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AlyoshaKaramazov
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Total Posts : 49
| Posted 2/6/2003 6:33 PM (GMT -6) |   | Has anyone read Geisler's "Christian Apologetics"? What do you think about his apologetical methodology? Is it sound? Is there a better one out there? I cut my teeth in apologetics on this book, so I'd be interested to know what y'all think.
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AugustineofHippo
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| Posted 2/7/2003 9:15 AM (GMT -6) | | It is my informed opinion that the method used by Geisler is a "too good to be true method." What I mean by this is that according to Geisler's method all philosophical questions are put to rest. Call me a skeptic but I think things are more complex than this.
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 2/7/2003 11:43 AM (GMT -6) | | I read Geisler's book a long while back, so my memory is a bit foggy. One thing I like about his methodology is his observation that what cannot be rationally denied must be affirmed, and that what cannot be rationally affirmed must be denied. So far so good. One has to be careful, however, for it is possible to misjudge matters. Judgments about what can and cannot be rationally affirmed almost invariably presuppose some substantive assumptions. In other words, Geisler methodology is fine in principle, but in practice it is not theoretically neutral.
For example, Geisler argues that God must be altogether unchangeable b/c since God is perfect any change must be in the direction of imperfection which is impossible. In other words, he would argue that the proposition "God changes" is rationally unaffirmable given that God is an essentially perfect being. This argument fails, however, because it masks a hidden assumption, namely, that all change involves either an increase or decrease in perfections, i.e., to change is either to become better or worse. Why accept that? I might decide to change my hair color from brown to blond by dyeing it. Would that make me either better or worse? I don't see how.
The point is that our judgments about what is and is not rationally affirmable may mask controversial assumptions. Thus, I agree with Augustine that matters are generally more complex than Geisler seems to intimate.
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honorman
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| Posted 2/7/2003 7:36 PM (GMT -6) | | When I read Geisler's work I get the impression that after you read his arguments he is crossing his arms and saying, "so there," like you would be stupid to challenge him. For me he makes too many assumptions in his attributes of God.
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AlyoshaKaramazov
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| Posted 2/7/2003 8:17 PM (GMT -6) | | Thanks guys for your comments. I agree with Augustine and Honorman to a certain extent on Geisler's triumphalistic tone.
Alan, I continue to be amazed at your clarity; then again, you are a professional philosopher, so I guess it comes with the territory. I'm so thankful for your input on this website, I hope you keep it up for a long time.
Geisler quote:
quote:
This book will show that all non-theistic world views are directly or indirectly unaffirmable and only theism is affirmable and , hence, only theism is true.
Geisler then takes his test for truth and applies it to Deism, Pantheism, Panentheism, and Atheism. He then claims that these views fail to pass his tests, and that Theism, because it is the only remaining alternative, is true.
Question: What do you guys think of this method? It just seems to me that this kind of disjunctive, process of elimination argumentation is not the most convincing. I wonder if he has included every possible non-theistic worldview? Would slight or not so slight alterations in one's non-theistic worldview pass Geisler's tests? Is there a better method?
Geisler's positive argument for God's existence (and, of course, this is just the skeleton):
quote:
(1)Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).
(2)My nonexistence is possible.
(3)Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.
(4)There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.
(5)Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.
(6)This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all perfect.
(7)This infinitely perfect Being is appropriately called "God."
(8)Therefore, God exists.
(9)This God who exists is identical to the God described in the Christian Scriptures.
(10)Therefore, the God described in the Bible exists.
Now, Geisler elaborates on each step of the proof, but, in general, is this a good strategy for arguing for God's existence? I realize that the "unchanging" part of premise (6) is going to be a concern on this website, and I thought Alan's comments here were very enlightening. But bracketing "unchanging," what do you all think?
"Man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest."--Paul Simon | | Back to Top | | |
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the_rickster
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| Posted 2/8/2003 5:36 AM (GMT -6) | |
I'm a big fan of Geisler's works. I've also had the pleasure of hanging out with him. When you ask him a question, he doesn't cross his arms and say ,"so there" for the record. But I do understand the criticism. I'd really like to hear more input on everyone's views of Geisler's methods. I also have a couple of questions.
Alan- Could you give me an example of a way an immaterial being such as God could change for neither better or worse. It seems knowledge would be the most likely way, but I would think to have more knowledge would be better than less?
Others- Two criticisms that were mentioned more than once were Geisler's methods seemed too simple and he has hidden presuppositions. These are fine, but could you try substantiating them a little more. I guess I don't see how making things simple is a fallacy.
