define BY THE CHOICE, because the choice, as we’re discussing it, only relates to COLOR. And even if you have 1,000 green shirts and 1 blue, you still only have 2 colors. Now, no two green shirts are exactly alike (unless Chaz is the sort of guy who buys multiple identical shirts). So if you have two green shirts, one is a pull-over and one is button up. The choice between green over blue is ONE choice. The choice of button-up over pull-over is ANOTHER CHOICE.

But anyhow…the more important point is that probabilities of CHOICE derive FROM THE CHOOSER, internally, not just from the number of available choices external to the chooser.

Zach: Since Chaz possesses LFW and can decide his own criteria for choosing a shirt, there is no way to even assign probability, even for an omniscient being.

Tom: The criteria have to be ‘possible states of affairs’. God knows those. They have to lie within the range of Chaz’s field of knowledge. God knows those. What’s the problem?

Like I said, IT MAY BE that choice probability is best conceived as not SO TIGHTLY defined (in objective terms) as to narrow probability down to a numerical value that extends to the thousandth decimal point. But that’s not to say that LESS LIKELY and MORE LIKELY, based in the CHOOSER’S identity and character, have to go. I don’t know how Jeff makes sense of the solidification process he and I like if all talk of objective probability with regard to choice is disallowed.

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Tom: “You mean that for each leaf there is a specific numerical probability that defines the likelihood of that leaf’s getting blown lose from the tree and falling to the ground?” We chatted about it. It just seemed so, so…tight. Too tightly defined. We thought that saying there’s a probability of, say, 51.75% (not 51.75% or 51.76%), that was just pushing it too far.

Zach: But if we are speaking of God's point of view, of ACTUAL probabilities, then God does know them with precision.

Tom: IF they exist, yes. IF reality is such that its fabric grounds such objective probabilities, then sure, God knows them. What we were questioning is whether reality really does ground such detailed probabilities, or whether reality, at its deepest level, fully apprehended, only admits LESS LIKELY and MORE LIKELY tendencies for becoming (or perhaps, VERY UNLIKELY, SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY, NEUTRAL, LIKELY, VERY LIKELY). I don’t pretend to know how many separate categories can be said to be generated BY THE WAY THE WORLD IS. I’m just saying (against what I hear you and Jeff say) that SOME differentiation of probability regarding choice (if character solidification is a PROCESS) has to be admitted if we’re believers in indeterminism.

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Tom: Neither of us could figure out how to deny what seemed to be the plain fact that we ARE influenced in non-determinative ways to make choices, and those influences tend us in probabilistic terms toward being less or more likely to do something.

Zach: I don't see why not. If we are talking colloquially about how I will probably see a movie tomorrow, that's all fine and good. But if I define my probability of seeing the movie as .75, then I am either trying to take into account my own lack of knowledge about what the future holds or I'm making a joke.

Tom: Take the numerical values out, fine. We still can’t account for choice probability (as you do) simply by defining it as the reciprocal of the number of options available. One, you’re positing NUMBERS, which you say you don’t like, and two, it locates the realities that generate probability in the mere number of options and says nothing about the internal state of mind of the chooser. Surely choice probability has as much, maybe MORE, to do with the chooser than it does the NUMBER of options available. So if there’s ONE movie to see and we take TWO choosers, one who is a professional movie critic and one who really doesn’t care that much for movies and only goes infrequently, the probabilities of their accepting an offer to go to the movies is NOT the same for each in spite of the fact that each faces the same number of choices. Agents share in defining the probability of their choices.

Zach: I guess all I'm getting at is that I don't believe there are random events…

Tom: Why didn’t you say so! I’d agree. Well, I’m not convinced there are purely random events (excepting perhaps quantum events, as you say) either. Is that all you’re concerned about? You think that assigning an objective probability to a free choice undermines the freedom and personal responsibility of the choice? If that’s your beef, I see what your concern is. I don’t think probability per se challenges choice in this way. But I’m follow you at least.

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Tom: We simply are sometimes very likely to do something while at other times we are very unlikely to do something else, while also being free in such instances.

Zach: I think I need a for-instance. But I'll go ahead and predict my response. "This choice may seem to have been heavily influenced, but technically speaking this could have been only apparently so. Either the ultimate choice was your own (50/50 to misuse probability language), or it was determined and you only felt free. Logic does not allow semi-determined libertarian free choices. Neither can you have square-ish circles."

Tom: You think the category of “preference” void of meaning then, an illogical notion?

Tom: We are in fact sometimes more likely, other times less likely, to make this or that choice.

Zach: I deny this.

Tom: I gather that. I think it’s a mistake to reduce “influence” to “the number of options I have to choose among.” So we’ll just disagree I guess.

Thanks guys!

T

Tom: OK then, so I do disagree. I was wondering if I was following you.

I think it’s undeniable that we ‘tend’ on occasion to choose this or that. On your views, however, it would be impossible to actually ‘prefer’ one thing over another. Preference would be a vacuous notion, unless you collapse preference into animalistic ‘habit’. But if we really do prefer this over that, (a) preference doesn’t rule out libertarianism, and (b) the reality can’t be expressed in 50/50 probabilities. We really are sometimes more likely to CHOOSE (not out of habit), this or that.

Jeff: To my mind, to do what I prefer, doesn't necessarily entail a free choice. Only when there are 2 or more desires (and, hence, impulses) in conflict is a free choice to be made. This doesn't happen frequently. No freedom is required for me to be at the computer now, e.g.

Z: Either we can say that the joy set before him was stronger than the desire for immediate relief, and so the odds were 1:0 that Jesus would endure...

or

We can say that the desire for joy has value A and the desire for relief has value B, and so the odds were A:B that Jesus would endure.

J: Actually, this is how compatibilists reason. That's not what I was trying to say. I was trying to say that we use the volition of mind to apply our utmost ATTENTION to that thought or idea which strengthens the naturally resulting impulse that we want to prevail. Jesus, by CONSIDERING the joy set before him, increased the strength of that impulse that ultimately prevailed over the impulse to give in. In this case, the joy set before him was only attainable IF he endured. And his thought was consistent with that fact.

Take a simpler example. The alarm clock goes off. I awake with a strong, natural desire and, hence, impulse to give in to sleep again. But I start to think of the consequences of missing work. The thought of these consequences arouse ANOTHER counter-impulse to the impulse to go back to sleep. And I keep thinking until I give enough concentration to that thought that it's correlative desire prevails over the desire to go back to sleep.

In short, our volition is a volition of MIND. The impulses and desires follow NATURALLY what we choose to think about. I can not choose an action DIRECTLY, independent of a natural impulse. I can only choose to think in such a way that the naturally-resulting impulse I want to prevail actually does prevail.

But again, most of the time, people are not even thinking volitionally. They're just happily going according to habit, both mentally and impulsively. Animals do this and adapt quite well to their environs. But we, being conceptual, give conceptual consent to our volitionally-formed habits.

Post Edited (Similtude) : 3/4/2008 9:37:24 PM (GMT-6)

Post Edited ("I am-in-I Am") : 3/6/2008 7:52:53 AM (GMT-6)