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Originally posted by Starkman

Hey Phil,

Part of your post said this: but why do we have to change the whole nature of the future and the way we've always thought about God?

I think I know what you meant, unless this is exactly what you meant, but an Open Theist is not changing, or even attempting to change, the nature of the future. Further, Open Theists are not redefining Omniscience either.

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Just what does OVT offer that arminianism can't compete with?

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Originally posted by Tiggers

Traditionally, the word omniscience when referred to the Christian God by Christians has always (i.e., generally always) equated God knowing not just all of reality perfectly, but as perfectly settled. As William Lane Craig asserts, the Doc (i.e., open theists), “espouses a view that threatens to undermine divine omniscience…Since Boyd affirms divine omniscience and yet denies that God knows future contingents, he must hold that such propositions are not true. If such propositions are true, then Boyd’s view undermines divine omniscience” (Divine Foreknowledge, 55). Now, maybe I’m splitting hairs, but aren’t Open Theists redefining the generally accepted definition or idea behind the traditional understanding (i.e., definition) of omniscience by unsettling the future?

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Originally posted by TGB

provides God no providential advantage whatsoever over a God who doesn't possess such knowledge.

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Originally posted by feelinahole

By the flamework that humans judge things. Are you saying you are God, and can make a judgment as God would?
In making such a claim, you are, of course, eliminating your own judgment. Your words eliminate anyone saying anything about God except God, because only God has the frame of reference that you require.

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Ask your Arminian friends to give you an example of God DOING something with the type of foreknowledge they believe God possesses. For example, ask them if God is able to USE such knowledge of the future to a) avoid some undesired foreknown evil event, b) bring about some desired event, c) prophesy the future, or d) provide guidance. It will take some time, but hopefully your friends will realize that Arminian foreknowledge provides God no providential advantage whatsoever over a God who doesn't possess such knowledge. There is nothing a God possessing such foreknowledge can do that the God of open theism cannot also do.

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For those needing a bit more pain in their lives, here’s a bit of something I submitted to my leadership last year in a paper (by the way, Laika, I liked your comment, “Declaring I’ll wear socks tomorrow doesn’t mean I see the future”!):

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[Note: There’s some of Doc and others in here. You’ll see it. I actually did footnote it where necessary in the printed version of this, but I took all that out for posting it here.]

What of the popular claim made by many Arminians that God simply “previews” (as it were) all of history? He doesn’t determine or cause all that happens, he simply “sees” it timelessly. On this view, our choices are free in the libertarian sense (viz., we could do other than we do), but God sees them timelessly and so eternally knows all that will ever come to pass. I’m personally unable to hold to such a view of God’s foreknowledge for several reasons:

First, it is incompatible with libertarian free will. Though there are those who argue that no contradiction exists in the claim that God eternally foreknows as definite our free choices, I’m inclined to side with those who argue otherwise.


Secondly, I believe it to be unscriptural. Scripture portrays God as sometimes “changing his mind” in response to human actions, expecting what does not come to pass (e.g., Isa. 5.1-4; Jer. 3.6-7, 19-20), speaking conditionally about the future (e.g., Ex. 13.17; Jer. 26), and testing people “to know” what is in their hearts. However, if the future is eternally settled in the mind of God, it becomes impossible, in my view, to understand such descriptions as truthful depictions of God’s relatedness to us and we are left with no option but to view God’s speaking in such ways as disingenuous.


Thirdly, the simple-foreknowledge model affords no providential value whatsoever. If God timelessly knows all of history in the sense argued by advocates of simple-foreknowledge, then he knows his own as well as our choices, and he knows them in one single, timeless sweep. He does not acquire this knowledge in stages; he timelessly possesses it as an attribute. In this case, simple-foreknowledge provides God no providential advantage in governing the universe for the simple reason that God cannot intervene into the story line of history on the basis of such knowledge or access such knowledge in an attempt to determine what his own actions are to be. This includes attempting to prevent undesired events or to bring about what he does desire, warning and guiding people, and prophesying future events. What is foreknown, according to this view, is what actually happens and by definition is already the result of whatever has or has not been done to influence it. Such knowledge cannot then also be the basis of such interaction for the simple reason that this knowledge comes to God too late (logically speaking) for God to use it to influence outcomes.

For example, let us say God timelessly knows that Susan will be in a fatal car accident on her 21st birthday. Granted, this knowledge does not cause her death or determine her choice to go driving with her friends. We’re only talking here about whether or not timelessly definite foreknowledge provides God a basis upon which he is able to act providentially. Can God use his knowledge of Susan’s death to warn Susan not to go driving? Can God act in a miraculous way to prevent this accident? In fact, can God do anything on the basis of his knowledge that Susan will die to prevent her from dying? The answer to these questions is, of course, that God cannot intervene on the basis of simple-foreknowledge in order to prevent this event from happening. Since God’s foreknowledge is infallible, what he foreknows will happen will indeed happen. Not even God can act in order to change what he infallibly knows will come to pass. Simple-foreknowledge, if it existed, would be useless to God in preventing foreknown evil and other undesired events.