Thanks
Rickster
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Tom
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| Posted 2/8/2003 9:29 AM (GMT -6) | | Rickster: ...give me an example of a way an immaterial being such as God could change for neither better or worse. It seems knowledge would be the most likely way, but I would think to have more knowledge would be better than less?
Tom: I wanna hear Alan on this too. Sorry to open my big maw here, but I’m online anyhow and it’s easier to post thoughts while they’re fresh and I don't have to log on again later! 
The changing state of God’s knowledge is, I think, a good example of God changing for neither better nor worse. But in God’s case this is not “more” knowledge nor “less” knowledge. It’s just “different” knowledge. If a change in God meant moving from a state of ignorance (viz. less knowledge) to a state of knowledge, then this would be problematic. But this isn’t what open theists (or non-open theists who are not fans of Aquinas; see Bill Craig’s [no fan of the open view] criticism of Aquinas’s view on immutability in his Time and Eternity) claim. God’s knowledge changes with a changing universe. This is no imperfection IF the universe is really changing. If God’s knowledge didn’t change, he would be less than omniscient I should think. In my view, as possibilities are resolved into certainties with the passing of time, God keeps infallible, unmediated, and coterminous account of the state of reality. God never moves from a state of not knowing something to a state of knowing something, but his knowledge is constantly changing as the state of reality changes.
Another change in God which doesn’t imply imperfection is God’s changing state of emotion. Yes, Aquinas attempted to explain the Bible’s description of God as experiencing anger, love, joy, grief, etc., as compatible with his being absolutely immutable. But perhaps it’s a different set of presuppositions which removes in my mind the need for such explanations. If an event “occurs,” God is related to it. If it’s good or bad, lovely or evil, God will relate emotionally to it as the perfect God he is. I’m inclined to question the sort of divine perfection of a maximally personal God who is emotionally unchanging with respect to the events of our world.
Tom 
Love never ends
Edited by - TGB on 02/08/2003 2:33:00 PM | | Back to Top | | |
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the_rickster
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| Posted 2/8/2003 11:52 AM (GMT -6) | |
TGB-
"God never moves from a state of not knowing something to a state of knowing something, but his knowledge is constantly changing as the state of reality changes."
I haven't done a lot of reading in process theology, but it seems that for knowledge to change it is necessary to not know something and then know it. Otherwise, did your knowledge ever actually change?
"I’m inclined to question the sort of divine perfection of a maximally personal God who is emotionally unchanging with respect to the events of our world."
Could you explaing what you mean by maximally personal? Also, could you provide reasoning or references why God is maximally personaly?
Thanks
rickster
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Tom
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| Posted 2/8/2003 7:33 PM (GMT -6) | | Tom: God never moves from a state of not knowing something to a state of knowing something, but his knowledge is constantly changing as the state of reality changes.
Rickster: I haven't done a lot of reading in process theology…
Tom: I haven’t done any!
Rickster: …but it seems that for knowledge to change it is necessary to not know something and then know it. Otherwise, did your knowledge ever actually change?
Tom: Let me try again. If a working clock changes, does it necessary change from ‘not keeping time’ to ‘keeping time’? No. And why not? Because the time changes. And if what the clock is keeping track of is changing, the clock must change.
When I said God’s knowledge changes without God’s “not knowing something” and then “knowing something” I had in mind God’s “moving from a state of being ignorant about that something to a state of knowing that something.” Of course, if God’s knowledge changes it’s true that he comes to know things he did not know before. But mere change in knowledge need not amount to movement from being “ignorant” of something to knowing that something. On Feb. 24, 2002 I knew I was 41 years of age. The next day I knew I was 42. My knowledge changed. But did I move from a state of ignorance to knowledge? No. Because the thing I knew, my age, changed, it was a accuracy that my knowledge changed.
So, for example, God knows at T1 that I may possibly have tea for breakfast. When at T2 I actually choose to have tea (because I was also contemplating coffee, another possibility God knows at T1) then it comes to be that God no longer knows I may possibly have tea for breakfast. He now knows that I’m having tea. Because the world changed, God’s perfect knowledge of the world changed. This is a perfection provided the world is really changing.
Now, did this change in God’s knowledge amount to his gaining knowledge he did not have before? Yes. Does it amount to his gaining knowledge of something he was ignorant of? No. At T1 it was not true that I was having tea. And it is no imperfection to not know this, for it is not true. What was true at T1? At T1 it was true that I may have tea or coffee. A God of perfect knowledge, then, would know at T1 what is true at T1. What is true changed at T2 when I eliminated the possibility of my choosing coffee by choosing tea. I transitioned what was possible (my having tea or coffee) to what was definite or determinate (my having tea). The question is, how does God relate to this changing state of affairs? When the change takes place, a change in God’s knowledge takes place, not because he comes to know what previously was true and he was ignorant of. Rather, what was previously true (possibly tea OR coffee) is no longer true (definitely tea). This is not “more” or “less” knowledge for God. It’s perfectly accurate knowledge of a changing world. So, does God know tensed facts? Is the divine clock keeping track of changing time?
Better?
Tom: I’m inclined to question the sort of divine perfection of a maximally personal God who is emotionally unchanging with respect to the events of our world.
Rickster: Could you explain what you mean by maximally personal? Also, could you provide reasoning or references why God is maximally personal?
Tom: Now there’s a tall order! I’m gonna explain this really poorly, but here it goes. By ‘maximally personal’ I mean that God is ‘perfectly personal’. God IS a person, and our being persons is at least part of what it means to bear God’s image. God is the ultimate standard of what it is to be personal. This, I take it, involves being emotionally healthy. Now, some may want to argue that being emotionally healthy for US means experiencing appropriate changes in emotion relative to what’s happening in our lives but that for GOD this need not be true. Immutability is the ultimate perfection, some think, and so a God who experiences changing states of emotion relative to what’s happening in the world is changing and thus is imperfect. I a) don’t share the presupposition that immutability is the ultimate perfection, b) already concede that God’s knowledge is perfect but changing relative to a changing world, c) find it difficult to make any sense whatsoever of the Bible’s claim that God experiences changing states of emotion if it's also true that God does not experience these emotions (viz., he is immutable), and so conclude that being ‘personal’ for God must mean something analogous to what it means to be personal for humans created in his image. Just as God’s knowledge keeps perfect account of the changing state of reality, God’s emotions keep perfect account of the changing state of reality.
Tom
Edited by - TGB on 02/09/2003 12:49:24 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 2/10/2003 5:47 PM (GMT -6) | | quote:
(1)Some things undeniably exist (e.g., I cannot deny my own existence).
(2)My nonexistence is possible.
(3)Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another.
(4)There cannot be an infinite regress of current causes of existence.
(5)Therefore, a first uncaused cause of my current existence exists.
(6)This uncaused cause must be infinite, unchanging, all-powerful, all-knowing, and all perfect.
(7)This infinitely perfect Being is appropriately called "God."
(8)Therefore, God exists.
(9)This God who exists is identical to the God described in the Christian Scriptures.
(10)Therefore, the God described in the Bible exists.
(1) is undeniable, as both Augustine and Descartes have shown.
Does (2) refer to logical or ontological possibility? If the former then it's obviously true, but not an adequate basis for the rest of the argument which is distinctly ontological in purpose. If the latter, then it is not obviously true. Perhaps God has created us with the kind of being that necessarily endures so that, once created, cannot now cease to exist.
(3) is highly debatable. Again are we talking about logical or ontological possibility? In either case, why think that the mere possibility that something not exist means that it requires a present sustaining cause for its existence? Perhaps the gift of being is like the inertia of a moving body--once set in motion a body will continue in uniform motion unless external forces act upon it. Perhaps once created things no longer need an external cause to keep them in existence, just as the moving body doesn't need an external cause to keep it moving.
(4) seems correct to me. (Though it has been challenged)
(5) is a logical consequence of earlier premises.
(6) requires a lot of supporting argument and at least some of these supporting arguments (like the one for absolute unchangeability) contain debatable presuppositions.
(7) seems acceptable to me.
(8) is a logical consequence of prior premises.
(9) requires considerable support.
(10) is a logical consequence of prior premises.
All in all, I do not think this Thomistic-style argument for God's existence is the best one to use. I think the Kalam cosmological argument defended by William Criag and J.P. Moreland is much stronger because it depends on fewer questionable assumptions.
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
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Total Posts : 635
| Posted 2/11/2003 1:10 AM (GMT -6) | | I read ‘When Skeptics Ask’ and thought the tens points somewhat cumbersome, yet effective. That is, "Every effect has a cause and which is first"? This was enough reason for me to believe, but then I am very much into simple answers. Reading the Bible however, has taken me from believing there is a God, to a relationship with Him, which is much better by far, Amen.