The same thing applies to God’s acting to bring about some event he wishes should happen. Why? Because by the time God foreknows what will happen, it’s logically too late to make use of this knowledge in order to bring about this event. The foreknown event is already the result of whatever divine influence contributed to bringing it about. It cannot also be the basis of that influence. On the simple-foreknowledge view, everything that God knows he knows timelessly. He doesn’t gain his knowledge of the future in stages. Therefore, if God were to timelessly possess exhaustively definite knowledge of past, present, and future, such knowledge could not provide him a basis upon which to determine how to act in ways not also timelessly foreknown by him. Thus, there is nothing a God who possesses simple-foreknowledge can do that a God who does not possess such foreknowledge cannot also do. In truth, whatever might be the reciprocal nature of the relationship between God’s actions and ours within the foreknowledge of God, the simple-foreknowledge model offers us no help whatsoever in understanding it. In my exposure to advocates of simple-foreknowledge, it appears the chief reason they hold to this model is because of the perceived providential advantage they believe it gives God and the perceived basis for trust in God they believe it gives them. But once the providential uselessness of simple-foreknowledge is faced, and the providential advantage of infinite intelligence (to be discussed immediately) is understood, one can continue trusting God with the added benefit of not having to embrace beliefs which explain nothing.


Lastly, the integrity of divine-human relations and God’s knowledge of tensed facts require, in my view, the abandonment of the timeless view of God in favor of temporal eternity. God engages in real relations with a changing temporal world and has perfect knowledge of tensed facts. These entail his being temporal. I would also argue, though the open view does not require it, that the integrity of God’s triune personhood suggests there is in some sense of the words a “before” and an “after” that characterize God’s own inner triune life irrespective of his relating to creation—the eternal, loving fellowship that exists between Father, Son, and Spirit and that constitutes God’s own experience and enjoyment of himself. God is not an “eternal, unblinking, cosmic stare”; he is from eternity actively self-related and personal.


[Note: As I said, I no longer find it necessary to even have an opinion on the mode of God’s existence prior to (or in the absence of) creation. My “hunch” is that God was not absolutely timeless prior to creation, and I state here the reasons why. Craig has me doubting this a bit while Nick Wolterstorff freed me up to not give a rip!]

…Does God play chess? There are three reasons for believing this is a good analogy of the way God relates to us:

First, as we’ve already seen, if God possessed timeless knowledge of every move I make in life, it would do him no good. He could not use this knowledge to strategize, plan, or respond to any of my moves, for every move he ever makes is equally foreknown in the one timeless act of knowing. Timeless knowledge is providentially useless.


Secondly, in the open view, possibilities give God room to move and act, room which timeless knowledge cannot provide. It accounts for how we actually live our lives and relate to God as well as for how God is able to act providentially in the world.


Thirdly, God’s glory and greatness are increased if we understand him as infinitely intelligent and facing a partly open future. Who is more glorious? A God who timelessly faces a future he can do nothing about or a God who achieves his purposes by perfectly knowing and preparing for all possible futures? Who do we admire more? A chess player who plays you with a computer printout of all the moves you will make, or a chess player who, facing genuine novelty as the game proceeds, and perfectly attending to every possible move and the constantly changing probabilities, is nevertheless creative and resourceful enough to guarantee the final victory? I’m genuinely surprised that anyone would call into question the orthodoxy of somebody who chooses to believe the latter describes the greater God.
Lastly, as amazing as it may seem, the simple-foreknowledge model seems to me to be…

…nothing more than pre-recorded open theism!

Consider, the simple-foreknowledge model believes that we live in a world where God really responds to us, where we are really free to choose, where our prayers really make a difference to God, and where things might sometimes really be different than they are. Open theists also believe we live in this kind of world. The only difference is that advocates of simple-foreknowledge believe that everything about this world exists eternally in God’s mind, and their trust in God’s providential care rests in this being the case. But I ask, what difference would such knowledge make to God? What difference would it make to the world? What providential advantage would God gain by possessing this kind of knowledge as opposed to foreknowledge of all possible story lines? None whatsoever. And if such knowledge is of no practical value to God, believing that he possesses such knowledge is of no practical value to us.

Tom

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Originally posted by echo

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Originally posted by TGB

provides God no providential advantage whatsoever over a God who doesn't possess such knowledge.

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But how is "our" idea of "advantage" an appropriate standard? By what framework do "we" judge that advantage, and who are we to make that claim?

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