God is Love,
Tim
Jam 1:13-16 Let no man say when he is tempted (to do evil), I am tempted of (or made by) God (to do such): for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man (with evil, to do it): But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed (to do such). Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth (the evil act of) sin:
…Do not err, my beloved brethren.
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AlyoshaKaramazov
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| Posted 2/11/2003 7:00 PM (GMT -6) | | Alan,
Thanks for your assessment of Geisler's argument. I agree that premise (3) needs some serious argument before it can be accepted. I am going to read Geisler's defense of (2) and (3) and post a Geislerian response in the next day or so.
Everyone,
What do you think about theistic proofs in general? Are they necessary in order to have a rational basis for one's faith? I've read a little on reformed epistemology and the idea that belief in God is a basic belief (one that is foundational in our knowledge that doesn't depend on any other beliefs for its justification)--do we even need to bother with arguments for God's existence? If we go this route, do we then have nothing to offer inquiring non-believers when asked why we believe in a God? What's to prevent someone from having the basic belief that there is no God?
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Tom
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| Posted 2/11/2003 8:53 PM (GMT -6) | | I confess that I find the arguments for the impossibility of an actual infinite strong, convincing in fact. I also find the arguments for God’s being temporal based on his knowledge of tensed facts and his real relations to a temporal world even more convincing. Put together, these two would appear to support Craig's theory that God is timeless in the absence of creation but temporal since creation. Timelessness and temporality are, thus, contingent attributes of God.
But I also find the unhappy implications which God’s timelessness (in the absence of creation) has for his being “personal” at least as difficult to escape as the impossibility of an actual infinite. In addition (and I don’t know how to argue this), something tells me that an absolutely timeless God would never be able to get off the dime, so to speak, in creating the world and time. Is passing from timeless existence to temporal existence even coherent? If God is timeless in the absence of creation, I don’t see how creation ever happens at all. How does an absolutely timeless being "do" anything? I don't know how to adjuticate the evidence for timelessness and temporality of God in the absence of creation.
I appreciate Wolterstorff’s honesty here. He admits “Whether it’s true that time is an inherent feature of God’s own life I do not know.” Concerning the place of time in God’s life apart from creation, he has “remained uncommitted.” I appreciate it when very smart people say “I don’t know.” This of course concerns God’s relationship to time in the absence of creation. On the question of God’s relationship to time since creation, Wolterstorff agrees that God is temporal.
For those who fear that believing God to be being temporal and not timeless reduces God to human categories and thus limits God, Padget has some good things to say in his chapter in the Four Views book.
I’m not sure why the question of God’s relationship to time in the absence of creation should be so important. It’s academically interesting I admit. But the world now exists. What can be argued about God’s relationship to time given this fact is what’s important, right?
I also don’t see that the open view itself requires a particular view on God’s relationship to time in the absence of creation. Craig may be right that timelessness and temporality are contingent attributes. I incline to this view on Tuesdays and Thursday. But it’s academic.
Tom
Love never ends
Edited by - TGB on 02/12/2003 01:54:54 AM
Edited by - TGB on 02/12/2003 01:57:38 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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Matthew Timothy Short
Huh?
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Total Posts : 635
| Posted 2/12/2003 1:35 AM (GMT -6) | | AlyoshaKaramazov,
I love the way Scriptures argue, so here are some…
Psa 10:4…through the pride of his countenance…God [is] not in all his thoughts…
Psa 53:1…The fool hath said in his heart, [There is] no God…
Rom 1:19,20Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed [it] unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, [even] his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse:
Paul’s argument appears to be from one of ‘design’.
(2)My nonexistence is possible. Of which I would agree, if we were defining ‘existence’, as the animation of my life or to say, the existence my body and soul in union. Did I exist in God, before my own knowledge of myself, I would also argue for.
(3)Whatever has the possibility not to exist is currently caused to exist by another. Seems obvious, to argue that my parents are the immediate cause for the animation of my life.
So much for proceeding from one place, state or station to another, as opposed to resting. Hope this helps…Amen.
God is Love,
Tim
1Jo 2:16…the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father… | | Back to Top | | |
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Alan Rhoda
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| Posted 2/12/2003 11:36 AM (GMT -6) | | Alyosha: I am going to read Geisler's defense of (2) and (3) and post a Geislerian response in the next day or so.
Alan: Look forward to it. Should be interesting.
Alyosha: What do you think about theistic proofs in general?
Alan: I prefer the words "argument" and "evidence" to "proof". In most contexts outside of mathematics and abstract logic, "proof" is too strong a word to use. I don't think any of the theistic arguments amount to a "proof" in the strict sense of the word.
Alyosha: Are they necessary in order to have a rational basis for one's faith?
Alan: Seems to me that one's belief in God ought to be grounded in SOME kind of evidence, but there's lots of possibilities as to what that evidence might be: theistic arguments (cosmological, teleological, moral, etc.), direct experience of God, the testimony of a trustworthy source (e.g., one parents), the testimony of one's creation (Rom.1), the testimony of conscience (Rom.2), etc.
Alyosha: I've read a little on reformed epistemology and the idea that belief in God is a basic belief (one that is foundational in our knowledge that doesn't depend on any other beliefs for its justification)--do we even need to bother with arguments for God's existence?
Alan: Reformed epistemology says that we can be prima facie and a priori justified in believing in God in the absence of argument--thus, theistic arguments aren't strictly necessary for justified theistic belief. Even if that is so, it is still the case that theistic arguments can enhance one's justification (i.e., put one in a better epistemic position) and that they are apologetically very useful (1 Pet. 3:15). Furthermore, our prima facie justification for belief in God could in principle be overriden by a successful atheological argument--hence we need to be engaged with answering the arguments of skeptics (2 Cor. 10:5).
Alyosha: What's to prevent someone from having the basic belief that there is no God?
Alan: Good question. A belief is 'basic' if it is not based on other beliefs. A belief is 'properly basic' if it is basic and justified. The real issue is whether atheism could be basic but whether it could be properly basic. We'll need to clarify what it takes for a basic belief to be justified. No easy chore, so I'll just reference Paul (Rom. 1:20), who essentially denies that belief in God could be properly basic.
God bless,
Alan | | Back to Top | | |
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CalvinnHobbes
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| Posted 2/14/2003 9:29 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
Now, did this change in God’s knowledge amount to his gaining knowledge he did not have before? Yes. Does it amount to his gaining knowledge of something he was ignorant of? No. At T1 it was not true that I was having tea. And it is no imperfection to not know this, for it is not true. What was true at T1? At T1 it was true that I may have tea or coffee. . . . .I don’t share the presupposition that immutability is the ultimate perfection. --TGB
Classical theists identify God's knowledge and nature. There is nothing ontologically distinct about them. In fact, all of God's attributes are ontologically identical in nature and inseparable. (How we can discuss this intelligibly, or know what any of this even MEANS, I'm having some trouble following.) The classical position obviously sees a big problem in predicating "knowledge" of God in different ways by ascribing some actual and some potential knowledge to him. Because God's knowledge is identical to his nature in this paradigm, any quantitative OR qualitative change in that knowledge is seen as a change in the divine substance, or "being" for any Thomists in the house. It destroys the classical conception of the "simplicity" and "unity" of God.
Do Classicalists place immutability at the top of the list of God's character attributes? Some definitely give that impression. It looks like they shouldn't according to their own theory. I imagine they would cite it as a concession to the order of logic or human knowledge, even though it may not correspond to the order of being.
quote:
being ‘personal’ for God must mean something analogous to what it means to be personal for humans created in his image. --TGB
You asked, "How does an absolutely timeless being "do" anything?" I've wondered the same thing. Not long ago, I was working through several introductions to Aquinas' thinking and I have yet to see that made clear. Do-ING seems to imply progression which seems to imply change and time. I've seen several Thomists use the analogy that we relate to God as people relate to a pillar. The people move and the "relationship" changes, even though the pillar didn't move or change. Of course I'm left asking the question, "How is the pillar actively relat-ING?"
quote:
Does (2) refer to logical or ontological possibility? If the former then it's obviously true, but not an adequate basis for the rest of the argument which is distinctly ontological in purpose. If the latter, then it is not obviously true. Perhaps God has created us with the kind of being that necessarily endures so that, once created, cannot now cease to exist. --Alan Rhoda
From my reading of Aquinas and Geisler, I'm confident they consider it an ontological possibility. Geisler would say that there are three logically-exhaustive (and ontologically-exhaustive) categories in which one may fit regarding "existence." My existence is either impossible (which the actual/existential undeniability supporting his first premise discredits), necessary (which can only be true if I never came into existence and will never cease to exist), or possible (which I must be if I'm neither impossible nor necessary). Geisler, along with every Thomist I've read, asserts that the existential nature of the demonstration is undeniably acquired in the first premise and maintained until the conclusion, safeguarding the argument from the valid criticisms brought against the rationalistic cosmologists (Descartes, Leibniz, etc.) by Kant and others.
quote:
. . .so I'll just reference Paul (Rom. 1:20), who essentially denies that belief in God could be properly basic.
I recently read some comments on Romans 1:20 made by Caleb Miller of Messiah College, a proponent of reformed epistemology (RE). He claims that this passage is quite compatible with RE. He argues that classical apologists and others typically set up a false dichotomy when they relate this passage to justification. He said they ". . .improperly assume that if the acquisition of this knowledge is not by reasoning from the evidence, it must be a priori (not based in experience) and not by means of creation." He goes on to say, "God might. . .have created our faculties and the world in such a way that when we experience the starry heavens, the order of biological life, or the birth of a child, we are induced to think that this world is a world created by God." I don't know exactly what he means by "induce." Earlier in this same essay (Faith and Reason, from Reason for the Hope Within, edited by Michael Murray), he notes that, were it not for the noetic effects of sin, "the experience of everyone would make it obvious that there is such a person as God."
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams
Edited by - CalvinnHobbes on 02/17/2003 12:23:46 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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rossfadeinout
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| Posted 3/19/2003 3:03 AM (GMT -6) | | I know that this topic has been dead for a while, but I have been reading some Geisler here lately so I came back and read over this thread.
I was hoping that Alyosha would post a Geislerian defense of premise (2) and (3). I actually had checked out from my library Geisler's philosophy of religion, but I only had it for a couple of weeks and so I was only able to give a quick reading of the book. I would like to go back now and look at his defense of the cosmological argument. I do remember that Geisler stressed that he saw differences in Leibenez type cosmological arguments that made use of the principle of sufficient reason and Thomistic cosmological arguments that use the principle of existential causalty. He of course defends the latter and shows how the former types lead to difficulties.
As I read Geisler's version of the argument in Philosophy of Religion I was impressed with the rigor and clarity with which he defended his premises of the argument. If their is anyone who could perhaps attempt a defense of His 2nd and 3rd premises I would love to continue the discussion of his argument...
Ross
I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else. - C.S. Lewis | | Back to Top | | |
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CalvinnHobbes
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| Posted 3/21/2003 5:02 AM (GMT -6) | | quote:
I do remember that Geisler stressed that he saw differences in Leibenez type cosmological arguments that made use of the principle of sufficient reason and Thomistic cosmological arguments that use the principle of existential causalty. --ross
Kant rightly demonstrated how the Leibnizian and Wolffian rationalistic formulations of the cosmological argument inevitably fell back on the a priori in some manner, thereby eliminating their existential import. Geisler understands that his argument is only sound if it doesn't succumb to the same accusation. In his Philosophy of Religion he claims, "The restated cosmological argument does not begin with the a priori and at no point does it borrow from the purely conceptual to complete its task (p. 195)."
I think he definitely begins with the real. This seems clear through his particular test for truth which he calls "actual undeniability" (sometimes referred to as "existential undeniability" and implicit in the idea of "performative inconsistency").
What I would like to see is a CLEAR discussion of how the argument MAINTAINS this undeniable existential import all the way to the conclusion. In my reading of Geisler and various other Thomists, I haven't seen this explicitly defended AS SUCH. I'm sure it's probably tucked in there somewhere implicitly, but, hey, sometimes I need people to draw me a picture. Would he say that given a certain reality (an undeniable existence), the rest of the argument merely follows from the answer to the question, "Does logic apply to reality?"
"The longer I live, the more I read, the more patiently I think, and the more anxiously I inquire, the less I seem to know." ~President John Adams
Edited by - CalvinnHobbes on 03/24/2003 09:50:45 AM | | Back to Top | | |
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rossfadeinout
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Date Joined Oct 2002
Total Posts : 428
| Posted 3/21/2003 7:37 AM (GMT -6) | | CalvinHobbes,
Thanks for your response. I can't really add much, but I hope that someone else can. If I can remember correctly,(again just a basic reading of his Philosophy of Religion) his argument depends not on sufficient reason but existential causalty. Everything must be uncaused or caused. Essentially Geisler rests his argument on the principle "from nothing, nothing comes." Another principle is that an infinite regress of causes cannot exist. I guess the question is if these principles have undeniable existential import? Geisler says that they do. Even if a person says that something can come from nothing, metaphysically this is impossible. I think so too, but apparently there are those who would deny these premises.
Ross
I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else. - C.S. Lewis | | Back to Top | | |
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